Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

GMC, a 15-year-old girl, ran away from her foster home and was arrested for shoplifting. She did not provide her real name or age to the police Her friend picked her up from jail, accompanied by Vines, who began prostituting GMC. He posted ads online, including on the website Backpage, and arranged for FMC to meet with customers to engage in sex acts. She gave the money paid for those acts to him. Vines was aware that GMC was a minor. GMC was taken into custody by law enforcement and was evaluated at an emergency room, where an examination determined that she had injuries “too numerous to count.” GMC told officers what had happened.Vines was found guilty of sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c); sex trafficking of a child, conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, sections 1594(c), 1591, transportation of a minor, section 2423(a); and interstate travel in aid of racketeering, section 1952(a)(3). He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment, with supervised release for life, and ordered to pay $13,500 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of an expert witness that related to the credibility of GMC; denying his motion to suppress GMC’s identification of Vines through a Facebook photo; and denying motions to suppress evidence obtained from searches of Vines’s iPhone and of his Facebook and iCloud accounts. View "United States v. Vines" on Justia Law

Wyatt victimized six women, each of whom acted as prostitutes under Wyatt’s abusive supervision in 2011-2014. He pleaded guilty to interstate sex trafficking 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). Under 18 U.S.C. 1593, Wyatt was subject to mandatory restitution to the victims for the full amount of their losses. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. Following negotiations between the parties, oral argument, and supplemental briefing, the district court entered an order requiring Wyatt to pay $12,750 to Adult Victim 1, $45,200 to Adult Victim 3, and $37,125 to Adult Victim 5, totaling $95,075.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wyatt’s arguments that the district court improperly delayed the restitution determination, did not rely on a statutorily required “complete accounting” of the victims’ losses (and relied on improper evidence), deprived him of counsel during the restitution process, and improperly ordered restitution outside of his presence. The amount of restitution was not ascertainable on the record at the time of sentencing; the court based its determination of the amounts on materials sufficient to make a reasoned restitution award. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

McGill was convicted of possessing child pornography. He completed his prison sentence and began serving supervised release. McGill has a history of violating the terms of his supervised release. McGill failed two polygraph tests, administered as part of his sex offender treatment program, when he was asked whether he had sexual contact with a minor.Probation Officer Williams conducted a home visit, entered McGill’s bedroom, and observed a black cell phone that he recognized as McGill’s monitored phone and an unknown white cell phone. McGill attempted to block the officer’s view of the second cell phone, stating that it was an old phone that no longer worked. At Williams’s request, McGill handed over the white phone. Williams claims that he was able to power on the phone, saw that the background photo was of a young boy’s face, and then powered it off. Williams delivered the phone to the FBI, which obtained a search warrant. The subsequent search of the phone revealed thousands of images of child pornography. McGill was again charged under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B).The district court denied McGill’s motion to suppress, accepted a conditional plea, and sentenced McGill to 168 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams was lawfully present in McGill’s house, the unmonitored phone was in plain view, and, under the circumstances, the phone’s incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Williams had reasonable suspicion to believe that the cell phone was evidence a criminal act. View "United States v. McGill" on Justia Law

In each of the consolidated appeals, the defendant, having been imprisoned for drug crimes, violated the conditions of his original term of supervision. Each appeared in front of the same judge at a revocation hearing. Acting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), (h), the district court ordered each to be returned to prison and to serve an additional period of supervised release afterward; the court imposed the term of supervised release mandated by statute as part of the original sentence.The Seventh Circuit vacated. A federal criminal sentence may, and sometimes must, be a period of supervised release to follow the offender's time in prison, 18 U.S.C. 3583(a); statutes often confer discretion on the district court, but there are instances in which they specify the required duration or range. Those rules, however, pertain to the initial sentence. The picture is different for a person who has completed his term of incarceration, has begun serving supervised release, and violates the conditions of his supervised release. If his probation officer moves for revocation of supervised release, a term of supervised release that was mandatory for initial sentencing does not remain a mandatory part of any new sentence after revocation. Revocation operates under different rules. View "United States v. Teague" on Justia Law

In 2011, Evans approached his girlfriend’s house after a fight with While. White appeared with a loaded gun, raised the gun, and tried to strike Evans. Evans blocked the blow, but the gun fired. The bullet struck Evans in the abdomen and grazed the leg of Evans’s girlfriend. White was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). White’s criminal history included 12 previous Illinois convictions, including delivery of crack cocaine (2003), attempted armed robbery (2004), aggravated fleeing (2007), and delivery of crack cocaine near a church (2008). The district court designated White as an armed career criminal, subject to an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act, based on his three previous convictions for a “violent felony” or “serious drug offense”: the 2008 drug delivery, the attempted armed robbery, and the aggravated fleeing.The Seventh Circuit rejected his 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenge to his 30-year sentence. The sentencing court relied on a previous conviction that no longer supports the enhancement. For that inapplicable conviction, the district court substituted the 2003 cocaine delivery. Reasonable jurists may debate whether a court may substitute one predicate conviction for another for a sentencing enhancement and whether an Illinois cocaine conviction may serve as a predicate offense. White’s petition fails, nonetheless. He had fair notice that the substitute conviction could be used as a predicate offense; waiver and procedural default also foreclose his challenge. View "White v. United States" on Justia Law

