Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police responded to a reported residential burglary in progress. M.G. met officers at the property and stated that he owned the home as a rental property with no current tenants and that no one should be inside. M.G. spotted a window cracked open and, peering inside, he saw someone in the house. Officers banged on the door and ordered all the occupants outside. Sawyer and three others came out and stood with the officers on the porch. M.G. asked the officers to “check my house.” Inside, officers found a backpack; they opened it and discovered four guns. Outside, officers placed the four men in custody. The backpack was brought outside. An officer opened it, found a cell phone, gave Miranda warnings, and asked the arrestees who owned the phone. Sawyer responded that it was his phone and bag. Sawyer later denied it was his bag. Sawyer moved to suppress the contents of the backpack and his statements. The government successfully argued that Sawyer failed to provide evidence that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack and that, as a trespasser, Sawyer had no legitimate expectation of privacy; officers had obtained the owner's consent to search the home. Sawyer conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The officers were entitled to search the backpack as part of their ongoing investigation of a burglary; Sawyer, as a trespasser, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack he brought in when he unlawfully entered the premises. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Gawron, a Polish citizen who has lived in the U.S. for 17 years, and her husband, Motyka, were involved in an elaborate credit card fraud scheme. Gawron pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The presentence investigation report noted that the court “ordinarily” should not impose supervision on a defendant who would likely be removed from the country after her release from prison, U.S.S.G. 5D1.1(c) but recommended a discretionary condition prohibiting Gawron from leaving the “jurisdiction” where she is being supervised without permission. Gawron objected to other conditions of supervised release, but did not argue that supervised release should be skipped because of her likely removal, nor did she contest the condition restricting her movement. Gawron’s counsel stated that immigration proceedings had started and that her deportation was likely. The court imposed a below-Guidelines prison sentence of 12 months and one day, with two years of supervision. The court granted Gawron’s request to delay reporting to prison until Motyka’s release, for the sake of their children. In the meantime, Gawron would be subject to the conditions of her pretrial supervision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the imposition of any term of supervised release because she is likely to be deported after her imprisonment. Her argument that the condition confining her to the district where she is being supervised is flawed for containing no scienter requirement would have warranted relief if she had properly preserved it. View "United States v. Gawron" on Justia Law

While Flores was on supervision for a state conviction, Flores and her co-defendant were found with more than 300 pounds of marijuana with a street value of approximately $1.8 million. Flores, who had a prior felony drug conviction, pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At her sentencing hearing, Flores did not object to standard condition 3, which stated: “Defendant shall maintain lawful employment, seek lawful employment, or enroll and participate in a course of study or vocational training that will equip defendant for suitable employment, unless excused by the probation officer or the Court.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that condition 3’s use of the word “suitable” was unconstitutionally vague. Flores had notice and opportunity to make the challenge in the district court, she submitted other sentencing challenges, and she affirmatively waived reading of the conditions and their justifications at sentencing. Her failure amounts to waiver, precluding appellate review. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

A jury found that Morgan possessed the 86.5 grams of methamphetamine that he tossed past law enforcement officers in the Peoria airport. Morgan had testified that all of it was for his personal use. The jury could not agree on whether the government proved that he possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(A). They declared themselves deadlocked on that issue—the one charged in the indictment—but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of methamphetamine. At a second trial, the court read the jury a limiting instruction several times: you’re going to hear testimony that the defendant committed a wrong other than the one charged in the indictment. Before using this evidence, you must decide whether it’s more likely than not that the defendant committed the wrong that is not charged in the indictment. If you decide that he did, then you may consider this evidence to help you decide whether the defendant intended to distribute methamphetamine …. You may not consider it for any other purpose ... the defendant is on trial here for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute ... not for the other wrong. Morgan was sentenced to 240 months for possession with intent to distribute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding only harmless errors and no violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

During a Rock Island, Illinois traffic stop, two officers were arresting the driver of a vehicle on an outstanding warrant, when they recognized defendant Yancey, the passenger. Based on their past interactions with Yancey, and their familiarity with a contact sheet labeling him as potentially armed, the officers decided to pat him down for weapons. Before they could do so, Yancey ran. The officers tackled him and saw a handgun sticking out of his waistband. Yancey was subsequently convicted of felony possession of a firearm. Yancey claimed that police lacked justification to keep him from leaving the scene. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, Under Supreme Court precedent, police officers can detain passengers in a car while a stop is ongoing if they have a lawful reason to seize the driver. The officers lawfully stopped the car in which Yancey rode as a passenger and that stop was still lawfully ongoing when Yancey tried to flee; it was not unreasonable for the officers to detain him. View "United States v. Yancey" on Justia Law

