Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Gamble robbed a Chicago branch of Chase Bank, where she had worked until three months earlier. Two Chase employees were working at the time of the robbery, Gamble entered the bank wearing a disguise and waited for customers to leave, then pulled out a gun and ordered the employees to open the vault, pressing the gun against the back of one employee's head, The employee later testified that the gun felt cold and made a clicking noise. Gamble took over $126,000 from the vault and left the bank. Both employees had recognized her. FBI agents arrested Gamble hours later when she arrived for work at another Chase branch. Gamble waived her Miranda rights and admitted that she had robbed the bank. She said that the gun was a “play gun” that she had bought at a Walmart store. A later investigation determined that Walmart did not sell fake guns in Illinois. Gamble also said that she disposed of the gun on Irving Park Road and stashed the money in a trash can. FBI agents canvassed Irving Park Road and looked for the money, but found nothing.Convicted of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113, Gamble was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Ample evidence supported a finding that Gamble used a real firearm. Gamble’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated. The district judge was entitled to consider her false statements in deciding on her sentence. View "United States v. Gamble" on Justia Law

A confidential source, “Bonz” told Champaign Police that he knew a crack cocaine dealer named Moe. Over a few months, the department conducted five controlled buys from Moe, consistent with information from Bonz. After reviewing the video of the transactions, officers identified Moe as Orr, who was on parole after being convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Bonz identified a picture of Orr. Officers tied the involved vehicle and apartment to Orr. Pursuant to a warrant, officers searched Orr’s apartment. They found a semi-automatic pistol with ammunition, approximately 22 grams of crack cocaine, approximately 15 grams of powdered cocaine, and drug paraphernalia. Orr voluntarily admitted that the gun and cocaine were his. Indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Orr unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, asserting Bonz was an unreliable source.Orr testified that he had no reason to possess a firearm. The prosecutor presented evidence of Orr’s drug involvement. The jury found Orr guilty. Before sentencing, the Judicial Council of the Seventh Circuit determined that Judge Bruce had breached the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges by engaging in improper ex parte communications in other cases with members of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Although the Council found no evidence that those communications affected the outcome of any case, it suspended Bruce from all criminal matters involving the U.S. Attorney’s Office for one year. Orr’s case was transferred to another judge. The Seventh Circuit vacated Orr’s conviction. Judge Bruce’s conduct “cast a pall over certain decisions" that "required the exercise of substantial discretion.” This was not harmless error. View "United States v. Orr" on Justia Law

In 2000, Indiana University student Jill Behrman went for a bike ride but never returned. The police later found her bicycle less than a mile from the home of Myers, on the north side of Bloomington. Two years later a woman (Owings) confessed to the murder. The case was reopened when a hunter came upon Behrman’s remains far from the location Owings described. Recognizing her story no longer added up, Owings recanted her confession and admitted to lying about the murder in hopes of leniency on other charges. A renewed investigation led the authorities to Myers, who was eventually charged with the murder. Multiple Indiana courts affirmed his conviction.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of his application for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Myers’s trial counsel was plainly deficient by promising to prove that Behrman was killed by someone else although he had to know he could not follow through on that promise and by failing to object to testimony about a bloodhound tracking Behrman’s scent. However, given the strength of the state’s case against him, including many self‐incriminating statements that Myers made to many different people, combined with other evidence, his counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice him. View "Myers v. Neal" on Justia Law

Howard was charged with seven crimes relating to possession, receipt, distribution, and production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), (a)(4). He pleaded guilty to five; the remaining counts, under section 2251(a), proceeded to trial. The statute mandates a minimum 15-year prison term for “[a]ny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in … any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.” Howard’s videos do not depict a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct; they show Howard masturbating next to a fully clothed and sleeping child. The government’s theory was that Howard violated the statute by “using” the clothed, sleeping child as an object of sexual interest to produce a visual depiction of himself engaged in solo sexually explicit conduct. The jury found him guilty.The Seventh Circuit vacated the convictions on the two counts. The government’s interpretation of section 2251(a) “stretches the statute beyond the natural reading of its terms considered in context.” The government’s “implausible” interpretation, taken to its logical conclusion, would not require the presence of a child on camera; the crime could be committed even if the child who is the object of the offender’s sexual interest were across the street. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Biegert texted his mother that he had taken pills in an apparent suicide attempt; she called the Green Bay police and requested a welfare check. She stated that Biegert was depressed, had a history of suicide attempts, was alone, and had no weapons nor vehicles. Officers were dispatched to Biegert’s apartment. As they approached, Biegert called police dispatch, expressing concern that there were strangers outside his door. While Biegert was on the call, the officers knocked and announced themselves. The officers did not know that Biegert had called dispatch and grew suspicious when they heard him walk away from the door, rummage for something, and return to open the door. Biegert opened the door, confirmed his identity and that he was depressed, and allowed both officers into the apartment. Biegert initially cooperated. He began resisting when the officers tried to pat him down. The officers used fists, Tasers, and batons. Biegert armed himself with a kitchen knife. When he began to stab an officer, they shot him. He died at the scene. In rejecting a suit alleging excessive force, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the officers reasonably restrained Biegert and reasonably resorted to lethal force when Biegert threatened them with a knife. View "Estate of Biegert v. Molitor" on Justia Law

