Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Nine Illinois energy consumers sued their electricity provider, ComEd, and its parent, Exelon, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated for damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging injury from increased electricity rates. These rates increased, they allege, because ComEd bribed former Illinois Speaker of the House Michael Madigan to shepherd three bills through the state’s legislature: the Energy Infrastructure and Modernization Act of 2011 (EIMA); 2013 amendments to that legislation; and the Future Energy Jobs Act of 2016. Although Illinois law still required public utilities to file rates with the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC), EIMA implemented statutorily prescribed, performance-based rate increases that limited ICC discretion in reviewing rates and authorized at least $2.6 billion in ComEd spending on smart meters and smart grid infrastructure, costs that were required to be passed on to customers. In 2016, FEJA provided $2.35 billion in funding for nuclear power plants operated, paid for through a new fee for utility customers, and allowed ComEd to charge ratepayers for all energy efficiency programs and for some expenses relating to employee incentive compensation, pensions, and other post-employment benefits.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Paying a state’s required filed utility rate is not a cognizable injury for a RICO damages claim. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth Edison Co." on Justia Law

A man grabbed Flowers’s girlfriend in a bar. After a verbal altercation, the bar’s owner asked both men to leave. Flowers protested but left the bar accompanied by a bouncer and Davis, an off-duty police officer employed as a security guard. While Flowers waited in the parking lot for his girlfriend, he and Davis talked. Officer Renfro, another off-duty Springfield police officer employed by the bar, without warning or provocation, grabbed Flowers and slammed him to the pavement face first, knocking out Flowers’ tooth. Renfro then placed Flowers under arrest. Flowers had not verbally or physically threatened the officers and was not showing any indication that he would resist arrest. The only conduct that Renfro claims justified slamming Flowers to the ground was that Flowers questioned the command to leave the bar and turned around to face Davis within one to two feet of him. Flowers disputes that he ever turned to face Davis.Flowers sued the city, Renfro, and Davis under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, which asserted that the officers did not violate Flowers’ civil rights and were entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court held that there are genuine issues of disputed fact, material to Flowers’ claim against Renfro; the reasonableness of that use of force would inform a decision on qualified immunity. View "Flowers v. Renfro" on Justia Law

Hernandez coerced hundreds of victims—mostly minors—to produce sexually explicit images and videos of themselves, then extorted the victims. He often posted the results online or sent them to the victims’ friends and families. He threatened to murder, rape, kidnap, and injure his victims and their friends and family and encouraged some victims to kill themselves. Hernandez used at least 169 different accounts under countless aliases. He used the Tor Network to make his geographic location virtually impossible to trace. A minor victim allowed officers to use the victim’s online identity to send a video to Hernandez containing embedded code that revealed his IP address.Hernandez pled guilty, without an agreement, to 41 counts: production of child pornography; coercion and enticement of minors; distribution and receipt of child pornography; threatening to use explosive devices; extortion; threats to kill, kidnap, and injure other persons; witness tampering; obstruction of justice; and retaliation. A PSR disclosed that the government would seek $10,000 in restitution each for eight minor victims, mandatory under 18 U.S.C. 2259(b)(2)(B), (c)(3). Hernandez objected to an offense-level enhancement but said nothing about restitution.Hernandez was sentenced to 75 years’ imprisonment plus payment of $10,000 for each of 11 victims—three were added in an amended judgment. Hernandez argued that the government did not prove his victims’ losses or, alternatively that the judgment was not properly amended. The Seventh Circuit affirmed without reaching the merits. Hernandez failed to raise the issues with the district court; the omission was part of Hernandez’s sentencing strategy, so he waived the arguments. View "United States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Williams, an inmate, suffers from chronic tendinitis and has been prescribed pain medication. After injuring his finger, Williams was seen by a doctor. Williams’s finger did not require further treatment, but in an apparent error, Williams was removed from his pain medication. The next day Williams filed a “Request for Health Care” form, indicating that he was still experiencing pain and was no longer receiving his medication. Williams was seen by a nurse, who allegedly caused him further knee pain by making him do exercises while shackled. His medication was not reinstated and Williams continued to experience pain in his knee. As required by state grievance policies, Williams tried to informally resolve his complaints but Indiana’s policy requires that formal grievances be filed within 10 business days of the incident. Williams did not meet that deadline, believing that prison officials needed to respond to his informal grievance attempts before he could file a formal grievance. After Williams received a response he filed a formal grievance, but it was untimely.In Williams's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust all available remedies in the prison’s administrative-review system before filing suit in federal court. Williams did not do so and his argument that he had good cause for his failure to timely file a formal grievance is unexhausted and waived. View "Williams v. Rajoli" on Justia Law

