Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Alkhalidi was convicted of murder, robbery, and theft. He appealed, claiming that his attorney failed to advise him of a plea offer. The Indiana state court denied relief, holding Alkhalidi’s innocence claim strongly indicated he would not have accepted the plea deal. The state court also held that Indiana requires a defendant to admit a plea deal’s factual basis otherwise the trial court would be prevented from entering the plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Alkhalidi’s petition for habeas corpus relief. Alkhalidi is unable to show prejudice; he failed to show the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or that the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). View "Alkhalidi v. Neal" on Justia Law

Wisconsin Department of Corrections policy requires that transgender prisoners taking cross-gender hormones, like Balsewicz, shower separately from inmates who are not transgender or intersex. Balsewicz complained that inmates who were not transgender or intersex were allowed to shower with those who were and identified Rivers as one of those inmates, believing Rivers falsely claimed to be transgender to receive single-cell housing. Rivers and Balsewicz were in a shower house with other inmates. Rivers made threats. Balsewicz reported the incident to Sergeant Pawlyk and repeatedly asked Pawlyk to report her concerns for her personal safety. Other inmates witnessed this interaction. Pawlyk took no action. Two days later, when Rivers and Balsewicz were leaving a dining hall, Rivers without any provocation or warning, punched Balsewicz multiple times in the head. Balsewicz collapsed, lost consciousness, and experienced dizziness and numbness in her face.Balsewicz filed suit against Pawlyk under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment favoring Pawlyk. When a prison official knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm, the Eighth Amendment requires that official to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. A reasonable juror could conclude that the threat Balsewicz reported would not expire once the inmates left the shower and that Pawlyk knew Balsewicz faced an ongoing risk of serious harm. Pawlyk is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Balsewicz v. Pawlyk" on Justia Law

To impress a woman he wanted to date (Bishop), Wade wore a badge and a holstered gun, discussed investigating a suspect, and left a business card that claimed Wade was a DEA special agent. The card had a hand-written note indicating that Bishop should go out with Wade. She reported Wade’s interactions. The police opened a stalking investigation. Wade was indicted for impersonating a federal employee and acting as such, 18 U.S.C. 912. The government successfully moved to preclude Wade from claiming his romantic motivation negated his culpability. During closing argument, defense counsel nonetheless stated: “Although [Wade] might be a hopeless romantic, he’s not a criminal.”The judge also ruled against Wade’s proposed jury instructions that would have required the jury to find Wade acted to cause Bishop to follow some course she would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct. The instruction actually given required the jury to find that Wade falsely assumed or pretended to be a DEA officer or employee and as such committed some overt act involving an assertion of claimed authority derived from that office. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Wade’s conviction. Wade’s alleged romantic intent does not negate the scienter requirement; his motivation has no bearing on whether he knew he was not a DEA agent. The only effect the romantic-motivation argument could have had was to cause the jury to conclude Wade’s crime was not serious or harmful, leading to jury nullification. View "United States v. Wade" on Justia Law

Bowman, a prisoner at the Western Illinois Correctional Center, reported abuse by prison guards in a grievance he filed within the prison. The prison denied the complaint. The state’s Administrative Review Board affirmed. Bowman then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983,. As trial was fast approaching, the defendant correctional officers filed a motion, alleging that his case, which had been pending for nearly three years, should be dismissed on summary judgment for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The defendants had already filed an unsuccessful summary judgment motion and the second motion came nearly two years after the deadline the court had set for any motion based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The defendants offered no reason for the late second motion. Defense counsel indicated that she had learned only recently that Bowman (who was proceeding pro se) did not name the defendants or allege a failure to intervene in his grievance, so he failed to exhaust his remedies. The district court allowed the motion. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Nothing in the record supported the district court’s allowing the second summary judgment motion without making the “excusable neglect” finding required by FRCP 6(b)(1)(B). View "Bowman v. Korte" on Justia Law

Day was indicted for conspiracy to commit wire fraud after participating in a fraudulent “credit repair” scheme. The government offered Day a plea deal that would have yielded a probable sentencing range of 51-63 months’ imprisonment. Day’s federal defender advised him to accept the deal. His father urged him to consult a private lawyer—an acquaintance with no experience in criminal law. That lawyer brought in an attorney experienced in federal criminal law. The two told Day that he was not guilty and should reject the offer. Day hired the two lawyers. The federal defender withdrew and offered to make her file available. The government extended the same offer six weeks before trial. Though they had not yet reviewed the case materials, Day’s new lawyers advised him to reject it. Day declined the deal. At the final pretrial hearing, Day again rejected the plea offer. The lawyers later told Day he would lose at trial. Day told them to get the best deal they could. They instead advised him to throw himself on the mercy of the court.Day pleaded guilty without an agreement, facing a sentencing range of 87-108 months. The district judge imposed a 92-month sentence. Day sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The government conceded the deficient-performance element of Day’s Sixth Amendment claim. The facts set forth in his motion, if proven, could establish prejudice. View "Day v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2008, Sutton pled guilty to distributing cocaine base and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced Sutton to the then statutory minimum 15 years’ imprisonment. In announcing the sentence, the court emphasized that it had no authority to reduce the sentence further or amend it later, except on the government’s motion, and that the court’s authority had been so limited since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The First Step Act of 2018 subsequently permitted a defendant sentenced for a covered offense (which includes Sutton’s crack cocaine charge) to move for the district court to impose a reduced sentence. The district court denied Sutton’s motion. On Sutton’s pro se appeal, the Seventh Circuit recruited counsel for supplemental briefing on the narrow question of the proper vehicle for a First Step Act motion--how the First Step Act interacts with the Sentencing Reform Act. The Seventh Circuit then affirmed the denial of relief. The First Step Act is its own procedural vehicle; the only limits on the district court’s authority under the First Step Act come from the interpretation of the First Step Act itself, which gives the court broad discretion. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

