Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In March 2009 Truitt joined the Moorish Science Temple of America, which calls itself a sovereign “ecclesiastical government” and teaches that neither the states nor the federal government have authority over its members. Members purport to hold something akin to diplomatic immunity. In late 2009, Truitt filed seven nearly identical tax returns, each falsely claiming that she was entitled to a $300,000 refund. The IRS identified six returns as fraudulent, but for unknown reasons, approved one and sent her a check for the full amount. Within weeks the IRS demanded that she return the funds. She did not respond but spent the money on jewelry, a condominium, tickets to sporting events, and an investment. Truitt was convicted of making false claims against the United States, 18 U.S.C. 287 and theft of government funds, 18 U.S.C. 641. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Truitt’s challenge the exclusion of her expert witness, psychologist Dr. Fogel, who proposed to testify that Truitt was a member of a “charismatic group”—a cult-like organization that indoctrinates its members. Truitt argued that she lacked the requisite mens rea for the crimes. The judge properly excluded the testimony under “Daubert” and Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704(b), reasonably concluding that Fogel lacked the relevant expertise and his methods were not reliable. View "United States v. Truitt" on Justia Law

On September 28, 2000, Camm, a former Indiana State Trooper, arrived home and discovered his wife lying on the garage floor, having been shot in the head. His children, Brad and Jill, were dead in his wife’s vehicle. Camm thought Brad might be alive, so he reached over Jill’s body, pulled Brad out, and began performing CPR. Jill’s blood ended up on his T-shirt. Camm called the Indiana State Police. Floyd County prosecutor Faith arrived and decided to hire an Oregon private forensics analyst, specializing in blood-spatter analysis, a subjective field he admits is only partly scientific. The analyst's assistant, Stites, arrived to document evidence and take photos. Stites is not a crime scene reconstructionist, has never taken a bloodstain-analysis course, and has almost no scientific background. Stites told investigators that the blood on Camm’s shirt was “high-velocity impact spatter” (HVIS), which occurs only in the presence of a gunshot. Stites identified HVIS bloodstains on the garage door, shower curtains, breezeway siding, a mop, and a jacket. Only the stain on the T-shirt was actually blood. Stites also stated that the blood was manipulated by a high pH cleaning substance. Faith and the investigators also found a prison-issue sweatshirt in the garage with a nickname written on the collar. The Indiana Department of Corrections has a database of inmate nicknames, but no one tried to match the nickname to a former prisoner. A palm print on Kimberly Camm’s car was not run through the system for a match. Camm’s attorney had the sweatshirt tested, uncovering a DNA profile. Faith agreed to run the profile through CODIS and stated that nothing came up; he never actually ran the test. At trial, Stites gave credentials and made statements that were indisputably false. Camm was twice convicted but was acquitted after a third trial. The DNA, nickname, and palm print had, by then, identified the actual killer. Camm sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for the 13 years he spent in custody. Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit held that Camm presented enough evidence for trial on the Fourth Amendment claim, as it relates to the first probable-cause affidavit. A trial is also warranted on aspects of the Brady claim: whether some defendants suppressed evidence of Stites’s lack of qualifications and their failure to follow through on a promise to run a DNA profile. View "Camm v. Faith" on Justia Law

Chazen was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felony and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which mandates a minimum 15-year sentence if a defendant unlawfully possesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a serious drug offense or violent felony, which “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or is “burglary, arson, or extortion.” At the time, the definition included a residual clause, which encompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” In 2015, the Supreme Court held the residual clause void for vagueness. Chazen has felony convictions under Minnesota law for second-degree assault, second-degree manufacture of a controlled substance, escape from custody, and second-degree burglary. After an unsuccessful appeal and 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas petition, Chazen sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. The government conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances conviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense. Minnesota's burglary statute covers more conduct than generic burglary and does not qualify as an ACCA predicate violent felony. Relief was available under section 2241 because, at the time of Chazen’s 2013 section 2255 petition, precedent foreclosed any contention that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felony predicates. View "Chazen v. Marske" on Justia Law

Khan construed a lawsuit concerning a traffic accident as “senseless provocation”; believed “noise pollution around [his] house” to be “organized persecution,” for which he promised retaliation; and believed Mayor Emanuel “doomed Chicago.” In Facebook posts, Khan threatened to “kill,” “shoot,” “hunt,” “murder,” and “put bullets in” college students, “vulnerable individuals,” people walking dogs, “high net worth individual[s],” and witnesses that “get [in] the way.” He claimed a specific Chicago neighborhood as his “free kill zone,” planned to “purchase a [G]o[P]ro camera, ... record the killings, and upload them.” Khan drove for Uber and posted messages about “dry run[s]” and carrying a loaded gun during shifts for “necessary murders.” He posted photos of himself holding those guns and “sw[ore] to Allah ... that I will ... murder in the next 30 days, which corresponded to Khan's plan to fly to Pakistan.Khan was indicted for making interstate threats to injure others, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting challenges to the indictment and the sufficiency of the evidence. The district court was not required to instruct the jury that it must find that Khan intended to communicate a threat; that the intended victim received it; and that it caused the victim to feel threatened. The court properly refused to suppress evidence of a gun found in Khan’s car and to suppress other evidence on the theory that the government did not produce evidence of an anonymous tip. View "United States v. Khan" on Justia Law

