Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bennett contends that Division 10 of Cook County Jail does not satisfy the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act because it lacks grab bars and other fixtures that disabled inmates need in order to use showers and toilets safely. Bennett cited a regulation providing that as of 1988, "construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)(1). UFAS requires accessible toilets with grab bars nearby and accessible showers with mounted seats, Division 10 was constructed in 1992.In 2020, the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of class certification, stating that Bennett “proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply (and were violated, to detainees’ detriment).” On remand, the district court certified a class. More than two years later, the judge decertified the class, reasoning that some class members, although using aids such as wheelchairs, may not be disabled under the statutes.The Seventh Circuit again reversed. The 2020 decision identified an issue relevant to every Division 10 detainee. Class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) resolves the issue, not the whole case. Class members could receive the benefit of a declaratory judgment on the issue but would need to proceed in individual suits to seek damages; if the class loses, every detainee would be bound by issue preclusion. The application of UFAS can be determined class-wide while leaving to the future any particular inmate’s claim to relief. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law

Confidential informants participated in controlled purchases from Ramirez that tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine and fentanyl. Officers executed a traffic stop; inside a vehicle operated by Ramirez, they discovered 184.79 grams of a substance that tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl. Ramirez pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(B).The court sentenced him as a career offender (Sentencing Guideline 4B1.1) because he had prior Wisconsin felony convictions for possessing with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinol and for manufacturing or delivering cocaine. The court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. Ramirez asked the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its 2020 “Ruth” holding that an offense need not involve a substance controlled by the Controlled Substances Act to qualify as a predicate “controlled substance offense” under the career offender enhancement, and argued that the district court failed to consider adequately his primary mitigating sentencing argument.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to overrule Ruth. Until the conflicting circuit positions are reconciled, it is arguable "that undercounting career offenders works a substantial injury by failing to protect the public from recidivist drug criminals.” The district court addressed, explicitly and extensively, Ramirez’s arguments about his upbringing, including in reference to the factors and goals of sentencing. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Moore was sentenced to 120 months in federal prison for drug offenses. One factual foundation for the sentence was the district court’s finding that 55.6 grams of methamphetamine found in Moore’s home were 100% pure. Moore argued that a chemist’s affidavit that he submitted was “some evidence” sufficient to call the purity finding into question and that the government failed to support the finding on purity. Moore claimed that the district court erred by placing a burden on him to perform independent testing and by assuming, without supporting evidence, that the Drug Enforcement Administration’s methods for testing purity are reliable and were applied correctly in Moore’s case.The Seventh Circuit remanded for re-sentencing. Moore has a due process right to be sentenced based on reliable information. The district court’s assumption about the general reliability of DEA testing protocols was not supported by any evidence in the record. The “some evidence” standard is not a demanding one. The chemist’s affidavit here did not purport to resolve conclusively the accuracy of the DEA test results, but it raised a fair question about them. View "United St v. Mooatesre" on Justia Law

Atkins pleaded guilty to drug crimes in 2014. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction, he sued, claiming that the district and magistrate judges committed errors, the prosecutor did not identify herself when talking to Atkins during the case and did not respond to his compassionate release motion, the court reporter “invaded” his transcripts, and his court-appointed attorneys were ineffective. Atkins also sued the United States but did not state any allegations against it. The district judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous, stating that he would alternatively dismiss all claims under the Supreme Court’s “Heck” decision because Atkins’s criminal conviction is intact.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All the acts that Atkins attributes to the judges and prosecutor occurred in the criminal case, within their roles as judge or prosecutor, so they are absolutely immune from suit. The Supreme Court has not implied a Bivens-style constitutional claim against federal officials for transcription errors and an alternate remedy to cure transcript inaccuracies is available. The federal defense attorneys cannot be defendants in a Bivens suit because they did not act under color of law. The United States is not subject to suit in a Bivens action. The court affirmed that Atkins incurred a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) for filing a frivolous suit and another “strike” for filing this frivolous appeal. View "Atkins v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

As early as 2009, Dickey recruited followers for her church, “DTM,” grooming vulnerable victims and forcing them to disavow their families, live in the church, and work multiple full-time jobs. The victims gave Dickey all their wages, which she kept for herself. She required multiple victims to find employment at Hyatt hotels, where Dickey forced them to falsify reservation bookings, thereby fraudulently misdirecting kickbacks to Dickey’s own travel company. If someone disobeyed, Dickey threatened them with violence and required them to be homeless until she considered them redeemed. Her scheme netted $1.5 million, most of which came from DTM members. She spent over $1 million on personal expenses, such as travel, rental and vacation properties, and luxury hotels.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Dickey’s convictions for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589, upholding the district court’s denial of her fourth motion to continue her trial, rejection of a proposed jury instruction regarding religious liberty, and the imposition of restitution ordering her to pay for future mental health treatment for her victims. Dickey’s proposed instruction would have excused her criminal conduct based on her religious assertions and was not an accurate statement of the law. View "United States v. Dickey" on Justia Law

