Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1984, Kidd stabbed four people to death in a Chicago apartment. The building was then set on fire. Officers arrested Kidd and Kidd’s half-brother, Orange. Kidd made statements that implicated himself and identified Orange as the primary perpetrator and led the police to a knife stained with a victim’s blood. At Orange’s trial, Kidd voluntarily testified that he alone committed the murders. Months later, Kidd pled guilty to the murders. He testified at his sentencing hearing that he stabbed all four victims.On remand in 1992, Kidd moved to suppress his statements from the night of the murders as an unlawfully coerced confession, claiming various acts of torture by the police, that he was under the influence of drugs when he made the statement .and that the police refused to let him contact a lawyer. At a hearing, Kidd did not testify, but the officers denied Kidd’s allegations. The court denied his motion. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Kidd filed an unsuccessful state postconviction petition alleging that he was abused by the police, including former Chicago Officer Burge, who was found in other cases to have abused many people around the time of Kidd’s arrest.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Kidd’s federal habeas petition. Even if the allegedly coerced confession was improperly admitted at Kidd’s trial, the admission did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. View "Kidd v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers responded to a call of shots fired near a residence, canvassed the area, and, minutes after the shots were fired, came upon Lowe running in an alley. In the alley Lowe had just traversed, other officers noticed a partially opened dumpster; they found a pistol on top of the garbage. Ballistics revealed that the handgun had fired the shots near the residence. No physical or biological evidence conclusively linked Lowe to the gun, cartridge casings, or fired bullets found at the scene. Security video footage from the alley showed someone running from the residence and throwing a gun-shaped object into the dumpster, with the same clothes, backpack, and tattoo as Lowe.Lowe was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). During a jury poll, the court asked each juror whether the verdict “constitute[s] your individual verdict in all respects.” Juror Eleven answered, “Yes. Barely.” The court responded, “You said yes?” The juror replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The court stated: “Juror [Eleven], who was a lawyer, did not indicate disagreement with the verdict; he simply indicated that he found the government’s evidence to be minimally sufficient to carry its burden.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Lowe’s conviction and 90-month sentence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony that referred to the prior shooting. The juror’s answer was not equivocal. View "United States v. Lowe" on Justia Law

In 2008, Canfield was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release for knowingly possessing child pornography. Canfield’s first years of supervision went without incident. The district court later modified conditions of and extended Canfield’s supervised release based Canfield’s use of unauthorized smartphones to view adult pornography and his purchase of DVDs containing adult pornography. The district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release in 2017 for failure to participate in sex offender treatment and unauthorized contact with a person under the age of 18.A 2020 revocation petition alleged that two minor females had lived at Canfield’s apartment for several days. Canfield was also charged with violations of Illinois sex-offender registration laws. The probation office memo indicated that the applicable sentencing options were “[n]ot less than 5 years to life.” Canfield’s attorney noted that she had reviewed the petitions and violation memorandum with Canfield; the court recited the applicable penalties. Canfield confirmed he had reviewed the report. In response to his guilty plea, the district court revoked Canfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment and an additional five years’ supervised release. Both government and defense counsel referred to the five-year supervised release term as “mandatory.” Canfield waived a reading of the conditions of supervision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Canfield had ample advance notice of the terms of his supervised release and was given a meaningful opportunity to object, His actions amount to waiver. View "United States v. Canfield" on Justia Law

Roush, pled guilty to transportation and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1), and 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment on Count I and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count II, followed by 10 years of supervised release.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in failing to properly identify the Guidelines range and in failing to consider his primary arguments in mitigation before imposing the sentence. The court recognized the proper Guidelines range, which is confirmed in its post-sentencing statement of reasons, and awarded the two-level deduction for acceptance of responsibility, which was the only deduction available to Roush. The court held that Roush’s base offense level was 22, and applied a two-level increase because the offense involved images of minor children as young as five years old; a five-level increase because Roush distributed child pornography in exchange for valuable consideration but not for pecuniary gain; a four-level increase because Roush possessed images that portrayed sadistic conduct or other depictions of violence; and a five-level increase because Roush was responsible for possessing at least 21 video files which represent 1,575 images of child pornography. The court considered and denied Roush’s objections to specific enhancements. View "United States v. Roush" on Justia Law

