Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Schaul's business, ChildRite, provided incontinence supplies for special-needs individuals. In 2009-2013, Schaul submitted claims for Medicaid reimbursement for four million units; approximately one million of those units did not exist. He obtained $582,844.10 from Medicaid for those nonexistent items. Charged with health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, Schaul entered into a plea agreement that described a scheme to defraud Medicaid, substantially identical to that described in the indictment. It stated that Schaul’s counsel had “fully explained” the indictment and the charges and that Schaul fully understood the nature and elements of the crimes. The agreement erroneously stated that the government needed to prove that the defendant “knowingly or willfully" executed the scheme.” The statute requires proof that the defendant acted “knowingly and willfully.” At his hearing, Schaul agreed with the government’s factual allegations and stated that he had discussed the charges with counsel; that he understood the charge; that he had no questions; and that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.When the prosecutor explained the elements of the offense, he read from the plea agreement, which incorrectly stated the mens rea element. The court imposed a 24-month sentence plus $582,844.10 in restitution. After his attorney moved to withdraw, Schaul filed an unsuccessful motion to delay the date of his reporting to the Bureau of Prisons. Schaul filed a motion to reconsider, stating, for the first time, that he could “prove … there was no intent to commit fraud.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The misrepresentation of the elements of the offense constituted plain error but did not affect Schaul’s substantial rights. The record affirmatively demonstrates that he knowingly and willfully violated the law. View "United States v. Schaul" on Justia Law

Chicago Police Officers testified that Washington, standing with his back to them, turned his head as their unmarked squad approached and walked away. He removed a shiny, polished chrome handgun from his waistband and tossed it over a fence into a yard. The officers questioned Washington and recovered the handgun. Washington was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g).The government moved to introduce a YouTube video posted three months before the arrest, depicting Washington and another displaying a chrome handgun, arguing that the gun in the video was the same gun that was recovered from the yard. The court rejected a Rule 404(b) objection and permitted the government to introduce still photos from the video. At trial, an ATF Agent, who examined the gun recovered from the yard, described its features and told the jury that the gun recovered by police and the pistol in the still photos from the video had many similarities.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Washington's conviction. Evidence of recent past possession of the same gun is admissible for a non-propensity purpose—to show the defendant’s ownership and control of the charged firearm—although evidence of past possession of a different gun would raise Rule 404(b) concerns. The judge minimized its potential for unfair prejudice by limiting the government to still photos. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Jackson was driving with Freeman as a passenger, Chicago Police Officer Petrus, on patrol with other officers, observed an object hanging from Jackson’s rearview mirror that appeared to be an air freshener. Petrus ran Jackson's license plate through a database, then pulled Jackson over for violating a city ordinance regarding the obstruction of the driver’s clear view. During the traffic stop, the officers discovered a loaded rifle beside the front passenger’s seat and two loaded handguns underneath the driver’s seat. The men were charged as felons in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At a suppression hearing, Petrus testified that she believed the law to be that a driver “cannot have anything obstructing the driver’s view” and that the air freshener obstructed the driver’s view. She explained that her “verbiage was off” when she first spoke to Jackson and said that “can’t have anything hanging from there [the rearview mirror]” and that she was “trying to gain control of the situation.” The court concluded that “this type of air freshener is enough justification to pull the car over,” finding Petrus “very credible.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All that is required for a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion; the officer had an articulable and objective basis for suspecting that the air freshener obstructed Jackson’s clear view in violation of the city municipal code, so the stop was lawful. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Reid sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a corrections officer used excessive force against him. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Reid had not exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).The Seventh Circuit vacated. The prison’s communications were so obscure that they made further steps of its administrative process unknowable and, thus, unavailable to Reid. Reid had filed both a “standard grievance” and an emergency grievance, followed by an appeal to the Review Board, which was returned to him. Reid filed a second emergency grievance, which was again denied; the Board returned Reid’s subsequent appeal. The prison’s responses indicated that there was no conceivable next step for Reid. The grievance officer’s memorandum gave him conflicting messages. The Board told him that his appeal was missing specific documents but did not check the box specifying that those documents needed to be provided or that some explanation needed to be given for their absence. When the warden and the Board rejected the second grievance, neither mentioned a pending standard grievance or an ongoing Internal Affairs investigation. As far as Reid could tell, his standard grievance had been either lost in the shuffle or resolved against him. View "Reid v. Balota" on Justia Law

While on supervised release for a drug crime, Shanks was charged in a drug-distribution conspiracy that led to overdoses that resulted in a death and serious bodily injury. At an arraignment, defense counsel reported that Shanks pled not guilty and understood the charges. When the government filed a superseding indictment, Shanks refused to enter a plea; challenged the court’s jurisdiction, denied understanding the charges, and refused to talk with counsel. Shanks did not appear in court again. The judge issued an order for Shanks to appear at trial. Shanks refused to accept service. The judge, counsel, and a court reporter began the trial outside Shanks’s jail cell. Shanks denied understanding whatever was said or refused to answer, despite repeated explanations. The judge found that by “disruptive conduct” Shanks had waived his right to attend. To avoid harm to Shanks or others, the judge did not use force but told Shanks that, if he changed his mind, the marshals would transport him. Outside of the jury’s presence, the judge regularly asked whether Shanks had changed his mind. The judge instructed the jury not to draw any inference from Shanks’s absence.Shanks was sentenced to multiple life terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, which (he claimed) requires a defendant’s presence in a courtroom at the start of the trial and that the court clearly erred in finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to attend. View "United States v. Shanks" on Justia Law

