Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Beginning when G.L. was 15 years old, Paauwe, an elementary school teacher, engaged in an online relationship with G.L., a special needs girl living several states away. Paauwe persuaded her to perform sexual acts and “punishment” on herself. During the two-year relationship, Paauwe amassed a collection of child pornography depicting G.L. and recorded an illicit video of a student and videos of himself masturbating at school. Paauwe eventually responded to an undercover officer’s sex-related social media post and “expressed disturbing views.” When officers interviewed him, Paauwe admitted that he struggled with sexual urges toward young girls and to viewing child pornography. A search of Paauwe’s phone revealed several images of child pornography, some depicting children as young as five engaged in sex acts with adults.Paauwe pleaded guilty to coercion and enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Paauwe objected to the imposition of a five-level sentencing enhancement for “engag[ing] in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct,” arguing that U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b)(1) contemplates offenses against multiple minors. Application Note 4(B)(i) to 4B1.5(b)(1) indicates that the Guideline applies to a defendant who engages in prohibited sexual conduct with a single minor. Paauwe argued that an application note may not expand a Guideline’s scope. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 420-month sentence, stating that Paauwe’s enhancement follows from the plain terms of the Guideline itself. View "United States v. Paauwe" on Justia Law

In 1997, Sexton pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and aggravated robbery; an Ohio state court judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Sexton later argued that Ohio law required a three-judge panel to receive his plea and impose the sentence and that he was not aware of that purported error nor was he told about his right to appeal his sentence. Within 13 months, he wrote to the Ohio Public Defender, which replied with a form that Sexton could use to pursue pro se claims pro se. Two weeks later, Sexton filed a pro se petition to vacate his sentence, focused on Sexton’s co-defendant, who apparently testified against him and received a more lenient sentence. Sexton made assertions that amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition as time-barred and failing to state any claims warranting either relief or an evidentiary hearing.Sexton says that in 2017 he learned, from another inmate, that he should have been sentenced by a three-judge panel. Sexton filed an application for leave to file a delayed appeal with the affidavits from Sexton and the other inmate. Ohio courts denied Sexton’s application. The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal of his federal habeas petition; 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D) made timely Sexton’s claim that he was denied due process and equal protection in 2017 when the Ohio court denied his motion for leave to file a direct appeal. View "Sexton v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

After almost 20 years as a Reynoldsburg detective, Tye was charged with a federal drug trafficking offense. While awaiting a preliminary hearing, Tye committed suicide in his cell at the Delaware County Jail. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to Tye’s serious medical need, with state-law claims for wrongful death and survival, the district court denied summary judgment to officers Foley and Wallace, finding that neither was entitled to federal qualified immunity or immunity under Ohio law.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The facts and inferences as found by the district court do not, as a matter of law, show that either officer was aware that Tye posed a “strong likelihood” of attempting suicide. During the intake process, Tye denied any thoughts of suicide, feelings of hopelessness, or history of psychiatric issues. Foley reported no visible signs of distress, noting only that Tye was a “peace officer.” Tye was later seen by a nurse, who ministered her own physical and mental health assessments, and again denied any thoughts of suicide, feelings of hopelessness, or history of psychiatric issues. Tye later met with a mental health clinician, who reported only “[n]ormal [f]inding[s]” with respect to demeanor, mood, thought process, behavior, affect, and cognition. View "Downard v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 1993, Snow was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and conspiracy to kill a person while engaged in a conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base, sections 846 and 848(e)(1)(A). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 327 months as to Count 1 and life imprisonment as to Count 2. Snow sought reduction of his Count 2 sentence under the First Step Act, which allows district courts to apply retroactively certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Snow’s motion, finding Snow ineligible for relief. A First Step Act “covered offense” is “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified" by the Fair Sentencing Act.” The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for certain offenses involving cocaine base by increasing the drug quantities required to trigger certain sentencing ranges and generally requires only adjustment to a new, lower sentencing range. The Fair Sentencing Act did not reduce the sentencing range for Snow’s section 848(e)(1)(A) conviction. The elements of that conviction no longer amount to an offense under section 848; there is no applicable sentencing range. The elimination of statutory penalties is not a “modification” of statutory penalties. The Act states that a court may “impose a reduced sentence” for a covered offense “as if [the changes made by the Fair Sentencing Act] were in effect” when the offense was committed. If the district court revisited Snow’s Count 2 sentence as if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect, it could not “impose” any sentence. View "United States v. Snow" on Justia Law

Police found Moore dead with a syringe in one hand, his cell phone beside him. Officers obtained a search warrant. The cellphone revealed text messages between Moore and “Joe,” indicating that Joe had delivered drugs to Moore’s address. Officers identified “Joe” through his cellular telephone number, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). Moore’s death had “resulted from a mixture of cocaine and fentanyl toxicity,” consistent with the drugs purchased from Joe Ward. Six months later, officers searched Ward’s curbside trash and found mail addressed to Ward, “loose marihuana, cigar wrappers, and a plastic bag that appeared to contain illicit drugs at one time.” Ward “has an extensive criminal history which includes charges of felony drug possession, trafficking in drugs, and weapons violations.” Based on that information, a magistrate issued a warrant to search Ward’s residence. During the search, officers seized approximately a kilogram of heroin, some cocaine and some hashish, five firearms, ammunition, drug packaging material, a partial bag of syringes, and a digital scale.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the suppression of that evidence. The government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Ward’s drug-dealing and his home. The “good faith” exception does not apply. Undated charges, without further information, plus the lone trash pull are not probative of whether Ward used his residence to traffic drugs. The affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