Galvan, a citizen of Honduras, borrowed a van from his employer, Gomez. He drove to Gomez’s home to return the vehicle and shared a meal with Gomez's family. For unknown reasons, Galvan eventually pulled out a handgun, fired several shots, took the keys from Gomez, and drove away in the van. Gomez called the police. Less than two hours later, police received a report of a man with a gun at an apartment complex. Galvan had threatened men in the complex while brandishing a handgun. Police found Galvan leaning on Gomez’s van, arrested Galvan, and found a handgun in the driver’s seat. Galvan pled guilty to possessing that handgun as an alien unlawfully in the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). A state court charge for armed robbery of Gomez’s van was dismissed.The district court found that the sentencing guideline for robbery governed Galvan’s firearm-possession offense because he had used the same handgun when he robbed Gomez, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(a) & 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) and that Galvan fired the handgun in connection with the robbery, increasing his offense level by seven. Galvan’s sentencing range was 63-78 months in prison. The district court sentenced Galvan to 70 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ample evidence supported the court’s finding that the same gun was involved in both episodes. A preponderance of the evidence established that Galvan discharged a firearm “during” the robbery under Indiana law. View "United States v. Galvan" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted Muhammad of being a felon in possession of a firearm and stealing firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer. Muhammad was sentenced as an armed career criminal and ordered to pay $10,421.66 in restitution to the firearms dealer and its insurer under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.On collateral review, the district court vacated Muhammad’s sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2241, finding that he was improperly sentenced as an armed career criminal. Muhammad was resentenced to time served plus supervised release. Relying on the restitution amount in the revised PSR and the parties’ statements that Muhammad had not made any restitution payments, the court also ordered Muhammad to pay $10,421.66 in restitution. While an appeal was pending, the parties learned that Muhammad paid $433.32 toward his restitution judgment while incarcerated. The district court updated the record on appeal to reflect that Muhammad now owes $7,993.63 in restitution. The $2,228.03 reduction included $433.32 Muhammad paid, $200 his codefendant paid, and $1,794.71 from a Treasury Department offset. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court declined to correct any error, given that Muhammad concedes that he originally owed $10,421.66 in restitution and that there is no disagreement that he should receive credit for his payments. View "United States v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

Rogers, with a friend, A.W., went to a Rural King store where the video surveillance system recorded Rogers as he handled firearms, including a Mossberg shotgun. Minutes later, A.W. provided her ID, filled out Form 4473, and paid for the shotgun. A week later, Rogers and A.W. went to another Rural King: Rogers approached the counter alone and inspected several firearms, including a Sig Sauer rifle. A.W. later purchased the rifle. Law enforcement received a tip that Rogers and A.W. were purchasing firearms with fraudulently-obtained gift cards. Officers reviewed the Rural King security footage and concluded that A.W. was purchasing the firearms for Rogers. During an interview, A.W. denied knowing the location of the Sig Sauer. Rogers, interviewed by the same officer, stated that the rifle was under the couch in A.W.’s home. Rogers was charged with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.At trial, it became evident that two Mossberg shotguns were involved, one that Rogers handled, and another retrieved by the manager from storage and sold to A.W. The defense argued impossible to ascertain whether the grand jury intended to accuse Rogers of possessing the gun that he had handled at the counter or the gun purchased by A.W. The prosecution proceeded on a theory of joint possession of the purchased Mossberg. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 70-month sentence. View "United States v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Dunn was convicted in Indiana state court for the Torres murder. The case against Dunn was based largely on the testimony of two pathologists. In a state court post-conviction proceeding, Dunn argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with any forensic pathologist. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a state court post-conviction hearing, a board-certified forensic pathologist, Dr. Sozio, testified that the autopsy was substandard, missed a great deal, and that Torres’s injuries were more consistent with a fall than with being bludgeoned by a blunt object. If the defense had presented Sozio's testimony, the jury would have been presented with conflicting expert testimony regarding whether the fall alone caused the injuries. The state conceded that blood evidence effectively ruled out the use of a bat; no other weapon was found. Two eyewitnesses testified consistently that Torres was not beaten after his fall. Sozio's testimony was critical in this case to create reasonable doubt because it countered the state's scientific evidence and gave the jury reason to doubt that Torres was beaten. Dunn demonstrated prejudice under Strickland. View "Dunn v. Neal" on Justia Law

Police arrested Davis, a convicted felon, on a state warrant for three counts of aggravated battery by discharge of a firearm, just outside of his residence. While being arrested, Davis stated that there were children in the house. Officers entered the house to conduct a limited sweep of areas where a person could be hiding, finding an eight-year-old child and a 19-year-old. An officer observed a rifle, upright in plain view, in an open bedroom closet. About 45 minutes later, after the sweep had concluded, Antionette, a woman with whom Davis was living and the owner of the house, arrived and gave the officers oral and written consent to search the home, acknowledging that she had been advised of her rights.Davis, charged with illegally possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the rifle on the basis that no valid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry or the later search. The district court found that three separate exceptions applied: a protective sweep following Davis’s arrest, exigent circumstances because a child was in the home, and Antoinette's voluntary consent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Davis did not dispute that Antoinette’s consent was voluntary and not tainted by the initial entry into the house. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence Defendant received for being a felon in possession of a firearm, holding that any error in the district court's methodology in arriving at the sentence was harmless.Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed a sentence of eighty-seven months in prison, which was less than the statute maximum of 120 months requested by the government. On appeal, Defendant challenged the procedures used by the district court in arriving at his sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) any error in the district court's methodology was harmless; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of error. View "United States v. Settles" on Justia Law