During Ramirez’s 2001 Wisconsin state court trial, the prevailing interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause was that a defendant had no confrontation right to cross-examine an unavailable declarant if the declarant’s statements were adequately reliable, which could be established where the statements fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Applying hearsay exceptions, the court admitted several out-of-court statements accusing Ramirez of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter. The jury convicted Ramirez of multiple counts relating to the sexual assaults.In 2004, while Ramirez’s conviction was pending on direct review, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to cross-examine a declarant if the declarant’s statements were “testimonial”—e.g., were statements that the declarant “would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Ramirez urged his lawyer, Hackbarth, to raise a confrontation claim under Crawford. Hackbarth instead raised other claims, each of which Wisconsin state courts rejected. Ramirez filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing that Hackbarth’s representation was ineffective based on her omission of the confrontation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in granting relief. An attorney exercising reasonable professional judgment would have recognized that the confrontation claim was clearly stronger than the claims Hackbarth raised. Raising a confrontation claim while Ramirez’s conviction was pending on direct review would have given him a reasonable chance of prevailing. View "Ramirez v. Tegels" on Justia Law

Detective Mings submitted an affidavit relating that an informant had been inside PaWon’s home and seen him take a retail quantity of methamphetamine from his safe. The affidavit did not discuss the informant’s criminal history, his likely motivation for cooperation (lenience on pending charges), or his reliability. It contained some facts that corroborated his story, though many of those facts could have been learned by someone who had not been inside PaWon’s home. The informant’s statements were not recorded or transcribed. The state judge issued a warrant. The police found what they went looking for. At a hearing on PaWon’s motion to suppress, the informant did not appear and Mings had little memory of what was said in state court. The federal judge proceeded as if the informant had not testified and deemed the affidavit alone insufficient to establish probable cause but concluded that the police were entitled to rely on the warrant. After pleading guilty, PaWon was sentenced to 76 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It would not have been impossible for an officer to have “an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Nor would every reasonable officer believe that unrecorded oral presentations to a judge must be ignored. A federal court must assume the state judge was doing his job, absent contrary evidence, and would have issued a warrant only after finding that probable cause existed under the governing precedents. View "United States v. Patton" on Justia Law

In 2003, McNair was sentenced for drug crimes. The court placed his Criminal History at Category II based on an Indiana conviction for driving without a license, calculated his Guidelines range at 324-405 months, and imposed a 360-month sentence, declining to consider McNair’s argument that his conviction was invalid. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 2005 McNair sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, again disputing the state conviction. The court denied relief, reasoning that he needed to contest that conviction in state court. McNair's subsequent motions were dismissed as unauthorized successive collateral attacks. In 2017 McNair’s Indiana conviction was vacated.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of McNair’s subsequent federal petition. A section 2255 petition based on the vacatur of a state conviction may be maintained as an “initial” section 2255 motion on the theory that the claim was unripe until the state court acted. Such a petition must be brought within a year of “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” McNair's judgment date was 2003. He first asked the state judiciary for relief in 2007. McNair did not appeal the denial of that motion. For nine years he did nothing in state court. When McNair returned to federal court in 2017, 14 years had passed since the event that requires diligent action. Ignorance of the law does not justify tolling the limitations period. View "McNair v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1998, Jones was convicted of two carjackings, armed bank robbery, and using firearms during those crimes of violence. His crime spree involved home invasion. He was sentenced, as a career offender under Sentencing Guideline 4B1.1, based on prior convictions for breaking and entering and armed robbery (during which Jones discharged his weapon), to 840 months in prison.In 2018, the court vacated that sentence; Jones no longer qualified as a career offender. At resentencing, Jones’s Guidelines range was 348–390 months. The court again sentenced Jones to 840 months in prison. Considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, the court stated that Jones had a “history as a violent predatory individual” and the offenses were “horrific crimes of violence…. The defendant put the victims in great fear … fired the firearms in the house during one of the break-ins.” Some of that statement was inaccurate. The court stressed that Jones “would be a risk of serious criminal activity based on his prior criminal history”; Jones’s co-defendants, “with similar records [and] similar conduct,” had received sentences of 675 months and 728 months; and after his original federal sentencing, Jones received a 273-year sentence in Indiana for murder and robbery. The court reiterated its “intention … to give the statutory maximum.” The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court did not sufficiently justify the extent of its deviation from the Guidelines. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law