Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Contending that his asthma and other breathing issues put him at extra risk should he contract COVID-19 while in prison, Broadfield applied for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). For a prisoner who is younger than 70, relief depends on finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Broadfield has not been convicted of a weapons offense, but the district court cited such an offense in its decision. However, section 3582(c)(1)(A) does not make a judicial finding of non-dangerousness essential to compassionate release. When Broadfield's application was denied, COVID-19 was a grave problem in America’s prisons. The Bureau of Prisons reports that 1,300 prisoners at FCI Seagoville, where Broadfield is confined, have been fully vaccinated against COVID-19. Because risk of COVID-19, which can bear especially hard on people with pre-existing breathing conditions, was Broadfield’s sole reason for seeking compassionate release, a remand would be pointless. A prisoner who remains at elevated risk because he has declined to be vaccinated cannot plausibly characterize that risk as an “extraordinary and compelling” justification for release. The federal judiciary need not accept a prisoner’s self-diagnosed skepticism about the vaccines as an adequate explanation for remaining unvaccinated, when the responsible agencies all deem vaccination safe and effective. View "United States v. Broadfield" on Justia Law

On December 5, 2013, individuals burglarized a closed Ann Arbor, Michigan, store, taking 24 firearms and other goods. Officers discovered that a caller, using the *67 code, had placed multiple calls to the store after it closed. Under the Stored Communications Act, officers can obtain cell‐site location information by voluntary disclosure, or “exigent request,” 18 U.S.C. 2702(c), or by court order, section 2703(d). The officers made an exigent request to Comcast, the store’s telephone service provider. After Comcast voluntarily disclosed the caller's number, officers determined that Sprint was that caller’s provider and made another exigent request. Sprint voluntarily provided cell‐site location information, which indicated that on December 3-4, the phone had pinged off Illinois cell towers. On December 4, at 11:14 p.m., the phone pinged off of an Ann Arbor tower; it pinged off Ann Arbor towers until 6:37 p.m. on December 5, then returned to Illinois. Officers discovered that the phone number had been provided to a hotel under Rosario’s name, then obtained court orders (2703(d)) to obtain the store’s phone records and the cell‐site location information.Applying then-law (prior to “Carpenter” (2018)), the court denied Rosario’s motion to suppress, holding that the acquisition of cell‐site location information from third‐party service providers did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Rosario’s convictions for transporting stolen goods in interstate commerce and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Officers relied on section 2702(c)(4) in good faith; their emergency request form stated that “the number of stolen handguns, pose[d] a significant community risk.” The inevitable discovery doctrine also supported the district court’s decision. View "United States v. Rosario" on Justia Law

Fulks pleaded guilty to eight federal charges—including two death-eligible offenses—arising from the 2002 carjacking, kidnapping, and death of Alice Donovan. Fulks had escaped from a Kentucky jail. Fulks’s attorneys, the court observed, “painted a compelling and empathetic picture" of Fulks "growing up in poor, crowded, filthy, and deplorable living conditions, raised by violently abusive, sexually deviant, emotionally neglectful, and alcoholic parents.” They hired or consulted at least 11 experts, six of whom testified that Fulks suffered from borderline intelligence with IQ scores ranging from 75-79, plus moderate brain and cognitive impairments. Fulks did not argue that he was intellectually disabled and ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia. The district court imposed, two death sentences.In 2008 Fulks moved to vacate his death sentences under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call additional mental health experts; again, Fulks did not raise an Atkins claim nor assert that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise such claims. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. In 2015 he filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The probability that Fulks would not have prevailed on his Atkins claim in 2008 does not mean that section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective. Updates to the legal and diagnostic standards, which may now provide Fulks a stronger basis to prove an intellectual disability, do not expose any structural defect in section 2255. View "Fulks v. Watson" on Justia Law

Brautigam, Jimenez, and two children were parked in a van when a man shot at Brautigam through his open window. Both men identified Corral as the shooter. Brautigam had known Corral for 15 years; both were members of the Latin Kings gang. Corral’s counsel argued that those identifications, the only evidence tying Corral to the crime, were unreliable. He insinuated that both men were drug addicts trying to buy heroin and that they made inconsistent statements about the shooting. Corral’s counsel argued that the real shooter was a juvenile, "Kenny," who was with Corral during the shooting, wearing the same color clothing and the same hat. Kenny alternated between implicating himself and Corral. Kenny did not appear before the jury. During deliberations, the jury asked “Do we know the height, weight[,] and race of [Kenny]?” Because the parties had not submitted any evidence of Kenny’s appearance, the court answered that “the jury is required to rely on their collective recollections.” Corral was convicted for attempted homicide, three counts of recklessly endangering the safety of others, recklessly using a firearm, and bail-jumping.State courts rejected his post-conviction argument that his attorney was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Corral and Kenny’s likeness. Counsel testified that he did not present evidence of Kenny’s appearance because, after seeing them both, he thought that Kenny did not look like Corral, who was 10 years older. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Corral failed to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably applied federal law in determining that his counsel made a sound strategic decision not to present appearance evidence. View "Corral v. Foster" on Justia Law

Bebris sent child pornography over Facebook’s private user-to-user messaging system. Facebook licenses a “hashing” image recognition technology, PhotoDNA, developed by Microsoft. PhotoDNA provides the capability to scan images uploaded onto a company’s platform and compares the “hash” (or essence) of a photo with a database of known images of child pornography. Three of Bebris’s messages were flagged by PhotoDNA. Facebook employees reviewed the images and reported them to the CyberTipline of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, as required by 18 U.S.C. 2258A(a), which then reported the images to Wisconsin law enforcement. Those officials obtained a warrant and searched Bebris’s residence, where they found a computer containing numerous child pornography files.Bebris, charged federally with possessing and distributing child pornography., argued that the evidence should be suppressed, contending that Facebook took on the role of a government agent (subject to Fourth Amendment requirements) by monitoring its platform for child pornography and reporting that content. The district court denied his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a) subpoena seeking pre-trial testimony from a Facebook employee with knowledge of Facebook’s use of PhotoDNA.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The subpoena sought cumulative testimony. The record included a written declaration from Microsoft and Facebook and live testimony from an executive at NCMEC, which administers the federal reporting system. Facebook did not act as a government agent in this case. View "United States v. Bebris" on Justia Law

