Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Two armed men robbed three cash-and-check stores. Jett and McKissick were convicted of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and attempted bank robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” section 2113(a). The government alleged four “overt acts” for Count 1: three completed robberies and an attempted fourth robbery The defendants had unsuccessfully moved for a special verdict form requiring the jury to find unanimously that the defendants had committed one specific overt act. The district court sentenced each to 293 months’ imprisonment, based on a Guidelines range of 235-293 months, repeatedly commenting on the strength of the evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed the attempted-robbery convictions because there was no evidence of force, violence, or intimidation, but otherwise affirmed, stating “Hobbs Act conspiracy does not have an overt-act requirement.” On remand, a probation officer calculated the defendants’ advisory Guidelines ranges as 188-235 months. Although Count 2 was gone, the defendants’ total offense levels were still 33, using a grouping analysis and multiple-count adjustment based on the three robberies and the attempted robbery. The defendants’ criminal history categories were lower because of intervening precedent.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 230-month sentences imposed on remand. The district court erred by using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and not the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, to decide whether the defendants conspired to commit the “object offenses” of the conspiracy but the error was harmless. The court adequately explained increasing their sentences on the conspiracy count. View "United States v. Jett" on Justia Law

Norwood met a 15‐year‐old girl, a runaway from a state facility, at an Indianapolis gas station. Using drugs, violence, threats, and manipulative affection, he enticed her to have sexual intercourse with him and then prostituted her to countless men. A jury convicted him of attempted transportation of a minor across state lines with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and (e). The district court sentenced him to 330 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Norwood’s efforts to prostitute the victim before attempting to transport her to Wisconsin was sufficient evidence of his intent to continue prostituting her once they crossed state lines. The court upheld the admission of the victim’s medical records; the victim’s statements about what had happened and when were for the primary purpose of medical treatment. They are non-testimonial. The court also upheld the admission of a recorded jail call in which Norwood talked about “pimping” a young “white girl” to whom he had given cocaine. By arguing that the victim had sex with five men per day because that was what Norwood intended, the government simply asked the jury to draw a reasonable inference from the evidence. The court rejected a challenge involving a juror and affirmed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence and the application of the five‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G 4B1.5(b). View "United States v. Norwood" on Justia Law

Wyatt pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic a minor, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). The government promised to recommend a below-Guidelines sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and to notify the court about his post-plea cooperation. Wyatt’s recommended sentencing range was 262-327 months. At sentencing, Wyatt described how he had “turned his life around” and requested a three-year sentence but reiterated that he wanted to stand by his plea agreement. The government recommended a 10-year sentence but it was defense counsel, not the prosecution, that told the court about Wyatt’s cooperation.Wyatt did not object and received the recommended sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the government’s silence breached the plea agreement, Wyatt did not show a reasonable probability that the breach had any effect on his sentence. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

During a 2005 traffic stop, officers searched Hogsett’s vehicle and discovered crack cocaine and a firearm. A jury convicted Hogsett of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), possessing with intent to distribute 0.5 grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). The court found that Hogsett’s relevant conduct was approximately 21.5 grams of crack cocaine (0.5 grams from the vehicle search and 21 grams from prior, noncharged instances of trafficking) and sentenced him to 355 months’ imprisonment: 295 months on Count 1, 240 months concurrently on Count 2, and 60 months consecutively on Count 3. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently reduced the crack-to-powder penalty disparity from 100:1 to 18:1; Congress made this reduction retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, permitting district courts to reduce the sentences of defendants convicted of a “covered offense” before August 3, 2010.In 2019, Hogsett sought resentencing. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) is a covered offense. View "United States v. Hogsett" on Justia Law

Donald has glaucoma and keratoconus, a thinning of the cornea that causes distorted vision. To treat his keratoconus, Donald had left-eye corneal transplant surgery in 2011. A few years later, Donald was convicted of drug crimes. He began his prison sentence at Illinois River Correctional Facility in 2014. His eye problems started flaring up, causing redness and poor vision. He was subsequently seen by Illinois River’s optometrists and at Illinois Eye Center several times. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with a rupture of the globe, an irreversible loss of vision in his left eye. After surgery, pathological tests revealed that the infection that led to the ruptured globe was caused by bacteria that can act very quickly and cause perforation in as few as 72 hours. Donald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence shows that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference toward an objectively serious medical condition and the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction to dispose of the malpractice claim. View "Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2016 agents found Barrett with nearly 15,000 images and 2,450 videos of child pornography. A search of his computer also uncovered a “Pedophile’s Handbook.” Barrett pled guilty to possessing child pornography under a plea agreement with a provision waiving any appellate challenge “on any ground” to “all components” of his sentence. Barrett confirmed that he understood the waiver during his plea colloquy. The district court sentenced Barrett to 97 months’ imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release. Barrett brought a First Amendment challenge to “Condition 31” of supervised release that will prevent him from viewing any material depicting “sexually explicit conduct,” defined in 18 U.S.C. 2256(2) to include adult pornography.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Barrett’s sentence, citing its previously-announced “clear and precise rule” that such conduct constitutes waiver, rendering the challenge unreviewable on appeal. Barrett confirmed at sentencing that he received advance notice of all 34 proposed conditions of supervised release and discussed them with his counsel. The district court invited objections; Barrett responded with several. The objections resulted in a colloquy with the judge and ended with rulings on each challenge. Barrett expressed no reservation with and asked no questions about, Condition 31. That Barrett asserts the First Amendment is irrelevant. View "United States v. Barrett" on Justia Law

