Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

While investigating a heroin distribution network involving Triplett and Collins, investigators obtained court-authorized wiretaps on 12 phones, 18 U.S.C. 2510. In copying files containing the recordings onto optical discs and sealing those discs, the government made mistakes, failing to seal the Phone 5 recordings and those from nine days on Phone 9. The government searched Collins's stash house, and recovered heroin, cutting agents, packaging, and 10 firearms.After the government disclosed its Phone 9 mistake, Collins moved to suppress those recordings and all subsequent recordings which relied on the improperly sealed disks to obtain additional authorizations. The government committed not to use at trial any Phone 9 recordings from the nine-day unsealed period. The district court denied the motion, finding that no later wiretap applications relied on unsealed recordings.The government later discovered and disclosed the Phone 5 error. Collins filed another motion to suppress. The government agreed not to use any Phone 5 recordings at trial but opposed the suppression of recordings from other phones. The district court denied the motion, finding that the government had not yet failed to immediately seal Phone 5 when it applied for another wiretap, that the government’s explanation concerning mechanical error was satisfactory, and that the applications for additional wiretaps did not rely on the recordings. Collins pleaded guilty to conspiracy, firearm, and money laundering offenses.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government’s voluntary suppression of the unsealed recordings indicated that they were not central to the case, which supported the government’s explanation. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Suspecting that Troconis-Escovar was involved in the illegal drug business, the DEA searched his vehicle. Agents found $146,000 in cash, which they believed represented drug proceeds. DEA notified Troconis-Escovar that it intended to effect an administrative forfeiture of the funds (to declare them to be government property). Illegal drug proceeds are eligible for civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6), subject to the procedural safeguards of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 983. Troconis-Escovar’s attorney tried to contest the forfeiture, but filed the wrong form—a “petition for remission” rather than a “claim.” Only a claim may be used to challenge a proposed forfeiture. After the mistake was discovered, DEA gave Troconis-Escovar an extra 30 days to supplement his petition for remission. Troconis-Escovar did not do so and lost the money. He filed a Motion for the Return of Property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).The district court dismissed his lawsuit, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dismissal was correct, but not because jurisdiction was lacking. Troconis-Escovar does not explain why he should be able to obtain relief outside section 983 when Congress expressly conditioned relief from civil forfeiture on circumstances that do not apply to him. He did not explain his argument about the untimeliness or sufficiency of the DEA’s notice. View "Troconis-Escovar v. United States" on Justia Law

Benner was a 43-year-old high school coach. P.A., 17, hoped to use basketball to obtain a college scholarship. A sexual relationship between the two began after Benner resigned from his position but promised to continue coaching P.A.. Indiana law prohibits anyone who “has or had” a professional relationship with a person under the age of 18 to “use[] or exert[] the person’s professional relationship to engage in sexual intercourse” with that young person. Benner was convicted under Ind. Code 35-42-4-7(n). Indiana courts rejected constitutional challenges and affirmed Benner’s conviction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Benner’s petition for collateral relief. The statutory definition refers to the defendant’s “ability to exert undue influence over the child.” Benner claimed that a person of ordinary intelligence would not understand how he might use a professional relationship to engage in sexual conduct with a child when that professional relationship has ended. The court stated: It is easy to see how a coach can use that position to groom a youngster for sex, even if the coach plans that the sexual activity will follow the basketball season’s end. While Benner never had an official coaching relation with P.A. after the statutory amendment added the word “had,” Indiana did not charge Benner with conduct that preceded July 2013. No Supreme Court holding “clearly establish[es]” a constitutional problem with the present tense or words such as “use” or “exert”. Compared with some statutes that the Supreme Court has upheld, "35-42-4-7 is a model of precision.” View "Benner v. Carlton" on Justia Law

Alt, age 26, sent a message to a Grindr account operated by an undercover FBI Agent. The account included a picture of a youthful-looking boy and listed his age as 18. The boy responded to Alt after Alt sent two more messages. The two discussed meeting to engage in sexual activity and smoke marijuana. The boy stated that he was only 15 years old, but Alt continued with his plans to meet. Approximately 90 minutes after the boy first responded, FBI agents arrested Alt outside of what Alt believed to be the boy’s home. Alt had a tablet with the Grindr app and messages, an iPhone, and marijuana.Alt was convicted of attempted enticement of a minor and sentenced to the mandatory minimum, 120 months in prison, plus 15 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of Alt’s motion to suppress his statements to the FBI. Alt’s alleged invocation—“real quick, on the, uh, appointed lawyer, do you have a lawyer here?”—does not “indicat[e] a certain and present desire to consult with counsel.” The government did not commit a Batson violation in rejecting a Black juror who stated he had family that had suffered sexual abuse. Alt was not deprived of a fair trial because of the government’s statements about the standard of proof during closing arguments. The court also upheld a supervised release requirement that Alt participate in a sex offender treatment program/ View "United States v. Alt" on Justia Law

Smartt had a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old runaway (S.S.) and traveled around the country with her while working as a trucker. He took sexually explicit photos of her. When she got pregnant, he returned her to Alton, Illinois. The FBI investigated when S.S. sought medical care at an Alton hospital. Agents obtained a warrant to search Smartt’s East St. Louis home, where they seized electronic devices containing sexually explicit photos of S.S. DNA tests confirmed that Smartt is the father of her child. Smartt sent letters addressed to S.S. and others trying to influence her testimony. Smartt was convicted of producing child pornography and of witness tampering.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smartt’s claims that the judge erred in referring to S.S. as “the victim” before she testified. During her direct examination, S.S. identified 14 sexually explicit photos Smartt had taken of her. The prosecutor moved to admit only one. The judge asked whether the prosecutor planned to admit the other photos through another witness. The prosecutor said yes. The judge replied: “Just making sure.” The court rejected Smartt’s argument that the comment signaled pro-government bias to the jury. Smartt did not clear the high hurdle of plain-error review; “his arguments are frivolous.” View "United States v. Smartt" on Justia Law

