Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kejuan Pharrell Carter was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment by the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Carter contended that the district court failed to consider his policy argument for a downward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. This argument was grounded in the notion that the Guidelines' focus on drug quantity and purity disproportionately punished low-level offenders due to an increase in the average purity of methamphetamine in circulation since the implementation of the Guidelines.However, during the sentencing hearing, Carter only briefly referred to his policy argument and primarily focused on his life experiences and characteristics. Upon sentencing, the district court asked if all non-frivolous arguments had been addressed, and both Carter and the government, through their respective counsels, affirmed they had. Carter's appeal claimed that the district court had failed to address his policy argument, but the appeals court held that Carter had either waived this right or invited the error by agreeing that all his arguments had been addressed.The appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that there was no "manifest injustice" that warranted a review of the claimed error, as Carter did not allege a violation of his constitutional rights, and the alleged error did not stem from an obvious mistake such as a Guidelines miscalculation. The court further noted that the strategic decisions of the parties during sentencing, including which arguments to emphasize, reasonably influence the court's response. Thus, Carter's decision to focus primarily on his life experiences and characteristics at the sentencing hearing contributed to the district court's emphasis on these aspects. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

This case concerns an appeal by Edgardo Esteras against the district court’s decision to revoke his supervised release and sentence him to 24 months in prison. Esteras had pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, violating the conditions of his supervised release by committing domestic violence and possessing a firearm.Esteras argued that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him. He claimed that the court should not have considered three subfactors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when crafting his sentence: “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected his argument, citing the precedent set in United States v. Lewis. The court stated that a district court judge who considers the mentioned factors does not necessarily impose a procedurally unreasonable sentence. The court also noted that the judge could not ignore respect for the law but consider a defendant’s need to respect the terms of supervised release. The court affirmed the district court’s revocation order. View "United States v. Esteras" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which denied Clarence Mack's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Mack was convicted of aggravated murder in relation to a 1991 carjacking and was sentenced to death. His habeas petition alleged that prosecutors suppressed material evidence, introduced false testimony, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The appellate court found that Mack had not demonstrated any violation of his constitutional rights. Material evidence was either disclosed, non-existent, not favorable, or immaterial. Mack failed to show that the prosecutor knowingly used a false, material statement to obtain the conviction. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted, and he failed to establish his actual innocence to excuse the default. Lastly, the court found that the exclusion of certain testimony did not render Mack’s trial fundamentally unfair. Therefore, the court denied all claims raised by Mack and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Mack v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In this case, Da’Rell Winters, a convicted petitioner, sought to appeal the district court's denial of his habeas relief application. However, due to the delayed receipt of the district court's decision, he did not file his appeal in time. When he finally filed the appeal notice, he explained his delay but did not formally request to reopen the appeal period. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that his explanation was sufficient for the district court to consider his appeal notice as a motion to reopen, thus deeming his appeal timely.The case's facts reveal that in 2014, Winters was convicted for armed robbery. After exhausting his appeals in Michigan state courts, he applied for habeas relief in a federal court in 2018. He represented himself and raised various claims, including insufficiency of evidence and errors in jury instructions and sentencing.The federal district court denied Winters's habeas application and a certificate of appealability on March 10, 2021. Due to a mailing error, Winters received the court's decision only on May 18, 2021. He filed a notice of appeal on June 1, 2021, which was after the 30-day deadline for filing an appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal as untimely.Winters later moved the district court to reopen the appeal period, which the court granted. It retroactively construed his June 1 notice of appeal as a motion to reopen, making his appeal timely. The Sixth Circuit agreed with this interpretation, concluding that Winters's appeal was timely and directing the Clerk's Office to set a briefing schedule for considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability in this appeal. View "Winters v. Taskila" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which had denied Adam Carson's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Carson had been convicted of robbing a bank and tampering with a witness, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In his motion, Carson argued that his trial attorney had provided ineffective assistance by failing to initiate plea negotiations and by committing several mistakes during the trial. He also claimed that he did not knowingly waive his right to testify. The Court of Appeals held that Carson's ineffective-assistance claims failed because they lacked grounds for prejudice. The court ruled there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of Carson's case would have been different if his attorney had acted differently. The court also held that Carson had not demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to testify, as he did not object on the record to his attorney's statement that he did not want to testify. View "Carson v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a man named James Wilder II who was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon and attempted witness tampering. While on patrol, Officer Meric Whipple observed Wilder walking beside the road with a visible firearm. When Wilder noticed the police car, he ran, dropped the gun, picked it back up, and entered a house. Upon searching the house, the officers found a gun that matched the one Wilder had dropped and arrested him. While in jail, Wilder called a friend and directed her to bribe the residents of the house to falsely claim that they owned the gun. A jury found him guilty of both charges.Wilder appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial testimony regarding the officer's training and experience was unfairly admitted and that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for attempted witness tampering. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officer's training and experience in identifying weapons were relevant to the case, and the testimony did not pose a risk of unfair prejudice. In regards to the second ground, the court found that Wilder's instructions to his friend to bribe the residents of the house to claim the gun was theirs demonstrated a substantial step towards witness tampering and was sufficient evidence for the conviction. View "United States v. Wilder" on Justia Law