In 1995, Sanders, age 15, forcibly entered his victims’ homes while they slept, suffocated and raped them, and then robbed them. His youngest victim lived in a foster home. Another had given birth only a few weeks earlier. Sanders admitted that he committed his crimes near the first of the month, believing the victims would have just received public assistance checks. Fingerprints recovered from three homes led the police to Sanders. Charged as an adult with five counts of sexual assault and one count of armed robbery, Sanders entered an Alford plea. Wisconsin courts rejected Sanders’s argument that his Alford plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, then denied post‐conviction relief, rejecting ineffective assistance claims.In 2011, Sanders, who will be eligible for parole in 2030, sought federal habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, reviving his challenge to his Alford plea, and arguing that his sentence did not conform with the Supreme Court’s 2010 "Graham" holding, which requires that states give juvenile nonhomicide offenders “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” and that the sentencing court violated the Eighth Amendment by not considering his youth in sentencing him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Sanders, who will be eligible for parole in his early 50s, has not been denied a meaningful opportunity for release under the rule announced by the Supreme Court. View "Sanders v. Eckstein" on Justia Law

Smith stole a truck in Iowa, drove it across the Mississippi River into Illinois, crashed into a median, then fled, leaving a stolen handgun inside. He has a felony record and pled guilty to federal charges of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon and possession of stolen goods. The PSR recommended an enhanced offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2) based on Smith’s 2009 Iowa conviction for delivery of cocaine and a 2008 Iowa conviction for aggravated assault. Smith conceded the “controlled substance offense” but objected to counting the aggravated-assault conviction as a “crime of violence.” The judge overruled the objection and imposed a sentence of 115 months, the top of the advisory range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A “crime of violence” is an offense that has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). Under the Iowa Code, “[a] person who commits an assault ... and uses or displays a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault” is guilty of the crime of aggravated assault. Some variants of the simple assault offense do not require the use or threat of physical force but the section is divisible. Smith was convicted under a subsection that requires a threat of physical force; the judge properly relied on Smith’s 2008 aggravated-assault conviction to elevate his base offense. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Dunn slapped Schuckman in a bar's parking lot, causing him to fall to the ground. Witnesses reported seeing Schuckman upright and apparently unharmed afterward. Hours later, Schuckman was found dead on the bar’s patio. Dunn and Crochet were charged with felony murder, battery, and theft from a corpse. Dunn’s counsel consulted with a forensic pathologist. After viewing the medical examiner’s report, the pathologist believed that Schuckman died immediately from his head injuries—suggesting that Dunn’s slap could not have caused his death. Before trial, defense counsel repeatedly, erroneously, stated that the medical examiner had concluded that Schuckman died immediately from a fatal blow and would testify to that at trial. The medical examiner’s report did not contain such conclusions and counsel never confirmed them. The prosecutor informed Dunn’s counsel that Crochet had retained experts, who were going to produce reports that bolstered Dunn’s no-causation defense. The prosecution considered the reports exculpatory. Dunn’s counsel did not ask for a continuance or attempt to view the reports. At trial, defense counsel did not call his forensic pathologist as a witness. The medical examiner testified that there was no reason to think that Schuckman would have died immediately from the fatal head injury, and it would have been possible for Schuckman to move after sustaining this injury.The Seventh Circuit upheld an order granting federal habeas relief. Dunn’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and offer evidence to support a no-causation defense and Dunn was prejudiced by that deficient performance. View "Dunn v. Jess" on Justia Law

McDonald pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). He admitted to using his computer to send two emails with video attachments containing pornography depicting children as young as five and portraying “sadistic and masochistic conduct” and admitted to using a filesharing website to download child pornography. His hard drive contained approximately 5,000 images and 890 videos of child pornography.His guidelines range was 151-188 months’ imprisonment. The PSR recommended a reduction of three levels for acceptance of responsibility, even though McDonald insisted that he received the emails unintentionally and “wasn’t sure” if the content was illegal. McDonald sought a statutory minimum sentence of five years, arguing “[a]ny lengthy sentence may be a death sentence” because of his age (62-63), his type I diabetes, and two blocked arteries near his heart.The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 156-month sentence as being “in most part and significant part” based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the guidelines range. The court acknowledged McDonald’s medical reports and considered his age and medical conditions and how McDonald had served his family and community by caring for his parents and by rescuing animals. The court concluded that aggravating factors countervailed because McDonald possessed and distributed large amounts of child pornography, there were “significant” reasons to believe that McDonald would re-offend, McDonald had photographed neighborhood children, and he had wavered in accepting responsibility. View "United States v. McDonaldes" on Justia Law