Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Wofford was found guilty of a 1993 murder in a Michigan court following the removal and replacement of a juror. While that juror was holding out against conviction at the time, the judge removed her for misconduct: she had violated his instructions not to discuss the case with anyone other than her fellow jurors by hiring a lawyer to address the court about tensions in the jury room. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Wofford’s conviction under a state precedent on juror removal.A federal district court granted Wofford’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that decision not entitled to deference under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, because the Michigan court had overlooked Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims and the removal of the juror violated Wofford’s Sixth Amendment rights.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The 2020 Supreme Court decision, “Ramos,” held that the right not to have a juror removed due to the juror’s opinions on the merits of the case is contained in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a “trial by an impartial jury.” Michigan did not overlook Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims. While the juror was a holdout, she was not removed for this reason, but because of her misconduct. The Michigan court was free to require a showing of an actual constitutional violation and clearly, if implicitly, did so. View "Wofford v. Woods" on Justia Law

A.F., age 14, reported to police that she was being blackmailed by a user on the messaging application Kik. The perpetrator had obtained nude photographs from her phone and was threatening to release the images if she did not send additional nude photographs. Oakland County, Michigan, deputies investigated her claims but disregarded the fact that the blackmailer used the Kik username “anonymousfl” rather than “anonymous”—a separate Kik username associated with Tlapanco, a New York resident. As a result, NYPD officers working with Oakland County Deputy Elges, searched Tlapanco’s apartment, seized his electronic devices, arrested him, and detained him in New York for two weeks before extraditing him to Michigan. He was detained at the Oakland County jail for another three weeks before the charges were dismissed.Tlapanco sued the deputies and Oakland County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Elges unlawfully searched his apartment, caused his false arrest, and prosecuted him; Deputy McCabe unlawfully seized, searched, and copied his electronic devices before returning them; and Oakland County is liable for failure to train or because of McCabe’s decisions as a purported county policymaker. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to McCabe and Oakland County but reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elges on Tlapanco’s Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims. View "Tlapanco v. Elges" on Justia Law

Kettles first prostituted an 18-year-old, planning to build a prostitution “empire,” then prostituted a 13-year-old child to at least six different men. Kettles was convicted of one count of sex trafficking a child, 18 U.S.C. 2 andv1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c), and one count of conspiracy to do the same, section 1594(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and 180-month sentence. In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the district court’s error in prohibiting Kettles from cross-examining the minor about inconsistent statements she had allegedly made concerning three prior sexual assaults (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 412) was harmless. The jury instructions contained all the elements required for the jury to find that section 1591(b)(1)’s enhanced penalties apply; that the indictment contained superfluous elements is of no consequence. Finally, the court rejected a vagueness challenge to the statute. View "United States v. Kettles" on Justia Law

Beck claims he was assaulted by other inmates while detained at the Hamblen County, Tennessee jail. He sued Sheriff Jarnagin under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Jarnagin had no direct involvement in Beck’s detention; section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on supervisors for their subordinates’ actions. Beck argued that the overcrowded jail has repeatedly failed minimum standards; that Jarnagin has long known of its failures; and that Jarnagin has been deliberately indifferent to inmate safety. The Tennessee Corrections Institute has identified the jail’s failures in inspection reports that are sent to Jarnagin each year. The court denied Jarnagin qualified immunity on Beck’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, reasoning that pretrial detainees have a clearly established right to be free from a government official’s deliberate indifference to inmate assaults.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Existing precedent would not have clearly signaled to Jarnagin that his responses to the overcrowding problem were so unreasonable as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Beck has no evidence suggesting that Jarnagin had any personal knowledge of Beck’s specific situation Jarnagin did make efforts “to abate” th3 general risk of inmate-on-inmate violence but did not have the power to allocate more taxpayer dollars to the safety problems. The court noted that Beck’s suit against Hamblen County remains viable. View "Beck v. Hamblen County" on Justia Law

In 2009-2015, Bradley ran a Tennessee drug trafficking conspiracy that distributed opioid pills. He pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and money laundering charges, the court sentenced him to 17 years in prison and ordered him to forfeit a million dollars, two cash payments, and five properties. On remand in light of the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Honeycutt v. United States, that forfeiture must be based on the defendant’s own receipts, not the conspiracy’s, the court found additional facts and ordered Bradley to forfeit a million dollars, the two cash payments, and four (instead of five) properties.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When a defendant is convicted of certain crimes, district courts must order forfeiture of “any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the [defendant] obtained as the result of” the crimes, and “any of the [defendant’s] property used, or intended to be used . . . to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,” the crime, 21 U.S.C. 853(a)(1)–(2). If the defendant no longer has the property, the court “shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant” as a substitute. The court rejected an argument that section 853 does not authorize money judgments. It is irrelevant whether the money was kept as profits or went toward the costs of running the conspiracy. Bradley offers no authority for his argument that the statute prohibits “financially ruinous” forfeitures. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