Robl, an unlicensed and uninsured asbestos abatement contractor, undertook asbestos removal and disposal in Minnesota and Wisconsin. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud for falsely holding himself out as a licensed and insured asbestos abatement contractor and to knowingly releasing asbestos into the ambient air by burning asbestos-containing material in burn piles and in burn barrels at his home. The district court sentenced Robl to 144 months in prison and entered judgment, noting that it had not yet determined a restitution amount. At Robl’s request, the court canceled the initial restitution hearing until after the disposition of his pending direct appeal. Robl dismissed his initial appeal with prejudice.The district court then set a new restitution hearing. After a telephonic status hearing, at which Robl was not present but was represented by counsel, the hearing was again canceled. The district court subsequently ordered restitution of $94,031.41. Robl challenged the court’s jurisdiction to order restitution and the award amount and argued that the court denied him his rights to be present and to speak as guaranteed by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 43(a) and 32(i)(4). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court had jurisdiction under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A to enter the order and committed no error in adjudicating the amount of restitution. View "United States v. Robl" on Justia Law

DHS Agent Goehring obtained a warrant for Calligan's girlfriend's Fort Wayne house. His supporting affidavit reported that, 10 days earlier, customs agents had intercepted a package containing one kilogram of a synthetic cannabinoid controlled substance (5F‐ADB), addressed to that house, with Calligan as the addressee. Calligan had received more than 50 international shipments there. Calligan had Indiana convictions for attempted murder, criminal recklessness, and unlawfully resisting police, and a pending gun possession charge. Although police delivered the package, agents had replaced the controlled substance with sugar. After Calligan accepted the package, the officers executed the warrant and found money, a gun, and a notebook that contained the package’s tracking number and a recipe for making 5F‐ADB into a consumable product. In the warrant return, Goehring inaccurately reported that police had also recovered 5F‐ADB, the package’s original contents.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Calligan’s convictions for possessing a firearm as a felon, importing a controlled substance, and attempting to distribute a controlled substance. The court rejected arguments that because the warrant application said police would deliver actual drugs, the agent’s replacement of the drugs with sugar took the search outside the warrant’s scope and that Goehring’s warrant application relied on materially false representations that police would deliver drugs to the home before the search. The warrant was supported by probable cause and had no triggering condition and, in any event, police relied on it in good faith. View "United States v. Calligan" on Justia Law

Love sold crack to a confidential informant. Officers searched his apartment and found crack in the kitchen and found two guns and ammunition in an adjoining room, about 15 feet from the drugs. Love pleaded guilty to three drug counts and one felon-in-possession count (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)). A violation of section 922(g)(1) causes a default sentencing range of up to 10 years but the Armed Career Criminal Act increases the penalty to a 15-year mandatory minimum if the defendant had three previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Love’s prior convictions included Illinois armed robbery (1994), federal distribution of crack cocaine (2009), and Indiana Class D battery resulting in bodily injury (2015). Love argued that he received a “restoration of rights” letter without an express reference to guns after he was released on the 1994 Illinois armed robbery conviction and that his Indiana Class D battery-resulting-in-bodily-injury conviction was not a crime of violence. The judge held the armed robbery conviction was an ACCA predicate but that the battery-resulting-in-bodily-injury conviction was not, as a categorical matter, a “violent felony,” so Love was not an armed career criminal. The judge sentenced Love to 96 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Love committed three ACCA-predicate offenses. View "United States v. Love" on Justia Law

Herrera, an Illinois state prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against three correctional officers of the Cook County Jail for failing to protect him from assault and denying him prompt medical care. In his timely filed original complaint, Herrera named each of the defendants “John Doe” as a nominal placeholder until he could ascertain the proper identities of the officers. Herrera then twice amended his complaint to include their actual names—but did so outside of the two-year limitations period set by Illinois law.The district court denied a motion to dismiss, reasoning that suing “John Doe” defendants constituted a “mistake” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), so that Herrera’s amended complaint “related back” to his original complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Knowingly suing a John Doe defendant is not a “mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c). Whether Herrer satisfies the factual test for equitable tolling is beyond the scope of an interlocutory appeal and should be considered on remand. View "Herrera v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 2009, Brown, then 13 years old, was tried as an adult, convicted of murder, and sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment. Brown unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in Indiana state courts, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.On remand the federal district court granted Brown a conditional writ of habeas corpus, noting that the court had admitted an out-of-court statement (a jailhouse confession to another detainee) by the co-defendant. The statement was hearsay as to Brown but implicated him in the shooting. Brown could not cross-examine his co-defendant. Brown’s lawyer failed even to ask for a limiting instruction. The conditional writ ordered Indiana to vacate Brown’s conviction and release him from custody unless it elected to retry Brown within 120 days. The state appealed. Brown filed a cross-appeal, challenging the denial of his motions to authorize discovery and expand the record in light of statements made by the elected county prosecutor in a 2018 campaign debate that Brown asserts contradicted the prosecution’s theory at trial. Within 120 days, the state moved to vacate Brown’s murder conviction, to initiate retrial proceedings in a new criminal case, and to transfer Brown to pretrial custody. In March 2021, the state court vacated Brown’s conviction. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the state’s appeal. The state court’s vacatur of the conviction ended its jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. 2254 and Article III of the U.S. Constitution. View "Brown v. Vanihel" on Justia Law