Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Stringer and a confidential informant (Hinkle) appeared before a state court judge and obtained a warrant. Following the ensuing search, Sanford was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and possession of a firearm as a felon, 922(g)(1). Sanford sought to challenge the warranted search and sought a “Franks” hearing. Sanford presented Hinkle’s Declaration that officers told her that if she did not cooperate they would take away her one-year-old daughter, that she would not be charged with any new offenses, that an outstanding warrant for failure to appear in a misdemeanor case would be “taken care of,” and that she should state that she had not been promised anything for testifying. . The government informed the court that FBI agents had discussed Hinkle’s Declaration with her and that she told them she did not prepare the Declaration and that much of it was false or essentially untrue.After a "pre-Franks" hearing, the district court upheld the search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Warrant-issuing judges are aware that confidential informants are likely to have criminal histories; Hinkle admitted to criminal conduct. The district court did not err in determining that a Franks hearing was not necessary based solely on the failure to discuss Hinkle’s “unremarkable” criminal history. View "United States v. Sanford" on Justia Law

While imprisoned in Indiana, Lauderdale-El petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the loss of good-time credits resulting from a prison disciplinary conviction. His petition asserts that prison officials violated his due process rights in applying an Indiana Department of Correction policy rescinding previously restored good-time credits.The district court concluded that Lauderdale-El could challenge the restoration policy in state court, so it dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A). Lauderdale-El had exhausted administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that dismissal of a habeas corpus petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is a final and appealable judgment. Indiana law permits state-court review of Lauderdale-El’s claims. Because Lauderdale-El is still on parole, the court concluded that the matter was not moot. View "Lauderdale-El v. Indiana Parole Board" on Justia Law

Whyte was convicted of second-degree intentional homicide for killing his girlfriend, Weiland, during a 2006 altercation. In his habeas petition, Whyte argued his constitutional rights were violated when he was required to wear a stun belt in front of the jury. The parties dispute whether the jury ever saw the stun belt or understood the nature of the device but when Whyte took the stand to testify, he declined to reenact the altercation with Weiland for fear the jury would see the device and draw negative inferences. Whyte also claims the belt had a chilling effect on his testimony, rendering his account of the incident “stilted” and “emotionless,” which the state underscored in its closing argument. Whyte’s trial counsel did not object to the stun belt’s use. Whyte also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Whyte’s claims are procedurally defaulted under adequate and independent state grounds, so federal review is foreclosed. Whyte failed to challenge the stun belt or the effectiveness of his trial counsel, either on direct appeal or in a state court post-conviction motion. Whyte offered no external impediment that prevented him from complying with the state court pleading standards. View "Whyte v. Winkleski" on Justia Law

Police believed one man committed 10 armed robberies in the Madison, Wisconsin area in late 2018. On November 4, 2018, the suspect, subsequently identified as Edwards, robbed Neil’s Liquor in Middleton. Security camera footage enabled officers to obtain a warrant for a GPS tracking device on Edwards’s vehicle. After another armed robbery and a high-speed chase, police obtained a warrant, searched the vehicle, and recovered a loaded handgun, cash, drugs, gloves, and a ski mask. Police later re-entered the vehicle, without a warrant, to retrieve the property of a witness (Wood)s who had been in the car with Edwards, Edwards was apprehended weeks later.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, being a felon in possession of a firearm, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The court upheld the denial of Edwards’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking device. Security camera footage supported the description in the affidavit. All five “Biggers” factors support the reliability of Woods's photo identification of Edwards; the process did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Rejecting an argument concerning the unwarranted search of his vehicle, the court stated Edwards had no expectation of privacy in the abandoned vehicle. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

A fire consumed Jones’s house in 2013. York, a county sheriff’s investigator, initially blamed an electrical malfunction. When he learned that Jones’s friend, Onopa, claimed to have a recording of Jones admitting to arson, he reopened the investigation. York interviewed several witnesses, analyzed Jones’s telephone records, and secured Onopa’s recording, then referred the matter to the district attorney, After her conviction, Jones obtained new counsel and argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Onopa’s recording as created for the purpose of extortion. Before the court ruled on the matter, the district attorney dropped all charges against Jones. Jones then sued York and Adams County under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She contended that York violated her due process rights by withholding exculpatory evidence, fabricating inculpatory evidence, testifying falsely at trial, and prosecuting her without probable cause.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find for Jones on any of her claims. Jones’s cell phone records were presented and discussed by both sides at trial. The jury heard testimony from York, Jones, and Onopa. Questioning by both sides exposed the discrepancies in each witness’s version of events. Jones failed to show a genuine dispute of fact as to whether York fabricated evidence. View "Jones v. York" on Justia Law

