Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, Brazier, Fields, and Mzembe kidnapped, shot, and ruthlessly beat Harris as he left his home. Charged with federal kidnapping and firearms crimes, the three were tried and sentenced separately. Their appeals were consolidated. The defendants did not challenge their convictions for the underlying crimes of kidnapping or holding Harris for ransom; the two defendants convicted of being felons in possession of firearms did not challenge those convictions. Defendants Fields and Mzembe challenged their convictions and sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and discharging firearms during a crime of violence. The Seventh Circuit reversed those section 924(c) decisions, citing later decisions by the Supreme Court, establishing that the underlying offenses do not qualify categorically as crimes of violence. Under the categorical analysis that applies to both the elements and residual clauses of section 924(c)'s definition of crimes of violence, Mzembe’s and Fields’ convictions for kidnapping and demanding ransom cannot support the mandatory consecutive sentences. The categorical method focuses on the essential elements of the counts of conviction, requiring courts to focus on the least culpable conduct that could violate the relevant statutes, without considering the actual facts of the defendants’ conduct. In resentencing Mzembe and Fields on the remaining charges, however, the court can consider their actual conduct in exercising its discretion under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). View "United States v. Mzembe" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainees at the Lake County Adult Correctional Facility allege that for approximately three days, jail officials shut off all water in their jail without any warning. The shutdown was apparently conducted in order to replace a pump. With no running water, the detainees were provided with five bottles of water for their personal and sanitation uses and with a communal barrel of water for each pod in the jail. As a result, they became ill and feces built up and festered in the jails’ toilets, attracting insects. When plaintiffs asked for more water, they were locked down in their cells as punishment. The detainees filed a putative class action, alleging violations of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The rights that plaintiffs identify—to have enough water for drinking and sanitation, and not to be forced to live surrounded by their own and others’ excrement—are clearly established. Regardless of the legitimacy of the jail’s objective, taking as true the conditions described in the complaint, with plausible inferences, the conditions of confinement were objectively unreasonable and “excessive in relation to” any legitimate non-punitive purpose. View "Hardeman v. Wathen" on Justia Law

Chicago Officers stopped Martin for non-functioning tail and brake lights. Martin claims he had not committed any traffic violations. Martin explained that he did not have his driver’s license. The officers asked Martin to step out of the car as additional officers arrived. Martin claims the officers forced him from the car, conducted a pat-down search, handcuffed him, put him into a police car, then searched his car, where they recovered a semiautomatic handgun with a defaced serial number and a baggie of crack cocaine. Martin had previously been convicted of first-degree murder and unlawful use of a weapon by a convicted felon. Martin was charged with various crimes under Illinois law and spent 65 days incarcerated. The state court granted Martin’s motion to suppress the evidence. The charges were dismissed. Martin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers argued that even if the stop was unlawful, once officers saw the handgun and cocaine, they had probable cause for Martin’s arrest, which limited Martin’s damages to the period between his stop and his arrest. The district court agreed. The jury awarded him $1.00. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The jury concluded that the officers unlawfully seized Martin without reasonable suspicion, but found against Martin on the claim that officers either arrested him or searched him or his car without probable cause. The only Fourth Amendment injury being redressed is the brief initial seizure before officers asked for Martin's license. View "Martin v. Marinez" on Justia Law

An informant sent Harper a photograph of a pistol. Harper offered to trade five grams of crack cocaine. The informant and an undercover agent met Harper in a parking lot. The agent opened a toolbox containing the gun and handed the gun to Harper, who held it. Harper promised the crack cocaine would arrive within an hour; he got into the truck to wait. The agent returned the gun to the locked toolbox and placed the toolbox in Harper’s lap. The police arrived and arrested Harper. After Harper's first lawyer withdrew, his court-appointed lawyer unsuccessfully sought leave to withdraw. Harper entered a plea agreement, calling for 96 months’ incarceration—60 months for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and 36 months for possession of a firearm by a felon and possession with intent to distribute. The judge explained the sentence to Harper. Harper said that the sentence was acceptable and confirmed that he had no other questions. The judge reviewed all the admonishments for a change of plea, then accepted his guilty plea. Months later, Harper moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective. Harper obtained new counsel, who argued that Harper did not “possess” a firearm because he never had “full control of th[e] firearm.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Harper had at least constructive possession of the gun and cannot establish prejudice from any ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

