Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved defendant Antwaun Allen who was found guilty of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute. The defendant had been involved in a police sting operation where he sold methamphetamine to a confidential informant. At sentencing, he requested a downward variance from his Guidelines range, arguing the government's role in his offense, criticizing the Guidelines' treatment of meth purity, and pointing out mitigating offense and character traits. Ultimately, he was sentenced to 108 months, at the bottom of his Guidelines range.On appeal, Allen puts forth three arguments: (1) his sentence is procedurally unreasonable as the district court failed to address the government's provocation of his offense, (2) his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court ceded its sentencing discretion to Congress, and (3) his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court relied solely on the meth's weight and purity, neglecting his "whole person."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all three arguments. The court held that the district court properly addressed all non-frivolous arguments raised by Allen, did not cede its discretion to Congress, and did not abuse its discretion in weighing sentencing factors. The court affirmed Allen's sentence of 108 months. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

The case involves Deaunta Belcher who was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for his participation in a murder-for-hire scheme, hindering the investigation of a federal offense, and two other offenses. Belcher appealed his conviction, arguing that his murder-for-hire conviction was invalid because the government and the court constructively amended the indictment, and therefore he was sentenced for a crime he was not charged with. He also claimed that his obstruction conviction was invalid due to the government's prejudicial variation from the indictment at trial. Lastly, Belcher argued that the district court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the obstruction charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the government constructively amended Belcher's superseding indictment as to his charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a), the federal murder-for-hire statute. However, the court found that despite the constructive amendment, Belcher was not entitled to relief because he was aware from the outset that the government was pursuing an enhanced penalty under the "death results" statutory enhancement of § 1958(a).Regarding the claim of indictment variance, the court held that the government did not impermissibly vary the superseding indictment with reference to evidence uncovered at trial in response to Belcher's motions for acquittal. Thus, the court found no prejudicial variance.Lastly, the court found that the government offered sufficient evidence at trial to convict Belcher of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) because the evidence showed that Belcher tried to deceive law enforcement from the outset by suggesting that the shooter killed the victim because he was an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). View "United States v. Belcher" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Phillip Cabbage, was convicted for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Cabbage had been orchestrating drug shipments from cartel suppliers to street-level dealers. During his sentencing, he initially objected to a three-level enhancement recommended by the probation officer on the grounds that he did not have control over another person. However, he later withdrew this objection and agreed to a two-level enhancement. Cabbage was sentenced to 210 months in prison, within the Guidelines range calculated with the two-level enhancement.On appeal, Cabbage argued that the two-level enhancement should not have been applied, thereby challenging the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The court held that because Cabbage had agreed to the enhancement and subsequently withdrew his objection to it, the doctrine of invited error applied. Cabbage had contributed to any mistake by agreeing to the role enhancement. The court emphasized that parties in an adversarial system bear the burden of proving facts and presenting their best case. Therefore, if a party agrees that a certain set of facts presents their best case, it is not a manifest injustice for a court to hold them to that agreement. The court concluded that factual errors agreed to by the defendant are not sufficiently grave to constitute manifest injustice. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision and held Cabbage to his agreement. View "United States v. Cabbage" on Justia Law

The case involves Jason Kechego, an inmate at a federal detention center in Michigan, who was convicted of second-degree murder for killing fellow inmate Christian Maire. Kechego appealed against several of the district court's rulings during his trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to hold a Remmer hearing, a hearing to examine whether the verdict was tainted by external influences. The court also held that the district court did not err in accepting a partial verdict, where the jury unanimously convicted Kechego of second-degree murder, acquitted him of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and failed to reach unanimity on conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.The court further held that the district court did not err in refusing to give a voluntary-manslaughter instruction, as there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on the lesser offense. The court also affirmed the district court's exclusion of Kechego's expert's testimony on retrograde extrapolation, a technique for estimating prior blood-alcohol content based on a later measurement, which was done as a discovery sanction. Finally, the court held that any error in excluding evidence of a phone call that Kechego received two weeks before the killing was harmless. View "United States v. Kechego" on Justia Law