Kizart was driving alone when Officer Russell stopped him for speeding. As they talked, Russell smelled burnt marijuana coming from Kizart’s car. Kizart explained that his brother had smoked marijuana in the car earlier. Russell stated he would search the vehicle, had Kizart step out of the car, patted him down, and found no drugs or weapons. Russell searched the passenger compartment, including areas not in plain view, for several minutes. Russell asked Kizart how to open the trunk. Kizart did not respond and “looked sort of shocked” for about five seconds, making Russell “suspicious.” Russell removed the keys from the ignition and used them to open the trunk. Toward the back of the trunk, he found a backpack with a garbage bag inside, which contained three smaller bags of what appeared to be raw marijuana and a “white, vacuum-packed brick ” that turned out to be methamphetamine. The backpack contained approximately three pounds of marijuana and three pounds of methamphetamine.Charged with possessing marijuana and methamphetamine, each with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(D). Kizart unsuccessfully moved to suppress the drugs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the circumstances, including the smell of burnt marijuana and Kizart’s reaction and behavior when Russell asked Kizart about the trunk, provided probable cause to search his car’s trunk. View "United States v. Kizart" on Justia Law

For nearly a week Lentz feigned ignorance as she pretended to help investigators locate her missing father. Officers soon discovered the father’s decaying body hidden at the office building the two shared. All signs pointed to Lentz as the murderer. Lentz, with her young daughter, voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station under the pretense of follow-up questioning for the investigation. For the first hour and a half, officers asked general questions, like when and where she last saw her father, to commit Lentz to her story. They then took a cigarette break. When the interview resumed, officers read Lentz her Miranda rights and confronted her with the mounting evidence against her. Over the next four hours, Lentz slowly confessed to shooting her father. In the state trial court, Lentz unsuccessfully moved to suppress her videotaped confession. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed her first-degree murder conviction; state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court’s decisions that Lentz was not in custody during the pre-Miranda portion of the questioning and that her confession was not involuntary, despite officers’ comments about her daughter, were not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Lentz v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

Corner violated the conditions of his supervised release for possessing with intent to distribute 11 grams of cocaine base by using and possessing illegal drugs, failing to comply with drug testing, and lying to his probation officer about his inability to maintain employment. Corner had tested positive for controlled substances more than three times in one year. The court sentenced Corner to 18 months’ imprisonment and 42 months of supervised release.The First Step Act of 2018 subsequently authorized courts to reduce a defendant’s sentence by retroactively applying the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which modified 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), under which Corner was convicted, by reducing the statutory minimum penalties and increasing the amount of crack necessary to trigger those penalties. Corner moved (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)) for a reduction of his revocation sentence and term of supervision. Corner argued that, although his current sentence was for violating his supervised release, he was eligible for a reduction because of his original conviction. The district court denied Corner’s motion, without determining whether he was eligible for relief. Corner began his 42 months of supervision in March 2020.The Seventh Circuit vacated. A district court’s discretionary determination whether to grant a First Step Act motion for a reduced sentence must be informed by whether the Act applies to the defendant's sentence and calculation of the new sentencing parameters. View "United States v. Corner" on Justia Law

Bonk conspired with Kampas and Wood to distribute ice methamphetamine. Charged with conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, Wood and Kampas pleaded guilty to conspiracy with plea agreements. Bonk, who pleaded guilty without an agreement, had several previous convictions, many of them violent in nature, resulting in a guidelines sentencing range of 292-365 months’ imprisonment. Defense counsel argued that the guidelines' 188-235-month range for methamphetamine mixture should be used instead of the higher range for ice methamphetamine and noted several mitigating factors.The district court sentenced Bonk to 262 months’ imprisonment. Bonk requested access to all sealed documents for Bonk and his codefendants “for the crucial purpose of analyzing, or ruling-out, whether disparity and/or excessiveness of sentencing was committed by the trial court in separately sentencing the three defendants.” The court denied the motion in part. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review that denial and rejected a challenge to the reasonableness of Bonk’s sentence. Bonk sought to appeal from an order that was issued after he filed his notice of appeal, and, the order, addressing appellate counsel’s emergency request for access to all documents, is not obviously related to the sentencing order from which he appealed. View "United States v. Bonk" on Justia Law

Cook County, Illinois revised its policies in favor of broader access to pretrial release. The plaintiffs are nine black Chicago residents, arrested and charged with felonies, whom the county trial courts admitted to bail subject to electronic monitoring supervised by the Sheriff. They allege that Cook County Sheriff Dart disagreed with the revised policies, independently reviewed their bail orders, and decided they should not be released on those conditions. They were neither released on monitoring nor left at liberty but remained in jail for about two weeks. Motions for rules to show cause were filed. Two plaintiffs were released in the dead of night, hours before the motion hearings. The district court dismissed most of the plaintiff's civil rights claims.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to proceed on federal constitutional claims for wrongful pretrial detention and denial of equal protection, and on state-law claims for contempt of court. A core function of the Fourth Amendment is to put neutral decision-makers between unchecked official discretion and invasions of private liberty by search or seizure. Once the plaintiffs appeared before the court, probable cause ceased to be a justification for the Sheriff’s unilateral seizure. View "Williams v. Dart" on Justia Law