Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Behning, an Illinois prisoner, claims that prison guards violated his constitutional rights while responding to his altercation with a prison guard. After the incident Behning was taken to the emergency room, was charged with assaulting an officer, and was put in solitary confinement at another institution. While he was in solitary confinement, Behning allegedly timely mailed a grievance over the altercation, inadequate medical care, and procedural defects in his disciplinary hearing to the Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative Review Board. He sent a copy to his attorney, who also forwarded it to the Board. The Board returned it, asserting that only offenders themselves could submit grievances. Behning mailed another grievance, which the prison rejected as untimely.Behning filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted summary judgment based on Behning’s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. Behning, through his attorney, submitted most of his grievances to the appropriate administrative office, on time. Nothing in the regulation prohibits an offender from submitting a grievance through an attorney. Regardless of how Behning’s grievance arrived, it apprised the Board of the nature of his complaints. View "Behning v.Johnson" on Justia Law

Baker ran from police officers, took a loaded firearm out of his waistband, and threw it over a fence into a residential backyard. He pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court added two offense levels under Sentencing Guideline 3C1.2 for Baker’s having “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.”The Seventh Circuit upheld Baker’s 72-month sentence. Without the contested enhancement, his guideline range would have been 57-71 Months but the record indicates that the district judge would have imposed the same sentence even if the contested guideline levels had not been added. The judge focused on Baker’s 11 prior convictions, including three for being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition, and said, “I noted that you got 72 months before when you [committed this offense] a third time. You need to get at least 72 months this time given your history. I need to deter you from committing this crime again. I need to deter others not to do it again.” Any guideline error would have been harmless. The actual sentence was reasonable under the circumstances. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

In 2013. Yankey pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 846. The court sentenced Yankey to 115 months in prison followed by 48 months of supervised release. His prison term was 36 months below the bottom of the advisory guideline range. In 2020, Yankey began his term of supervised release. The probation office’s summary indicates that Yankey associated with people engaged in criminal activity and had a certain person at his home who his probation officer had specifically and repeatedly warned could not be there. During a 2022 probation visit, drugs and paraphernalia were found in Yankey’s home. Yankey admitted that in March 2022, he had used methamphetamine and cocaine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the revocation of Yankey’s supervised release and his sentence of 24 months in prison followed by 24 more months of supervision. The judge’s questions and comments indicate that he considered mitigation arguments about Yankey’s family support, employment history, and efforts toward sobriety. The judge considered the sentencing factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, and the need for treatment. The court’s decision that the prior below-guideline sentence justified a revocation sentence at the top of—but still within—the guideline range was not plainly unreasonable. View "United States v. Yankey" on Justia Law

Stapleton lured women into prostitution and exploited them using threats, force, and other forms of coercion. An anonymous tip led to his arrest. Indicted for sex-trafficking crimes, Stapleton claimed that the police had fabricated the anonymous tip and tampered with his cellphone. The court appointed a succession of defense attorneys, but Stapleton constantly disagreed with them regarding his police-misconduct claims. The judge denied his motion to suppress the evidence derived from the anonymous tip. Stapleton then insisted on representing himself. After making the inquiries required by Supreme Court precedent, the judge granted Stapleton’s motion and appointed a standby attorney. Before trial, Stapleton unsuccessfully moved for a court-funded expert to investigate his phone-tampering claim. Before opening statements, Stapleton announced that he would conditionally plead guilty, reserving the right to challenge the suppression ruling. The judge conducted a colloquy and accepted Stapleton’s pleas. Before sentencing, Stapleton unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his pleas. The judge sentenced him to life in prison.Stapleton did not appeal the suppression ruling but argued that his guilty pleas were invalid because he did not have counsel and was confused about his appellate rights and challenged the denial of his motion for a court-funded expert. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stapleton validly waived his right to counsel after two thorough colloquies; his guilty pleas were also knowing and voluntary. The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Stapleton’s request for a court-funded cellphone expert. View "United States v. Stapleton" on Justia Law

