Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Mandacina was sentenced to life imprisonment for paying to kill a potential witness in a criminal case. His conviction and sentence were affirmed in 1995. Mandacina filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 collateral attack. While his appeal was pending, he attempted to add a contention that the prosecutor failed to produce information that a trial witness—FBI agent Craft—had committed misconduct in other cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed without discussing that contention. Mandacina requested permission to pursue a second 2255 collateral challenge based on information about Craft. The Eighth Circuit denied the request in 2005. Mandacina sought a 28 U.S.C. 2241 writ of habeas corpus, based on the same considerations presented to the Eighth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the petition is blocked by section 2255(e), which says that habeas relief is unavailable unless it appears that the remedy under 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of the detention. Mandacina does not contend that Craft engaged in misconduct while investigating or testifying in his prosecution and did not contend that the prosecutors knew of Craft’s misconduct. Brady claims concerning potential impeachment evidence are routinely decided under section 2255. That Mandacina did not previously succeed does not make section 2255 inadequate or ineffective, nor is a prisoner entitled to section 2241 review just because the court did not write an opinion. “We do not use section 2241 to regulate how our colleagues in other circuits handle their business.” View "Mandacina v. Entzel" on Justia Law

In July 2009, two people approached a van and opened fire. Patel died; Fernandez was shot but recovered; Russell was not hit. Detectives swore that Russell and Fernandez named Kuri and Gomez as the assailants and that both witnesses had selected their pictures from a photo array. That was the basis of Kuri’s arrest, detention, and prosecution; police lacked any physical evidence such as fingerprints, DNA, or a link between Kuri and the gun. Russell and Fernandez testified at the criminal trial and at the subsequent civil trial that they had not identified Kuri as an assailant, even after the detectives directed them to do so, and that the detectives had made up that accusation. Russell and Fernandez contradicted themselves and changed their statements several times. Kuri spent three years in jail before and during the murder trial. After his acquittal, he sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict of $4 million in compensatory damages plus $50,000 in punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that only a violation of the Fourth Amendment could support relief, and that, as a matter of law, Kuri’s arrest and detention were supported by probable cause. Once the jury decided to believe the victims that the detectives were lying, that left his arrest and detention without support. A Fourth Amendment theory based on lack of probable cause survives a judicial decision holding a suspect in custody. View "Kuri v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Law operated three Indiana massage spas that offered sex services. HV and XC were Law’s “employees.” HV was born in Vietnam, knew limited English, and knew no one else in this country. XC traveled from China to Chicago with few personal contacts, almost no money, and knowing little English, believing she would be providing non-sexual massages. HV testified she serviced six to nine men over a 15-hour workday. Law prevented the women from leaving the spa unaccompanied, declined to pay them hourly wages, provided only one meal each day, confiscated their passports, and monitored their activities using security cameras. Law did nothing in response to XC enduring violent treatment by a spa customer and forced HV to work hours after suffering a miscarriage. From information obtained in interviews of HV and XC after a sting operation, Hong Kong authorities arrested Law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed her convictions for trafficking XC and HV for involuntary servitude, 18 U.S.C. 1590(a) and 18 U.S.C. 2; transporting XC for the purpose of prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2421 and 18 U.S.C. 2; and using an interstate facility to promote prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and her 360-month sentence. The court rejected hearsay arguments concerning the testimony of agents at Law’s trial, noting the judge’s limiting instruction, and upheld the admission of an affidavit signed by Law. View "United States v. Law" on Justia Law

Coleman is serving a 45-year sentence for attempting to murder Dye. He was tried twice. The first jury acquitted him of murdering Jackson during the same incident but could not reach a unanimous verdict on the charge of attempted murder. The events were captured by a surveillance camera. By the time Coleman shot Jackson, Dye was on the ground with two bullets in him and Jackson had opened fire at Coleman. Coleman cited the Double Jeopardy Clause, arguing that the first jury must have found that he acted in self-defense when killing Jackson and that this conclusion necessarily applies to Dye. Coleman also argued ineffective assistance at the second trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. It does not require any deference to conclude that Coleman’s acquittal on the murder charge does not establish self-defense in Dye's shooting. Coleman shot Dye twice, including once after he was on the ground. Applying the “Strickland” standard, the court concluded that counsel’s overall performance was admirable. Dye testified at both trials. His testimony was subtly different; Coleman’s lawyer did not try to impeach Dye at the second trial. Counsel may have felt that pointing out such modest inconsistencies would have been nitpicky. That judgment call did not result in prejudice, in light of the video. View "Coleman v. Neal" on Justia Law

In 1997, for his participation (at age 18) in a deadly kidnapping scheme to collect drug debts, Ruiz was convicted of conspiracy to commit racketeering, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping resulting in death, assaulting a federal officer, four counts of violating the Hostage Act, including one count resulting in death, and three counts of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The indictment listed a different predicate offense for each section 924(c) count: the underlying conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, and assault on a federal officer charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his seven concurrent life sentences plus a consecutive term of 45 years for using a firearm during the underlying crimes of violence.Ruiz made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge his sentence through 28 U.S.C. 2255 and 2241. After the Supreme Court invalided as unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, one of the Act’s alternative definitions for a predicate “violent felony,” Ruiz obtained permission (28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3_) to file a new collateral attack, contending that the residual clause of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague and that his predicate offenses otherwise did not count as crimes of violence under section 924(c)’s elements clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ruiz’s petition on harmless error grounds; any error in his section 924(c) convictions would have no effect on Ruiz’s seven life sentences. View "Ruiz v. United States" on Justia Law