Thacker committed several armed robberies in 2002, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1951 (commercial robbery) with two accompanying violations of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The district court sentenced Thacker to 400 months’ imprisonment; seven years were attributable to Thacker’s first 924(c) violation. A consecutive 25 years followed for the second 924(c) violation. Those sentences reflected the mandatory minimum and consecutive terms of imprisonment at the time of Thacker’s sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.In August 2020, after exhausting his remedies within the Bureau of Prisons, Thacker sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), citing the First Step Act’s change to 924(c)’s penalty structure and added health-related considerations amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Thacker has Type-2 diabetes and hypertension.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Thacker’s motion. The discretion in section 3582(c)(1)(A) to reduce a sentence upon finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” does not include the authority to reduce 924(c) sentences lawfully imposed before the effective date of the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment. The First Step Act’s change to 924(c) applies only prospectively; the amendment, whether considered alone or in connection with other facts and circumstances, cannot constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to authorize a sentencing reduction. View "United States v. Thacker" on Justia Law

During a 2009 drug purchase, Rabe and his dealer, Powell, got into a fight. Powell jumped into his truck and sped away, running over Rabe. Ryckman, who had been waiting in Rabe’s car, dialed 911. Powell returned. Ryckman and Powell struggled over the phone; the phone was broken in half. Powell returned to his truck and sped away. When police arrived, they found a knife on the ground. Rabe had several serious injuries and was bleeding from a deep gash on his neck. He survived. At trial, Powell argued that the entire incident was an accident and that Rabe attacked him first. Powell was convicted of first‐degree reckless injury but acquitted of attempted first-degree murder.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Powell’s petition for habeas relief, rejecting an argument that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in approving a supplemental jury instruction about the reckless injury charge. There is no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state appellate court’s conclusion that the instruction was an accurate response to a question from the jury about the definition of “utter disregard for human life.” Powell’s trial counsel had reasonable and strategic reasons for not objecting; by focusing on the injury-producing conduct, he hoped to minimize the chance that the jury would convict Powell based on the severity of Rabe’s injuries. View "Powell v. Fuchs" on Justia Law

In 2013-2016, law enforcement investigated a large methamphetamine distribution conspiracy, installing three cameras on utility poles on public property that viewed Tuggle’s home and a shed owned by Tuggle’s coconspirator, Vaultonburg. The cameras recorded around the clock. Rudimentary lighting technology improved the quality of overnight footage; agents could remotely zoom, pan, and tilt the cameras and review the camera footage in real-time or later. Officers tallied over 100 instances of what they suspected were deliveries of methamphetamine to Tuggle’s residence. After these alleged “drops,” different individuals would arrive, enter the home, and purportedly buy methamphetamine. Several witnesses corroborated these activities. Relying heavily on the video evidence, officers secured and executed search warrants on several locations, including Tuggle’s house.After the denial of his motions to suppress, Tuggle pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) to conspiring to distribute, and possess with intent to distribute, at least 50 grams of methamphetamine and at least 500 grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine, and 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1) for maintaining a drug-involved premises. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government used commonplace technology, located where officers were lawfully entitled to be, and captured events observable to any ordinary passerby; it did not invade an expectation of privacy that society would be prepared to accept as reasonable. The prolonged, uninterrupted use of pole cameras did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. View "United States v. Tuggle" on Justia Law

Jackson and Walker sold drugs on six occasions to a confidential source (CS) during a two-month span in 2019. For the final sale, Jackson, through Walker, had agreed to sell 35 grams of crack cocaine to the CS for $1,800. When the CS arrived with Walker to the location for the buy, Jackson handed over only 24.92 grams of crack cocaine. After negotiations, the CS paid Jackson $1,500. Jackson said that he would retrieve and provide the CS the full amount previously agreed. Jackson then traveled to a nearby town to get more crack cocaine before again meeting the CS and Walker at a location one mile from the original meet-up. There, Jackson exchanged 6.28 grams of crack cocaine for the remaining $300.A jury found Jackson guilty of distributing more than 28 grams of crack cocaine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting Jackson’s arguments that the government’s evidence showed that the sale involved two transactions, not one, each amounting to less than 28 grams of crack cocaine and that the district court should have given a lesser-included-offense instruction to allow the jury to find Jackson distributed less than 28 grams of crack cocaine. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Calan-Montiel, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection and was ordered removed. He was returned to Mexico. He came back, again evading inspection, and was caught again in 2019. Convicted under 8 U.S.C. 1326, for reentering without permission, after a removal order, he was sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment. He argued that his first removal was unlawful because his Notice to Appear did not contain the information required by statute.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A removal order that serves as the basis of a section 1326 prosecution is subject to collateral attack only if the alien demonstrates that he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available, the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. Noncompliance with the one document rule is not a jurisdictional defect in a removal proceeding. There is nothing unfair, “fundamentally or otherwise, about using two documents to provide information.” Calan-Montiel does not deny that he had actual knowledge of the removal order. He could have asked to reopen the proceedings, or sought judicial review, even after being removed. His actions make it impossible to satisfy section 1326(d), even if the agency erred in sending notice of the hearing’s date. View "United States v. Calan-Montiel" on Justia Law