Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Yang pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Before his sentencing hearing, Yang objected to the inclusion of one ounce of methamphetamine in the drug-quantity calculation listed in the PSR. The prosecutor cited an audio file of a recorded phone call between Yang and a co-conspirator that supported the PSR’s inclusion of the one ounce of methamphetamine in the drug-quantity calculation. Yang and his counsel acknowledged that they had listened to the recording before sentencing. The court overruled Yang’s objection and sentenced Yang to 30 months’ imprisonment, 21 months below the bottom of the applicable guidelines range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Yang’s argument that the district court committed reversible error because it considered an audio file at sentencing that was not publicly available on the court’s electronic docket. District courts routinely review evidence at sentencing that is not publicly available on the court’s docket. The federal judiciary’s case management-electronic case filing system does not support the submission of audio files; like other exhibits not available electronically on the system, audio files are maintained by the district court, which transmits those files to the court of appeals if requested. That happened here. View "United States v. Yang" on Justia Law

Following an investigation of an Indianapolis‐based drug trafficking organization, the government secured a warrant to search Zamudio’s residence, where they found large amounts of methamphetamine, a digital scale, and a loaded firearm. Zamudio pled guilty to two drug‐related offenses and was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Zamudio challenged the calculation of his base offense level based on the amount of drugs attributed to him, the court’s application of a 2‐level firearm enhancement. and the court’s application of a 2‐level enhancement for maintaining drug premises.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on the government’s factual basis for the plea, the PSR, and an agent’s testimony, the district court found that Zamudio coordinated the sale of drugs to co‐conspirators, agreed (in text messages) to assist his brother in all aspects of the conspiracy, allowed large amounts of drugs and drug proceeds to be stored in his home; served as an interpreter in drug transactions, and picked up drug proceeds and wired the proceeds to the source in Mexico. Zamudio played a large role in the conspiracy; the drug amounts were reasonably foreseeable to him. Because the gun was found in close proximity to illegal drugs, it is presumed to have been used in connection with the drug trafficking offense. View "United States v. Zamudio" on Justia Law

Moreland, convicted of first-degree reckless homicide by delivery of a controlled substance, unsuccessfully appealed. On August 11, 2013, his direct review ended when the opportunity to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court expired. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, he had one year from that date to file a federal habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). Moreland sought collateral postconviction relief in state court on July 30, 2014. On March 7, 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Moreland’s petition for review. All 586 days of the state postconviction process were tolled.Moreland filed a federal habeas petition on March 28, 2016, nine days after the one-year statute of limitations elapsed; 374 untolled days had elapsed since the end of Moreland’s direct review. Moreland’s petition raised claims related to due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair and impartial jury. Moreland alleged that the time for filing his petition should be equitably tolled because he suffered from schizophrenia, and on several occasions, was unable to research his case due to lack of access to the prison library.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Moreland has not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances or reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling. The court rejected claims that the district court should have tolled the time connected with motions for postconviction discovery and for reconsideration. View "Moreland v. Eplett" on Justia Law

Dean, incarcerated since 2012, developed kidney cancer. Seven months after he first presented symptoms, Dean had kidney-removal surgery. The cancer had already spread to his liver, Dean remains terminally ill. Dean sued his doctors and their employer, Wexford, a private corporation that contracts to provide healthcare to Illinois inmates, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Dean cited delays in his diagnosis and treatment, caused by his doctors’ failure to arrange timely off-site care, and on a policy that requires Wexford’s corporate office to pre-approve off-site care.A jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages, which was reduced to $7 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Dean has endured great suffering, but he did not produce enough evidence to hold any of the defendants liable for violating the Eighth Amendment. Dean’s claim against Wexford hinged on two expert reports from another case that critique the medical care, and process for medical care, that Illinois provides, through Wexford, to its prisoners. Those reports are hearsay, but the district court allowed Dean to use them for a non-hearsay purpose: to prove that Wexford had prior notice of the negative assessments of its review policy. One report postdated all events relevant to Dean and could not have given Wexford prior notice. The other report alone was insufficient to hold Wexford liable under the exacting “Monell” requirements in this single-incident case. View "Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Kurzynowski pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography. He admitted to officers that he spent years in internet chatrooms discussing sexual behavior involving minors and that his sexual interest focused on 10-13-year-old boys. His more recent online conversations explored fantasies of cooking and eating children. In 2015, the district court sentenced Kurzynowski to 96 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Kurzynowski moved for compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing his hypertension, diabetes, and obesity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The fact that Kurzynowski is vaccinated precludes a finding that the COVID-19 pandemic presents extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. The district court properly recognized that the need to protect the public, “especially the most vulnerable members, children,” was particularly significant with Kurzynowski because his crimes “were motivated by his depraved sexual appetite toward young children, a pathology for which he has not received medical, psychological, or spiritual treatment.” The district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not err or abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Kurzynowski" on Justia Law

