Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Dixon pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment, raising his base‐offense level by six levels under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because he had a previous conviction for a “crime of violence,” an Iowa conviction for intimidation with a dangerous weapon. According to the charging document in the Iowa court, Dixon had shot at a vehicle with multiple occupants and continued firing at them as they fled.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A conviction under the Iowa statute requires that the defendant placed someone in “reasonable apprehension of serious injury.” The court applied the categorical approach and stated that the only way a defendant uses a dangerous weapon to put someone in fear of serious injury is by threatening physical force. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Rucker is serving a 240-month sentence. While awaiting a jail transfer in 2012, Rucker attacked another prisoner who had testified against him, slamming the man’s head against a concrete wall. In 2020, Rucker sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that he had an extraordinary and compelling reason for release—his medical conditions (obesity, hypertension, pre-diabetes, poor eyesight, possible sickle cell trait, and his then-current COVID-19 infection) and the spread of COVID-19 throughout the prison. He argued that early release was supported by 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, specifically his traumatic childhood during which his mother died and his father abused drugs, and his successful completion of anger management and drug abuse courses while in prison. Rucker’s criminal history included prior convictions for damage to property, battery, home invasion, and drug trafficking.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court’s assessment of Rucker’s COVID-19 risk was cursory but any error was harmless because the court acted within its broad discretion in finding that the 3553(a) factors did not favor release. The court highlighted the need to protect the public from further crimes and the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense and provide just punishment for the offense. "Recent events underscore the need for ... individualized arguments and evidence." View "United States v. Rucker" on Justia Law

Thomas pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), while he was serving an extended term of supervised release based on an earlier conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. Thomas did not contest the revocation of his supervision term. The probation officer determined that Thomas qualified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines because he had committed a controlled substance offense and had “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense” In addition to his prior federal heroin conviction Thomas had a Wisconsin conviction for Child Abuse—Intentionally Cause Harm. Employing the career offender guidelines yielded a sentencing range of 262-327 months; without that designation, the range would have been 120-125 months.The underlying Wisconsin statute refers to: “Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child.” Thomas argued that because the statute did not require the use of physical force as an element, it did not fit the definition of a “crime of violence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentences of 100 months in the distribution case with a consecutive sentence of 30 months in the revocation case. Seventh Circuit controlling precedent holds that the crime of intentionally causing bodily harm is a crime of violence. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainees Kemp, Dearborn, Galvez, and Lind-Enriquez had lived together in the cellblock without incident for several months when a fight broke out, with Kemp throwing the first punch. Officer Burget was patrolling the jail but, to avoid being considered a “snitch,” Kemp did not tell Burget about threats made before the fight. The fight ended with Kemp lying motionless on the floor. Officer Williams, conducting her rounds, saw Kemp lying on the floor and called for emergency medical services. The medics responded about eight minutes later. Kemp suffered severe injuries.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Kemp’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on summary judgment. Although Burget had about 60% hearing loss in one ear and about 40% hearing loss in the other and was not wearing his prescribed hearing aid, the evidence did not indicate that his impaired hearing made any difference in the response to the beating. Nothing in the record would have put a reasonable guard on notice of a substantial risk of harm to Kemp. The court also rejected wrongful hiring and wrongful retention claims. View "Kemp v. Fulton County" on Justia Law

Edwards and several accomplices robbed three cellphone stores in northeastern Illinois. Each time, the team would enter around 5:30 p.m. wearing hats and hooded sweatshirts, wait until all the customers had left, announce a robbery, point a gun at an employee, force the employee to assist them, stuff black garbage bags with cellphones, and flee through the back door. Edwards was charged with multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery stemming from the three crimes and brandishing a firearm in connection with two of the robberies. Edwards pleaded guilty to robbing two stores but claimed not to be involved in the third robbery. The government sought to introduce evidence of the two admitted crimes to prove Edwards’s identity through a common modus operandi. The district court admitted the evidence subject to a limiting instruction. After beginning deliberations, the jury sent a note asking if one of the witnesses identified Edwards. The district judge instructed the jury to “rely on your collective memory of the testimony.” The jury convicted Edwards on the remaining charges.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence from the other two robberies or in declining to provide the jury with a trial transcript in response to its question. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Gibbs and others were indicted for conspiring to possess “500 grams or more of a substance” containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Gibbs pleaded guilty. At the plea hearing, the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) first asserted that the conspirators had distributed more than 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. The PSR only listed .839 kilograms seized from his car and two .907-kilogram deals Gibbs tried to arrange. Based on the assumption that the conspiracy involved 4.5 kilograms or more of methamphetamine, and that the drug was in the pure “ice” form, the PSR calculated an advisory guidelines range of 235–293 months. If Gibbs had been sentenced for a conspiracy involving 2.5 kilograms of ice, his range would have been 188–235 months. Gibbs objected to the PSR’s use of the alleged 4.5 kilos. The AUSA did not provide any evidence. At Gibbs’s sentencing hearing, the AUSA raised new, allegations concerning Gibbs's statements during an unrecorded proffer session. Gibbs’s counsel objected, stating that he had been present at the proffer session and that he did not remember Gibbs making the alleged confession. The AUSA had not been present.The district court overruled Gibbs’s objections and sentenced him to 200 months' imprisonment, The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although sentencing proceedings are more informal than trials, they are not “a free-for-all.” The requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 were not followed; Gibbs was held responsible for far more methamphetamine than the record supported. View "United States v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

