Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Burks was a Gangster Disciple member with leadership and enforcement responsibility. On November 3, 2012, another member, Hardison, went to a Clarksville, Tennessee club, where members of the rival “Bloods” attacked him. Hardison called Burks. The Disciples found Wright, a Blood who had helped attack Hardison, partying without his crew. During the ensuing fight, someone shot Wright in the leg. He staggered toward the door and collapsed. Someone fired another shot into Wright’s abdomen. Wright collapsed and died. The government claims Burks shot Wright.At trial, prosecutors presented three informants to tie Burks to the killing. A jury convicted Burks on all charges. The court granted him a new trial on four counts, deeming the verdict for those counts against the manifest weight of the evidence. The government appealed. Months later, the government realized it had not disclosed two investigation reports. Burks unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on two counts not subject to the new trial order, claiming a "Brady" violation.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. It discounted one informant’s grand jury testimony without a valid reason and discredited the other informants’ trial testimony based on contested facts that are generally resolved by juries. The evidence did not weigh heavily against the verdict but set out a straightforward narrative that the jury could reasonably believe. View "United States v. Duncan Burks" on Justia Law

In 1986, Mitchell, a black man, was convicted by an all-white jury of raping two white women in Tennessee. It is undisputed that the prosecution’s decision to strike a black prospective juror violated the Supreme Court’s 1986 holding, Batson v. Kentucky. The district court granted relief on Batson grounds in 1995, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Mitchell had to first establish “cause and prejudice” for failing to develop the claim before the state court. Multiple remands left Mitchell in a “procedural thicket.”In 2012, the Supreme Court decided "Martinez," holding that when a state limits the consideration of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to collateral review, a habeas petitioner may establish cause for procedural default if state post-conviction counsel was ineffective under Strickland and the underlying claim has “some merit.” The holding changed prior law--that post-conviction counsel’s “ignorance or inadvertence in a post-conviction proceeding,” including failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, does not qualify as cause to excuse procedural default.The Sixth Circuit then granted Mitchell a conditional writ of habeas corpus, concluding that “Martinez” enables Mitchell to show the necessary “cause,” and authorizes him to raise his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim and to seek redress through a Rule 60(b) motion. View "Mitchell v. Genovese" on Justia Law

Cordero and Velasquez, convicted of conspiring to commit murder for hire and conspiring to distribute one kilogram of cocaine, argued that their convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and challenged the admission of other-acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). They also raised sentencing claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the court did not plainly err in trying the defendants together. The record demonstrates a sufficient factual basis for their guilt on the charged offenses. The intent-to-murder, pecuniary-value, and conspiracy elements of murder for hire were met; the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants of conspiring to distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 846. The court correctly admitted the challenged bad-act evidence, as that evidence served permissible purposes under Rule 404(b) and was probative of contested issues in the case. The court accurately and succinctly conveyed the permissible purposes of Rule 404(b) evidence when it instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of defendants’ other crimes “only as it relates to the Government’s claim on Defendants’ intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.” The court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines to calculate Cordero’s base offense level. A limited remand is required; Velasquez, who was incorrectly sentenced as a career offender. View "United States v. Velasquez" on Justia Law

In 2011, Michigan narrowed the crimes covered by the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) making Hart, who had been a juvenile offender, no longer a “sex offender.” Local officials required him to continue registering as one. In 2013, Hart registered an incorrect address and, in January 2014, he failed to update his address. The defendants arrested Hart each time, using warrant requests incorrectly representing that he was required to register under SORA. The first time, Hart spent the night in jail; the second time, he served 19 months in prison. When prison officials realized the mistake, they released Hart and his convictions were vacated.Hart sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation. The court denied motions to dismiss by employees of the city police and county sheriff’s departments, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and Monell claims, as well as the defamation claim against registration officials; reversed regarding the defamation claim against three officers; and remanded. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Hart, a reasonable officer could not believe that Hart was subject to SORA’s requirements based solely on his inclusion in the database. Without additional evidence, it is impossible to determine individual culpability. View "Hart v. Hillsdale County" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Sandra, Calvin, and their son Bryan Bailey of conspiring to commit healthcare fraud and other related crimes (18 U.S.C. 371, 1343, 1347; 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b). The three, working for medical equipment companies, used fraud, forgery, and bribery to sell power wheelchairs and other equipment that was not medically necessary. The district court sentenced Sandra to 120 months’, Calvin to 45 months, and Bryan to 84 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and the sentence imposed on Bryan. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to various evidentiary rulings and upheld the admission of certain out of court statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The district court miscalculated Sandra’s Guidelines-range sentence when it erroneously imposed a two-level increase in her offense level for using “mass marketing” in her scheme and incorrectly calculated the loss amount for which Calvin was responsible—and by extension, his Guidelines-range sentence—by holding him responsible for losses beyond those he agreed to jointly undertake. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