Roldan was convicted of criminal sexual assault. Roldan, then 21, allegedly had sex with an intoxicated 16-year-old noncitizen. The Illinois Appellate Court later reversed the conviction, concluding that the state did not prove that Roldan knew the victim was too intoxicated to consent.Drawing upon information he learned after trial, Roldan sued Cicero, Illinois police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers failed to disclose an agreement to help the victim apply for an immigration benefit—a U visa—in exchange for her testimony. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion on grounds that the Supreme Court’s 1972 “Giglio” decision and related cases clearly established the officers’ duty to disclose the agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that immunity is inappropriate at this early stage but for a different reason. Qualified immunity hinges on a fact that Roldan did not flesh out in his complaint: whether the police officers informed the prosecution about the U-visa agreement with the victim. If the police did, they cannot be liable, for the ultimate disclosure obligation would have rested with the prosecutors. View "Roldan v. Stroud" on Justia Law

Shaw’s pro se complaint alleged that three times in 2018 he needed to use the handicapped bathroom but was unable to because nondisabled prisoners occupied it. Shaw is confined to a wheelchair and incontinent. Each instance ended with Shaw defecating on himself. Shaw alerted prison staff, who asserted that they could not control what toilets other inmates used or reserve the handicapped stall solely for his use. Shaw’s complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and constitutional rights.Before allowing the defendants to be served and fulfilling the screening obligation imposed by 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), the district court addressed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and concluded that Shaw, while unquestionably a qualified person with a disability, failed to allege a denial of access to any prison service and instead complained only about an “inconvenience” of prison life. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Shaw’s allegations suffice to state claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act; he will still need to prove his claim and show deliberate indifference. View "Shaw v. Kemper" on Justia Law

After Gates split up with his girlfriend, B.F., he began violently threatening her, apparently vandalizing the house where she was staying. Gates was arrested nearby for disorderly conduct but released after a few hours. Gates called B.F. to say, “I posted bond, bitch. I’m on my way.” She saw Gates across the street. He fired five shots in her direction, then fled. After a third threatening call, a woman drove Gates past the house. He leaned out the window and shot at B.F. again. Police stopped the car and arrested Gates.Gates pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The PSR recounted Gates’s extensive 25-year criminal history. In the weeks before he shot at B.F., he was arrested for domestic violence and was charged with drunk driving. Despite Gates’s long criminal record, the Guidelines assigned him just one criminal history point; with a four-level increase for using a firearm in connection with a felony offense, his Guidelines range was 18–24 months. The district court determined that an upward variance was appropriate, citing several 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and a “pattern of escalating violence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 48-month sentence. Gates’s sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Gates" on Justia Law

Rodriguez was arrested for domestic violence. He gave the police his brother’s name and date of birth. He was convicted and sentenced to probation. Although the court had learned Rodriguez’s real name, the judgment of conviction listed “Ely M. Martinez” as an alias for Rodriguez and listed Martinez’s date of birth. Rodriguez failed to report for probation. An arrest warrant was issued with the same information as the judgment. Years later, police arrested Martinez for an unrelated offense and booked him in the Milwaukee County Jail on a Wednesday. The next day, the district attorney decided not to press charges but a warrant check revealed the outstanding warrant for Rodriguez. Although jail officials made efforts to positively identify the detainee, he was not released until Tuesday morning.Martinez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming due process violations. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Martinez’s detention was relatively brief and Martinez could not show that the defendants failed to investigate or ignored evidence of his innocence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the defendants could have improved aspects of their investigation, Martinez has not provided evidence showing that they were deliberately indifferent to his claims of mistaken identity. View "Martinez v. Santiago" on Justia Law

Walton supplied crack cocaine to the people who ran three Gary, Indiana drug houses. Gould dealt drugs out of a different drug house. Eventually, more than 20 people were indicted for the drug conspiracy. Many pled guilty. Walton and Gould were convicted of conspiracy to distribute powder and crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841, 846). A jury found them guilty of conspiring to distribute more than 280 grams of crack cocaine but did not find them culpable for any quantity of powder cocaine. The court sentenced Walton to 360 months and Gould to 168 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the district court erred by holding a trial in March 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to Walton's sentence. There was no evidence that the jurors rushed to verdict in order to go home.Harris, who pled guilty, argued that his written judgment contradicted the district judge’s oral pronouncement of his sentence. The court rejected that argument, noting that it was not barred by Harris’s appeal waiver. An argument that a written judgment conflicts with a sentencing judge’s oral pronouncement is not a challenge to the sentence—it is a request for imposition of the actual sentence the judge intended. View "United States v. Gould" on Justia Law