Berkman killed his drug supplier. An Indiana jury acquitted Berkman on a first-degree murder charge, but could not reach a verdict related to felony murder. At a second trial, a key prosecution witness, Timmerman, was declared unavailable due to illness; her testimony from the first trial was read into the record. Berkman appealed his subsequent conviction, challenging the admission of Timmerman’s testimony. The Court of Appeals of Indiana determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence given that Timmerman was unavailable and that Berkman had had an opportunity to cross-examine her at the first trial. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.Berkman filed a pro se federal habeas petition in which he maintained that the introduction of Timmerman’s testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of relief. The Court of Appeals of Indiana did not unreasonably apply the Supreme Court’s “Crawford” decision. Timmerman initially was unavailable because she was hospitalized following a sudden illness. The trial court postponed the trial for several days; there is no Supreme Court precedent that required the court to reevaluate Timmerman’s condition after the early-lunch recess to determine whether her condition had improved so that she was able to testify. View "Berkman v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Inmates who were housed by three Illinois Department of Corrections centers between April-July 2014, alleged that the prison-wide shakedowns conducted violated their constitutional and statutory rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The shakedowns involved uniformed tactical teams called “Orange Crush” that operated according to a uniform plan, which involved a loud entry, strip searches, handcuffing, and other procedures involving allegedly humiliating physical contact. The inmates allege that the planning and execution of the shakedowns violated the Eighth Amendment because it was designed to inflict pain and humiliation.The Seventh Circuit affirmed class certification. The plaintiffs satisfied the “commonality” requirement because they alleged that the defendants acted pursuant to a common policy and implemented the same or similar procedures at each institution and that the challenge was to the constitutionality of that common plan as enacted. The claims require resolution of key common factual and legal questions, specifically: “whether Defendants developed and carried out a uniform policy and practice that had the effect of depriving the putative class members of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; whether the shakedowns were executed in the manner Defendants contend or as Plaintiffs claim; whether Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the putative class members of their constitutional rights through the shakedowns; and whether the Defendants knew of, approved, facilitated and/or turned a blind eye to the alleged unconstitutional shakedowns.” Those questions do not require individualized consideration. View "Ross v. Gossett" on Justia Law

Lumpkin was convicted of various drug crimes. Wisconsin courts denied his appeal and post-conviction petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his federal habeas corpus petition, in which Lumpkin argued ineffective assistance of counsel. The Wisconsin court’s determination that he suffered no prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s deficient performance in cross-examining a key witness was not an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, Even if Lumpkin’s trial counsel had impeached the witness so thoroughly that she could be deemed completely unreliable and her testimony could be set aside entirely, there existed overwhelming other evidence incriminating Lumpkin. During his arrest, officers uncovered from Lumpkin’s pockets three different types of drugs, separated into nearly thirty individual plastic bags plus more than $1100 in cash, all in small bills. The testimony of another witness and text messages provided overwhelming evidence proving that Lumpkin possessed drugs with an intent to deliver them. View "Lumpkin v. Hermans" on Justia Law

Jennings, who was not a medical professional, ran Results Weight Loss Clinic in Lombard, Illinois. Jennings paid Mikaitis, who was working full‐time for a hospital in Lockport, Illinois cash to secure a Drug Enforcement Agency registration number for the clinic and to review patient charts. Over the next two years, Jennings ordered over 530,000 diet pills (controlled substances) for over $84,000 using Mikaitis’s credit card and DEA number. Mikaitis appeared at Results weekly to get $1,750 cash and review four to eight charts. Results also gave drugs—in person and by mail— to many patients whose charts he never reviewed. A nurse practitioner who worked at the clinic later testified she noticed almost immediately that Jennings was unlawfully distributing drugs. Jennings paid Mikaitis about $98,000 cash, in addition to reimbursement for drug costs.Mikaitis was tried on 17 counts. He denied knowing about illegal activity. The district judge issued a deliberate avoidance (ostrich) instruction. Convicted, Mikaitis was sentenced to 30 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ample evidence demonstrated that Mikaitis subjectively believed that there was a high probability he was participating in criminal activity and that he took specific, deliberate actions to avoid learning that fact. Mikaitis was a medical professional with corresponding duties. The jury was free to conclude the red flags were obvious to him. View "United States v. Mikaitis" on Justia Law

In 2001, Williams was convicted of conspiring to sell more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; distributing more than 50 grams of crack, 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); and distributing more than five grams of crack, 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Sentenced to life imprisonment for Counts 1 and 2 and the statutory maximum 40-year term for Count 3, Williams sought a reduced sentence three times based on retroactive guidelines amendments, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). By 2014, Williams’s guidelines range had dropped to 235 from 293 months. The judge lowered his sentence to 360 months.Williams filed his fourth sentence-reduction motion under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the Fair Sentencing Act's lower statutory penalties for crack offenses. The new ranges for Counts 1 and 2 were 60-480 months; Count 3 carried a maximum sentence of 240 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), (b)(1)(C) (2021). Judge Moody acknowledged Williams’s youth at the time of the offense, lack of significant criminal history, and near-perfect disciplinary record, but relied on the “reprehensibility of the crimes” without calculating new statutory ranges. He apparently assumed that the 2014 sentence conformed with new statutory maximums.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The procedural requirements—calculating new penalties before deciding on the motion—apply to all First Step Act motions. The statutory ranges for all of Williams’s convictions changed between 2014 and the 2019 motion; the judge misstated the statutory penalty for Count 3. Williams was deprived of the benefit of any anchoring effect that the new ranges could have had on Judge Moody’s decision, which affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the proceeding. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law