In 1998-2010, Dimora served as one of three Cuyahoga County Commissioners. An FBI investigation revealed that Dimora had received over $250,000 in gifts from individuals with business before the County, including home renovations, trips to Las Vegas, and encounters with prostitutes. Dimora had used his position to help with the awarding of County contracts, hiring, the results of at least one County election, and civil litigation outcomes. Dimora’s “influence” ranged from casting formal votes as Commissioner to pressuring other officials.Dimora was charged with Hobbs Act offenses, bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, making false statements on tax returns, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and honest services mail fraud, conspiracy to commit bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and honest services wire fraud, RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstructing a federal investigation. A jury convicted Dimora on 33 counts. The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury instructions defining “official acts” as having “fairly trace[d] the line between permissible gifts and impermissible bribes.” A ruling that state ethics reports were inadmissible hearsay was harmless in light of “overwhelming evidence.”In its 2016 “McDonnell” decision, the Supreme Court gave a narrow construction to a key element included within several of Dimora’s offenses. The term “official acts” does not include “setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event.” Official acts are limited to “formal exercise[s] of governmental power.” Dimora petitioned to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit vacated a denial of relief. The court declined to decide whether the instructional error was harmless with respect to most of the counts or whether the “cumulative effect” of instructional and evidentiary errors entitles Dimora to relief. View "Dimora v. United States" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Judicial Drug Task Force and the Drug Enforcement Administration investigated Abdalla for suspected narcotics trafficking. The Tennessee judge who signed the warrant permitting officers to search Abdalla’s residence on New Hope Road only had jurisdiction in DeKalb County but the warrant, in one place, listed an address on Carey Road in Trousdale County. This error resulted from the officer using a previous warrant as a template and failing to erase all vestiges of that document. Abdalla argued that a warrant cannot be valid if it contains a mismatch between the residence in the authorization section and the residence that the police searched and that a judge’s failure to notice an address outside his jurisdiction in a warrant’s authorization section demands the inference that the judge impermissibly rubber-stamped the warrant. The affidavit supporting the warrant listed the correct address and county at the top of the first page; the warrant itself directed officers to the correct address by providing step-by-step directions along with a detailed description of Abdalla’s residence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, Abdallah’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, and his 168-month sentence. The warrant’s singular incorrect address posed almost no chance of a mistaken search. Despite the government’s irregular mistake, this clerical error case demands the usual result for technical mistakes that threaten no constitutional harm. View "United States v. Abdalla" on Justia Law

In 1993, Willman was convicted for violating a Michigan sexual assault law. He served 10 years in prison and completed parole. Willman registered on Michigan’s sex offender registry. Congress, in 2006, passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20901 to “make more uniform" a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration systems, that had resulted in an estimated 100,000 sex offenders becoming missing or lost. SORNA “made it a federal crime for a sex offender who meets certain requirements to ‘knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration’” Willman challenged the Michigan law and SORNA. The district court dismissed the Michigan defendants and directed them to not enforce the 2006 and 2011 amendments to Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act against Willman. The court declared that the duration of Willman’s registration under Michigan law had ended and that he should be removed from that registry. The court later dismissed the federal claims.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A sex offender’s obligations under SORNA are independent of any duties under state law. The court rejected Willman’s arguments that SORNA is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, as double jeopardy, as violating the Fifth Amendment, as cruel and unusual punishment, as overbroad and vague, as violating his privacy rights, and as violating his right to travel. View "Willman v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

In 2005, Williams pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). Williams’s PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 262-327 months' imprisonment. The government filed a notice of a prior felony drug conviction under 21 U.S.C. 851, which made Williams subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum term of life imprisonment. The court sentenced Williams to 262 months.The 2018 First Step Act authorized district courts to reduce defendants’ sentences for certain drug offenses, 132 Stat. 5194. Although the Act reduced Williams’s mandatory minimum sentence to 10 years, his Guidelines’ range remained the same. Williams sought resentencing under the Act, citing his good conduct in prison: he had not failed a single drug test, had helped 13 other prisoners earn their GEDs, and had held the same job for over eight years. The district court explained that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and concluded that “the 262-month within guideline sentence originally imposed remains sufficient and necessary to protect the public from future crimes of the defendant, to provide just punishment, and to provide deterrence.” The court did not address Williams’s post-conviction conduct.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Williams's post-conviction conduct occurred after his initial sentencing, so the record for his initial sentence provides no indication of the court’s reasoning. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 1984, two 17-year-old Caucasian students were car-jacked, sodomized, robbed, and murdered by Taylor and Wade, both African-Americans. A witness picked Wade from a line-up. Wade confessed, naming Taylor as the sole shooter. Convicted, Wade received a life sentence. Taylor’s trial began in 1986, before "Batson," The controlling law about racial animus in peremptory challenges was "Swain." In selecting Taylor’s jury, the prosecutor had nine peremptory challenges; he used four to strike African-Americans, leaving only one African-American on the jury after Taylor’s counsel removed an African-American woman with a peremptory challenge. Taylor’s counsel raised a fair-cross-section challenge. The prosecutor responded, “almost incoherently.” The court rejected the challenge, stating: “I believe the issue being addressed ... [Batson] as to whether it is permissible to exercise your peremptory strikes whichever way you wish to. I don’t know, but the record is clear as to what has been done in this case.” The prosecutor presented overwhelming evidence of Taylor’s guilt. The judge found Wade unavailable to testify pending his direct appeal and allowed the prosecutor to play Wade’s tape-recorded police statement. The jury convicted Taylor. The court sentenced him to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Taylor’s Batson and Confrontation Clause claims. On collateral attack, Taylor also raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Based on Taylor’s limited argument, the prosecutor’s otherwise non-discriminatory conduct, and the absence of an indisputable pattern of discriminatory strikes, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s denial of Taylor’s Batson claim was not necessarily an unreasonable application of Batson. Even if evidence that Taylor produced at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing had been presented at trial, Taylor could not have prevailed on a Swain claim, so his counsel was not ineffective for failing to produce that evidence. Any Sixth Amendment error was harmless. View "Taylor v. Simpson" on Justia Law