Believing that Sammons had stolen his girlfriend’s jewelry, Price called the house in Indianapolis where Sammons was staying and announced that he was coming to get the jewelry back—by force, if necessary. In trying to gain entrance, Price fired a revolver several times through the door, hitting Smith in the leg, then dropped the revolver and fled. When police caught him, they found a Taurus pistol. Price pleaded guilty to possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The factual basis proffered in support of the plea identifies possessing the Taurus pistol as the crime of conviction. The PSR recommended that the judge add four offense levels under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which applies when the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense” (shooting into an occupied house). The court sentenced Price to 110 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit remanded based on the district court’s failure to make an essential finding connecting the Taurus pistol to the shooting. The judge did not declare that the sentence is independent of section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), so the error cannot be found to be harmless. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Wilber was convicted of a 2004 murder and was sentenced to life in prison. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction in Wisconsin state court, Wilber sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2554, arguing that he was deprived of his right to due process when he was visibly shackled before the jury during closing arguments. The district court issued a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision sustaining the shackling order amounted to an unreasonable application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision, “Deck v. Missouri.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Neither the trial judge nor the state appellate court ever articulated a reason why Wilber had to be visibly restrained in the jury’s presence, so the shackling decision ran afoul of Deck. Wilber was visibly restrained at a key phase of the trial, when the prosecution highlighted evidence that, in the moments leading up to the murder, Wilber’s behavior was “wild,” “crazy,” “possessed,” and “out of control,” so Wilber was prejudiced by the shackling error. The restraints would have suggested to the jury that the court itself perceived Wilber to be incapable of self-control and to pose such a danger that he must be manacled in order to protect others in the courtroom, including the jurors. View "Wilber v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Palladinetti and others purchased 30 Chicago-area apartment buildings and resold individual apartments as condominiums. Using a process that Palladinetti helped create, his co-defendants bought the buildings, falsely representing to lenders that they had made down payments. Palladinetti served as his co-defendants’ attorney for the purchases and sales and as the registered agent for LLCs formed to facilitate the scheme. The group recruited buyers for the condominiums and prepared their mortgage applications, misrepresenting facts to ensure they qualified for the loans.Palladinetti and his co-defendants were charged with seven counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) and (2), and nine counts of making false statements on loan applications, 18 U.S.C. 1014 and 2. Count one involved a $345,000 mortgage that Palladinetti’s wife obtained for the purchase of a residence. That mortgage application was prepared using the group’s fraudulent scheme in July 2005. The government agreed to dismiss all other counts if Palladinetti were convicted on count one. Because Palladinetti stipulated to almost all elements of section 1344(1), the trial was limited to whether the bank he defrauded was insured by the FDIC when the mortgage application was submitted.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The testimony and exhibits demonstrated that one entity was continuously insured, 1997-2008, that on the date the mortgage was executed that entity was “Washington Mutual Bank” and also did business as “Washington Mutual Bank, FA,” and that entity was the lender for the mortgage at issue. View "United States v. Palladinetti" on Justia Law

Wood served time in Indiana state prison for methamphetamine‐related offenses. He was released on parole, subject to conditions, including that he was subject to "reasonable" searches, Wood violated his parole by failing to report to his supervising officer. The Parole Board issued an arrest warrant. Agents arrested Wood at his home. Agent Gentry secured Wood with wrist restraints, conducted a frisk search, and noticed Wood repeatedly turning toward his cellphone, which was lying nearby. Gentry picked up the cellphone and handed it to Agent Rains. Wood demanded that his cellphone be turned off and began to physically resist Gentry. Rains felt something “lumpy” on the back of Wood’s cellphone, removed the back cover, and found a packet of a substance which Rains believed to be methamphetamine. Wood admitted the substance was methamphetamine. A later search of the home revealed syringes and other drug paraphernalia.Seven days after Wood’s arrest, an Indiana Department of Correction investigator performed a warrantless search of Wood’s cellphone, which revealed child pornography. The investigator forwarded the information to the FBI, which obtained a search‐and‐seizure warrant for Wood’s cellphone and its contents. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), Wood unsuccessfully moved to suppress the data extracted from his cellphone. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Given Wood’s diminished expectation of privacy and Indiana’s strong governmental interests, the search of Wood’s cellphone was reasonable. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law

Lovies, wielding a gun, stole Butler’s car as she was filling it with gasoline. Along with three other individuals, including a minor, Lovies kidnapped Butler and took her from Indianapolis to Cincinnati while threatening to kill her. The others accepted plea agreements. Lovies was convicted of kidnapping, carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), 2119, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c( and was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 388 months within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In rejecting Lovies’s Batson challenge, the district court found the prosecutors credible and their explanation for exercising the challenged peremptory strike to be plausible--that the prospective juror kept falling asleep. The court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The district court’s factual findings were also adequate to support the application of the sentencing enhancements for use of a minor to commit the offense, and for his role in the offense. Any error with respect to the calculation of Lovies’s Guidelines range would be harmless. View "United States v. Lovies" on Justia Law