Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The FBI took over a child-pornography website, “Playpen,” and kept Playpen running to locate people who distributed and viewed child pornography. Playpen allowed visitors to remain anonymous. The FBI obtained a warrant authorizing the use of a “Network Investigative Technique” (NIT). When a user logged into Playpen, the NIT installed malware on the user’s computer and relayed identifying information to the FBI. The warrant application said that the property to be searched was “located in the Eastern District of Virginia” but an addendum stated that the NIT would be “deployed” on a server “located at a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia” to obtain information from “activating computer[s]” of “any user” who logged into Playpen. Grisanti logged into Playpen from Indiana. The NIT sent identifying information. The FBI obtained Indiana search warrants and found evidence of child pornography on Grisanti’s computer. Before the FBI could complete its investigation, Grisanti destroyed the hard drive and a flash drive. The court denied a motion to suppress, concluding that the agents relied on the warrant in good faith. Convicted of destruction of evidence and child-pornography offenses, Grisanti was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. The court noted that Grisanti possessed more than 600 images of child pornography—some involving prepubescent children—and destroyed the evidence. He never sought treatment and blamed others when he was caught. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that it had already held that the good-faith exception applies to the warrant at issue. Grisanti’s sentence was not unreasonable and the district court did not make any procedural error. View "United States v. Grisanti" on Justia Law

Glispie pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), reserving the right to challenge his anticipated designation as an armed career criminal based on his prior Illinois convictions for residential burglary. The district court concluded that residential burglary in Illinois is no broader than “generic burglary” and that it qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); it sentenced Glispie to 180 months. The court cited the Seventh Circuit’s 2016 “Dawkins” decision. The Seventh Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Illinois: whether the limited-authority doctrine applies to the Illinois residential burglary statute. Under that doctrine, one who enters a public building with the intent to commit a crime automatically satisfies the unlawful entry requirement of the Illinois burglary statute with respect to a business burglary. If the doctrine applies to residential burglary, then a conviction for Illinois residential burglary is broader than generic burglary and cannot qualify as an aggravated felony for purposes of the ACCA. View "United States v. Glispie" on Justia Law

Insurance executive Menzies sold over $64 million in his company’s stock but did not report any capital gains on his 2006 federal income tax return. He alleges that his underpayment of capital gains taxes (and related penalties and interest imposed by the IRS) was because of a fraudulent tax shelter peddled to him and others by a lawyer, law firm, and financial services firms. Menzies brought claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Illinois law. The district court dismissed all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Menzies’s RICO claim falls short on the statute’s pattern-of-racketeering element. Menzies failed to plead not only the particulars of how the defendants marketed the same or a similar tax shelter to other taxpayers, but also facts to support a finding that the alleged racketeering activity would continue. A fraudulent tax shelter scheme can violate RICO; the shortcoming here is one of pleading and it occurred after the district court authorized discovery to allow Menzies to develop his claims. Menzies’s Illinois state law claims were untimely as to the lawyer and law firm defendants. The claims against the remaining financial services defendants can proceed. View "Menzies v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP" on Justia Law

Shoffner was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit vacated his below-Guidelines sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment because the district court had miscalculated the base offense level. The district court had not specified whether its imposition of a six-level increase for punching the arresting officer, U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1), was based on a belief that it was required to find, as a matter of law, that the punch created a substantial risk of serious injury or whether the court had found, as a factual matter, that the punch created a serious risk of injury. On remand, the district court, a different judge presiding, conducted a sentencing hearing. Even though the Seventh Circuit decision had decreased his applicable advisory guidelines range, Shoffner received the same sentence. The Seventh Circuit again vacated and remanded. The district court erred procedurally by not explaining why it believed that the imposed sentence was appropriate and by failing to engage with his arguments in mitigation. View "United Statesx v. Shoffner" on Justia Law

Robinson pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The probation officer recommended the statutory maximum term of 180 months’ imprisonment. At his sentencing hearing, the district court considered and rejected defense counsel’s argument that the Sentencing Guidelines calculation double-counted Robinson’s past convictions. Robinson raised the argument again when he had the opportunity to speak. He also attempted to mitigate his conduct by explaining the circumstances surrounding his arrest. He explained that his prior convictions were based on events that happened about 20 years ago and that he was now a steadily-employed family man. The court rejected those arguments as frivolous and then revoked the three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility that it had granted him earlier. The Seventh Circuit vacated the 188-month sentence. The district court clearly erred in concluding that Robinson did not accept responsibility. Robinson did not attempt to disclaim his criminal conduct but simply made a mitigation argument explaining why he was in possession of the gun. The court rejected Robinson’s double-counting argument. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

