Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Anderson participated in an Illinois conspiracy to distribute heroin that included a dealer, Mansini. In 2012, Reader, a 21-year-old addict, purchased and used heroin from another dealer. Later that day, Reader purchased an additional half-gram of heroin from Mansini, who had obtained it from Anderson. Reader used that heroin and was found dead that evening. According to the coroner’s report, the cause of death was “opiate intoxication.” The report did not attribute Reader’s death to one particular heroin dose or make findings on the incremental effects of other drugs. Anderson and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Three defendants, including Anderson, pleaded guilty. Anderson admitted to distributing the heroin that resulted in Reader’s death, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Anderson concurred with the plea agreement’s factual statements but told the court that he might have a factual defense to Reader’s death because Reader had bought heroin from other sources and used prescription drugs. The court sentenced him to 223 months’ imprisonment.Anderson's 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not adequately investigate the cause of Reader’s death and advise Anderson of the “but-for” causation standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 2014. Counsel responded that Anderson authorized her to proceed with plea negotiations without hiring a medical examiner and she was “not trained to interpret toxicology results” and “never discussed” the toxicology evidence with anyone who had relevant training. The Seventh Circuit vacated a denial of relief. Anderson was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Fields filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Chicago police officers, and former Cook County prosecutors. Fields alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights and state law by fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence in a criminal investigation that resulted in Fields’s conviction for a 1984 murder. A retrial resulted in an acquittal, 12 years after the original trial. The individual who had implicated Fields in the crimes eventually confessed to committing the murder. Fields sought a certificate of innocence, which was denied.After a third trial, the jury found in favor of Fields against Detectives O’Callaghan and Murphy on one of his section 1983 claims, against Chicago on Fields’s Monell liability claim, and against O’Callaghan on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and found for the defendants on the remaining claims. The jury awarded Fields $22 million in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $30,000 against O’Callaghan and $10,000 against Murphy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the detectives’ challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning wiretaps, character evidence, evidence of Fields’s 1972 murder conviction, and evidence concerning prison incidents. The evidence allowed a jury to conclude that the city had failed to take the necessary steps to address an unconstitutional practice of using street files and that there was a “systemic underproduction of exculpatory materials to prosecutors and defense counsel.” View "Fields v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Federal judges may release prisoners for compassionate reasons. Previously, that authority required a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. The 2018 First Step Act created a judicial power to grant compassionate release on a prisoner’s own request; the prisoner must first allow the Bureau to review the request and make a recommendation (or let 30 days pass in silence), 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Gunn’s sentence for drug and firearm offenses runs into 2024. She sought release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that, because of her age (62) and medical condition, she faces extra risks should she contract COVID-19.The district court denied relief, citing the requirement ”that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The Sentencing Commission, which lacks a quorum, has not updated its policy statements to implement the Act. The most recent Guidelines Manual refers to a “motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons" and covers only prisoners who suffer from certain medical problems.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Manual lacks an applicable policy statement; any decision is “consistent with” a nonexistent policy. “Consistent with” differs from “authorized by.” While a judge acting on a prisoner’s motion may lack the Director's advice, contemplated by Manual, about whether an “extraordinary and compelling reason” exists, the First Step Act does not muzzle the Director. Until an amended statement is adopted, district judges must operate under the statutory criteria: ”extraordinary and compelling reasons.” View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law

