Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2018, Marlon Johnson was arrested after a vehicle he was driving crashed during a police pursuit. The police found over 1,000 grams of pure methamphetamine and a loaded semiautomatic pistol in the vehicle. A jury convicted Johnson of firearm and drug trafficking offenses, and he was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Johnson appealed his convictions and sentence on four grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Johnson's convictions and sentence. Firstly, the court rejected Johnson's claim that his jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Jury Selection and Services Act. The court found that Johnson failed to show that the underrepresentation of African Americans in the jury pool was due to systematic exclusion.Secondly, the court dismissed Johnson's claim that his felon-in-possession conviction violated the Second Amendment. The court noted that there was no precedent explicitly holding that the law under which Johnson was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional.Thirdly, the court upheld the district court's decision to admit testimony about Johnson's prior drug sales as "res gestae" evidence. This type of evidence is considered to be part of the story of the charged offense and is not subject to Rule 404(b), which generally prohibits the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts.Finally, the court found that Johnson's sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment was not substantively unreasonable. Johnson had argued that the district court erred in using a 10:1 weight ratio between methamphetamine mixtures and actual methamphetamine to determine the offense level. The court noted that a district court’s use of the 10:1 ratio is a discretionary decision and cannot, by itself, render a criminal sentence invalid. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Charles O’Neill, appealed the judgment of the district court. O’Neill was charged with sexually exploiting a minor and receiving or distributing child pornography. He pleaded guilty to both charges but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his home and a barn he owned. The evidence included large numbers of photographs of nude and partially nude minor boys on O’Neill’s phone and iPad, and a computer, camcorder, camera, digital storage devices, miscellaneous clothing, and a vibrator found in the barn.The district court found that although the affidavits from the police officers used to obtain search warrants contained false statements and lacked probable cause, the officers had not knowingly or recklessly misled the issuing magistrate, and their reliance on the warrants was objectively reasonable under the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon.On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that none of the exceptions to the good-faith exception applied. The court found that the officers' errors in the affidavits were negligent rather than reckless, the affidavits weren't "bare bones" as they contained more than conclusory claims and were far from devoid of factual support, and the warrants weren't facially deficient. The court noted that the officers' reliance on the search warrants was objectively reasonable, and therefore the fruits of their searches shouldn't be suppressed. The court also noted that even if it shared the dissenting judge's view on the officers' state of mind, it would likely conclude that the district court's denial of the suppression motion was proper because the remaining content of the affidavit would likely establish probable cause. View "United States v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Bryce Axline, appealed the 65-month sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea to charges of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault on federal lands. Axline argued that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence by failing to provide sufficiently compelling reasons for varying upward from the Sentencing Guidelines advisory range by approximately 40 percent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the sentence was substantively reasonable. The court found that the district court thoroughly assessed the seriousness of Axline's offense, his history with underage substance abuse, and the importance of specific and general deterrence. The court also found that the circumstances of this case fell outside the heartland of similar cases. The court noted that the Guidelines did not necessarily account for the confluence of his underage drinking and extremely reckless driving, nor did they necessarily adequately account for the effect of Axline's actions on multiple victims. Thus, the district court acted within its discretion in varying Axline's sentence above the Guidelines range. View "United States v. Axline" on Justia Law

Zachariah Histed pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The District Court for the Western District of Michigan sentenced him to 300 months' imprisonment. Histed appealed his sentence on both procedural and substantive grounds, arguing that the district court incorrectly calculated the drug quantity, wrongly applied multiple sentencing enhancements, improperly denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a sentence that was too long.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated Histed’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in calculating the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to Histed because it did not adequately explain how it arrived at the drug quantity or articulate any methodology for reaching the offense level of 32. Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated Histed's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing with a more precise determination of the drug quantity attributable to Histed.However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's application of the dangerous-weapon, reckless-endangerment, and obstruction-of-justice enhancements, as well as its denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The court found that Histed's possession of an inert grenade during his drug-trafficking offense justified the dangerous-weapon enhancement. It also held that Histed's reckless behavior during his flight from law enforcement warranted the reckless-endangerment enhancement, and his attempts to make others lie to investigators justified the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Finally, the court held that despite Histed's guilty plea, his lack of full acceptance of responsibility for his actions justified the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. View "United States v. Histed" on Justia Law

In 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined whether a conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon under Ohio law could be considered a "crime of violence" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which would lead to an enhanced sentencing range. The defendant, Alexander Ivy, had pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court found that Ivy's prior conviction for aggravated robbery was a "crime of violence," resulting in an increased Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months' imprisonment instead of the likely 46 to 57 months' imprisonment without such a finding. Ivy appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals held that a conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon under Ohio law without further information that the aggravated-robbery conviction is predicated on a particular underlying theft offense is not a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. The court found that the Ohio aggravated-robbery statute criminalizes a broader range of conduct than both robbery and extortion, making it not a crime of violence under the Guidelines. Moreover, the court found that Ohio aggravated robbery doesn't require an offender to obtain something of value from another person, making it broader than the definition of extortion under the Guidelines.Therefore, the court vacated Ivy's sentence and remanded the case back to the district court for resentencing, consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Ivy" on Justia Law

