Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Subdiaz‐Osorio stabbed his brother to death during a drunken fight in Wisconsin. He attempted to flee but was stopped in Arkansas while driving to Mexico. At Subdiaz‐Osorio’s request, the interview in Arkansas was conducted in Spanish. Neither Subdiaz‐Osorio nor Officer Torres had any trouble understanding each other. Subdiaz‐Osorio signed a waiver of his Miranda rights, indicating that he understood his rights. During the interview, after discussing the extradition process, Subdiaz‐Osorio asked in Spanish, “How can I do to get an attorney here because I don’t have enough to afford for one?” The officer responded: If you need an attorney‐‐by the time you’re going to appear in the court, the state of Arkansas will get an attorney for you. The interview continued for an hour with Subdiaz-Osorio’s full cooperation. Denying a motion to suppress, the court concluded that Subdiaz‐Osorio’s question about an attorney was not a request to have an attorney with him during the interview; he was asking about how he could obtain an attorney for the extradition hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, that Subdiaz‐Osorio did not unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Subdiaz‐Osorio’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The state court finding was not contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. View "Subdiaz-Osorio v. Humphreys" on Justia Law

In 2013, Guerrero, a Chicago police officer who participated in drug trafficking, pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in racketeering activity, conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, interfering with commerce by threats or violence, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence and drug trafficking. Guerrero’s guideline range for the first three counts was life in prison and for the fourth count was 60 consecutive months. He provided substantial assistance in prosecuting co-conspirators and the government recommended that he serve 228 months.Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782 became effective in 2014, retroactively reducing by two levels the offense levels for most drug-trafficking crimes. Guerrero sent the district court a letter requesting that he be appointed counsel in order to seek resentencing under the amendment. The district court rejected Guerrero’s 2015 request and additionally found that Guerrero was eligible for a two-level reduction under Amendment 782 but that the reduction would make no difference to his ultimate sentence: Guerrero filed a motion for clarification. The court construed that as a late motion to reconsider and denied it. In 2018, Guerrero tried again, with counsel. The district court denied the motion without considering the merits. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The 2015 proceedings should not be counted against Guerrero as his one chance to seek relief under Amendment 782. View "United States v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

In 2006, Allgire was charged with multiple drug-related offenses. He pleaded guilty to two charges and served concurrent terms of 233 months and 120 months. Allgire then began serving concurrent supervised release terms but violated the conditions and was sentenced to seven months’ reimprisonment or, alternatively, up to six months in a halfway house, plus another 24 months’ supervised release. A month into his time at a halfway house, Allgire absconded and spent seven months on the run. The guidelines range for his violation was five to 11 months. The district court felt that Allgire had taken advantage of the court’s previous leniency, having been given a 53-month reduction for cooperating with the government in his initial sentence, and time in a halfway house rather than in prison. The court sentenced Allgire to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the terms of supervised release on one count of his conviction and 17 months’ imprisonment on the other, to run concurrently. The parties agreed that any additional supervised release would be futile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the 24-month sentence was unreasonable and that the district court lacked authority to impose a concurrent 17-month sentence. The district court “ably explained its decision to vary upward from the guidelines range.” View "United Statesx v. Allgire" on Justia Law

The Drug Enforcement Administration investigated Dr. Ley and his opioid addiction treatment company, DORN, conducted undercover surveillance, and decided Ley did not have a legitimate medical purpose in prescribing Suboxone. Indiana courts issued warrants, culminating in arrests of four physicians and one nurse and seven non-provider DORN employees. Indiana courts dismissed the charges against the non-providers and the nurse. Ley was acquitted; the state dismissed the charges against the remaining providers. DORN’s providers and non-provider employees sued, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, holding probable cause supported the warrants at issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to every plaintiff except Mackey, a part-time parking lot attendant. One of Ley’s former patients died and that individual’s family expressed concerns about Ley; other doctors voiced concerns, accusing Ley of prescribing Suboxone for pain to avoid the 100-patient limit and bring in more revenue. At least one pharmacy refused to fill DORN prescriptions. Former patients reported that they received their prescriptions without undergoing any physical exam. DORN physicians prescribed an unusually high amount of Suboxone; two expert doctors opined that the DORN physicians were not prescribing Suboxone for a legitimate medical purpose. There was evidence that the non-provider employees knew of DORN’s use of pre-signed prescriptions and sometimes distributed them. There were, however, no facts alleged in the affidavit that Mackey was ever armed, impeded investigations, handled money, or possessed narcotics. View "Vierk v. Whisenand" on Justia Law

Edwards pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250 (SORNA). It was his fourth conviction for a failure to register a change of address as required by state and federal statutes. The district court ordered him to serve a prison term of 27 months and imposed three conditions on his supervised release: a requirement that, as required by his probation officer, he inform employers, neighbors and family members with children, and others of his criminal record, his obligation to register as a sex offender, and other SORNA requirements; a ban on meeting, spending time with, or communicating with any minor absent the express permission of the minor’s parent or guardian and the probation officer; and a bar on working in any job or participating any volunteer activity in which he would have access to minors, absent prior approval of his probation officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conditions. Although Edwards has never committed a “hands‐on” sexual offense against a child, the district court expressly considered that point and articulated a reasonable basis to believe that such restrictions were warranted. Edwards has possessed and distributed child pornography, including pornography depicting adults having sex with minors. The court noted his enduring sexual interest in children and his pattern of deception and non‐compliance with the conditions of his release. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Porraz was the leader of a Chicago Latin Kings gang for about four years. In 2018 he pleaded guilty to participating in a racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961–1968. The district judge applied the base offense level for conspiracy to commit murder, factored in Porraz’s criminal history, and sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Porraz’s argument that his sentence was procedurally defective because he did not kill anyone and murder was nota reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy. He also cited “unwarranted disparities” between his sentence and sentences imposed on other Latin Kings members.Porraz’s admitted conduct defeated his claim that murder was not a reasonably foreseeable part of his gang activities. The judge considered and responded to his disparity arguments. View "United States v. Porraz" on Justia Law