Evans, a state prisoner with multiple health issues, alleged that he developed nasal polyps and that the prison medical staff refused to authorize surgery, the only effective remedy. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed Evans’s case with prejudice as a discovery sanction. Kayira, one of the defendants, attempted to depose Evans. Kayira noticed the deposition by mail on February 16, for February 21. Evans swears that he did not receive that notice until February 22. When, on the 21st, he was taken from his cell to meet with the defendants’ lawyers, he says that he had no idea why they were there and was feeling ill and could not sit for the deposition. Evans refused to be sworn or to answer questions. The Seventh CIrcuit reversed. Although dismissal is sometimes the proper sanction for a discovery violation, it is one of the harshest sanctions a court can impose. Courts must be especially careful before taking that step. If a party appears for his deposition but refuses to cooperate, the proper procedure is to obtain a Rule 37(a) order, directing him to be sworn and testify. The order permitting Evans’s deposition was far from an order compelling Evans to do anything. In addition, Evans was entitled at least to actual notice. View "Evans v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Brown pled guilty to distributing a controlled substance. Thornton pled guilty to bank robbery and an associated firearms charge. The same district court separately imposed terms of imprisonment followed by supervised release on both. The court imposed mandatory conditions under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. 5D1.3(a) (do not commit another crime, do not possess a controlled substance, submit to drug testing, and submit a DNA sample). There were also special (discretionary) conditions, authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), 3583(d). The PSRs also contained nine “administrative” run-of-the-mill conditions that often accompany supervised release, including a requirement to report to the probation office following release from prison, a prohibition on possessing firearms, a direction not to leave the judicial district without permission, and a requirement to communicate with the probation office. The PSRs cited no authority for these conditions but stated that the conditions are administrative and applicable whenever supervision is imposed, regardless of the substantive conditions. Brown and Thornton argued that the PSRs suggested the conditions are mandatory, but there is no statutory basis for that proposition, and that the imposition of administrative conditions violated their due process rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that neither defendant objected to the conditions in the district court, and so both waived the issue. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Police arrested five men involved in a string of Milwaukee armed robberies in 2016. Three of the defendants cooperated with the government and pled guilty. The two remaining defendants, Hunter and Evans, were convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s handling of jury selection and denial of their Batson challenge. Even if the court could have conducted a more perfect jury selection by starting over with a new panel, the choice to restart the process with the same panel was not clear error. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to mandate a procedural approach for handling jury selection after a party raises a Batson challenge. The court rejected an argument that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause when it prevented them from cross‐examining government witnesses about the specific prison terms they avoided through their cooperation. The defense’s cross‐examination exposed enough information for the jury to deduce that the witnesses received a serious benefit from cooperating with the government. The court also rejected challenges to how the trial court handled witness testimony and to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for crimes related to their involvement in a bank robbery. Defendant Thompson's attorney field an Anders brief explaining that he does not believe Thompson has any viable arguments on appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and dismissed appeal No. 19-1519.The court affirmed Thomas's conviction and sentence in appeal No. 19-1356, holding that there was no plain error in admitting the testimony of Thomas' probation officer; there was no abuse of discretion by deciding to allow evidence of Thomas's statement that the Mercedes was worth $30,000; there was not abuse of discretion in the government's use of the word "you" instead of "reasonable person" in its closing argument to describe the inquiry for intimidation; the delay in this case did not violate the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment; and there was no error, let alone plain error, in the jury instruction regarding accomplice liability. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Officers discovered downloads of child pornography from an IP address associated with Kraemer’s residence. FBI agents executed a search warrant and found an external hard drive containing images of child pornography. Kraemer later admitted that he possessed child pornography, that he searched for child pornography using specific search terms, and that his collection of child pornography totaled about 100,000 files. Kraemer pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). At sentencing, the court determined that Kraemer’s prior Wisconsin convictions for first‐degree and second‐degree sexual assault of a child constituted convictions “relating to … abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” that triggered a 10‐year, mandatory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2), and imposed a sentence of 133 months’ imprisonment, followed by eight years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The applicable federal enhancement statute, section 2252(b)(2), requires only that a prior state statute of conviction “relat[e] to,” rather than be fully equivalent to, “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Kraemer’s first‐degree sexual assault conviction is one “relating to” abusive sexual conduct involving a minor despite a slight difference in the maximum age of the victim under state and federal law. View "United States v. Kraemer" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Seventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B), which partially defines “crime of violence,” is unconstitutionally vague. In 2017, the court relied on Cardena to vacate Jenkins’s and Jackson’s convictions under section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). In 2018, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded both decisions for reconsideration in light of its Sessions v. Dimaya decisions. In 2019, the Supreme Court (Davis) found that section 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutional. In Davis, the Court held that section 924(c)(3)(B)’s language required the use of the categorical approach and thus that it was unconstitutionally vague. Although a case-specific approach would alleviate the vagueness, the Court concluded that “the statute simply cannot support” the use of that approach. The Seventh Circuit held that Davis vindicates its earlier opinions, and remanded both Jenkins and Jackson for resentencing. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law