Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bridgewater pleaded guilty to soliciting an obscene visual depiction of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(3)(B)(i). The Guidelines called for a mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months in prison. The district court deviated from the Guidelines to 78 months to account for a charge of attempted enticement of a minor that the government dismissed in exchange for his guilty plea. That conduct, the court found, aggravated the nature and circumstances of the offense of conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because basing it—even in part—on dismissed conduct creates systemwide disparity. The court addressed unwarranted sentencing disparities and the lack of evidence of his recidivism and gave ample weight to the Guidelines but ultimately concluded they failed to properly reflect the scope of Bridgewater’s conduct. The court’s 18-month (or 30%) deviation did not introduce unwarranted sentence disparities among similar defendants. View "United States v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

Bridges, a Cook County Department of Corrections pretrial detainee, fell out of the upper bunk to which he had been assigned and injured himself. He sued, asserting that his injuries were caused by the defendants’ practice of ignoring medically necessary lower bunk prescriptions. Bridges cited five lawsuits filed by detainees who alleged that, between 2005 and 2012, they were injured when using upper bunks after their lower bunk prescriptions were ignored. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. A local government may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents; it is when the execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the governmental entity is responsible under section 1983. The Department houses thousands of detainees, with hundreds entering and leaving on a daily basis; three or five incidents over a seven-year period is inadequate as a matter of law to demonstrate a widespread custom or practice. Nothing connected the incidents and they were not so common as to place the defendants on notice of a widespread practice. View "Bridges v. Dart" on Justia Law

Picardi, a former Customs and Border Protection Officer at the international terminal of Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, was convicted of embezzlement by an officer or employee of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 654 and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment and a fine of $100,000. He had stolen from a traveler who was referred for a secondary inspection. While out on bond, Picardi harassed his estranged wife using electronic and other means and engaged a private detective in his efforts, falsely telling the man that he was a customs officer conducting a legitimate investigation. After Picardi was convicted, he enlisted a friend to approach his victim’s adult daughter to persuade her to convince her mother to recant her testimony.Because Picardi waived any argument regarding the amount of the fine and the adequacy of the explanation of the fine, the Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. Picardi and his lawyer knew what was at stake: the maximum under the Guidelines was $40,000, and the probation department recommendation was $100,000. This was not simply an inadvertent failure to object to the imposition of an above-Guidelines fine; it was a calculated, strategic decision, based on a hope that it would work to the client’s benefit on the custody determination. View "United States v. Picardi" on Justia Law

Cates was transporting drugs when he was pulled over for driving without rear license plate lights. The deputy saw a revolver on the passenger seat. Cates admitted that he did not have a license for the firearm. Retail quantities of cocaine and heroin were later found in his possession. Cates pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm; the government agreed not to bring additional charges. Cates waived his right to contest his conviction on any ground other than ineffective assistance of counsel. A district judge accepted the plea. Before sentencing, Cates’s attorney moved to withdraw. A new lawyer was appointed and moved to withdraw the guilty plea, claiming that Cates had entered the guilty plea under duress because he was threatened with new charges and was given only one hour to decide. Cates testified that before he received the letter accepting his plea, he had told his attorney that he “changed [his] mind” but that his lawyer told him that it was too late.The district court denied Cates’s motion, noting the five days between the submission of the plea and the Rule 11 hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court questioned the wisdom of deciding Cates’s ineffective‐assistance claim on this record rather than on collateral review and directed his appellate counsel to review the question with him. He insisted on proceeding. The court held that the record contains insufficient evidence to support Cates’s ineffective‐assistance claim, View "United States v. Cates" on Justia Law

Law enforcement learned that Lee was distributing large quantities of ice methamphetamine and arranged a controlled buy. The source purchased over 83 grams of ice methamphetamine. Days later, officers conducted a planned traffic stop. Lee consented to a K-9 walkaround. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Troopers searched the car and found over seven pounds of ice methamphetamine and $19,170 in cash, including $900 of marked money used in the controlled buy. Lee stated that he had been dealing ice methamphetamine in the area for three years. In the seven months before his arrest, Lee distributed approximately 100 pounds. Agents executed a search warrant at Lee’s residence and discovered ice methamphetamine, 12 firearms in close proximity to the drugs, scales, drug paraphernalia, and ammunition. Lee pled guilty to possessing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting Lee’s argument that he should not have received two extra criminal history points under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) for dealing methamphetamine while on supervision for a drunk driving offense. The court vacated a term of supervised release that would have prohibited him from interacting with known felons unless he receives the probation officer’s permission; that term violates the rule against delegating Article III power. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

