Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Hanson was indicted in 2009 for conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in excess of 500 grams. The prosecution established Hanson’s three prior drug offenses and Kentucky felony third-degree residential burglary conviction. Hanson pleaded guilty with a plea agreement; the government listed only one prior felony drug conviction under 21 U.S.C. 851, instead of three potentially qualifying convictions, and relied in part on Hanson’s burglary conviction for a recommended Guidelines sentencing range. The Probation Officer calculated Hanson’s Guidelines range as 262-327 months, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(c)(3). The court sentenced Hanson to 262 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of his collateral challenge to his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Noting that the challenge was untimely, the court rejected an argument that the district court erred when it included his third-degree burglary as a crime of violence, enhancing Hanson’s status to a career offender, and resulting in a “miscarriage of justice.” The government conceded that the Kentucky third-degree burglary statute does not inherently involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” of a “crime of violence” as part of the career offender designation but the court did not rely solely, or even principally, on the Guidelines; it referenced multiple considerations in imposing Hanson’s sentence, including the Guidelines, the lengthy presentencing report, the argument of the parties, and factors set forth in section 3553(a). View "Hanson v. United States" on Justia Law

While on supervised release for possessing a firearm as a felon, Shockey tested positive for methamphetamine, which he later admitted using. A probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervision, charging Shockey with a Grade B violation for conduct constituting an offense punishable by a prison term exceeding one year, U.S.S.G. 7B1.1(a)(2). Shockey asked the court to find that he had merely used methamphetamine, rather than possessed it. Use is a Grade C violation that does not mandate revocation. He argued that he violated the requirement of his supervised-release condition to refrain from using drugs—a violation that is not a felony. The district court rejected Shockey’s argument, implying that use supports an inference of possession. With a sentencing range of 21-24 months in prison, the court sentenced him to 15 months, recognizing that Shockey had stayed sober for seven months before using methamphetamine and committed no other crimes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Shockey was notified before the hearing by the probation officer in writing that he was alleged to have violated the Indiana “Possession of methamphetamine” statute and that this constituted a Grade B violation because the offense is punishable by more than one year in prison. The district court reasonably could infer possession from use. View "United States v. Shockey" on Justia Law

Portee pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and faced a sentencing guidelines range of 63–78 months, with a statutory maximum of 120 months. The government sought sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), citing: a 1983 Illinois attempted armed robbery conviction; a 1990 Indiana robbery conviction; a 2000 Indiana pointing a firearm conviction; and a 2006 Indiana intimidation conviction. Under ACCA, a defendant convicted of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) who has three prior violent felony convictions must be sentenced to at least 15 years. In 2010, the judge sentenced Portee, under ACCA, to 180 months. In 2015, the Supreme Court held, in “Johnson,” that ACCA’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague; a felony is a “violent felony” under ACCA only if it satisfies ACCA’s elements clause (has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another) or is specifically enumerated as a violent felony. Portee moved to correct his sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of relief. The elements of Indiana felony pointing do not require that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force against the person of another. There are situations that could meet all the elements of Indiana felony intimidation by threat to commit a forcible felony that do not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another. View "Portee v. United States" on Justia Law

The Marion County Superior Courts and the Sheriff’s Office use different case management systems, which have difficulty communicating. A system implemented to ensure the transfer of data was imperfect. Problems arose when the courts modified a release order for a detainee who had already been processed. The Sheriff’s Office reached an agreement to have court staff contact the Sheriff’s inmate records staff if there was a subsequent order. The Sheriff’s Office took custody of Levy on February 29, 2016. Levy remained in custody until March 3, 2016. Levy claims the judge at his first court appearance ordered him released on his own recognizance and the Sheriff unlawfully detained him. The Sheriff’s Office claimed that the judge ordered that Levy remain in custody until he transferred to Marion County Community Corrections; at Levy’s second appearance on March 2, a different judge ordered Levy to self-report. The records staff had already processed Levy; the court did not contact the Sheriff’s Office about the modification, Levy sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unreasonable seizure and detention and deprivation of liberty without due process. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Absent evidence that the Sheriff’s Office knew or should have known that the policy would fail, or failed so often that it would obviously result in over-detention, Levy cannot show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The Sheriff’s actions showed awareness that a danger existed and an attempt to avert an injury. Levy’s singular experience does not support a finding to the contrary. View "Levy v. Marion County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Chicago Officers, in uniform, were patrolling a public housing complex in an effort to increase police visibility in anticipation of celebratory gunfire to usher in the new year. They saw Holly walking on a sidewalk inside a courtyard, approached, and asked Holly if he had a gun. The officers testified that they did not draw their guns nor did they touch Holly. Holly claimed that they approached with guns drawn. Holly said yes. The police confiscated the gun and arrested him. Holly was charged with possessing a firearm following a prior felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the gun, arguing that his police encounter was an impermissible seizure. He also moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the police’s failure to preserve video footage of his arrest violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland. The court denied Holly’s motions, reasoning that the officers’ testimony made more sense than Holly’s and that Holly was less credible given his criminal history and his three shifting explanations for why he had a gun. The court noted that no one who watched the video (before it was overwritten) testified that it depicted Holly’s arrest. Holly had not established that the video was potentially exculpatory or that the police acted in bad faith by failing to preserve it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In the totality of circumstances, Holly’s interaction with police was voluntary and did not constitute a seizure. View "United States v. Holly" on Justia Law

