Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Reyes was convicted of several federal crimes stemming from the armed robbery of a credit union, including brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), He was sentenced as a career offender based on his prior convictions for burglary, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted murder under Illinois state law. After Reyes was convicted, the Supreme Court issued decisions interpreting statutory definitions of “crime of violence,” holding that “residual clauses” in several statutes are unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, Reyes brought a second collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting that this emerging case law rendered his conviction and sentence unconstitutional. The district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability concerning the conviction for brandishing a firearm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury was properly instructed. The instruction did not treat Reyes’ conspiracy conviction as a predicate for his colleagues’ brandishing of the firearm. That the brandishing (and robbery) occurred in furtherance of the conspiracy was a necessary but not sufficient condition for Reyes’ conviction under section 924(c). The instruction explained that the government still had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reyes’ colleague brandished the gun in furtherance of a crime of violence--the robbery. View "Reyes v. United States" on Justia Law

Hodkiewicz’s pregnant wife, S.P., reported that Hodkiewicz was abusing her. Hodkiewicz filed for divorce. For the next three years, S.P. endured vandalism, ominous notes. and assaults that resulted in emergency room visits. Hodkiewicz denied involvement and little evidence implicated him other than S.P.’s word. S.P. received 146 calls and harassing text messages. She testified to recognizing Hodkiewicz’s voice. The phone number used to activate the TracFone from which the calls originated belonged to Hodkiewicz's employer. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement. In 2013, Hodkiewicz was charged with stalking, placed on probation, and told to have no contact with S.P. S.P. later walked into her bathroom and was suddenly choked from behind and lost consciousness. Hodkiewicz again denied involvement.A jury convicted Hodkiewicz, who was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. A Wisconsin trial court denied his post-conviction motions, finding that Hodkiewicz failed to prove that his trial attorney was ineffective. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed his convictions for unlawful use of a telephone and disorderly conduct “because his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to hearsay testimony that S.P. received a particular call on her work phone but affirmed his remaining convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, agreeing that Hodkiewicz could not show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome. The jury heard 35 witnesses and had ample evidence to assess S.P.’s credibility. View "Hodkiewicz v. Buesgen" on Justia Law

Elgin met Garbutt at an international convention. Garbutt, who holds dual citizenship, moved from Belize into Elgin’s Gary, Indiana home and worked on her successful campaign to become Trustee of Calumet Township. Elgin hired Garbutt to work at the Trustee’s Office as her “executive aide” at a salary of $60,000 per year. Garbutt’s unofficial duties included Elgin’s political campaign work. He understood that he should not perform political work at the Township Office but began to do so. Elgin also hired her friend Shelton, who also worked on Elgin’s campaign. Elgin and Garbutt had a falling out. Elgin demoted Garbutt, docked his salary barred him from attending meetings, and took away his government car. Garbutt eventually began a partnership with an FBI agent who directed him to conduct warrantless searches of his co‐workers’ offices.Elgin took a plea deal, Shelton was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, after learning, mid‐trial, about the warrantless searches. The district court denied Shelton's post‐trial motion for relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that Shelton lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy in her office. Garbutt’s document collection, undertaken at the direction of the FBI, violated her Fourth Amendment rights. No warrant would have issued without the information gathered as a result of the unlawful searches; the evidence obtained from the search authorized by that warrant should have been suppressed. View "United States v. Shelton" on Justia Law

In 2012, Grzegorczyk hired two men to kill his ex-wife and others whom he deemed responsible for his divorce and the loss of custody of his son. The men he hired were undercover law enforcement officers. During a final meeting, Grzegorczyk gave the undercover officers $3,000 in cash, and showed them pictures, $45,000 in cash that he intended to pay upon completion of the murders, a semi-automatic handgun, and ammunition. Grzegorczyk was arrested.In 2014, Grzegorczyk pled guilty to murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. 1958(a) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)., Grzegorczyk waived the right to “all appellate issues that might have been available if he had exercised his right to trial”; he could only appeal the validity of his guilty plea and the sentence imposed. The district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 151 months, with consecutive 60 months for the firearm offense, which was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court then invalidated the definition of a “violent felony” under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (Johnson decision), later extending the holding to section 924(c)'s residual clause definition of “crime of violence.”Grzegorczyk sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 from his 924(c) conviction. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Grzegorczyk has long unconditionally waived his right to contest the validity of his plea agreement and the legal sufficiency of the 924(c) charge. View "Grzegorczyk v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, Guenther was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the penalty for that offense to a 15-year minimum and a maximum of life in prison if the defendant has three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” Guenther’s PSR identified two convictions for first-degree burglary (1990 and 1992), second-degree burglary (1986), and kidnapping (1990), all under Minnesota law. The judge applied ACCA and sentenced him to 327 months. His Eighth Circuit direct appeal failed as did his petition for collateral review under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In 2017, incarcerated in Wisconsin, Guenther sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that his Minnesota burglary convictions are not “violent felonies”The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief. A section 2255 motion in the sentencing court is normally the exclusive method to collaterally attack a federal sentence, but the “saving clause,” 2255(e) provides a limited exception, allowing a prisoner to seek section 2241 relief in the district of confinement if “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit applies the exception when the prisoner relies on an intervening statutory decision announcing a new, retroactive rule that could not have been invoked in his first section 2255 motion and the error is serious enough to amount to a miscarriage of justice. Guenther’s Minnesota burglary convictions are not ACCA predicates under Seventh Circuit law. View "Guenther v. Marske" on Justia Law