Elmer owned and operated multiple healthcare-related companies including Pharmakon, a compounding pharmacy that mixes and distributes drugs—including potent opioids like morphine and fentanyl—to hospitals across the U.S.. Pharmakon conducted its own internal potency testing and contracted with a third party to perform additional testing to evaluate whether its compounded drugs had too little of the active ingredient (under-potent) or too much (over-potent). In 2014-2016, testing showed 134 instances of under- or over-potent drugs being distributed to customers. Elmer knew the drugs were dangerous. Rather than halting manufacturing or recalling past shipments, sales continued and led to the near-death of an infant. Elmer and Pharmakon lied to the FDA.Elmer was charged with conspiracy to defraud the FDA (18 U.S.C. 371); introducing adulterated drugs into interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a)(1) & 351); and adulterating drugs being held for sale in interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(k), 331(a)(1) & 351). Pharmakon employees, FDA inspectors, and Community Health Network medical staff testified that Elmer was aware of and directed the efforts to conceal out-of-specification test results from the FDA. The district court sentenced Elmer to 33 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to rulings related to the evidence admitted at trial and Elmer’s sentence. The evidence before the jury overwhelmingly proved Elmer’s guilt. The sentence was more than reasonable given the gravity of Elmer’s crimes. View "United States v. Elmer" on Justia Law

Shuhaiber, who is confined to a wheelchair, sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. He alleged that the Stateville Center failed to accommodate his disability by confining him to a cell unsuited to the use of a wheelchair and that he was transported to physical therapy in vans that were not ADA-compliant, leaving him to depend on an officer to lift him. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that Shuhaiber failed to allege that he was deprived of access to facilities or services or that the vans caused him to miss medical appointments.Shuhaiber appealed and sought permission to proceed without prepaying the requisite filing fee. Meanwhile, Shuhaiber, a native of the United Arab Emirates, had been transferred to DHS custody for removal from the United States. Shuhaiber, as a frequent filer of federal lawsuits, had accumulated more than three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for filing frivolous lawsuits and would have had to prepay the filing fee to appeal the dismissal of his claims. Doubting that Shuhaiber was still a “prisoner,” the district court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the appellate filing-fee bar does not apply where the appellant is being held by immigration authorities and no longer is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. The district court was, nonetheless, right to dismiss his claims. View "Shuhaiber v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dawson pled guilty to conspiring to transport stolen property in interstate commerce and was sentenced to 18 months of prison followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Less than a year after Dawson was released, Dawson’s probation officer asked the court to revoke his supervised release because Dawson had violated several conditions, including by possession of a firearm. Dawson was charged in state court with weapons violations. He was released to home confinement on electronic monitoring.At the federal revocation hearing, the parties disagreed about proving the firearms violation. The judge opined that state courts “do literally nothing” on firearm violations and continued the hearing. Later, officers testified and the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Dawson had possessed the firearm. Dawson did not contest the other violations.The advisory Guidelines range was six-12 months in prison. The statutory maximum was 24 months. The court revoked Dawson’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. The court focused first on Dawson’s electronic-monitoring violation, then on Dawson’s failure to make restitution payments. As for Dawson’s missed drug tests, the court considered them a “technical violation.” The court called the firearm violation, “an affront to the Court,” and “a danger to the community.” The court made its sentence consecutive to any forthcoming sentence in the pending state-court case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court chose its sentence to punish Dawson for possessing the firearm but should have focused on his breach of the court’s trust and left any punishment to the state court and that the court disregarded his mitigation arguments and the relevant sentencing factors. View "United States v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Daoud came to the FBI’s attention because of online activity that evinced a desire to engage in violent jihad. While communicating and meeting with undercover agents, Daoud sometimes wavered about killing people. Daoud planned a Chicago car bomb attack. Undercover agent, “Mudafar” described the bomb that he would supply and the mass carnage it would cause. Mudafar and Daoud met to implement the attack. Daoud, age 18, was arrested upon pressing the button and was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to destroy a building used in interstate commerce with an explosive. While Daoud was in pretrial custody, he solicited the murder of the FBI agent (Mudafar). Daoud’s cellmate was paid to record conversations and instructed Daoud to make a phone call authorizing the killing, which Daoud did. Daoud was charged with soliciting a crime of violence, murder-for-hire, and obstruction of justice. Two years later, Daoud physically attacked another for drawing a picture of the Prophet Muhammad. Daoud was, again, charged. Daoud spent over 400 days in segregated housing during his pretrial incarceration, and Daoud witnessed his cellmate commit suicide.The cases were consolidated. Daoud was diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. With medication, Daoud’s condition improved; he was found competent to stand trial. Daoud pled guilty while maintaining his innocence. The advisory Guidelines range was life imprisonment; he was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. The court downplayed the extreme seriousness of Daoud’s offenses in conflict with the undisputed facts; failed to account for the need to protect the public from Daoud’s high risk of reoffending; improperly distinguished the sentences of similar offenders by relying on Daoud’s pretrial confinement; and premised its sentence on mitigating factors that could not bear the weight assigned to them. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law

