Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Coscia used electronic exchanges for futures trading and implemented high-frequency trading programs. High-frequency trading, called “spoofing,” and defined as bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution, became illegal in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Act, 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5). Coscia was convicted of commodities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, and spoofing, After an unsuccessful appeal, Coscia sought a new trial, citing new evidence that data discovered after trial establishes that there were errors in the data presented to the jury and that subsequent indictments for similar spoofing activities undercut the government’s characterization of Coscia as a trading “outlier.” He also claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, having an undisclosed conflict of interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that Coscia’s new evidence could not have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence, Coscia failed to explain how that evidence or the subsequent indictments seriously called the verdict into question. Coscia has not established that his attorneys learned of relevant and confidential information from its cited unrelated representations. Coscia’s counsel faced “the common situation” where the client stands a better chance of success by admitting the underlying actions and arguing that the actions do not constitute a crime. That the jury did not accept his defense does not render it constitutionally deficient. View "Coscia v. United States" on Justia Law

Chicago officers responded to a 911 call and found Jones bleeding from a gunshot wound. Jones stated, “Damon shot me” and that Damon was wearing a “black hoodie.” About 90 seconds later, officers encountered Damon Goodloe, wearing a black hoodie but unarmed. They took Goodloe to the scene, where Jones stated, “he’s the one that shot me.” Jones died at a hospital.The prosecution introduced Jones’s statements to the officers. Goodloe’s hands tested positive for gunshot residue. Lovett testified that she saw Goodloe (whom she knew) and another man, both in black hoodies, heard several gunshots but ducked before she could see who fired a gun, called 911, and identified Goodloe in a line-up. Loggins testified that he was purchasing cocaine from Jones when he observed two men in black hoodies. When the shots were fired, he fled. A jury convicted Goodloe of first-degree murder without finding that he personally discharged a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Goodloe’s habeas petition, first upholding the admission of Jones’s identification of Goodloe. Statements are nontestimonial when made during police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to meet an ongoing emergency. The state appellate court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in concluding that the emergency was ongoing when Goodloe was taken to the ambulance in handcuffs. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses who could have provided an innocent explanation for Goodloe's presence near the shooting; their testimony was unlikely to create a reasonable probability of a different result. View "Goodloe v. Brannon" on Justia Law

Gonzalez, a member of the Latin Kings street gang, sold a gun to a fellow Latin Kings member, who was a confidential government source. The source assisted law enforcement in recording conversations between himself and Gonzalez, including a call in which Gonzalez stated that he could sell him two more firearms the following day. Gonzalez, who had an earlier felony conviction for aggravated robbery, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). During Probation Office interviews, Gonzalez made “several inconsistent statements” about his identity and lied about his gang membership.The district court awarded Gonzalez a three‐point reduction in his offense level for accepting responsibility but concluded that Gonzalez’s material misrepresentations merited a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice, resulting in a sentencing range of 33-41 months. The court found this to be inadequate, in light of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While a court must always consult the guidelines and take them into account, the ultimate length of a sentence (within statutory maxima and minima) is committed to the discretion of the judge, who is constrained by the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Gonzalez’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Schenck and Davis have a young child, ABC. Schenck took sexually explicit photos of ABC and sent them to Schneibel, who told Davis, who told Schenck’s mother, who told Detective Bauman. Detective Enget interviewed Schneibel, who described the images she received from Schenck. Bauman obtained, from a Wisconsin state judge, a warrant to search Schenck’s apartment for child pornography. Police executed the warrant, seized Schenck’s computer and iPhone, and found four pornographic images of ABC when she was under two years old.Schenck was charged with three counts of production of child pornography and one count of distribution. Schenck moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the search, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause because it failed to demonstrate ABC was a child, and it failed to demonstrate the images were sexually explicit. . The district judge denied the motion and sentenced Schenk to 240 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of suppression. Considering the totality of the circumstances, and applying common sense, it is clear that there were good reasons for the state judge to think ABC was a child at the relevant times. The complete content and context of the affidavit also gave the issuing judge ample grounds to find probable cause that a search would produce evidence of a crime. View "United States v. Schenck" on Justia Law

Wessel, who has a history of mental issues, allegedly raised a gun toward a police officer. He was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. Defense counsel moved multiple times to find Wessel not competent to stand trial. The judge ordered three 45-day evaluations by mental-health experts. Defense counsel also sent multiple mental-health experts to evaluate Wessel. The judge held three competency hearings. She determined he was competent. At trial, Wessel refused to wear civilian clothing provided by his attorney and exploded into a tirade of profanities and accusations in front of the venire. The judge sent him to a remote room where he stayed for most of the trial. The jury convicted him. The judge sentenced him to 100 months' imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge applied an appropriate standard; she was in the courtroom, heard the expert testimony, and could also evaluate Wessel’s demeanor over time. Even with mental illness, a defendant can be competent to stand trial; the judge committed no clear error in relying on the government’s experts or in determining Wessel was competent for trial even though she denied his attempted jury waiver because she could not conclude that waiver was knowing and voluntary. Defense counsel vigorously and continuously challenged competency but the judge considered and carefully weighed his position. View "United States v. Wessel" on Justia Law