Plain-clothes narcotics officers visiting a park observed Lickers, alone in a parked car, looking at his phone and watching children on a playground. Based on his movements, the agents thought Lickers was “tweaking,” and approached to offer him drugs. Lickers had a towel covering his lap and a cellphone on the passenger seat. The agents acknowledged that they were police, Lickers became nervous and attempted to knock the cellphone off the seat but continued placing his hands under the towel. Concerned that Lickers might have a weapon, they directed him to remove the towel. Lickers did so, exposing his genitals. An officer then smelled marijuana and radioed for a K9. The unit arrived 20-30 minutes later. A dog alerted. Lickers admitted he had marijuana. The officers found marijuana and placed Lickers under arrest. An inventory search of the car resulted in the officers recovering Lickers’s electronic devices. With a warrant, agents found sexually explicit videos of young children on Lickers’s phone. The state court granted his motion to suppress, concluding that the police lacked sufficient justification to remove Lickers from his automobile and lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him for 20-30 minutes. Weeks later, the FBI obtained a warrant to search Lickers’s phone, submitting a copy of the state search warrant application and disclosing that the prior search uncovered child pornography. A search of Lickers’s phone found pornographic images of very young children, including one video of a girl less than a year old. The district court denied his suppression motion. Lickers pled guilty. The court sentenced Lickers to 132 months’ imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No aspect of the encounter in Monmouth Park offended the Fourth Amendment. The process of application for, and execution of, the federal search warrant reflected good faith. View "United States v. Lickers" on Justia Law

M.J.J. and J.K.J. were inmates at Polk County Jail at various times between 2011 and 2014. Christensen admits he engaged in sexual acts with the women individually. He urged the women not to discuss his sexual advances; his assaults were kept hidden from jail officials until a former inmate reported her own sexual encounters with Christensen to an investigator in a neighboring county. An investigation led to Christensen pleading guilty to several counts of sexual assault. He is serving a 30‐year prison sentence. J.K.J. and M.J.J. sued Christensen and the county under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, with a state law negligence claim against the county. A jury found Christensen and the county liable and awarded each woman $2 million in compensatory damages. The jury also levied punitive damages against Christensen, $3,750,000 to each plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Christensen. His assaults were predatory and knowingly criminal. The court reversed as to the county. To impose liability against the county for Christensen’s crimes, there must be evidence of an offending county policy, culpability, and causation. Christensen’s acts were reprehensible, but the evidence shows no connection between the assaults and any county policy. View "J.K.J. v. Polk County" on Justia Law

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) inmate Palmer has a nub which terminates at his left wrist and does not have functional fingers. Before arriving at NRC, Palmer was at Shawnee Correctional Center, where the medical director issued Palmer a low bunk pass. When Palmer arrived at NRC, Franz conducted a routine intake screening. Franz noted his missing hand but ignored Palmer’s request for a low bunk permit and took no other steps in conjunction with Palmer’s deformity. Palmer had to use the top bunk. Palmer made two requests to see a doctor to get a low bunk pass; neither was acknowledged. Palmer fell while attempting to climb down from the upper bunk. He landed on his knee, sustaining a severe injury. Palmer then received a low bunk permit. Palmer filed grievances with IDOC based on the incident. With no response to his grievances, Palmer appealed to the Administrative Review Board, which also went unanswered. Palmer filed suit, alleging that Franz was deliberately indifferent to Palmer’s serious medical need. The district court granted Franz summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The evidence is enough to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that: Palmer suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, Franz knew of the heightened risk of harm, and Franz deliberately failed to act in the face of that harm. View "Palmer v. Franz" on Justia Law

Harmelech pled guilty to one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; the government dismissed the remaining count. Harmelech, who owned and operated multiple cable installation companies, admitted to setting up about 384 DIRECTV accounts under a fraudulent scheme that involved multi-family buildings. He pocketed money that should have been paid for servicing those accounts for six years. Harmelech involved several employees in his scheme and attempted to prevent DIRECTV from discovering his scheme by instructing the building managers not to cooperate in an investigation. At sentencing, Harmelech claimed his scheme actually benefited the company by bringing in additional business. The district court adopted the government’ loss calculation and found Harmelech owed: $108,000 in account delinquencies; $39,000 in unrecovered DIRECTV receivers; and $29,600 in promotional customer credits; $166,0001 for stolen channels and $35,000 for the price DIRECTV paid for its internal investigation. The court ordered $372,600 in restitution, assessed a four-level sentencing enhancement for Harmelech’s role as the organizer and leader of an otherwise extensive fraudulent scheme U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a), and sentenced Harmelech to 48 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s loss calculation was concrete, specific, conservative in its results, and consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent. View "United States v. Harmelech" on Justia Law

In 2009, Beason pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a 15‐year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on his Wisconsin juvenile adjudication for armed robbery and two Wisconsin drug offenses. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Beason’s appeal in 2012, reasoning that it was enough that his drug offense carried a maximum penalty of at least 10 years and that Beason’s juvenile adjudication was a “violent felony” although Wisconsin armed robbery could be committed without a gun, knife, or explosive. In 2013 he unsuccessfully challenged his juvenile adjudication as a qualifying violent felony (28 U.S.C. 2255), making no arguments about the drug offenses. Four years later, Beason filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, arguing that neither of his drug offenses carried a sentence long enough to qualify as a “serious drug offense” and that his juvenile adjudication could not count as a “violent felony.” The district court agreed with Beason on the merits but concluded that Beason's section 2255 petition precluded section 2241 relief because he could have raised the exact arguments in his earlier petition. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Beason’s argument about his drug convictions was foreclosed to him at the time of his section 2255 motion; the Seventh Circuit subsequently addressed Wisconsin’s bifurcated sentencing system and held that only the term of initial confinement—not the term of extended supervision—counted towards ACCA’s threshold of 10‐years’ imprisonment for a “serious drug offense.” View "Beason v. Marske" on Justia Law