Johnson, a “sovereign citizen,” participated in a bogus mortgage-elimination scheme. Charged with mail fraud, Johnson represented himself at a month-long jury trial, presenting nonsensical defenses. Johnson was capable of basic trial tasks. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, stating that Johnson was a “fool,” but not incompetent.While serving his 300-month sentence, Johnson filed false bankruptcy petitions. Charged with bankruptcy fraud, Johnson did not have counsel at his initial appearance and repeatedly insisted that he was not the defendant. The magistrate asked Johnson several questions to confirm his decision to proceed pro se. Johnson stated that his competency to represent himself had “already been established and affirmed on appeal.” The magistrate “strongly urge[d]” him to accept counsel but ultimately found that Johnson had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Johnson was again questioned and declined counsel during the final pretrial conference, Before and at trial, Johnson performed the necessary functions. Johnson’s arguments were gibberish, characterized by statements like, “the United States is a figment of our imagination.” Johnson accepted counsel for sentencing. The court applied a downward variance and sentenced Johnson, age 55, to 216 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his current sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s colloquy with Johnson was lacking, but Johnson’s waiver of counsel was valid. Johnson’s history and his separate, more thorough colloquy with the magistrate indicate that Johnson’s decision to forgo counsel was not uninformed. The court also rejected Johnson’s challenge to the sentencing explanation. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Mzembe and two others kidnapped another man, shot him, beat him, and held him for ransom, then abandoned him in an alley. Separate federal juries found the three men guilty of multiple federal crimes. Mzembe was sentenced to 44 years' imprisonment. Intervening changes in law required the Seventh Circuit to vacate the convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for discharging a firearm in a crime of violence. Between Mzembe’s federal sentencing hearings, Mzembe was convicted in Indiana state court for crimes committed before the kidnapping and was sentenced to 62 years, consecutive to the federal sentence. The state sentence became final.Mzembe's Guidelines range for the remaining federal crimes was life in prison; he was sentenced to 36 years, to run consecutively. The court addressed mitigation evidence and said that a below-guideline sentence would be appropriate but said: I don’t know if I have the authority to run the sentences concurrent … if I do ... I don’t think it would be an appropriate exercise of my authority” because the state judge decided that the reasonable punishment for the state crime included consecutive sentencing. The written opinion stated: It is one thing for a federal court to modify a federal sentence in light of changes in federal law, but it would be a different thing for a federal court to restructure the state sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge gave an inadequate explanation for his decision, erred in deferring to the state court’s intervening judgment to make the sentences consecutive, and imposed an unreasonably severe sentence. View "United States v. Mzembe" on Justia Law

Hogenkamp pleaded guilty to a federal crime and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment plus 25 years’ supervised release. Fourteen months before the anticipated end of his custodial time (April 2021), he asked the district court to modify the terms of his supervised release. The judge denied his motion as premature, suggesting that Hogenkamp wait until after his release to seek a change in those terms.The Seventh Circuit remanded. A prisoner is entitled to know, before he leaves prison, what terms and conditions govern his supervised release. Those terms govern where a person may live, with whom he may associate, and what jobs he may hold from the day he walks out of prison. Federal judges may alter the terms and conditions of supervised release at any time, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2). A district judge has the discretion to determine the apt time for decision—provided that a motion made a reasonable time in advance of release is resolved before supervised release begins--and to decide whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Hogenkam’s date is approaching; further delay in making a decision is appropriate only if the court has reason to think that better information will be available in the next few months. View "United States v. Hogenkamp" on Justia Law