Butler downloaded, distributed, and shared child pornography via internet chat rooms. After tracking him online, investigators obtained a search warrant and seized ten electronic devices from his home, which contained more than 10,000 images and videos of child pornography. Much of this material involved very young children—including babies—and some depicted sadistic and masochistic content. After several years of competency proceedings, Butler pleaded guilty to one count of transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1).The district judge imposed a prison sentence of 188 months, the bottom of the properly calculated 188-235 month Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Butler’s argument that a lower sentence was warranted “in light of his background and mitigating circumstances” as “frivolous on the merits.” The judge considered all of the relevant factors and explained how she weighed those factors. She was aware that Butler suffers from bipolar disorder, personality disorder, and several mood disorders, and was himself the victim of sexual, physical, and emotional abuse as a child. Weighing the need to protect the public, she noted the seriousness of the offense and that Butler has an adult conviction for boarding a school bus while impersonating a police officer and another for child abduction in which he again posed as a police officer and attempted to lure children into his car. View "United States v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 2000, Von Vader pled guilty to distributing methamphetamine in Wisconsin and was sentenced to 270 months’ imprisonment; the court concluded he was a “career offender.” He did not appeal. Von Vader later pled guilty to possessing heroin in prison (in Kansas) and received an additional ten-year sentence. In a 2017 petition (28 U.S.C. 2255) Von Vader argued that intervening Supreme Court precedent indicated that one or more of his previous convictions should not have been counted toward career offender classification. Von Vader’s petition was dismissed as untimely.He then unsuccessfully applied for compassionate release (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)), contending that the 2000 sentencing error was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. The Seventh Circuit first held that the fact that Von Vader’s 2000 sentence has expired did not render the application moot because relief would be possible, The court then rejected his claims on the merits. A challenge to a sentence must be resolved by direct appeal or motion under 2255, not by seeking compassionate release. Judicial decisions, even those announcing new law, cannot alone amount to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, which, under 3582(c)(1), is some new fact about an inmate’s health or family status, or an equivalent post-conviction development, not a purely legal contention for which statutes specify other avenues of relief. Even if the Sentencing Commission’s staff erred in distributing information concerning Van Vader’s right to file a 2255 motion, prisoners do not have a right to legal assistance in initiating collateral relief requests. View "United States v. Von Vader" on Justia Law

Cruz‐Velasco entered the U.S. without inspection in 1999. He has remained continuously present, raising his American‐born sons as a single father after the death of his partner. In 2014, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted of reckless driving, endangering safety, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, with his nine‐ and 11‐year‐old sons in the car. In subsequent removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). While in removal proceedings, Cruz‐Velasco was convicted again with DUI and sentenced to serve another 10 days in jail. Cruz‐Velasco stopped drinking after his 2016 arrest and completed a court‐ordered substance abuse program.The IJ held that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, having failed to establish that his sons would suffer hardship beyond what is predictable as a result of a parent’s removal and because his DUI convictions demonstrated a lack of good moral character. While his BIA appeal was pending, the Attorney General ruled that two or more DUI convictions in the relevant period raise a presumption that a noncitizen lacks good moral character, which cannot be overcome solely by showing rehabilitation. The BIA affirmed the removal order Amid the 2020 COVID‐19 pandemic, Cruz‐Velasco sought to reopen his application, submitting new evidence that he had been diagnosed with diabetes and that this condition increased his risk of dying from COVID‐19 in Mexico. The BIA denied Cruz‐Velasco’s motion, without specifically addressing arguments concerning his diabetes. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Cruz-Velasco v. Garland" on Justia Law

Williams was shot and killed in 2009, and two other men were injured. A Wisconsin jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson was the gunman. After exhausting state remedies, he appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial and postconviction counsel.The Seventh Circuit declined to reach the merits of Wilson’s claims, finding both procedurally defaulted. Wisconsin state courts disposed of Wilson’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on adequate and independent state procedural grounds. Wilson failed to present his ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim for one complete round of state court review. If a petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas review is precluded unless the prisoner demonstrates either “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,” or that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” The miscarriage of justice exception ‘applies only in the rare case where the petitioner can prove that he is actually innocent. Wilson does not allege cause and prejudice and did not make a sufficient showing of actual innocence. View "Wilson v. Cromwell" on Justia Law

Oregon and his wife divorced; his ex-wife retained custody over their two children. After his divorce, Oregon failed to file and pay taxes for three years. When he ultimately filed his late tax returns, he mistakenly claimed his two children as dependents. Because of this mistake, Oregon owed the IRS approximately $60,000 in back taxes and penalties. Looking for additional work, Oregon met a man who offered to introduce Oregon to a man who needed help laundering his proceeds from illegal drug sales. He told Oregon that he could keep 10 percent of everything he laundered. Oregon agreed, not knowing that the man was an undercover FBI agent. The agent gave him $100,000. After laundering over $85,000, Oregon had a change of heart and refused to launder any more money.Oregon pled guilty to one count of laundering money, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(3)(B), and was sentenced to 18 months in prison—six months below the Sentencing Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Oregon’s arguments that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to consider relevant mitigating factors, such as his need to support his family and his payment of restitution, and improperly relied on the need for general deterrence and to avoid sentence disparities. View "United States v. Oregon" on Justia Law