A John Doe informant stated that Taylor had showed the informant a gun inside Taylor’s apartment. Taylor was a felon. Chicago police officer Hughes secured a warrant to search Taylor’s apartment. On the record, no one knows Doe’s real name, contact information, or why he came forward Doe knew how to get to Taylor’s apartment, but not his address. Hughes made an incorrect guess. Officers entered Taylor’s apartment, which was not the apartment listed on the warrant. Officers found mail addressed in his name from which they learned the correct address. They found a different gun than was described by Doe. Officers found no evidence directly connecting Taylor to the bedroom in which the gun was found. Hughes initiated an alert for Taylor’s arrest. Taylor turned himself in and spent four months in jail before a court found the warrant invalid based on the address error and quashed his arrest. Despite Taylor’s acquittal, the arrest alert remained active. A month later, Taylor was again arrested.Taylor filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendant summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to officers who were not involved in procuring the warrant and affirmed summary judgment for the city on Taylor’s Monell claims relating to the investigative alerts policy and policy with respect to John Doe informants. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for Hughes and remanded for a determination of damages. Hughes is entitled to good-faith immunity only if he could have “reasonably believed" that the search was authorized by a valid warrant. Hughes told the judge that he knew Taylor’s address; he did not. Hughes stated that there was probable cause to believe drugs would be found in the apartment; there was not. View "Taylor v. Hughes" on Justia Law

In 2003, Gamboa was convicted of seven counts of drug and firearm crimes. The court found that Gamboa had two or more prior convictions for felony drug offenses and was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without release, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). After an unsuccessful direct appeal and multiple 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions and 28 U.S.C. 2241 petitions, Gamboa sought habeas corpus relief under section 2241, arguing that, under the Supreme Court’s 2016 “Mathis” decision, his prior state drug convictions did not constitute felony drug offenses for the purposes of section 841(b)(1)(A)'s sentencing enhancement, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802(44). Mathis narrowed the range of state statutes that qualify as violent-felony predicates under the Armed Career Criminal Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Gamboa cannot seek relief under the saving clause gateway to section 2241 because, whether under the categorical approach or a comparison of the straightforward federal definition to the state statute of conviction, the law was not squarely against Gamboa and it would not have been futile for him to raise his arguments in his initial 2255 motion. Precedent did not prevent Gamboa from making an argument that an alternatively phrased statute could be indivisible under the categorical approach at the time of his initial 2255 motion. View "Gamboa v. Daniels" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for relief under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court accepted the government's concession that conspiracy to traffic crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) is a covered offense, even if another object of the conspiracy triggered the same statutory penalty range. The court also concluded that the district court's finding that defendant was ineligible for relief under the First Step Act was an error justifying remand and therefore remanded to the district court to exercise its discretion—especially in light of the district court's own characterization that no further analysis was warranted after it found defendant ineligible for relief. View "United States v. McSwain" on Justia Law

Indictments alleged that the Latin Kings had been involved in multiple acts of murder, arson, robbery, extortion, witness tampering, and the illegal distribution of narcotics. The three defendants were charged with racketeering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Bravo and Denava pleaded guilty while Luczak was convicted.In consolidated appeals, Bravo argued that the district court erred by adding criminal history points for two misdemeanor convictions he had under the Illinois “street-gang contact” statute. Luczak claimed that the district court should not have included, as part of his criminal history, points for a murder he allegedly committed; a jury had acquitted him of that offense, using the reasonable-doubt standard, but the court found at sentencing that his responsibility for the murder was established by a preponderance of the evidence. Denava claimed that the district court failed adequately to consider several mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred in counting Bravo’s two misdemeanor offenses toward his criminal history, and that error may have affected his ultimate sentence. The court noted the street-gang contact statute was amended in 2018 in a matter that might render Bravo’s street-gang contacts non-criminal today. There was no error in Luczak’s and Denava’s sentences. View "United States v. Bravo" on Justia Law