Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

S.B., age 13, lived with his mother in Michigan and visited relatives in Indiana. S.B.’s uncle, Hinkle, isolated and molested S.B. during two visits. By the time he was 17, S.B. used opiates and marijuana regularly and had experimented with heroin. During a family meeting to address his drug use, S.B. admitted his drug use and that Hinkle had molested him.Hinkle was charged with child molesting, sexual misconduct with a minor, and being a repeat sexual offender. Hinkle’s counsel opposed a motion to exclude evidence of S.B.’s drug use, arguing the evidence was relevant to show S.B.’s motive to fabricate allegations. The court ruled that it would not allow evidence of S.B.’s drug use except to show that it interfered with his ability to recall relevant events. At trial, Hinkle’s counsel unsuccessfully argued (outside the jury’s presence) that S.B. had falsely accused Hinkle to avoid facing consequences when his family confronted him for using narcotics. The jury heard evidence that S.B. “ha[d] a habit of playing family members against each other,” and was “really good at lying.” S.B. testified that he had convictions for credit card fraud, auto theft, and retail fraud.Hinkle was convicted and sentenced to 42 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not unreasonably apply federal constitutional law in upholding the exclusion of evidence of S.B.’s drug use. View "Hinkle v. Neal" on Justia Law

In 2005 Newbern pleaded guilty to possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. District judge Herndon found that Newbern had prior convictions for crimes of violence, including reckless discharge of a firearm, qualifying him as a career offender, and had distributed at least 50 grams of crack cocaine. With an advisory range of 262–327 months’ imprisonment, he sentenced Newbern to 300 months, explaining that he would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the career-offender determination.The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that reckless discharge of a firearm is not a crime of violence. Judge Herndon twice denied Newbern relief, reiterating that he would have sentenced Newbern to 25 years regardless of his career-offender status. Newbern later sought resentencing under the First Step Act; he met the criteria for relief: his sentence was based on the pre–Fair Sentencing Act crack-to-powder ratio, he committed his crime before August 2, 2010, his sentence had not been previously reduced under the First Step Act, and a previous motion for a sentence reduction had not been denied on the merits. Newbern reiterated that reckless discharge of a firearm no longer qualifies as a crime of violence and underscored his prison record. Judge Yandle denied Newbern’s motion, noting that Newbern’s guidelines range remained the same and adopting Herndon’s statements.The Seventh Circuit vacated, citing the 2022 Supreme Court holding (“Concepcion”) that “when deciding a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obligation to explain their decisions and demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments.” The district court did not consider Newbern’s good-conduct argument. View "United States v. Newbern" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lomax was convicted of heroin distribution and firearm offenses. Lomax’s prior felony convictions for drug and violent offenses subjected him to increased penalties; the district court sentenced Lomax to 400 months of imprisonment. On remand in 2017, the district court again sentenced Lomax to 400 months of imprisonment. In 2019, Lomax moved, pro se, to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging his counsel performed deficiently during his 2017 resentencing by failing to investigate whether Lomax’s prior Indiana cocaine conviction constituted a “felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. 841. The district court construed Lomax’s motion as arguing that he was actually innocent of the section 841 sentencing enhancement and agreed that he was. Lomax was resentenced in 2021, without application of the section 841 sentencing enhancement, to a term of 300 months of imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a section 2255 evidentiary hearing regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. Lomax’s prior attempted murder conviction constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. View "United States v. Lomax" on Justia Law

In March 2019, Lloyd robbed a Credit Union and led police on a high-speed chase, Lloyd was charged with credit union robbery and transporting stolen money interstate. On July 11, 2019, he pleaded not guilty. After a plea of not guilty is entered, the Speedy Trial Act requires that the trial begins within 70 days of the filing of the indictment or the arraignment, 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1), with exceptions including for delay resulting from mental competency examinations The court granted Lloyd two continuances. Trial was set for December 30, but on November 19, Lloyd’s attorney sought a competency evaluation. The court entered an order on November 22. Lloyd did not arrive at the site of his examination until February 27, 2020. The pandemic struck. Lloyd’s evaluation was completed on May 8, 2020; the psychologist’s report was finalized on May 26. Lloyd was returned to jail on July 1, 2020. On September 23, the court found Lloyd competent. The government conceded that over 70 non-excludable days elapsed. The court dismissed the case without prejudice.The government promptly brought the same charges again. Lloyd pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion. The facts and circumstances leading to dismissal weighed in favor of dismissal without prejudice. The discussions between counsel and the court at the hearing demonstrate the court’s sufficient consideration and application of all the factors within the Act. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Meyers was one of seven men convicted of the 1989 gang-related murders of Williams and Kaufman in Chicago. In 1995, after Meyers’ conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction, arguing that his trial counsel, Nichols, was ineffective for failing to investigate the scene of the shooting and to establish that a witness, Wilson, would not have been able to see the shooters from his second-floor vantage point. Pointing to Wilson’s post-trial recantation, Meyers added that he was wrongfully convicted based on Wilson’s perjured trial testimony and the prosecution’s subornation to commit perjury. Meyers also argued that his trial counsel, Nichols, was ineffective in failing to interview and present the alibi testimony of Parker. The Illinois appellate court rejected his claims.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition. The Illinois Appellate Court did not unreasonably apply “Strickland” in rejecting his claim that Nichols was ineffective for failing to interview and present Parker’s alibi testimony. The risk that the defense would have taken by pursuing that alibi, which contradicted statements made by Nichols after his arrest, is obvious. The state court reasonably determined that his conviction was not based on the knowing use of perjured testimony. View "Meyers v. Gomez" on Justia Law