In Chattanooga, Tennessee, Al Dorsey celebrated New Year's Eve by firing a gun into the air. This action was recorded by nearby cameras, and the police were dispatched. Dorsey was detained and found in possession of a firearm. As he had prior felony convictions, he was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. In determining his guidelines range, his base offense level was calculated as 24 due to having at least two prior convictions for a "crime of violence," specifically two prior Tennessee convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery and one for robbery. Dorsey appealed this, arguing his facilitation offenses were not "crimes of violence."The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with Dorsey's argument. The court held that Dorsey's prior convictions for facilitating aggravated robbery were indeed "crimes of violence" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court relied on its previous decision in United States v. Gloss, which interpreted the term "crime of violence" to cover the Tennessee crime of facilitating aggravated robbery. The court rejected Dorsey's argument that Gloss was in conflict with earlier or later decisions. The court concluded that facilitating aggravated robbery requires a knowing state of mind, not just a reckless one, and thus meets the definition of "crime of violence" under the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to treat Dorsey's facilitation offenses as "crimes of violence," leading to a higher base offense level for sentencing purposes. View "United States v. Dorsey" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the defendant, Thomas O’Lear, was convicted of healthcare fraud, making a false statement in connection with healthcare services, and aggravated identity theft. O’Lear ran a company that provided mobile x-ray services to residents in nursing homes. However, he used the company to defraud Medicare and Medicaid programs by billing for fictitious x-rays using the identities of nursing-home residents. When an audit revealed the fraud, O’Lear attempted to conceal it by forging staff names and duplicating x-rays in the patient files.On appeal, O’Lear raised several questions. Firstly, he questioned whether his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by excluding individuals who had not been vaccinated against COVID-19 from the jury pool. The court ruled that the unvaccinated do not qualify as a “distinctive group” that can trigger Sixth Amendment concerns. Secondly, O’Lear questioned whether the nursing-home residents were “victims” of his fraud under a “vulnerable victims” sentencing enhancement, even though the monetary losses were suffered by Medicare and Medicaid. The court ruled that the residents were indeed victims, as O’Lear had used their identities and health records without their permission, which constituted taking advantage of them.O’Lear also challenged his two aggravated-identity-theft convictions and objected to his 180-month sentence on various grounds, but these arguments were also dismissed by the court. Ultimately, the court affirmed O’Lear's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. O'Lear" on Justia Law

Kejuan Pharrell Carter was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Carter contended that the district court failed to consider his policy argument for a downward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. This argument was grounded in the notion that the Guidelines' focus on drug quantity and purity disproportionately punished low-level offenders due to an increase in the average purity of methamphetamine in circulation since the implementation of the Guidelines.However, during the sentencing hearing, Carter only briefly referred to his policy argument and primarily focused on his life experiences and characteristics. Upon sentencing, the district court asked if all non-frivolous arguments had been addressed, and both Carter and the government, through their respective counsels, affirmed they had. Carter's appeal claimed that the district court had failed to address his policy argument, but the appeals court held that Carter had either waived this right or invited the error by agreeing that all his arguments had been addressed.The appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that there was no "manifest injustice" that warranted a review of the claimed error, as Carter did not allege a violation of his constitutional rights, and the alleged error did not stem from an obvious mistake such as a Guidelines miscalculation. The court further noted that the strategic decisions of the parties during sentencing, including which arguments to emphasize, reasonably influence the court's response. Thus, Carter's decision to focus primarily on his life experiences and characteristics at the sentencing hearing contributed to the district court's emphasis on these aspects. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case concerns an appeal by Edgardo Esteras against the district court’s decision to revoke his supervised release and sentence him to 24 months in prison. Esteras had pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, violating the conditions of his supervised release by committing domestic violence and possessing a firearm.Esteras argued that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him. He claimed that the court should not have considered three subfactors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when crafting his sentence: “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected his argument, citing the precedent set in United States v. Lewis. The court stated that a district court judge who considers the mentioned factors does not necessarily impose a procedurally unreasonable sentence. The court also noted that the judge could not ignore respect for the law but consider a defendant’s need to respect the terms of supervised release. The court affirmed the district court’s revocation order. View "United States v. Esteras" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which denied Clarence Mack's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Mack was convicted of aggravated murder in relation to a 1991 carjacking and was sentenced to death. His habeas petition alleged that prosecutors suppressed material evidence, introduced false testimony, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The appellate court found that Mack had not demonstrated any violation of his constitutional rights. Material evidence was either disclosed, non-existent, not favorable, or immaterial. Mack failed to show that the prosecutor knowingly used a false, material statement to obtain the conviction. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted, and he failed to establish his actual innocence to excuse the default. Lastly, the court found that the exclusion of certain testimony did not render Mack’s trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, the court denied all claims raised by Mack and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Mack v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In this case, Da’Rell Winters, a convicted petitioner, sought to appeal the district court's denial of his habeas relief application. However, due to the delayed receipt of the district court's decision, he did not file his appeal in time. When he finally filed the appeal notice, he explained his delay but did not formally request to reopen the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that his explanation was sufficient for the district court to consider his appeal notice as a motion to reopen, thus deeming his appeal timely.The case's facts reveal that in 2014, Winters was convicted for armed robbery. After exhausting his appeals in Michigan state courts, he applied for habeas relief in a federal court in 2018. He represented himself and raised various claims, including insufficiency of evidence and errors in jury instructions and sentencing.The federal district court denied Winters's habeas application and a certificate of appealability on March 10, 2021. Due to a mailing error, Winters received the court's decision only on May 18, 2021. He filed a notice of appeal on June 1, 2021, which was after the 30-day deadline for filing an appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal as untimely.Winters later moved the district court to reopen the appeal period, which the court granted. It retroactively construed his June 1 notice of appeal as a motion to reopen, making his appeal timely. The Sixth Circuit agreed with this interpretation, concluding that Winters's appeal was timely and directing the Clerk's Office to set a briefing schedule for considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability in this appeal. View "Winters v. Taskila" on Justia Law