In 1996, Haynes robbed six stores at gunpoint. Three robberies were in Illinois and three were in Iowa. Haynes was charged with the Illinois robberies under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. For each robbery, Haynes also was charged with a count under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The Iowa robberies were charged under section 1952(a)(2), which makes it a crime to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to commit a crime of violence and then to attempt or carry out a crime of violence. The indictment alleged that Haynes accomplished each 1952 violation “by committing the offense of robbery” under section 1951; each charge had a corresponding 924(c) firearm charge. Convicted on all counts, Haynes was sentenced to life in prison for each robbery based on 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1) because he had two prior Illinois burglary convictions that were treated as “serious violent felonies.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Haynes’ section 924(c) convictions because the indictment and jury instructions, taken together, required jurors to find each element of the Hobbs Act robberies—crimes of violence—at the center of the nested charging scheme with section 1951 inside section 1952(a)(2) inside section 924(c). Haynes unsuccessfully argued that section 1952(a)(2) was not “divisible” and that the jury did not necessarily find him guilty of the underlying Hobbs Act robberies. View "United States v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Barber and Chipps used a crow‐bar to break into Dutchman Hunting Supplies in Shipshewana, Indiana, and steal 15 handguns. They set off the alarm during the robbery and were easily identified by shop employees because they had scouted out Dutchman earlier that day. In addition, Barber discussed the robbery on Facebook Messenger. Barber was indicted on charges of stealing firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer, possessing firearms as a felon, and possessing stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(u), (g)(1), and (j). Chipps cooperated with the government and testified at trial against Barber. In addition, the government introduced the Facebook messages and cell‐location data for Barber’s phone, placing him near Dutchman at the time of the robbery. The jury convicted him. The court sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment, reflecting a two‐level enhancement in his offense level for obstruction of justice based on a message scratched on a courthouse bench: TELL ANTHONY CHIPPS TO THINK B4 H GET ON THERE N LIE. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of the Facebook records, cell‐location data, and a certificate indicating that Dutchman had a firearms license and the application of the obstruction enhancement. The court rejected a Confrontation Clause challenge and an authentication argument View "United States v. Barber" on Justia Law

Williams, a Racine County Jail pre-trial detainee, suffers from osteoarthritis, for which he has received Social Security disability insurance since 1982. Although the Jail typically provides inmates with a single mattress to sleep on, when the jail places inmates in disciplinary segregation it does not allow them to keep their mattresses in their cells during the daytime hours. Medical staff provided Williams with double mattresses to sleep on as an accommodation for his osteoarthritis and allowed him to keep a single mattress in his cell during the day. Months later, the medical staff concluded that Williams’s medical condition no longer required a second mattress. During the following months, Williams had several disciplinary issues and served time in segregation without a mattress accommodation. The jail staff conducted hearings to evaluate Williams’s write-ups. Williams refused to participate. The jail’s medical staff continued to address Williams’s medical complaints and Williams continued to correspond with officers concerning his grievances. Williams appealed one of the disciplinary determinations. The district court screened Williams’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint and allowed claims alleging retaliation, harassment, conspiracy to fabricate disciplinary tickets, and medical deliberate indifference to proceed but later granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams never made a timely appeal of his grievances; the defendants did not provide him with objectively unreasonable medical care. View "Williams v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Kelerchian was a licensed firearms dealer. His co-conspirators were Kumstar, the Deputy Chief of the Lake County, Indiana, Sheriff’s Department, and Slusser, a patrolman who was the armorer for the department’s SWAT team. The trio defrauded firearms manufacturer H&K and the laser sight producer Insight into selling them machine-guns and laser sights restricted to law enforcement and military use. After many fraudulent transactions, the three were indicted. Kumstar and Slusser pleaded guilty. Kelerchian was convicted on four counts of conspiracy and four counts of making false writings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A machine-gun counts as a firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 924, so Kelerchian was properly charged with conspiracy to violate the Act by submitting documents falsely telling H&K that the buyer of all the machineguns would be the Lake County Sheriff’s Department. Kelerchian was properly charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. There was sufficient evidence to prove the charges involving the “demonstration letters” that enabled Kelerchian to buy machine-guns for his personal collection and the money-laundering conspiracy charge. The court rejected challenges to jury instructions and a claim of “constructive amendment” of the indictment. View "United States v. Kelerchian" on Justia Law

Janusiak called 911 to report that Payten, a friend’s baby in her care, was not breathing. Paramedics took Payten to the hospital while officers talked to Janusiak. The police returned about eight hours later, and Janusiak, then eight months pregnant, agreed to go to the police station for an interview. Police questioned her about Payten’s death for about seven hours. Toward the end of the interrogation, Janusiak made statements about what happened to Payten that were used to impeach her testimony at trial. After Peyten died Janusiak was convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide. On direct appeal, Wisconsin courts rejected her argument that statements she made during the interrogation were involuntary and should have been suppressed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of her petition for habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court rejected Janusiak’s arguments that her statements were coerced by comments that law enforcement made to her about keeping access to her children, the length and other features of the interrogation, and her vulnerability as a pregnant woman and mother. The state appellate court reasonably applied the correct standard to determine that Janusiak’s statements were voluntary. View "Janusiak v. Cooper" on Justia Law

U.S. Customs Officer Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open containers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport. Opening one from South Korea to inspect its freight, Parra found a fully assembled, five-foot-tall industrial turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “Assembled in USA.” The discovery led to a federal investigation that traced back to Lee. Prosecutors charged Lee with executing a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely representing that his company manufactured its turbo blowers in the U.S. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his wire fraud convictions, reasoning that Lee’s misrepresentations were material under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), which includes a “Buy American” provision. The evidence adequately supports Lee’s participation in a scheme to defraud and his intent to do so. Lee used interstate wires as a part of that scheme. The indictment afforded Lee ample notice of the case the government presented at trial and included specific details of the crimes alleged to avoid double jeopardy risk; no impermissible constructive amendment or variance occurred. The court also upheld Lee’s smuggling convictions under 18 U.S.C. 545. The mislabeling served an important function in Lee’s broader scheme to deceive customers about the origin of the turbo blowers. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law