In five 2008 transactions, Goodwin distributed a total of 71.9 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential informant. He pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846. Goodwin had a prior “felony drug offense,” 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), and faced a statutory minimum 20-year sentence. The district court found that two of his prior offenses made him a “career offender,” calculated his guidelines range as 262-327 months, and imposed a 262-month sentence. After Goodwin’s sentencing, the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to subject Goodwin to his 20-year minimum sentence from 50 to 280 grams; the 2018 First Step Act made that change retroactive. Goodwin moved for a reduced sentence under the Act. In 2020, before that motion was resolved, the Bureau of Prisons allowed Goodwin to serve the remainder of his sentence in home confinement because of the COVID-19 pandemic (CARES Act, 134 Stat. 281, 516).Two years later, the district court denied Goodwin’s motion for a reduced sentence primarily because his guidelines range remained the same even after the statutory changes. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court committed a procedural error by denying relief in a cursory order and committed a substantive error because Goodwin's rehabilitation efforts (combined with other legal changes) required the court to issue a below-guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Zheng and Wu owned and operated the Tokyo Dragon restaurant, where they employed noncitizens who were working in the U.S. illegally. In 2017, Homeland Security received a tip from a nurse who suspected that they were human trafficking. Agents executed a warrant at Tokyo Dragon and discovered that the business had not filed any government paperwork with respect to the noncitizens’ employment. Four Hispanic men lived in the basement of Zheng and Wu’s home. The owners transported the men to and from work every day and to the grocery store weekly, paying them in cash. Other employees were paid by check. A Mexican citizen testified he began working as a Tokyo Dragon cook in 2015, generally working six or seven days a week for 11-12 hours per day; he did not interact with customers. Zheng instructed the noncitizens that they “should not go outside” the house and should not make noise, to avoid being deported.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Zheng and Wu on four counts of harboring illegal noncitizens for commercial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court rejected arguments that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of “harboring” by not including a requirement that the defendants acted intentionally and knowingly in shielding the illegal noncitizens from law enforcement and invaded the province of the jury by giving examples of “harboring.” View "United States v. Zheng" on Justia Law

Brown created a driver’s license with his photo and someone else’s identity and made credit cards using that identity, pulling account numbers from the dark web. Brown used those fraudulent documents to purchase 25 firearms, which he sold. Brown subsequently walked into a gun store, picked out a firearm, and presented a fraudulent license and credit card. The store employee recognized Brown and called the police. As police arrived, Brown drove away in a rented U-Haul. During the ensuing traffic stop, officers found Brown’s fraudulent license and false credit cards in a wallet on the passenger seat; a gun that had been reported stolen was between the front seats. After being arrested, Brown recruited a friend to continue his scheme. The friend used fraudulent cards to purchase 39 firearms. The two fraudulently purchased $56,000 in guns over three months.Brown pled guilty to aggravated identity theft, using a false ID during the purchase of a firearm, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), 1028A(a)(1), 1343, 1349. The court enhanced Brown’s sentencing range based on the stolen firearm in the U-Haul, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), and imposed a 120-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the enhancement would apply even without the stolen firearm in the U-Haul. Fraudulently purchased firearms are “stolen” for purposes of the enhancement. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Tellez agreed to a car search. After the search, the officer asked, “Do you have your wallet?” Tellez handed it over. Inside, the officer discovered three Visa gift cards, each with numbers written on the back, which the officer believed was indicative of fraud. The officer asked whether he could swipe the cards. Tellez agreed but then said, “I don’t give permission.” The officer nevertheless swiped the cards. The numbers did not match the cards, indicating they had been altered. Tellez was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the U.S., bank fraud, and aggravated identity theft. He moved to suppress all evidence derived from the wallet search but did not challenge the officer’s decision to swipe the cards.After reviewing a video recording of the traffic stop and the officer’s testimony, the court denied Tellez’s motion, concluding that Tellez’s gesture of handing over his wallet reflected his nonverbal, voluntary consent. Tellez entered a conditional guilty plea. Tellez objected to the intended loss calculations used to derive his Guidelines offense level. The three cards had been used to spend or withdraw an average of $1,400 per card. The probation office calculated the intended loss by multiplying the number of accounts associated with Tellez—303, including 300 other accounts found on a thumb drive in Tellez’s possession—by $1,400. The court agreed with the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and Tellez’s 70-month sentence. View "United States v. Crespo" on Justia Law