Dewitt was living with his fiancée, three-year-old son, and four-year-old daughter when he began chatting with Palchak on an anonymous phone application. The men met in an online group, “Open Family Fun.” Palchak was actually an undercover member of the FBI’s Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force. Dewitt told Palchak about his children. Palchak reciprocated by conveying information about his (fictitious) nine-year-old daughter. Dewitt admitted to sexually abusing his four-year-old daughter but indicated he preferred slightly older girls at the beginning of puberty. He offered to send images of himself abusing his daughter if Palchak would do the same. Dewitt sent one video and one still image of fully nude girls, with descriptions of the sexual acts he would like to see Palchak’s nine-year-old daughter perform. The FBI arrested Dewitt and searched his phone, revealing the images sent to Palchak and a photo of Dewitt engaged in a sexual act with his four-year-old daughter. Dewitt was convicted of three counts relating to the production, distribution, and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(2), and 2252(a)(4)(B), and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dewitt’s argument that the government’s evidence was insufficient because the jury heard no expert testimony about the age of girls depicted in images sent from his cellphone. The jury heard and saw more than enough to make a reliable finding that Dewitt possessed, produced, and distributed images of children. View "United States v. Dewitt" on Justia Law

Frederickson lived in Joliet. He was homeless, had a sex crime conviction, and was subject to the Illinois Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA). He has to register every week in the jurisdiction in which he resides. Joliet requires that a person moving to a new jurisdiction register with the new jurisdiction, and “register out” of the old jurisdiction within three days. For Frederickson's first four years in Joliet, Frederickson complied. In 2007 Detective Landeros took over Joliet’s SORA registrations. The relationship became so contentious that Frederickson began bringing witnesses to his registrations. Landeros arrested Frederickson several times. In January 2011, Frederickson informed Landeros that he was leaving Joliet. Landeros threatened to arrest Frederickson (on unclear grounds) if Frederickson relocated. Frederickson moved to Bolingbrook on February 8. On February 9, Frederickson registered in Bolingbrook. Landeros believed that Frederickson had to “register out” of Joliet. To update Illinois’s Law Enforcement Agency Data System database, Bolingbrook needed Frederickson’s LEADS file. Only one law enforcement agency can “own” a LEADS file and only the agency that owns the file can update it. Joliet refused to transfer Frederickson’s LEADS file. Landeros indicated that Frederickson was not actually residing in Bolingbrook. Several additional problems followed and Frederickson was convicted of failing to register on March 3. 2011.In Frederickson's civil rights suit, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a finding that Frederickson had adequately alleged that Landeros had singled Frederickson out for unfavorable treatment, was motivated solely by personal animus, and lacked a rational basis for his actions. The court denied Landeros’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Frederickson’s equal protection right to police protection uncorrupted by personal animus was clearly established. View "Frederickson v. Landeros" on Justia Law

Clay, on parole, broke into his neighbor's home, abducted her and drove her across state lines to withdraw all he could from her bank account—$140. He shoved her into her car's trunk and drove to a parking lot, then raped her, strangled her until she passed out, doused her with lighter fluid, set her afire, and left her to die. She survived. Clay was arrested days later. While in pretrial detention, Clay entered the office of caseworker Martinez, grabbed her arm, took her keys, locked the office door, and pressed a homemade knife against her throat. Jail staff unlocked the door and subdued Clay. Clay pled guilty to kidnapping, attempted murder, and using fire to commit another felony; he stipulated to the conduct involving Martinez--kidnapping a federal employee. His Guidelines range was life in prison. Clay pointed to his acceptance of responsibility, his terrible childhood, and the statistical improbability that he would re-offend if released at an advanced age. He claimed that he had taken Martinez hostage in an “attempt at suicide by police.” A physician testified that his neighbor was in intensive care for five months and endured life-threatening infections and organ failures. The prosecution emphasized Clay’s violent criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Clay's sentence of life in prison for kidnapping, with a concurrent 30-year sentence for attempted murder, a statutory minimum consecutive sentence of 10 years for using fire. The judge had cited the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, noting the “ripple effect of trauma and sadness and worry and fear” through the victims’ family, friends, and coworkers and that she saw only “recidivism” and “potential risk.” View "United States v. Clay" on Justia Law

Indianapolis pharmacies were robbed of opioid pills at gunpoint. A pharmacy employee reported that a man in the store, Fisher, had been involved in a previous robbery. An officer approached Fisher, who pulled out a semiautomatic pistol and fled. Another officer apprehended Fisher. Officers found a pistol along Fisher’s escape route. Employees of three pharmacies identified Fisher. Fisher was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and being a felon in possession of a firearm section 922(g)(1). The judge orally sentenced Fisher to 57 years plus one day in prison—one day more than the mandatory minimum sentence; ordered the forfeiture of any firearm involved in the crimes; and stated conditions of supervised release The text of the subsequent written judgment stated the conditions differently. Months later, the First Step Act, amended section 924(c) sentencing.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, remanding for correction of the inconsistency between the oral sentence and the written judgment. The court rejected arguments that the district court erred by failing to ask if Fisher would like a jury trial regarding forfeiture and abused its discretion by using the phrase “psychoactive substances” in his supervised-release conditions; that his section 924(c) convictions were invalid because Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence; that the written sentence is a nullity to the extent it conflicts with the oral sentence; and that these errors required a remand for new sentencing, applying the First Step Act. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law