Shaffer sued corrections officials, alleging that an officer attacked him and that others refused to treat his injuries. The court directed Shaffer to notify the court and the defendants if he were released, stating that it would not independently investigate his whereabouts and that failure to notify the court of any address changes could result in a dismissal. Shaffer conducted discovery and flooded the court with filings until he was released on parole 13 months later. The defendants, having had mail returned as undeliverable, moved for an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. The case languished for five months. On the deadline for the close of discovery, a defendant filed another motion. A month passed without any response, so the court dismissed Shaffer's case under FRCP 41(b) for failure to prosecute. Shaffer’s parole was revoked. Shaffer filed a notice of his new address, with requests for appointment of counsel and a status hearing 47 days after the entry of judgment. Shaffer asserted that his notices to opposing counsel and the court about his release must have gotten lost in the mail and that prison officials had not forwarded his mail.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shaffer’s motion. Shaffer’s allegation that he tried to notify the court was self-serving and not credible; it was not plausible that the postal service lost multiple, separate mailings. Shaffer had not established that his failure to update the parties stemmed from mistake or excusable neglect. View "Shaffer v. Lashbrook" on Justia Law

DHS’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) notified Agent Harrington about an airplane that would be landing at the Litchfield Municipal Airport. Harrington concluded that the plane might be smuggling drugs, and called Lieutenant Jarman for a drug‐detection dog. Lyons landed the Cessna at around 12:05 a.m. Eymann and Lyons loaded its cargo into the airport’s courtesy car and left the airport. Officers followed that car and blocked it in. Eymann admitted that he had a small amount of marijuana in the car. The drug‐dog (Arie) arrived and alerted on luggage, which the officers searched, finding a small amount of marijuana. Harrington frisked Lyons, who had $2,600 in his pocket. Officers arrested the men and returned to the airport. Arie alerted at the Cessna and on bags from inside the plane. Officers found 65 pounds of marijuana and a firearm. The court suppressed the evidence because, although Arie had completed the necessary training, his certification had lapsed weeks earlier. The state dismissed the charges. The two were then charged with federal conspiracy to distribute marijuana and aiding and abetting the possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute,. Lyons was also charged with carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. The AMOC information established reasonable suspicion. Because the officers used little show‐of‐force, kept their questioning reasonable, and acted consistently with investigatory detention, a reasonable person would not have understood that his freedom was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest before the handcuffing. Eymann's admission gave the officers probable cause to search the car. Once the marijuana was found, there was probable cause to arrest Eymann. The inevitable‐discovery doctrine then applied. View "United States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Brasher was part of a narcotics conspiracy, headed by Shelton, centered in Louisville. Shelton typically “fronted” heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to Brasher and accepted payment from the proceeds of Brasher’s subsequent re-sales of the substances. Brasher became Shelton's “number one customer.” Brasher sometimes supplied kilogram quantities of cocaine to Shelton that he obtained from his own supplier in Texas.Brasher and 14 others were charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics in and around the Southern District of Indiana, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). Only Brasher proceeded to trial. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that there was a material variance between the conspiracy as charged and as proven at trial, that the government’s proof constructively amended the indictment, that the government improperly exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude two African American venire members during jury selection, that the prosecutor made prejudicial remarks in closing argument, that the government made improper use of evidence obtained via court-authorized wiretaps, and that the court erroneously precluded Brasher from challenging a prior narcotics conviction that triggered his mandatory term of life imprisonment. View "United States v. Brasher" on Justia Law

Manyfield pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography; he was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Within a year of his release from prison, Manyfield was twice found in possession of a cell phone with internet connectivity, in violation of his conditions of release. He had created accounts and accessed pornographic websites. He had hard-copy photos of what “appear[ed] to be minor females in sexually provocative poses.” Manyfield had not attended a sex-offender-treatment program; he followed Twitter accounts advertising images of underage girls. The probation officer recommended 18 months’ imprisonment (above the four-10 months’ Guidelines range) plus lifetime supervised release. Manyfield, then 67, did not dispute the allegations but argued that the recommended sentence was excessive under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), emphasizing his medical conditions.The court revoked Manyfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment, the maximum allowed under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), explaining that he was a danger to the community and that his criminal history—including abusing his minor stepdaughter—was “relevant.” The court imposed “lifetime supervised release with the same conditions that were imposed before.” The court neither read the conditions aloud nor asked whether Manyfield waived reading. The written judgment contained conditions that had not been proposed in the revocation petition. Several have been questioned since Manyfield’s original sentencing (prohibitions on “excessive” alcohol use and “frequenting” places where controlled substances are sold). The Seventh Circuit remanded for further consideration of the release conditions; the court properly justified the prison sentence and term of supervised release. View "United States v. Manyfield" on Justia Law

Four months after escaping from a work-release facility, an intoxicated Carter walked into an Illinois bar. He told an employee that a white-supremacist gang was searching for him and then walked out. The employee called the police, who stopped Carter on the street and discovered an active arrest warrant related to his escape. As he was being handcuffed, Carter stated that he was “strapped” and gestured towards his pants. Officers seized a stolen, loaded semiautomatic pistol from Carter’s waistband. Carter pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court calculated his Sentencing Guideline range based on a finding that he had previously sustained at least two felony convictions for “crimes of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), and imposed a sentence of 105 months' imprisonment, at the top of the guideline range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Carter had at least two prior felony convictions (a California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and an Iowa conviction for aggravated assault) that qualify as crimes of violence under the categorical approach. The court noted that district judges may and should use their sound discretion to sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) on the basis of reliable information about the defendant’s criminal history even where a strict categorical classification of a prior conviction might produce a different guideline sentencing range. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law