Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Each of the three defendants in these consolidated appeals was convicted of at least one “covered offense” under the First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. A “covered offense” is a federal crime (committed before August 3, 2010) for which the statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. They each unsuccessfully sought a sentence reduction.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. If a defendant’s aggregate sentence includes both covered and non-covered offenses, a court may reduce the sentence for the non-covered offenses and, if the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the Guidelines range for a defendant’s covered offense, a court may still reduce the defendant’s sentence for that offense. View "United States v. Speed" on Justia Law

Wells was sentenced for two drug offenses: two years’ imprisonment for the first and one year for the second, to run consecutively, with credit for pretrial detention: 255 days for the first sentence and 97 days for the second. Wells calculated his term as 734 days: three years (1095 days) less 255 days less 97 days. The Department of Corrections calculated 1095 less 255, disregarding the 97-day credit because it believed that, after his arrest for the second offense (which occurred while he was on bail) Wells had been in custody on both charges simultaneously. Wells filed grievances but was held until the expiration of the 840-day term (less good-time credits). Wells filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. After a trial to determine whether the prison’s records supervisor (Caudill) acted with the mental state required to violate the Eighth Amendment, the court ruled in Caudill’s favor.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument based on Wells’ pro se status. Wells did not seek legal assistance. The district judge did not make a clearly erroneous finding when concluding that Wells had not shown that Caudill acted with the necessary state of mind. The court also noted that Wells received a sentence calculation early in his term. He protested within the prison hierarchy but did not ask a state court to determine the proper release date. View "Wells v. Caudill" on Justia Law

Vesey pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). His PSR had calculated a base offense level of 20 because Vesey had a prior conviction for a crime of violence, Illinois aggravated assault: Vesey swung a shower rod at a correctional officer performing his official duties. After subtracting three levels for acceptance of responsibility, with a criminal history category of VI, his guidelines range was 51-63 months’ imprisonment. Vesey argued that his prior conviction was not a “crime of violence.” The court sentenced him to 72 months’ imprisonment, stating that “even if my legal analysis on determining whether that prior aggravated assault is a crime of violence to raise your base offense level up to the 20 from the 14 and yield the— and result in the 51 to 63 is wrong, I still think based on the 3553(a) factors ... specifically, your personal history and characteristics and your risk to recidivate because you’ve been undeterred by any prior sentences, fully supports at least a range there independent of any of the guideline calculations." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Applying the categorical approach and finding the Illinois statute divisible, the court concluded that Vesey’s Illinois conviction was for a crime of violence. View "United States v. Vesey" on Justia Law

Hosler responded to a darkweb site post purporting to advertise sex with a young girl. Eau Claire Detective Beardsley had created the advertisement, pretending to be a mother, “Amanda,” offering her 12-year-old daughter, “Gracie,” for sex in exchange for money or in a swap for other young girls. Hosler corresponded with "Amanda," arranged a meeting, then traveled from Texas to Eau Claire. He was arrested at the planned meeting location and was charged with child enticement, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); interstate travel for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual activity, section 2423(b); and possession of child pornography, sections 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2).The court denied Hosler's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the child enticement charge, found him guilty, sentenced him to concurrent 120-month terms of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support Hosler’s conviction for attempting to persuade or entice a minor into a sexual relationship. The statute refers to a defendant who “ knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” the minor to engage in prohibited sexual activity. The court noted Hosler’s extensive communications with “Amanda” about “Gracie’s” preferences and awareness of and reaction to Hosler’s interest. It was not plainly irrational for the judge to interpret Hosler’s messages as trying to win Gracie’s favor. View "United States v. Hosler" on Justia Law

Manuel's disabled cellmate requested a change of rooms and became hostile toward Manuel. Manuel reported this but no action was taken. The cellmate beat Manuel into unconsciousness. Officer Nalley investigated. Manuel submitted a grievance to Counselor Miller. Manuel later filed additional grievances and requested status updates. Miller failed to respond. Manuel filed a civil complaint. Later, an inmate informed prison personnel that Manuel asked him and another inmate to file fraudulent paperwork regarding the attack. The prison filed an incident report and shakedown slip.Two weeks later, Manuel again sought a status update The conversation ended when Miller asked Manuel if he was going to file a grievance against her; he responded “maybe.” Minutes later, Nalley searched Manuel’s cell following the shakedown slip and confiscated a note describing trading and trafficking, forged letters describing the cellmate incident, letters addressed to the court, and a contraband cassette tape. The prison committee found Manuel guilty of forging documents and possessing contraband.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, his 42 U.S.C. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Miller and Nalley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Manuel needed to furnish evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that his protected speech was at least a motivating factor for Nalley’s response. The suspicious timing of the shakedown shortly after the conversation with Miller is not enough to prove that Nalley was motivated by the protected activity and the shakedown was retaliation. View "Manuel v. Nalley" on Justia Law