Parzych, a 58-year-old Polish citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1967. He was convicted of burglary in Illinois in 2011 and again in 2015 for knowingly and without authority remaining in buildings (storage lockers) with intent to commit theft. He was charged as removable for committing aggravated felonies of burglary and crimes involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii), and for committing aggravated felonies of attempted theft, sections 1101(a)(43)(G), (U), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).The “categorical approach” to determine whether a state-law conviction qualifies as a removable offense compares the elements listed in the statute of conviction with the generic elements of the crime. When a statute of conviction proscribes some types of conduct that would constitute removable offenses and some that would not and is divisible, the “modified categorical approach” applies; a court may consult a limited class of documents to determine which alternative formed the basis of the conviction and compare it to the generic offense.An IJ applied the categorical approach and found that the location and intent elements of the Illinois statute were broader than the removable offenses of burglary and attempted theft. The Board reversed, finding the statute divisible. On remand, the IJ found Parzych removable. The Board affirmed that Parzych was removable for committing aggravated felonies of attempted theft and crimes of moral turpitude under the modified categorical approach. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The Illinois burglary statute is not divisible and the modified categorical approach does not apply. View "Parzych v. Garland" on Justia Law

Thomas moved to a cell at Pontiac Correctional Center. Thomas claimed there were feces, urine, and mold smeared on the walls, sink, and cell door; the mattress was soiled with feces and reeked of urine; there were dead flies on the bunk bed; and the sink emitted only cold, black, oily water. After Thomas complained about his mattress, prison officials got him a new one within two weeks. Thomas used his sheets and blanket to avoid contact with the soiled mattress. Thomas received gloves to remove the dead flies; he had a towel for cleaning and received a disinfectant solution several times during his eight-week stay in the cell. Thomas refused to clean the walls. While awaiting a plumbing repair, officials allowed Thomas three hot showers per week. Pontiac’s water supply underwent regular testing and met all environmental requirements. Thomas sought treatment for dry skin and a rash on his back. A health worker noted “a small clogged pore,” recommended warm moist compresses, and told Thomas to return as needed. Thomas obtained hot water for the compresses from another inmate. Thomas sought no further medical care at Pontiac.Thomas later invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of his suit. Had the officials done nothing in response to Thomas’s complaints, they would have violated the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment but the prison responded to Thomas’s concerns and medical needs. View "Thomas v. Blackard" on Justia Law

In September 2013, Chicago Police Officers stopped a car in which Smith was a passenger. According to Smith, the officers fabricated a story that, during this stop, he made a “furtive movement” and that the officers found a bullet in the car. Smith was arrested and detained for seven months in the Cook County Jail. Smith was released on bond “on or about” March 29, 2014. While on bond, Smith was required to appear in court once per month and to request permission before leaving Illinois. Smith contends his bond conditions diminished his employment prospects and that he experienced financial stress and emotional anxiety. He was acquitted on July 21, 2016. On July 18, 2018, Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit as untimely under a two-year limitations period, rejecting Smith’s argument that his claim accrued when he was acquitted at trial. A Fourth Amendment claim such as Smith’s accrues when he is released from detention. The court also rejected Smith’s contention that his bond conditions constituted an ongoing Fourth Amendment seizure, so he was not released from custody until he was acquitted. Requirements to appear in court for a hearing and to request permission before leaving the state, taken together or separately, do not amount to Fourth Amendment seizures. View "Smith v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

“Teddy” lived in Los Angeles and supplied local distributors with drugs delivered through the U.S. Postal Service. The FBI used a confidential informant to conduct multiple controlled drug purchases from Teddy; obtained court authorization to intercept the phone calls and text messages; and determined that “Porky,” was supplying drugs to Teddy from Mexico. Alvarez-Carvajal, Porky’s father, served as a drug and cash courier in this operation,Alvarez-Carvajal and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Alvarez-Carvajal testified that Teddy gave him money to help Porky during his time in jail and again when Porky was kidnapped in Mexico; while he knew Porky and Teddy were drug dealers, he had no intentional involvement in the drug-distribution conspiracy. Alvarez-Carvajal’s testimony conflicted with that of cooperating witnesses.The jury found Alvarez-Carvajal guilty but did not find that Alvarez-Carvajal had testified falsely; no perjury charges were brought. Applying a two-offense-level increase because Alvarez-Carvajal “stored and allowed [methamphetamine] to be stored at his residence” and another two-level increase for obstruction of justice because Alvarez-Carvajal “testified falsely,” the PSR recommended a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Without the enhancements, his range was 235-293 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 240-month sentence. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district court made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of its Guidelines calculation. View "United States v. Alvarez-Carvajal" on Justia Law

Olvera’s conviction stems from the 2000, death of Stropes during a gang-related drive-by shooting in East Moline. Olvera’s codefendant, Delgado, fired the shot. Olvera was the driver of the vehicle and did not fire any shots that evening. Delgado pleaded guilty to murder. At Olvera’s trial, his girlfriend and others testified that the shooting arose out of an incident at a party. Olvera unsuccessfully sought state court post-conviction review, claiming that his trial counsel had failed to “contact or call” several witnesses “whose testimony would have been of significant benefit to him.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Olvera’s petition for federal habeas relief. The state court’s articulation of the Strickland standard was not contrary to the Supreme Court’s clearly established law. The state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland when it concluded that affidavits submitted by the potential witnesses identified by Olvera failed to demonstrate prejudice or failed to demonstrate deficient performance. The court noted the overwhelming evidence supporting the state’s accountability theory and precluding Olvera’s claim of self-defense that was “left untouched.” View "Olvera v. Gomez" on Justia Law