Balentine, who lived in Kokomo, pooled money from co-conspirators to buy illegal drugs from Riley in Georgia. The two arranged for couriers. Balentine stored the drugs in the homes of his associates, then distributed the drugs to O’Bannon, Jones, Myers, Reed, Owens, Jones, and Abbott. After two years of investigation, officers intercepted a courier and seized methamphetamine and cocaine she was transporting. Myers’s girlfriend drove to Georgia to pick up another shipment; she was also intercepted. To protect the operation, Riley and Balentine plotted to kill a suspected confidential informant. Officers stopped O’Bannon as he drove with the hitmen to the target’s home. Officers found several firearms in the hitmen’s hotel room. With a warrant, a DEA agent searched the conspirators’ residences, finding guns and drugs.Fourteen people were charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and individual counts related to drugs, firearms, murder for hire, and money. laundering. Nine defendants pleaded guilty. The others were convicted on most charges. Ten defendants appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, only vacating Jones’s sentence–the court erred in applying a firearm enhancement. The wiretap and search warrant affidavits were sufficient. The district court properly rejected a Batson challenge, focusing on the credibility of the government’s explanations for its strikes. The court upheld the admission of a DEA special agent’s “dual-role” testimony; a related jury instruction was “confusing” but did not merit reversal. Sufficient evidence supported all of the convictions. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Aguas received a tenant complaint about a marijuana odor and suspicious drug activity at Apartment 103. He called the police and stated that, on three occasions, he had smelled marijuana when passing by Apartment 103 and in the empty unit directly above it. When Aguas knocked on the door, Turner, opened the door. Investigator Quinley and Aguas swore to these facts in an affidavit. Warrants were issued. The first authorized a canine sniff outside Apartment 103. The second authorized a search of the apartment conditioned on a positive canine alert. A police dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers entered the apartment and found firearms, marijuana, heroin, and a scale with heroin residue.Turner was charged with possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense Turner unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause for the search. Turner stated he did not want to accept the government’s plea agreement. Turner’s counsel confirmed Turner wanted “an open plea.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. Turner entered an unconditional plea in open court and waived any objection to the suppression ruling. The court remanded for resentencing, the district court improperly relied on prior state convictions to enhance his statutory maximum sentence. Illinois defines cocaine in a matter “categorically broader than the federal definition.” View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Jerry robbed a cellphone store at gunpoint, The store determined that Jerry had taken 45 phones and watches, valued at $31,599.86. Jerry pleaded guilty to obstruction of commerce by robbery (Hobbs Act robbery), 18 U.S.C. 1951, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a robbery, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and possession of a firearm by a felon. Sections 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced Jerry to 264 months as a career offender.The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing based on its 2021 “Bridge” holding that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence.” On remand, the district court resentenced Jerry to 171 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court committed procedural error and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. A court does not commit procedural error simply by listening to purportedly incorrect arguments, nor did the court err in its calculation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines range. The district court’s remarks about the sentencing range were a “personal belief” that cannot reasonably be understood to indicate a personal grudge against Jerry. The court adequately explained that because the Guidelines range did not account for Jerry’s violent conduct and the impact on his victims, a sentence 16-27 percent above that range was appropriate. View "United States v. Jerry" on Justia Law

Barsanti was delinquent on $1.1 million of senior secured debt it owed to BMO Harris Bank. Barsanti’s owner, Kelly, hired attorney Filer and Gereg, a financing consultant. After negotiations with BMO failed, Filer introduced Gereg to BMO as a person interested in purchasing Barsanti’s debt. Filer created a new company, BWC, to purchase the loans. BWC purchased the loans from BMO for $575,000, paid primarily with Barsanti’s accounts receivable. Barsanti also owed $370,000 in delinquent benefit payments to the Union Trust Fund. Filer, Kelly, and Gereg used BWC’s senior lien to obtain a state court judgment against Barsanti that allowed them to transfer Barsanti’s assets beyond the reach of the Union Fund, using backdated documents to put confession-of-judgment clauses into the loan documents and incorrectly claiming that Barsanti owed BWC $1.58 million. Filer then obtained a court order transferring Barsanti’s assets to BWC, which then transferred the assets to Millwork, another new entity, which continued Barsanti’s business after the Illinois Secretary of State dissolved Barsanti for unpaid taxes. Gereg was Millwork's nominal owner in filings with the Indiana Secretary of State. Barsanti filed for bankruptcy. Filer instructed others not to produce certain documents to the bankruptcy trustee.After a jury convicted Filer of wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343., the district court granted his motions for a judgment of acquittal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. View "United States v. Filer" on Justia Law

Five days after Carter was booked into the Macon County Jail, he died of diabetic ketoacidosis. In the hours preceding his death, Carter exhibited symptoms commonly associated with diabetic ketoacidosis: confusion, lethargy, and labored breathing. He was denied timely medical care because the jail nurse thought he was faking his condition. She assured the corrections officers tasked with transferring Carter out of the medical unit that his vitals were within a normal range. Relying on the nurse’s medical judgment, the officers declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate Carter, believing that his failure to follow orders stemmed from deliberate refusal, not medically induced incapacity.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including claims against five corrections officers, the district court denied the officers’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding there to be a material factual dispute over whether they had reason to know that Carter was receiving inadequate medical care, creating a duty to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Established circuit precedent entitles a corrections officer to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. That is what the officers did here; they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "McGee v. Parsano" on Justia Law

Dorsey, an Illinois state prisoner, was emptying a bucket in the prison laundry when he felt a pop in his lower back and felt pain shoot down his leg. He asked to see a nurse and was told to “go lay down.” Dorsey took ibuprofen and lay down for two hours, but his pain worsened. He again, unsuccessfully, requested permission to seek medical care. The next morning, Dorsey could barely move. Six days later, a nurse concluded that he was exaggerating his symptoms. Dorsey alleges that instead of being treated for back pain, he was prescribed psychiatric medications without his knowledge or consent and was disciplined for refusing to take those medications.Dorsey sued. The district court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and determined that Dorsey had improperly joined unrelated claims. His complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against 12 defendants. Two claims alleged Eighth Amendment violations based on the poorly maintained washing machines and deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, his back injury. The third alleged a due process violation, that Dorsey was prescribed medications without his consent. After deeming three amended complaints unsatisfactory, the district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Dorsey’s claims met both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), so joinder was legally permissible and the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected his other claims. View "Dorsey v. Varga" on Justia Law