Informants reported that Slone was selling methamphetamine out of his basement apartment in Dillon's house. In that basement, agents found two guns, 80 grams of meth, and paperwork in Slone’s name. Dillon stated that Slone had recently moved out, leaving his possessions and that Slone sold meth. Agents later found Slone staying with a friend. A search revealed a small amount of meth and a scale in the apartment, and a revolver in the friend’s van, which she said Slone had borrowed. Slone admitted that he had dealt meth, stayed in Dillon’s basement, and had purchased the guns.Slone was charged with possession with intent to distribute the 80 grams of methamphetamine, and illegally possessing firearms as a felon (non-payment of child support), 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A jury acquitted Slone on the drug charge but convicted him on the firearm charge. The court sentenced him to 41 months’ imprisonment, based on a guidelines range of 41–51 months, adding two offense levels for obstruction of justice, based on perjury, and a four-level enhancement, concluding that Slone possessed the firearms “in connection with” the felony offense of meth trafficking. The court found that the guns potentially facilitated distribution regardless of whether the 80 grams seized were Slone’s and stated that, even if the enhancement did not apply, it would impose the same 41-month sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government did not need to show that Slone ever carried or brandished the gun during a sale; a gun that is available to protect a drug stash has the potential of facilitating drug trafficking. View "United States v. Slone" on Justia Law

In 2012, Berrios was charged with Hobbs Act robbery in connection with an armed robbery of a Chicago AT&T store. The next day, as Berrios and his associate were preparing to rob a currency exchange, the FBI conducted a traffic stop and arrested Berrios without a warrant. During a search incident to that arrest, the agents recovered a Samsung phone and other items including a BB gun that Berrios’ group had used in a series of robberies. The FBI conducted a warrantless search of the phone, downloading the contacts, call logs, text messages, and photographs. Some photos showed Berrios with his co-defendants. The government later admitted that the phone search was illegal but argued that the law at the time of the search did not prohibit it, so the "Davis" good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The other evidence at trial included co-defendant testimony, Berrios’s post-arrest statements, a recorded call that Berrios made from jail, surveillance videos, victim testimony, and the other items recovered from the car.A jury convicted Berrios on all counts; he was sentenced to a total term of 360 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and the convictions. Stating that it “was a close call,” the court concluded that although there was no binding precedent that would have exempted this search from the exclusionary rule, the independent-source rule allowed the admission of the limited evidence the government used. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Illinois law enforcement agents received a tip from a confidential source claiming that Smith had been dealing methamphetamine in Mattoon. The agents conducted controlled buys between Smith and the source and requested that a patrol officer stop Smith’s vehicle. The officer stopped the vehicle for “extremely dark window tinting,” and learned that Smith’s license was suspended. There was a 10-minute wait for batteries for the device to measure the tint. The officer then searched the vehicle and found marijuana, a marijuana grinder, and a firearm.Represented by court-appointed counsel, Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm as a felon. He then sought to retract his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied Smith’s motion, rejected his request for an evidentiary hearing, and sentenced him to 214 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Smith cannot establish that he would have succeeded on a motion to suppress the firearm evidence and did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s pressure to accept a plea, he would not have pleaded guilty. There is no evidence that appointed counsel made a misrepresentation or that suggests his unfamiliarity with the case. The court correctly applied the career offender enhancement to Smith’s sentence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Perry suffers from serious mental illness defined by two suicide attempts, severe depression, paranoid schizophrenia, and auditory hallucinations. He is serving a 70-year sentence for murdering his former wife during a fit of paranoia in 2013. In 2016, while housed in the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in southern Indiana, Perry’s condition worsened. He refused all medication, stopped eating because he feared someone had poisoned his food, renewed his conspiracy claims against the Wabash medical staff, and threatened to kill himself if left in his cell any longer. A medical review and administrative hearing culminated in a decision to forcibly administer the antipsychotic medication Haldol. Injections continued for about six months.Perry later sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the forcible medication violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied Perry’s request to appoint counsel, finding that Perry understood his case and quite ably prosecuted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The defendants attended carefully to Perry’s health and safety. The Facility’s Review Committee had enough evidence to demonstrate that Perry was a danger to himself or others so as to justify the involuntary administration of Haldol. View "Perry v. Sims" on Justia Law

The Roque drug trafficking organization moved more than 1,500 kilograms of cocaine and 100 kilograms of heroin from Mexico to Chicago for distribution and sale. The district judge stated that she had never seen “the level of drugs that were pumped into Chicago” by this criminal enterprise.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences of seven Roque organization defendants, ranging from 150 to 420 months’ imprisonment. The court rejected arguments that the district court misinterpreted the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6) and failed to adequately consider their arguments on that issue. The court upheld the imposition of enhancements for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1), for two defendants. The district court committed no error, properly avoided unwarranted sentencing disparities, correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines, and appropriately imposed supervised release conditions, with one minor exception relating to a condition concerning the consumption of alcohol. View "United States v. Cervantes" on Justia Law