Kozerski owned two construction companies in Detroit. He formed the second one, CA, to bid on Veterans Administration contracts set aside for small businesses owned by service-disabled veterans. Kozerski does not have a service-related disability. He convinced J.R., a service-disabled veteran, to pretend to be the company’s owner. CA handled six contracts. Kozerski forged J.R.’s signature and sent the government emails supposedly from J.R.. For five contracts, Kozerski did not pay J.R. anything, lying to him that CA did not receive any contracts after the first one.The government eventually discovered the scheme and charged Kozerski with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. Kozerski pleaded guilty. The PSR recommended a loss amount of $9.5 million to $25 million, calculated by adding the amounts the government paid CA on all six contracts without crediting the value of the work performed on the contracts: $11,891,243.45, resulting in a Guidelines range of 37-46 months. Kozerski argued the loss should be the amount of profit a qualifying veteran-owned business would receive from the contract, yielding a guidelines range of eight-14 months. The district court adopted Kozerski’s formula and sentenced him to a year and a day. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s calculation of the loss as the aggregate difference between Kozerski’s bids and the next-lowest bids, about $250,000. View "United States v. Kozerski" on Justia Law

Thomas pled guilty to two counts of distributing a mixture containing heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Thomas had several prior Michigan law drug convictions, including convictions for delivery of heroin and for possession with intent to deliver marijuana. The court concluded that those convictions made Thomas a career offender under the Guidelines, resulting in a sentencing range of 140-175 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a 140-moth sentence. The Guidelines define a controlled-substance offense as “an offense under federal or state law . . . that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” If the least culpable conduct criminalized by a statute falls outside the U.S.S.G. 4B1.2 definition, a conviction under that statute does not qualify as a controlled substance offense. The Guidelines define both distribution and possession with the intent to distribute as controlled-substance offenses. Under federal law, “distribution,” means “delivery,” “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance,” 21 U.S.C. 802(8).. Michigan defines “delivery” the same way. There is no meaningful difference between the federal offense of distribution and the Michigan offense of delivery. Nor is there any substantive difference between possession with the intent to distribute under federal law and possession with intent to deliver under Michigan law. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit earlier held that the district court miscalculated the Sentencing Guidelines range for Mongtomery’s sentencing, but explained that “the record shows that the district court would have imposed its sentence regardless of the Guidelines range” and the error was harmless. One feature of the sentencing hearing was that the court stated, “If the guideline calculation is determined to have been wrong, the Court would have imposed the same sentence under Section 3553(a) considering those factors as a whole.” Montgomery noted that the statement is part of the standard sentencing colloquy, even in cases where the parties do not object to the Guidelines calculation.The Sixth Circuit denied a rehearing while acknowledging that there is no reason to give any weight to boiler-plate language designed to thwart a deserved resentencing. The purpose of harmless-error analysis is to avoid resentencing in cases where the district court certainly would have announced the same sentence had it not erred..That aim is not served by a standard-issue pledge that the district court would have come to the same result under section 3553(a) had it calculated the Guidelines range correctly. Montgomery brought the argument too late so that it is inappropriate for consideration. The court issued an opinion “to voice our skepticism that a standard sentencing colloquy like the one at issue here should weigh into our harmless-error analysis in future cases.” View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Ouza was arguing with her son, Hassan. Ouza’s daughter, Maysaa called her father, Mohamad. Mohamad went to Ouza’s house, in violation of Ouza's Personal Protection Order. Maysaa called the police. When Officer Dottor arrived, the men were gone. The case report identified Ouza as the “victim” of domestic violence. After Dottor left, Mohamad returned and pushed into the house, causing Ouza to fall. A struggle ensued. The women pushed Mohamad out of the house. Maysaa called 911 and reported that her father was hitting her mother. Dottor and Officer Derwick arrived. Mohamad, standing outside, told a false story that Ouza had attacked him. Dottor placed Ouza under arrest and handcuffed her. Mohamad then said, “I was trespassing. I hit her. ... She was just defending herself.” Ouza alleges that she told Dottor several times that the handcuffs were too tight. Ouza was released from custody the next day. The prosecutor declined to prosecute. Ouza alleges that she continues to suffer physical injury from the excessively tight handcuffing.In Ouza’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with regard to Ouza’s excessive force claim; a ruling that the officers spoiled evidence (audio and video recordings), without a sanction of an adverse inference; and a ruling that the municipality is not liable. The court reversed summary judgment in favor of Dottor with regard to false arrest claims. View "Ouza v. City of Dearborn Heights" on Justia Law

Wingate was charged with one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a); two counts of pharmacy robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2118(a); three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Wingate was on parole for second-degree murder at the time of the robberies), 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and one count of conspiracy to commit those crimes, 18 U.S.C. 371. Nearly all of the indicted co-conspirators pleaded guilty. A jury convicted Wingate on all nine counts; he was sentenced to 684 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Wingate subsequently filed a section 2255 motion, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine more of the government’s witnesses and for “failing to move to suppress the identification obtained as a result of a suggestive photo lineup” and that his convictions for bank and pharmacy robbery were improperly classified as crimes of violence under section 924(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of those claims. Wingate cannot demonstrate prejudice as a result of his attorney’s purportedly ineffective assistance. The district court was right to conclude that sections 2113(a) and 2118(a) are crimes of violence under section 924(c)’s elements clause. View "Wingate v. United States" on Justia Law