After an argument with his girlfriend, Eatman pounded on her apartment door, yelling to be let inside. Chicago police officers arrived in response to a 911 call, frisked Eatman, seized a loaded handgun, and placed him in handcuffs. Officers asked Eatman to produce the gun’s registration. His girlfriend refused to sign a police complaint. Officers took Eatman to the police station, where a background check revealed two prior felony convictions. Eatman was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Eatman unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion when they found Eatman attempting to gain access to the apartment and that the officers arrested Eatman only after inquiring whether he had registration for the gun. Eatman entered a conditional guilty plea. On appeal, Eatman conceded the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk but argued he was arrested without probable cause when he was handcuffed, so his felon status should be suppressed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the use of handcuffs on Eatman to be reasonable. The use of handcuffs was not an arrest but a method to de‐escalate the situation and allow the officers to investigate. The officers likely had probable cause to arrest Eatman for either the domestic battery or disturbing the peace. View "United States v. Eatman" on Justia Law

Knight, a Wisconsin prisoner, sought treatment for a knee injury. Dr. Grossman, who worked at a hospital that provided medical services to state prisoners, diagnosed Knight with a tear in his anterior cruciate ligament and performed reconstruction surgery. A few years later, Knight reinjured his knee and returned for treatment. Dr. Grossman examined Knight, ordered x-rays, and, without consulting an MRI, diagnosed him with a torn ACL revision. Dr. Grossman offered Knight the option of undergoing a revision procedure to repair the tear. During surgery, he determined that Knight did not have a tear but had degenerative joint disease or arthritis. Not knowing when Knight would be available for surgery again, Grossman performed an alternate procedure, which he had not discussed with Knight. Knight did not learn of the change in course until his follow-up visit. In Knight’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Grossman. The court stated that prisoners retain a liberty interest in refusing forced medical treatment while incarcerated, with an implied right to the information necessary to make an informed decision about treatment. Knight did not establish a violation of that right because no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Grossman acted with deliberate indifference to Knight’s knee condition or to his right to refuse treatment. View "Knight v. Grossman" on Justia Law

Atwood pleaded guilty to federal drug crimes. The presentencing report calculated a Guidelines range of 188-235 months. Judge Bruce sentenced Atwood to 210 months’ imprisonment, citing the 3553(a) factors and stating, "if I have made a mistake in the guideline calculations … my sentence would still be the same.” It later became known that while Atwood’s case was pending, Judge Bruce engaged in extensive ex parte communication with the U.S. Attorney’s Office about other cases. Bruce had been a federal prosecutor at that Office before his appointment to the judiciary. A newspaper exposed that communication and published emails. Judge Bruce was removed from cases involving the Office. The ex parte communications never explicitly mentioned Atwood’s case. The Seventh Circuit Judicial Council found no evidence that Bruce’s improper communications actually affected his decision in any case but stated that his actions violated the Code of Conduct. Bruce remained unassigned to any case involving the Office until September 2019. The Seventh Circuit vacated Atwood’s sentence and remanded for resentencing by a different judge. The federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. 455(a), requires a judge to recuse himself from any proceeding in which his impartiality may reasonably be questioned. The disclosure of the ex parte correspondence invited doubt about Bruce's impartiality in proceedings involving the Office. Because of the judge’s broad discretion in sentencing, Bruce’s failure to recuse himself was not harmless error. View "United States v. Atwood" on Justia Law

Kimbrough dated the mother of daughters, ages five and seven, who eventually revealed Kimbrough had molested them for two years. Kimbrough was convicted and sentenced to 80 years’ imprisonment. The judge considered Kimbrough’s lack of criminal history and Kimbrough’s abuse of a position of trust. Kimbrough's counsel argued the court abused its discretion in imposing that sentence but never challenged his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows the court to revise a sentence that "is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” A split panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals sua sponte reduced his sentence under Rule 7(B). The Indiana Supreme Court vacated, holding Rule 7(B) should not have been invoked sua sponte. Kimbrough then sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the sentence under Rule 7(B). The trial court and Indiana Court of Appeals denied relief, stating: “Kimbrough has not established that there is a reasonable probability that, if appellate counsel had made a Rule 7(B) challenge, the result ... would have been different.” Granting Kimbrough’s petition for federal habeas relief, the district court found that because panels of the Indiana Court of Appeals reached opposite conclusions, Kimbrough necessarily had a reasonable probability of success and had satisfied Strickland’s prejudice prong. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a federal court considering a 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) habeas petition cannot disagree with a state court’s resolution of a state law issue. View "Kimbrough v. Neal" on Justia Law

Haldorson, a fireworks enthusiast and a drug dealer, was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy. Along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his car. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, explosives, and a firearm. Haldorson unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence and was convicted on four counts of the seven-count indictment: distribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 844(a); and possession of an explosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C. 844(h)(2). The court vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-included offense of Count Two and sentenced Haldorson to 192 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the motions to suppress. Probable cause, based on the controlled buy three weeks earlier, supported the arrest and exigent circumstances existed for the warrantless search of his bedroom. There was a legitimate concern that other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s bedroom and were dangerous to others. The jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment for unlawfully carrying an explosive and permit the jury to convict him on a broader basis than charged. View "United States v. Haldorson" on Justia Law