Police investigating Vermilion County drug trafficking sent an informant to buy cocaine at Glenn’s home. The transaction was recorded on audio and video. About a month later a state judge put agent Alblinger under oath, took his testimony, and issued a warrant to search Glenn’s home. A search turned up cocaine and guns. Glenn unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant rested on the “controlled buy” plus Alblinger’s testimony that the informant had for more than a decade provided reliable information. Although Alblinger did not reveal whether agents had searched the informant before the transaction, that the informant had a long criminal record and was cooperating to earn lenience, and that the informant’s record of providing accurate information was with the local police rather than with Alblinger personally, the omissions do not negate probable cause. Given the audio and video evidence of the controlled buy, the informant’s reliability and motivations are not material to the existence of probable cause. The passage of time did not render the information stale. In an interview shortly before Alblinger applied for the warrant, Glenn conceded that he sold cocaine from his house, negating any possibility that Alblinger knew that information obtained after the controlled buy implied that Glenn’s house no longer contained cocaine. The delay was intended to prevent Glenn from inferring the informant’s identity. View "United States v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Ruth’s residence and recovered 2.9 grams of crack cocaine, 5.6 grams of powder cocaine, a counterfeit $100 bill, $2,250 in U.S. currency, and drug paraphernalia. Ruth was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The government notified Ruth (21 U.S.C. 851) of intent to rely on his 2006 Illinois conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute as a predicate felony drug offense to enhance his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment. Ruth eventually pleaded guilty.The probation officer determined that Ruth was a career offender based on prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1: the 2006 Illinois cocaine conviction and a 2010 Illinois conviction for possession with intent to deliver cannabis. Ruth’s resulting Guidelines range was 188-235 months. Ruth argued that his 2006 conviction was not a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines because the Illinois statute is categorically broader than federal law; it prohibits possession of positional isomers of cocaine whereas the federal Controlled Substances Act does not and its definition of cocaine “analog” was categorically broader than the federal definition of a controlled substance analog. Ruth did not object to the section 851 sentencing enhancement.The Seventh Circuit vacated Ruth’s 108-month sentence. Using the categorical approach, the overbreadth of the Illinois statute disqualifies his prior conviction as a predicate felony drug offense. View "United States v. Ruth" on Justia Law

In 1997, Durham received a 35-year sentence for a federal drug offense that was reduced to 20 years after amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Durham was released in 2015. In 2018, he violated the terms of his supervised release by domestic battery, unauthorized travel, making false statements to a probation officer, and theft of over $500. Dunham denied having assaulted his ex-girlfriend, despite the testimony of a third party witness.He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, about twice the high end of the guidelines range. The district court emphasized the gravity of Durham’s abuse of his ex-girlfriend and stated: “The guideline allows for an upward variance if he received a reduction. He has received two reductions.” Durham’s attorney responded: “That’s a point well-taken, Judge.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dunham’s argument that he was being punished for the Guidelines amendments. Read as a whole, the sentencing transcript indicates that the district court selected the 30-month revocation sentence by applying the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and, most especially, considering the “nature and circumstances” of Durham’s supervised release violations, foremost the violent assault of his former girlfriend. The district court could reasonably conclude that Durham “squandered” his early release. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law

While in a hospital, Mintner entered a coma and seemed on the brink of death. Her blood and urine contained vastly more thallium than the natural concentration. Her fiancé, Fayemi had been providing some of her food, including in the hospital. Seven of Minter’s friends who occasionally ate with her also suffered from thallium poisoning. Her dog died of thallium poisoning after it ate table scraps. Fayemi had purchased enough thallium sulfate to kill about 50 people. Fayemi told the supplier that he needed the substance for research but later asserted that he and Minter wanted it to kill mice, a forbidden use, and that Minter had been careless with the poison. Fayemi often ate at Minter’s house without showing any traces of thallium poisoning. Thallium was found in a salt shaker in Fayemi’s kitchen. Fayemi had threatened to kill Minter if she left him. The jury convicted Fayemi of attempting to murder Minter plus seven counts of aggravated battery. The convictions were affirmed on appeal; a state court rejected a collateral attack.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Fayemi claimed that his lawyer was ineffective by telling the jurors, in his opening statement, that Fayemi would testify that Minter asked Fayemi to get the thallium for her. After the judge decided that some of his prior convictions, plus evidence that he had annotated a book about poisoning people, could come in on cross-examination, counsel persuaded Fayemi not to testify. Fayemi waived that right in open court. The state’s appellate judges reasonably concluded that there was no possibility of prejudice. View "Fayemi v. Roberson" on Justia Law

In 2006-2009,, Ghuman and Khan “flipped” 44 gas stations. Ghuman would recruit a buyer before they purchased the station. The buyers lacked the financial wherewithal to qualify loans. Ghuman and Khan's co-defendant, AEB loan officer Brahmbhatt, arranged loans based on fraudulent documentation. They also created false financial statements for the gas stations. Co-defendant Mehta, an accountant, prepared fictitious tax returns. The loans, which were guaranteed by the Small Business Administration, went into arrears. In 2008-2009 the SBA began auditing the AEB loans; the FBI began looking into suspected bank fraud. AEB ultimately incurred a loss in excess of $14 million.Khan cooperated and pled guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, in connection with a $331,000 loan. Ghuman pleaded guilty to another count of bank fraud in connection with a $744,000 loan and to one count of filing a false tax return, 26 U.S.C. 7206. The district court denied Ghuman credit for acceptance of responsibility and imposed a below-Guidelines prison term of 66 months. The court ordered Khan to serve a 36-month prison term and ordered Ghuman to pay $11.8 million and Khan to pay $10.8 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences with an adjustment to Ghuman’s term of supervised release. View "United States v. Khan" on Justia Law