The case involved defendant Antwaun Allen who was found guilty of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The defendant had been involved in a police sting operation where he sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant. At sentencing, he requested a downward variance from his Guidelines range, arguing the government's role in his offense, criticizing the Guidelines' treatment of meth purity, and pointing out mitigating offense and character traits. Ultimately, he was sentenced to 108 months, at the bottom of his Guidelines range.On appeal, Allen puts forth three arguments: (1) his sentence is procedurally unreasonable as the district court failed to address the government's provocation of his offense, (2) his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court ceded its sentencing discretion to Congress, and (3) his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court relied solely on the meth's weight and purity, neglecting his "whole person."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all three arguments. The court held that the district court properly addressed all non-frivolous arguments raised by Allen, did not cede its discretion to Congress, and did not abuse its discretion in weighing sentencing factors. The court affirmed Allen's sentence of 108 months. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

The case involves Deaunta Belcher who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for his participation in a murder-for-hire scheme, hindering the investigation of a federal offense, and two other offenses. Belcher appealed his conviction, arguing that his murder-for-hire conviction was invalid because the government and the court constructively amended the indictment, and therefore he was sentenced for a crime he was not charged with. He also claimed that his obstruction conviction was invalid due to the government's prejudicial variation from the indictment at trial. Lastly, Belcher argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the obstruction charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the government constructively amended Belcher's superseding indictment as to his charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), the federal murder-for-hire statute. However, the court found that despite the constructive amendment, Belcher was not entitled to relief because he was aware from the outset that the government was pursuing an enhanced penalty under the "death results" statutory enhancement of § 1958(a).Regarding the claim of indictment variance, the court held that the government did not impermissibly vary the superseding indictment with reference to evidence uncovered at trial in response to Belcher's motions for acquittal. Thus, the court found no prejudicial variance.Lastly, the court found that the government offered sufficient evidence at trial to convict Belcher of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) because the evidence showed that Belcher tried to deceive law enforcement from the outset by suggesting that the shooter killed the victim because he was an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). View "United States v. Belcher" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Phillip Cabbage, was convicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Cabbage had been orchestrating drug shipments from cartel suppliers to street-level dealers. During his sentencing, he initially objected to a three-level enhancement recommended by the probation officer on the grounds that he did not have control over another person. However, he later withdrew this objection and agreed to a two-level enhancement. Cabbage was sentenced to 210 months in prison, within the Guidelines range calculated with the two-level enhancement.On appeal, Cabbage argued that the two-level enhancement should not have been applied, thereby challenging the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The court held that because Cabbage had agreed to the enhancement and subsequently withdrew his objection to it, the doctrine of invited error applied. Cabbage had contributed to any mistake by agreeing to the role enhancement. The court emphasized that parties in an adversarial system bear the burden of proving facts and presenting their best case. Therefore, if a party agrees that a certain set of facts presents their best case, it is not a manifest injustice for a court to hold them to that agreement. The court concluded that factual errors agreed to by the defendant are not sufficiently grave to constitute manifest injustice. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and held Cabbage to his agreement. View "United States v. Cabbage" on Justia Law

The case involves Jason Kechego, an inmate at a federal detention center in Michigan, who was convicted of second-degree murder for killing fellow inmate Christian Maire. Kechego appealed against several of the district court's rulings during his trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to hold a Remmer hearing, a hearing to examine whether the verdict was tainted by external influences. The court also held that the district court did not err in accepting a partial verdict, where the jury unanimously convicted Kechego of second-degree murder, acquitted him of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and failed to reach unanimity on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.The court further held that the district court did not err in refusing to give a voluntary-manslaughter instruction, as there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the lesser offense. The court also affirmed the district court's exclusion of Kechego's expert's testimony on retrograde extrapolation, a technique for estimating prior blood-alcohol content based on a later measurement, which was done as a discovery sanction. Finally, the court held that any error in excluding evidence of a phone call that Kechego received two weeks before the killing was harmless. View "United States v. Kechego" on Justia Law

In Chattanooga, Tennessee, Al Dorsey celebrated New Year's Eve by firing a gun into the air. This action was recorded by nearby cameras, and the police were dispatched. Dorsey was detained and found in possession of a firearm. As he had prior felony convictions, he was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. In determining his guidelines range, his base offense level was calculated as 24 due to having at least two prior convictions for a "crime of violence," specifically two prior Tennessee convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery and one for robbery. Dorsey appealed this, arguing his facilitation offenses were not "crimes of violence."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with Dorsey's argument. The court held that Dorsey's prior convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery were indeed "crimes of violence" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court relied on its previous decision in United States v. Gloss, which interpreted the term "crime of violence" to cover the Tennessee crime of facilitating aggravated robbery. The court rejected Dorsey's argument that Gloss was in conflict with earlier or later decisions. The court concluded that facilitating aggravated robbery requires a knowing state of mind, not just a reckless one, and thus meets the definition of "crime of violence" under the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to treat Dorsey's facilitation offenses as "crimes of violence," leading to a higher base offense level for sentencing purposes. View "United States v. Dorsey" on Justia Law