Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The doctor examined Chambers during the intake process at the Stateville Correctional Center. Chambers was housed there for a few weeks when he was processed into state custody. Chambers requested medication to treat a flare-up of a painful chronic condition, herpes. The doctor did not provide the medication. Chambers filed a grievance with the Stateville grievance office but was transferred to a different prison before the grievance was investigated. A grievance officer returned the grievance to Chambers unreviewed and invited him to take the matter to the Administrative Review Board (ARB), which normally serves in an appellate capacity reviewing decisions of grievance officers. ARB’s regulations also specify that grievances pertaining to problems at an earlier-assigned prison must be filed directly with ARB. Chambers skipped this step and instead sued the prison doctor under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners must pursue their complaints about prison conditions through all levels of the relevant administrative-review system before bringing a lawsuit in federal court. View "Chambers v. Sood" on Justia Law

The 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194, addresses the disparities between sentences for crack and powder cocaine and allows courts to grant sentence reductions if the defendant was previously convicted of a “covered offense.” Section 404(b) of that Act makes the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable to defendants whose offenses were committed before August 3, 2010. If a defendant was convicted of a crack-cocaine offense that was later modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, he is eligible to have a court consider whether to reduce his term of imprisonment. In this consolidated appeal, the district courts denied each defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction, concluding that each defendant was ineligible under the First Step Act because the drug quantity described in each defendant’s PSR or plea agreement indicated that the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the penalty range. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding each defendant eligible to have a court consider whether to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act. The statute of conviction alone determines eligibility for First Step Act relief. The defendants’ offenses are “covered offenses” under the Act’s plain language because the Fair Sentencing Act modified the penalties for crack offenses as a whole, not for individual violations. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

O’Leary and his codefendants operated a crack cocaine distribution business from 2010-2014. O’Leary sold crack cocaine rocks to customers, collected money, and looked out for police. Each distributor received one-to-eight packets daily, each containing 30 rocks, depending on demand and favor in the operation. As a preferred distributor, O’Leary received more packets than others. At O’Leary’s bench trial, the prosecution's evidence included O’Leary’s stipulations, the grand jury testimony, six intercepted phone call recordings of O’Leary making incriminating statements, a map of the distribution area, and 23 grams of seized cocaine. The parties stipulated that O’Leary had knowingly sold .4 grams of crack cocaine to an undercover officer on two specific dates. O’Leary was also present when co-conspirators sold crack cocaine packets.O’Leary was found guilty and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the relevant quantity of 280 grams of cocaine. The law does not limit O’Leary’s guilt to the quantities he sold alone, but rather, to the entire operation; the conspiracy sold about 60 grams of crack cocaine daily, so the 280 grams of crack cocaine quantity was satisfied within five days View "United States v. O'Leary" on Justia Law

Beloit officers facilitated a recorded controlled buy of heroin from Perez, a suspected high-level drug dealer. Perez sold 98 grams of heroin to an informant. Based on that transaction alone, Perez pled guilty to distributing heroin. At Perez’s sentencing hearing, the judge expressed concern that the guidelines range of 33–41 months’ imprisonment did not reflect the full scope of his drug trafficking. The PSR described conduct that suggested that Perez was responsible for distributing large quantities of heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The judge continued the hearing, directing the government to file a memorandum, detailing which offense conduct it could support by a preponderance of the evidence. When the hearing reconvened, the government presented witness testimony that elaborated on conduct described in the PSR, including drug ledgers, Perez’s post-arrest conversation with his girlfriend, large sums of cash, a money counter, cell phones, and Perez’s passport. The judge calculated a higher guidelines range and imposed a 121-month sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentencing judge should have recused himself. Perez has not demonstrated that a reasonable observer would have questioned the judge’s impartiality nor did he allege that the judge was biased based on events outside the proceedings. The judge’s continuance was laudable, not prejudicial. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Lund, a reporter for the Rockford Scanner, heard, by police scanner, of multiple traffic stops in Midtown. He did not have a driver’s license, so he rode a motorized bicycle to Midtown to take photographs. He suspected a prostitution sting operation. An officer noticed Lund and radioed the team. Officers Welsh and Campbell knew of Lund's previous anti‐police speech. They directed Lund to “move on.” Lund asked if he was breaking any laws. Campbell informed him that he was not, but that his continued presence would constitute obstruction of a police detail and result in arrest. Lund started his bicycle and called out, loudly, “goodbye officers.” Concerned that Lund might post pictures on social media while the sting operation was ongoing and create a danger for unarmed undercover officers, the officers followed Lund and arrested him for driving the wrong way on a one‐way street, operating a vehicle without insurance, obstructing a police officer, felony aggravated driving on a revoked license, and operating a motor vehicle without a valid drivers’ license. News stories listed Lund’s name as an arrestee in the prostitution sting.The charges against Lund were dismissed. Lund sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on First Amendment retaliation and malicious prosecution under Illinois law, citing the Supreme Court’s intervening "Nieves" (2019) holding, that, in most cases, probable cause to arrest defeats a claim of retaliatory arrest. There was probable cause to arrest Lund. View "Lund v. City of Rockford" on Justia Law