Triplett pleaded guilty to three charges of human trafficking, pimping and pandering, and possession of a firearm by a felon, in exchange for the dismissal of 17 charges (including attempted first-degree homicide and kidnapping), which were to be “read-in” at sentencing (essentially allowing the judge to consider them as relevant conduct), Triplett’s total sentencing exposure was reduced from 354 years to a maximum of 47.5 years. The judge confirmed with defense counsel that the dismissed charges would be read-in. Defense counsel noted that Triplett did not admit the truth of the charges. In signing his plea agreement, Triplett acknowledged that “although the judge may consider read-in charges when imposing sentence, the maximum penalty will not be increased.” The judge ordered Triplett to serve 11 years in prison followed by nine years of supervision.Triplett unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his plea. Without conducting a hearing, the court determined that even if Triplett was given incorrect advice about the read-charges, Triplett was not prejudiced. The plea questionnaire and waiver of rights warned Triplett that the court could consider those charges. The court also represented that it had not considered the read-in charges at sentencing. Wisconsin's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The Wisconsin court’s rejection of Triplett's ineffectiveness claim rests on an adequate, independent state ground--Triplett’s failure to allege objective facts in support of his claim of prejudice. View "Triplett v. McDermott" on Justia Law

S.B., a 16-year-old girl from Illinois, communicated on the internet with Fredrickson, a 27-year-old man from Iowa. Their conversations turned sexually explicit. S.B., at Fredrickson’s request, sent him images and videos of herself. When Fredrickson sent flowers to S.B.’s high school, her mother became suspicious and discovered the relationship, later contacting police. A search of Fredrickson’s cell phone revealed he had been recording the videos and saving the images. Fredrickson possessed at least 15 sexually explicit videos of S.B. on his phone.Fredrickson was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. 2251(a): Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in … any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct … shall be punished … if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate" commerce.Fredrickson unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, arguing that under Illinois and Iowa state laws, he could have lawfully viewed S.B. making the videos in person and that 2251(a) criminalized protected expressive speech. Convicted, Fredrickson was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Child pornography’s exclusion from the First Amendment’s protection does not hinge on state law. View "United States v. Fredrickson" on Justia Law

Stivers pled guilty to receiving, possessing, and distributing child pornography and was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Because the parties disputed the restitution amount, the court deferred its restitution decision and allowed the parties to submit additional briefing. Stivers did not object. Months later, once the briefs were submitted, the court entered a written order overruling Stivers’s objections to the government’s proposed restitution calculation and ordering Stivers to pay $3,000 in restitution. Stivers argued that by ordering restitution in his absence the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43's requirement that “the defendant must be present at … sentencing.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 43 does not apply to the restitution order in this case, which was entered under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, 18 U.S.C. 2259. Restitution awards under this Act are subject to the procedures of 18 U.S.C. 3664, which permits a court to delay the “final determination of the victim’s losses” for up to “90 days after sentencing” if the losses are “not ascertainable” ten days before sentencing. Congress can supersede federal rules by statute and section 3664(c) supersedes Rule 43(a)(3) based on the plain language of the statute. View "United States v. Stivers" on Justia Law

Police saw Carswell driving a Porsche over 100 miles per hour through a 45 mph zone of New Haven, Indiana. When police stopped him, he gave his home address. Law enforcement had suspected Carswell of drug dealing but had not determined where he lived. After ATF Officer Anderson learned of Carswell’s arrest, he carried out surveillance for four days, then obtained a warrant to search the residence for evidence of drug trafficking and unlawful possession of a firearm. The supporting affidavit cited: a trash pull from Carswell’s driveway that turned up evidence of drugs, drug packaging materials, and a firearm purchase; Carswell’s prior drug-related activity; and a tip from a recently-arrested drug dealer who identięed Carswell as his supplier. Officers confiscated 64 grams of heroin, five cell phones, $25,000 in cash, firearms, and ammunition, and drug packaging materials, including two digital scales that field-tested positive for cocaine and a machete laced with marijuana residue.Carswell was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and a firearms offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge who issued the search warrant had a reasonable basis for thinking evidence of drug and firearm crimes was likely to be found at Carswell’s home. The prosecution’s closing arguments were not improper, did not make Carswell’s trial unfair, and did not deny him due process. View "United States v. Carswell" on Justia Law

An Illinois jury convicted Evans of the first-degree murder of Williams, who was killed in a Chicago drive-by shooting. Only one eyewitness, Jeffers, connected Evans to the shooting. Jeffers initially only provided a few general identifying details of the shooter and did not specifically identify any shooter. Eleven months later, the police approached him while he was incarcerated; Jeffers then identified Evans as the shooter. At trial, Jeffers recanted that identification: he testified that he did not see the identity of the shooter but had identified Evans because the police told him to. During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued that Jeffers’s trial testimony was false and the jury should disbelieve it because Jeffers only changed his story after being paid a visit by a defense investigator working for Evans’s co-defendant, who was a known gang member.The state appellate court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the prosecutor’s closing argument statements, so they were not improper. Evans unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed an order granting federal habeas relief. The state appellate court’s determination that the prosecutor’s statements were proper was objectively unreasonable. The facts compel the conclusion that Evans was deprived of his right to a fair trial. View "Evans v. Jones" on Justia Law