Walker, a Stateville Correctional Center inmate, has an incurable motor neuron disease, primary lateral sclerosis (PLS). PLS causes weakness in his voluntary muscles. Walker alleges that Stateville’s healthcare providers (Wexford and Dr. Obaisi) were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs after he underwent spinal surgery in 2011. Walker claims they failed to ensure he received proper follow-up care and allowed undue delays in his treatment by outside experts, which delayed his diagnosis and caused him to suffer from the undiagnosed PLS in the interim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Dr. Obaisi made a reasonable medical judgment to delay referring Walker until he had more information and could make a more informed referral request. Obaisi responded to Walker’s changing symptoms and was receptive to the specialists’ recommendations. That Walker’s pain and other symptoms did not subside is not evidence of Obaisi’s deliberate indifference, considering that Walker voluntarily stopped taking pain medication. Obaisi did what he could within the limits of his role to move Walker’s treatment forward. Wexford refers many inmates, and the specialists have a finite number of appointments available. Absent evidence that Wexford was on notice that these wait times were likely to cause constitutional violations, but failed to act in response, Wexford cannot be liable. View "Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Zamudio drug organization distributed pounds of methamphetamine and cocaine throughout the Indianapolis area. Zamudio imported the drugs from his suppliers in Mexico and oversaw his distributors, including De La Torre, Chapman, Rush, and Bennett. Gonzalez was Zamudio’s girlfriend; she allowed Zamudio to store and traffic drugs out of her home and helped launder Zamudio’s drug money and wired hundreds of thousands of dollars to Mexico and California. All five eventually pleaded guilty and were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. In consolidated appeals, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences of Gonzalez, De La Torre, and Bennett. The court upheld the application of the aggravating role enhancement to Gonzalez’s sentence and found that De La Torre waived any challenge to his conditions of supervised release. Bennett's below-Guidelines sentence was reasonable. The court vacated the guilty pleas of Chapman and Rush. For those defendants, the government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 851(a) alleging that prior state law convictions were each a “felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. 841, so that each faced mandatory minimums of life in prison. Their plea agreements were based on errors regarding the mandatory minimum sentences they would have otherwise faced and were not entered into knowingly and intelligently. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Wisconsin prisoner Brown cut himself severely while in restrictive housing. Brown sued the prison nurses, asserting that they had exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Wisconsin Department of Justice and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin have a 2018 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that covers 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuits by an incarcerated person, when those cases must undergo initial screening by the district court under 28 U.S.C. 1915A. In the MOU, the state DOJ gives “limited consent to the exercise of jurisdiction” by Magistrate Judges over several things, including, without qualification, the initial screening. Following its routine procedures and the MOU, the district court sent the case to Magistrate Duffin for initial screening. Brown consented (28 U.S.C. 636(c)) to the authority of the magistrate to resolve the entire case. Duffin found that Brown failed to state a claim, stating that “[t]his order and the judgment to follow are final” and appealable to the Seventh Circuit. Under Circuit precedent, a magistrate judge does not have the authority to enter a final judgment in a case when only one party has consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. Two defendants had not been served. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the state defendant may consent in advance to the magistrate’s jurisdiction to conduct the initial case screening and, if the plaintiff has also filed consent, the magistrate may enter final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice. View "Brown v. Doe" on Justia Law

Kaufmann arranged to care for an elderly man in exchange for room and board. The arrangement ended when police arrested Kaufmann for stealing from the man. Packing Kaufmann’s belongings, the family discovered child pornography. A grand jury indicted Kaufmann for receiving and possessing materials involving sexual exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and (a)(4). Kaufmann pled guilty. The mandatory minimum sentence for these convictions is enhanced to 15 years if the defendant has a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward, or the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography." The district court concluded that this enhancement applies because Kaufmann has prior Indiana convictions for possession of child pornography. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Kaufmann’s argument that his convictions did not support the enhancement because the Indiana statute criminalized conduct broader than the federal version of possession of child pornography. The Seventh Circuit has held that a 2252(b) enhancement does not require the state statute of conviction to be the same as or narrower than the analogous federal law; the words “relating to” in section 2252(b) expand the range of enhancement-triggering convictions. Kaufmann’s Indiana convictions are ones “relating to … possession … of child pornography.” View "United States v. Kaufmann" on Justia Law

Miller cut a hole in his bathroom wall and secretly filmed teenage girls—friends of his own children—undressing and showering. Federal authorities investigated and, after extensive discussions, offered to allow Miller to plead guilty to possessing child pornography, an offense with a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. Miller rejected the offer and went to trial, where he was convicted of the greater offense of producing child pornography and sentenced to 18 years. The Seventh Circuit, having previously rejected Miller’s challenge to his conviction and sentence on direct review, affirmed the district court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Miller failed to show that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. Miller’s counsel credibly testified that he fully informed Miller of the risks of rejecting the plea to simple possession and facing a charge of producing child pornography but that Miller insisted on going to trial on the view that accepting a 10-year sentence for possessing child pornography was tantamount to receiving a life sentence. The attorney and Miller “spent a long, long time” reviewing the case law informing the question whether the video images “met the federal definition of lascivious” and Miller made the ultimate decision to not accept the government’s offer. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law