Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Two Stateville inmates, struck by buckshot fired by prison guards, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the guards violated their Eighth Amendment rights when they discharged their shotguns over a crowded prison dining hall. The guards claimed that they fired the shots as a necessary warning to two other inmates who were fighting and resisting the efforts of guards on the floor, armed only with pepper spray, who were trying to break up the conflict. The inmates claimed that the shots were fired after the fight had been broken up and that the officers did not aim their shots at a "shot box" intended to prevent ricochets. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the force was more than de minimus and that the allegations would support findings of intent to make contact and of malice. Many of the facts are disputed. Construing the facts in favor of the plaintiffs, the force applied was grossly disproportionate to the force that could plausibly have been thought necessary. View "McCottrell v. White" on Justia Law

After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his phone, Bonin said he was a U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a gun on his belt, and threatened to “take it out in the hall.” Patrons called 911. Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived, Bonin convinced them that he was, and they allowed him to reenter the theater. As Bonin walked to his seat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police removed him from the theater. One month later, police observed a car driving with flashing emergency lights activated and pulled over to allow it to pass, then realized it was not an emergency vehicle, but a Ford Bronco adorned with an “AGENT” decal on the windshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was driving. Bonin was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 912, which makes it a crime to impersonate an officer or employee of the United States. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his claim that section 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech and his challenges to multiple evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. Public safety and protection of the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests and section 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve” those interests. View "United States v. Bonin" on Justia Law

Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In 1999, he applied for naturalization. He became a U.S. citizen in 2000. He was then indicted on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Less than five months after becoming a U.S. citizen, Corral pleaded guilty to Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse, under Illinois law, which then stated, “sexual conduct with a victim who was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family member.” In 2017, the government sought to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he obtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), in that Corral lacked good moral character because he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within the statutory period of five years preceding his application for citizenship. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling in favor of the government, rejecting defenses of “laches” and selective prosecution. Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or concealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not relate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. View "United States v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Lewellen, a Chicago Police Department “dirty cop,” arrested Ruiz-Cortez for possessing cocaine and served as the key witness at his trial Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-Cortez spent a decade in prison before the federal government discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included drug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the government, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government prosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction. Ruiz-Cortez sued the city and Lewellen under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for withholding material impeachment evidence of Lewellen’s crimes. The district court dismissed the claim against the city, finding no evidence of municipal liability. A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal to testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the city but vacated as to Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez failed to marshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard. The district court allowed Lewellen to offer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invocation, that “fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law,” and failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment invocation is proper. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth Amendment simply because there was other ongoing litigation, and not because truthful answers may have incriminated him, the jury was almost certainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation. View "Ruiz-Cortez v. Lewellen" on Justia Law

Hanson, age eight. was killed by shots fired into his grandmother’s Rockford home in 2002. Anderson, Johnson, and Ross were convicted of the murder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent more than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered a new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady material—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s key witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. Anderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They sued the city and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers not only withheld the recorded jail calls and other exculpatory information but also fabricated evidence. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth sufficient evidence to move forward against particular defendants on particular aspects of their alleged due process violations. No physical or forensic evidence linked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder, so the withheld evidence was material. The court rejected some of the claims of fabricated evidence. View "Anderson v. City of Rockford" on Justia Law

Nelson pleaded guilty to drug crimes and was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment and supervised release. After his release, Nelson was arrested for another drug crime. The court revoked Nelson’s release and sentenced him to imprisonment and additional supervised release. During his second term of supervised release, Nelson’s parole officer filed a revocation petition based on allegations that he had committed aggravated battery and drug crimes. At an initial hearing, the judge determined that defense counsel had discussed the petition with Nelson and that Nelson understood it. At the final hearing, the parties agreed to a 41-month sentence (below the guideline range) in exchange for Nelson’s waiver of a contested hearing. The judge informed Nelson that his stipulation could not be conditioned on the court’s acceptance of that sentence. Nelson responded: “Just go on.” After an exchange, Nelson's lawyer and Nelson assured the court that Nelson understood and did not “want to fight .” Nelson entered his stipulation. The judge questioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation. Nelson responded that he had “no say in nothing” but that he was “okay with stipulating” and that he had violated the conditions “just by being arrested.” The judge accepted the stipulation, stating, “just being arrested isn’t enough” and explained the stipulation. Nelson stated that he understood. The court rejected the recommendation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months, the statutory maximum, explaining that it was unpersuaded that avoiding a hearing justified a reduced sentence and concerns about Nelson’s criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Nelson’s waiver knowing and voluntary. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and six‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty under a Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child under 15 by anyone who is a least four years older than the child and was sentenced to four years’ probation. His probation was later revoked, and he served a prison term. After his release, Walker had to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which imposes a progressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the offense, 34 U.S.C. 20915(a). In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex offender after June 2016, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Walker argued that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I SORNA offense so that his obligation to register ended 15 years after his conviction. Walker entered a conditional guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit vacated his conviction, first stating that SORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach—part categorical and part circumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s conviction to the SORNA categories. Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical match with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III status regardless of the ages of his victims. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Jackson was charged with throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in front of their children, and later, threatening her from prison. Jackson asked the judge to remove his appointed counsel. The court granted the motion and barred Jackson from communicating with anyone but his attorney of record because of his threatening phone calls. A second appointed lawyer reported that Jackson asked him to withdraw. The court ruled that Jackson’s reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint another lawyer but allowed Jackson to seek a private attorney in compliance with the restrictions on his outside communications. The court denied Jackson’s request to represent himself. Months later, the court returned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of the case and stated that Jackson “can’t do this.” The court denied Jackson’s request. Jackson pleaded guilty to felony intimidation of a witness, first-degree reckless injury, and aggravated battery and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. Jackson filed an unsuccessful post-conviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. In his federal habeas action, Jackson argued that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he was competent to represent himself at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of that petition. Although the Wisconsin appeals court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent on the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial, Jackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. View "Jackson v. Bartow" on Justia Law

Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine, then found a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal firearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which applies if the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. The government offered evidence of Williams’ prior convictions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the cocaine conviction, the government established that in 2007, Indiana charged Williams with a Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine,” and alleged that Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty to “the lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The district court applied the ACCA enhancement, finding that Williams’ “Dealing Cocaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug offense.” Williams did not dispute the presentence report and was subject to a statutory minimum of 15 years in prison. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 210-262 months' imprisonment but found that the range likely overstated the seriousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the record did not show exactly which statute he was convicted of violating and that Indiana’s statute on dealing cocaine is broader than the ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration, Hunt began supervised release, with a condition prohibiting him from committing another federal crime. The next year, Hunt pleaded guilty to a bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), during which he brandished a firearm, section 924(c). The judge imposed consecutive sentences of 70 months for the robbery, 84 months for the gun charge, and 18 months for the violation of supervised release, followed by three years of supervised release, which included conditions that had been conditions of his original, revoked term of release. Hunt received the presentence report with the proposed conditions but did not object to any proposed conditions. Consistent with his on-the-record acquiescence, Hunt declined the judge's offers to read the conditions aloud for the record and justify the conditions individually. Hunt later challenged conditions prohibiting Hunt from leaving the judicial district in which he is supervised without permission and requiring (as directed by the probation officer) notification to third parties of risks that may be occasioned by Hunt’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics. The Seventh Circuit rejected Hunt’s challenges to the conditions as waived and dismissed an appeal of the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law