From 1985-2017, Ballard accrued over 30 convictions for crimes including attempted residential burglary, kidnapping, battery, aggravated assault (amended from rape), possession of a firearm as a felon, and multiple convictions for driving with a suspended or revoked driver’s license. Ballard also accrued many parole violations and committed infractions while in prison. Ballard pleaded guilty in 2018 to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court initially imposed an armed career criminal enhancement, resulting in a Guidelines range of 180-210 months. The court considered old offenses for which the Guidelines did not assess criminal history points. Citing the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, the court imposed a 232-month sentence. On remand, a revised presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of 33-41 months, with a statutory maximum of 120 months. The court again pointed to Ballard’s extensive criminal history and cited the section 3553 factors to impose a sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court committed procedural error by not providing an adequate explanation for the major upward departure. The court referred to the defendant's history and characteristics and the goals of promoting respect for the law, deterrence, and protecting the public. These were the same factors discussed at the original sentencing, resulting in a sentence only 22 months above the original Guidelines range. The court provided no explanation for why consideration of the same factors warranted a much greater departure on resentencing. View "United States v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Grayson does business under the name Gire Roofing. Grayson and Edwin Gire were indicted for visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546 and harboring and employing unauthorized aliens, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). On paper, Gire had no relationship to Grayson as a corporate entity. He was not a stockholder, officer, or an employee. He managed the roofing (Grayson’s sole business), as he had under the Gire Roofing name for more than 20 years. The corporate papers identified Grayson’s president and sole stockholder as Young, Gire’s girlfriend. Gire, his attorney, and the government all represented to the district court that Gire was Grayson’s president. The court permitted Gire to plead guilty on his and Grayson’s behalf. Joint counsel represented both defendants during a trial that resulted in their convictions and a finding that Grayson’s headquarters was forfeitable. Despite obtaining separate counsel before sentencing, neither Grayson nor Young ever complained about Gire’s or prior counsel’s representations. Neither did Grayson object to the indictment, the plea colloquy, or the finding that Grayson had used its headquarters for harboring unauthorized aliens.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Grayson identified numerous potential errors in the proceedings none are cause for reversal. Grayson has not shown that it was deprived of any right to effective assistance of counsel that it may have had and has not demonstrated that the court plainly erred in accepting the guilty plea. The evidence is sufficient to hold Grayson vicariously liable for Gire’s crimes. View "United States v. Grayson Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Two men entered a Sprint store with a gun, threatened and zip‐tied all witnesses, grabbed merchandise, and fled the store in two vehicles. Williams, a getaway driver, was indicted for obstruction of commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Judge Bruce presided over his jury trial. Williams was convicted. Months later, it became public that Judge Bruce had engaged in ex parte communications with members of the U.S. Attorney’s Office. All criminal cases assigned to Judge Bruce were reassigned. Judge Darrow presided over Williams's sentencing hearing and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Judge Bruce did not violate Williams’s due process rights on these facts. Although Judge Bruce’s conduct created an appearance of impropriety violating the federal recusal statute, there is no evidence of actual bias in this case to justify a new trial. Williams does not qualify as a career offender, but the district court’s finding otherwise was not plain error. Judge Darrow thoroughly considered the section 3553(a) factors, made clear that she would impose the same sentence even if the career offender provision did not apply, and explained her reasons for that position. There was sufficient evidence regarding the use of a firearm;Al the district court did not err in applying a firearm enhancement. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2011-2016, Collins was the executive director of the Kankakee Valley Park District. The Park District, which is not tax-exempt, works with the Kankakee Valley Park Foundation, which does have tax-exempt status and raises funds for Park District programs. Collins served as treasurer for the Foundation. It came to light that he had been lining his own pockets with the Park District and Foundation’s money. He pleaded guilty to mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 42 months’ imprisonment, two-year terms of supervised release, and overall restitution of $194,383.51. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in calculating his sentencing range and that Collins forfeited the right to complain about the restitution because he failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s amended judgment. The actual loss amount easily exceeded $150,000, which is the amount associated with a 10-level boost in the base guideline level for U.S.S.G. 2B1.1. More than a guilty plea is necessary before a district court ought to award a discount for acceptance of responsibility. The court fully supported its factual finding that Collins had not fully acknowledged his crimes. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

A supplier hired Guzman-Ramirez and Gonzalez to import cocaine into Wisconsin. Gonzalez was to haul the cocaine to Chicago. Guzman-Ramirez would help remove the cocaine from a hidden compartment and, with assistance, bring half of the cocaine to Milwaukee and store it at Guzman-Ramirez’s house or auto-body shop. The supplier asked another associate (a DEA informant) to assist. During the Chicago meeting, Guzman-Ramirez expressed familiarity with the amount of cocaine and how the secret compartment worked. Because of complications, Guzman-Ramirez returned to Milwaukee without the drugs. The next day, officers searched the semi-trailer and removed 50.12 kilograms of cocaine.Guzman-Ramirez pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Gonzalez also pled guilty. A probation officer concluded that Guzman-Ramirez did not have an aggravating role in the conspiracy but that his role was significant. Guzman-Ramirez unsuccessfully sought a two-level reduction because he agreed only to transport and store the drugs and had no decision-making authority. Applying the safety-valve provisions (18 U.S.C. 3553(f)) resulted in a guidelines range of 87-108 months’ imprisonment; the court imposed a sentence of 72 months. A different judge sentenced Gonzalez to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court should have applied a minor-role adjustment and that, compared to his coconspirator’s sentence, Guzman-Ramirez’s sentence was unreasonable. The court was not required to consider a sentence that had not yet been imposed. View "United States v. Guzman-Ramirez" on Justia Law