Police, checking on Thomas, who was unconscious in her car, called for paramedics. While waiting, they found a methamphetamine pipe in the car. At the hospital later, Thomas stated that she had used methamphetamine; that she and her live-in boyfriend obtained it together; that she kept her meth pipes at home; and that she had two children, a one-year-old and a 14-year-old. She was initially confused about where they were. The officers requested a welfare check. Caya answered the door, apparently under the influence of drugs. Sergeant Miller knew that Caya was on extended supervision for a felony conviction and subject to Wisconsin Statutes section 302.113(7r), which authorizes officers to search the person, home, or property of an offender released to extended supervision if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the offender is involved in criminal activity or is violating a condition of his supervision. Caya told the officers that he and Thomas were clean and that Thomas’s children were with their grandmother in Dubuque. The officers initiated a search and found Thomas’s one-year-old child in the living room; they later recovered drug paraphernalia, cash, several loaded rifles and handguns, and 350 grams of meth.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Caya's motion to suppress. Criminal offenders on community supervision have significantly diminished expectations of privacy because of the government’s strong interest in preventing recidivism. The Supreme Court has held that a law-enforcement officer may search a person on parole without any suspicion of criminal activity. A search under section 302.113(7r), which requires reasonable suspicion, is constitutionally permissible. View "United States v. Caya" on Justia Law

Chaparro was convicted based on viewing child pornography in 2013, transmitting child pornography in August 2014, and viewing child pornography on a smartphone in November 2014. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court rejected challenges, which were not raised in the district court, to the sufficiency of the evidence that he was the person using the electronic devices and to allegedly improper remarks made by the prosecutor. The court acknowledged that “the government’s case could have been stronger as to the identity of the devices’ user.” The computer forensics led investigators to a home, not to an individual, and little evidence showed that Chaparro resided at the address before December 2014. Any improper rebuttal comments did not affect Chaparro’s substantial rights.The admission of Chaparro’s statement to pretrial services that he lived at the address was an error; pretrial services information is “confidential” and its admission is specifically prohibited “on the issue of guilt,” 18 U.S.C. 3153(c)(1), (3). Chaparro’s lone witness, his uncle, testified that Chaparro did not live at the address where the crimes were committed until just before his arrest. The court allowed the testimony of the pretrial services officer for impeachment. Assuming an exception exists under section 3153(c)(3) for other forms of impeachment, applying that exception to include specific contradiction by a statement from someone other than the witness is contrary to the protections Congress enacted. View "United States v. Chaparro" on Justia Law

Winfield confessed to shooting Garrett. Winfield was convicted of attempted murder. Winfield was also accused of killing Stovall in the same shooting but was acquitted on that charge because no credible witness had placed Winfield at the scene of the crime and his confession did not mention Stovall. The judge rejected Winfield’s argument that his confession was coerced and his “half-hearted” alibi defense. On appeal, Winfield raised one unsuccessful sentencing argument. Illinois state courts, on post-conviction review, concluded that trial counsel’s presentation of Winfield’s alibi was not so deficient that it violated the Constitution; they did not meaningfully address the performance of appellate counsel. On federal habeas review, the district court concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), did not apply because the ineffective assistance claim had not been adjudicated on the merits in state court. It considered the claim without any deference to the state courts and found appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by omitting an argument that Winfield’s confession was uncorroborated.The Seventh Circuit held that Winfield is not entitled to relief. Winfield cannot overcome the deference applied to the state court’s finding that trial counsel performed reasonably because Winfield never told counsel that he was at home at the time of the shooting. The Constitution did not obligate Winfield’s appellate counsel to discover and present a complex and novel corpus delicti argument that may not have succeeded. View "Winfield v. Dorethy" on Justia Law

Godinez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The prosecution notified the court under 21 U.S.C. 851 that Godinez had a prior Ohio conviction for possession of cocaine. The district court determined that this prior state conviction made Godinez eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment rather than the otherwise applicable five-year mandatory minimum.The Seventh Circuit vacated the Sentence, citing the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194 enacted after the signing of Godinez’s plea agreement but before his sentencing. By failing to recognize the changes implemented by the Act, including the heightened thresholds that must be met for a court to impose increased mandatory minimums for certain drug offenses, the district court premised its sentencing calculations on a mandatory minimum that was twice what it should have been. The oversight constitutes plain error and requires resentencing. View "United States v. Godinez" on Justia Law

Young promoted the prostitution of high-school-aged minors, taking some of the money that they were paid for sex. Young showed the minors the website Backpage.com and taught them how to post advertisements for “escort services,” sometimes taking revealing photos and posting them himself. Young set the hourly rates, reserved the hotels, and provided the victims with condoms and cell phones. He provided housing for one victim and drove the victims to and from their calls. Sometimes he personally demanded sex from them. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1591. Weeks before Young’s trial was set to begin, Young elected to represent himself. The government presented substantial evidence of Young’s guilt. Young testified in his own defense, admitting that he had been trying to start an adult escort business, that he knew some of the victims, and that he gave them rides. He denied facilitating their prostitution and posting their ads, stating that he did not know that they were minors.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Young's convictions and 21-year sentence. Rejecting arguments the district court erred in instructing the jury on “interstate commerce” and that the evidence was insufficient on that element, the court noted the evidence of interstate advertising. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s third motion for a continuance. Young was warned of the consequences of representing himself. The court upheld the decision to exclude evidence of the minor victims’ past sexual conduct. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law