On June 1, 2020, the defendants surrounded an ATM located in a Chicago grocery store parking lot. The ATM included a surveillance video camera that captured video, but not audio. The footage shows Foy (in a neon construction vest) and his co‐defendants surrounding the ATM at approximately 7:10 PM. For eight minutes, the group used various tools, including a hammer, crowbar, and rod, trying to break open the ATM. They damaged its outside cover but ultimately failed to gain access to the cash inside. At 7:18 PM, police arrived on the scene and arrested all three. The vandalized ATM held over $190,000 in cash. Foy was charged under 18 U.S.C. 371, for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, specifically bank theft (18 U.S.C. 2113(b)), “exceeding $1,000 in value.” The bank that owned the ATM was FDIC-insured.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Foy’s conviction and sentence, rejecting arguments that the government was required to show evidence of intent to steal more than $1,000, rather than just intent to steal; that the government fell short of establishing a conspiracy; and that the district court impermissibly considered the civil unrest in the wake of George Floyd’s death as an aggravating factor in sentencing Foy. The court noted the video evidence of the defendants’ cooperative efforts. View "United States v. Foy" on Justia Law

A person arrested in Chicago can take some property into jail but must surrender other property, including cell phones. The detainee has 30 days to reclaim the property in person (if released) or by a designated friend or relative. Property remaining in the city’s hands after 30 days is sold or thrown away. In 2021, the Seventh Circuit (Conyers), rejected several constitutional challenges to that policy. Kelley-Lomax remained in custody for more than 30 days and did not have anyone retrieve his property. The city disposed of a cell phone and a wallet, including a debit card and library card, that the police had seized.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. The disposition of the seized property is governed by the Due Process Clause. Chicago provides detainees with notice and an opportunity to reclaim their property. Rejecting a substantive due process argument, the court reasoned that property is a fundamental right but property can be abandoned. Chicago draws the abandonment line at 30 days. Physical items seized from arrested persons make claims on limited space, and for many detainees, the costs of arranging a sale to free up space would exceed the value of the items in inventory. View "Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Wisconsin inmates undergo regular strip searches. One guard performs the search; another observes. West is a Muslim. Strip searches by guards of the opposite sex violate the tenets of his faith. He was required to submit to a strip search by a guard who is a transgender man—a woman who identifies as a man. West objected but was refused an accommodation. West unsuccessfully requested an exemption from future cross-sex strip searches. The warden stated that he would be disciplined if he objects again. West sought an injunction under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, and alleged Fourth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the constitutional claim; circuit precedent held that a prisoner has no Fourth Amendment interest against visual inspections of his body. Rejecting the RLUIPA claim, the judge concluded that West had not shown a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that cross-sex strip searches are permissible as the prison’s only means to avoid unlawfully discriminating against transgender employees.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Intervening precedent revives the Fourth Amendment claim. West is entitled to judgment on the RLUIPA claim. His objection to cross-sex strip searches is religious in nature and sincere. The prison has substantially burdened his religious exercise by requiring him to either submit, in violation of his faith, or face discipline. The burden is unjustified under RLUIPA’s strict-scrutiny standard: providing an exemption will not violate the rights of transgender prison employees under Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. View "West v. Radtke" on Justia Law

Mwangangi provided roadside assistance around Indianapolis. He set out to jumpstart a car in his used Crown Victoria and activated clear strobe lights on the outside of his car. A driver that Mwangangi passed on the highway twice called 911 to report him as a police impersonator. Shortly after Mwangangi helped the stranded motorist, he found himself at a gas station surrounded by seven police officers. Mwangangi was ordered from his car, handcuffed, patted down twice, and arrested for police impersonation—charges that were not dropped until two years later, when everyone realized he had been telling the truth about his roadside assistance job.The district court entered summary judgment for Mwangangi on many of his Fourth Amendment-based claims, denying some of the police officers the protection of qualified immunity. The court found for the city and officers on other claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Officer Nielsen had a “particularized and objective basis” to justify an investigatory Terry stop in the gas station and had the authority to ask Mwangangi to step out of his car to answer questions. Because of the context of the potential crime and surrounding circumstances, Officer Root’s decision to pat Mwangangi down did not amount to a constitutional violation. Officer Noland waived any challenge to the determination that his second pat down violated Mwangangi’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court stated that claims against officers for “bystander liability” required further factual development. View "Mwangangi v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Officer Crowder observed an SUV outside a closed business. Pace exited that vehicle. sta5int that he was lost and needed directions to Johns's house. Crowder knew of Johns's past methamphetamine use and had received complaints from Johns’s neighbors about traffic at her home. Crowder activated his emergency lights, and parked directly behind Pace’s SUV; nothing obstructed Pace’s ability to drive away. Shining his flashlight inside the SUV, Crowder did not see weapons or contraband but did see multiple musical instrument cases. Pace walked around his SUV and attempted to get one of the instruments. Pace’s behavior struck Crowder as odd and overly friendly, yet nervous. Dispatch confirmed that Pace’s license was clear and that he had no outstanding warrants but he had a history of drug possession including methamphetamine, narcotic instruments, and drug paraphernalia. Pace denied that he had weapons but declined to consent to a vehicle search. Crowder explained that Pace was not under arrest, but that he was going to place him in restraints during a canine sniff. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs in the SUV. Crowder searched the SUV and found methamphetamine and cannabis. Pace unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that ruling, a 60-month sentence, and a finding that Pace was not eligible for relief from the five-year statutory minimum sentence under the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). The search was based on reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Pace" on Justia Law