Leal used an online dating application to contact a user who was an undercover FBI agent, posing as a teenage boy. Despite learning that the user was underage, Leal engaged in sexually explicit conversations and solicited oral sex. The agent provided Leal an address. Under surveillance, Leal arrived at the house. When a surveillance officer drove an unmarked vehicle up the alley, Leal sped off. Leal was quickly pulled over. Three officers were present, wearing clothes that identified them as officers. Leal was told that he was not under arrest and agreed to speak with other agents in the house. Leal consented to a pat-down and surrendered his cell phone and his car keys. The recorded interview proceeded with the door closed. The agents neither handcuffed nor restrained Leal. Leal quickly confessed and confirmed he had sent the messages. After the 18-minute interview, the FBI arrested Leal for knowingly attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of Leal’s motion to suppress his statements. The agents did not conduct a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Fifth Amendment rights. The custody inquiry is not whether the defendant was under a subjective belief that his movements were restricted, but whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would believe that he was free to leave. That Leal believed he was in a precarious position says nothing about the officers' behavior or whether a reasonable person would have felt bound to stay. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Frazier, age 45, reported to the jail to begin a sentence for felony theft. Frazier informed the intake officer that she was epileptic, had blackouts and high blood pressure, and had used heroin the night before; that year she had experienced a stroke. Frazier got a “medical designation,” which meant that an officer would check on Frazier at least every 15 minutes. At health evaluations, hours later, she did not report pain or withdrawal symptoms. At 2:30 a.m., Frazier began groaning. Correctional officers responded several times, but Frazier did not describe her problem. Around 9:00 a.m., a nurse spoke with Frazier, who did not voice any complaints nor display signs of distress. Around 11:00 a.m., Frazier was evaluated as having “mild withdrawal.” A doctor prescribed heroin withdrawal medications. At 3:23 p.m., security footage shows Frazier removing (Advil or Aleve) pills from her toiletry bag and placing them in her mouth. Minutes later, Frazier had a seizure. An officer found Frazier unresponsive at 5:11 p.m. and called emergency personnel. Frazier was pronounced dead. A coroner determined that Frazier died of “diphenhydramine toxicity.” Frazier had smuggled the medication into the jail.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. There is no evidence that corrections officers were aware of the risk of substantial harm that Frazier ultimately suffered— death from diphenhydramine toxicity. No reasonable jury could conclude that they were deliberately indifferent to Frazier’s heroin withdrawal. View "Jones v. Mathews" on Justia Law

In 2008, pursuant to a plea agreement, Fowowe pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine. The district court determined that Fowowe’s sentencing range was a statutory mandatory minimum of life imprisonment and sentenced Fowowe to 262 months’ imprisonment. In 2015, Fowowe sought a reduced sentence pursuant to Amendment 782 to the federal sentencing guidelines, to which the government agreed; the district court reduced Fowowe’s sentence to 235 months.Although the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 had reduced the amount and kind of punishment for crack cocaine convictions like Fowowe’s, the changes only became retroactive with the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Fowowe unsuccessfully requested a reduced prison sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, rejecting Fowowe’s argument that the district court’s evaluation of his request was deficient because the court failed to apply a 2020 Seventh Circuit decision concerning sentencing enhancements for prior cocaine convictions. Section 404(b) authorizes but does not require district courts to apply an intervening judicial decision in evaluating First Step Act motions. View "United States v. Fowowe" on Justia Law

Cook County inmate Bowers filed a federal civil rights lawsuit after other inmates attacked him in 2012, alleging the defendants failed to protect him, instituted an observation policy that caused the attack, and later discriminated against him because of a resulting disability. Bowers remains in a wheelchair. The jail is short on ADA‐ compliant cells, however, and, save for one month, Bowers has lived in cells without accessible showers or toilets. The district court dismissed most of Bowers’s claims before trial. A jury returned a verdict in the Sheriff’s favor on the remaining claims,The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bowers, before filing suit, did not exhaust his failure‐ to‐protect claims as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). Bowers prison grievances did not assert the same claims as his complaint; his “Monell” claim was untimely. A reasonable jury could find that Bowers is not a qualified individual with a disability--someone who has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities,” has “a record of such an impairment,” or is “being regarded as having such an impairment,” 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). The jury had sufficient evidence to find that Bowers lied about needing a wheelchair. View "Bowers v. Dart" on Justia Law

Officer Cowick’s informant informed Cowick that she believed that Gholston was about to pick up large quantities of methamphetamine using his green pickup truck. At least three months later, Cowick spotted Gholston’s green pickup truck, followed Gholston, and activated his lights when Gholston turned without using a signal. Gholston parked and was walking away, which heightened Cowick’s suspicions but eventually returned. Cowick handcuffed Gholston at 12:18 am and began writing a ticket. Dispatch informed Cowick that Gholston’s ID was valid but that he had a Notice of Violation for improperly parking over a year earlier. At 12:24:23 am, Cowick called for a K9 officer, Saalborn, and requested assistance in delivering the Notice to the traffic stop. Sargent Elbus responded that he could bring the Notice. Cowick told Elbus, “take your time!!” because he was “trying to get” Saalborn While completing the ticket, Cowick continued to urge Elbus to move slowly and to urge Saalborn to “drive fast.” Cowick printed Gholston’s ticket at 12:32:27, then realized that he had not asked Gholston for insurance information. Gholston did not have proof of insurance. Cowick returned to his car to write another ticket. As Cowick was finishing that ticket, Saalborn arrived; his drug-sniffing dog alerted as the ticket was printing. The officers searched the truck and discovered nine grams of methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Gholston’s motion to suppress. Cowick did not unreasonably extend the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment; his failure to request Gholston’s insurance information at the start of the stop was a good-faith blunder. View "United States v. Gholston" on Justia Law

McHaney participated in at least four armed cellular phone store robberies around Chicago. While attempting a fifth, he was arrested. He was charged with Hobbs Act conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)); four counts of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)); attempted Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)); three counts of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)); using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)); and possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court denied McHaney’s motion to dismiss the 18 U.S.C. 924(c) counts, finding that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). McHaney entered into a plea agreement and was sentenced to 177 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to reject its precedent that Hobbs Act robbery meets the definition of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and is a qualifying predicate crime under the statute. Putting any person in fear in the context of robbery necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” “Every other court of appeals to have considered this agrees with this conclusion.” View "United States v. McHaney" on Justia Law