In 2014, a jury convicted Nassiri of the second-degree murder of his wife. In 2018, Nassiri filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. A magistrate determined that Nassiri’s limitations period expired on February 28, 2018—one day before his petition was submitted. Nassiri’s counsel had not recognized the petition’s untimeliness before submission and did not make any arguments in the petition about why his delay should be excused. The magistrate concluded that equitable tolling was not warranted. Nassiri’s objection to the magistrate’s report was prepared by the same counsel responsible for his untimely filing. Counsel explained that she had used a mechanical device, which wrongly indicated that the deadline was March 1, 2018. Counsel argued that she was “seriously negligent” when she “failed to use an alternative method ... after the Petitioner himself questioned the accuracy" of the deadline.” The district court denied the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). The court acknowledged that Nassiri’s counsel was “ineffective,” but concluded that her ineffectiveness did not merit tolling because counsel had not “abandoned” Nassiri.The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded to allow Nassiri an opportunity to develop and present his equitable tolling argument anew, while represented by unconflicted counsel. There is some evidence that Nassiri’s attorney did not present the “full picture” of her misconduct to the district court, so jurists of reason could debate whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. View "xNassiri v. Mackie" on Justia Law

A Michigan jury convicted Stewart of the premeditated murder of his estranged wife, Venus. At trial Stewart’s accomplice testified that Stewart persuaded him to help by claiming that Venus was harming the couple’s children and that, if she ended up killing them, Stewart would go on a “rampage” and “go after her family and the lawyers and prosecutors and jury[.]” Stewart moved for a mistrial based on his accomplice’s testimony about what he had said, arguing that its inflammatory nature prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. A state appellate court rejected Stewart’s due-process challenge.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). A habeas challenge to an evidentiary ruling cannot satisfy section 2254(d)(1) unless the petitioner identifies a Supreme Court case establishing a due process right with regard to the specific kind of evidence at issue. Stewart identifies no Supreme Court holding barring the “specific kind of evidence,” in this case Stewart’s out-of-court statements that allegedly inflamed the jury. The state appellate court reasonably concluded that Spencer’s testimony about Stewart’s statement was not unduly prejudicial. View "Stewart v. Winn" on Justia Law

Trice entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, reserving the right to challenge the warrant issued to search his apartment. Officers had entered the common area of his apartment building and placed a camera disguised as a smoke detector on the wall across the hallway from the door of his unit. The camera was equipped with a motion detector and set to activate whenever the door to his apartment opened. The camera made several videos of Trice entering and exiting; the information was used in an affidavit in support of the search warrant. Law enforcement executed the warrant and seized drugs and other paraphernalia consistent with distribution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his Fourth Amendment arguments as “squarely foreclosed by two lines of authority.” Trice had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment’s unlocked common hallway where the camera recorded the footage. Law enforcement may use video to record what police could have seen from a publicly accessible location. The camera captured nothing beyond the fact of Trice’s entry and exit into the apartment and did not provide law enforcement any information they could not have learned through ordinary visual surveillance. View "United States v. Trice" on Justia Law

Police caught Maya and two accomplices smuggling 50 pounds of marijuana into Kentucky in a BMW transported on a car-hauling truck from another state. When they searched Maya’s home, police found a firearm in his bed near over $20,000 in cash and money orders. Maya admitted to a drug-trafficking conspiracy and to possessing the firearm but denied possessing the gun “in furtherance of” the conspiracy—an offense that triggers an additional five-year prison term, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A jury nonetheless convicted Maya of that offense.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A rational jury could conclude that Maya possessed the firearm “in furtherance of” the drug conspiracy based on evidence that he, among other things, kept his firearm near his drug proceeds. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an officer’s testimony that drug dealers use guns for protection because they often have large amounts of cash and cannot rely on the police to protect them, that the gun’s placement under the mattress made it “easily accessible,” and that this location near the money was “consistent with the firearm being used to protect the funds.” View "United States v. Maya" on Justia Law

Carusone was convicted of felony murder exclusively on the theory—as the prosecution repeatedly emphasized in its closing argument at trial—that Carusone “plunged [a] knife into the victim’s heart.” That theory, as the state court of appeals later found, was “plainly discredit[ed]” by medical records that the state admits it wrongfully suppressed before trial. Those undisclosed hospital records contained a doctor’s affidavit that the victim “died as a result of cardiac arrest brought about by the combined effects of multiple drugs and alcohol and by heavy stress and exertion following a physical confrontation.” The state court of appeals denied Carusone relief.The Sixth Circuit granted habeas relief. The state court “plainly misapplied the governing Supreme Court precedent,” in Brady v. Maryland and Kyles v. Whitley, when it held that the undisclosed evidence does not undermine confidence in the verdict. The reasoning of the court of appeals amounted to speculation that a jury would go further than any expert did, and find that “stress” from the stab wounds was a proximate cause of the victim’s death. View "Carusone v. Warden, North Central Correctional Institution" on Justia Law