Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

While incarcerated for a Kentucky state conviction, Dotson was convicted, in 1999, of federal crimes and sentenced to 322 months of imprisonment to run consecutively to his Kentucky sentence. The following year Dotson, still incarcerated in Kentucky, was convicted in a Georgia state court and sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment. In 2004, Kentucky paroled Dotson into custody in Georgia. In 2011, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) declined to designate the Georgia prison as the place where Dotson would serve his federal sentence. Dotson filed an unsuccessful habeas corpus action. In 2019, Georgia released Dotson to federal custody. Dotson sought to have the time he spent in custody in Georgia credited to his federal sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. With respect to the transfer to Georgia, the federal government is permitted to waive its primary jurisdiction in favor of a state. Dotson’s argument that the BOP should have designated Georgia as his place of federal imprisonment is essentially an argument that his federal sentence should run concurrently with his Georgia sentence; 18 U.S.C. 3621(b) authorizes the BOP to designate a federal prisoner’s place of imprisonment, which effectively resolves whether sentences are served concurrently or consecutively; when the federal court is silent, the BOP decides. The BOP properly consulted the federal sentencing judge and considered the other pertinent factors including the seriousness of the offenses and Dotson’s criminal history. View "Dotson v. Kizziah" on Justia Law

Barber pled guilty to conspiring to possess 50 or more grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base with the intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 846, and was sentenced to 210 months in prison (his guideline range was 262-327 months). Following enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, and the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. Barber moved for a sentence reduction. The district court declined to reduce Barber’s term of imprisonment but reduced his term of supervised release.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first finding Barber eligible for resentencing.Eligibility under the First Step Act “turns on the statute of conviction, not a defendant’s specific conduct.” The Act, however, commits the decision of whether to reduce a sentence to the discretion of district courts. Barber never asked the court to consider his post-sentencing conduct and cannot establish plain error. The court need not consider facts that no party enters into the record. Nor has Barber shown any effect on his substantial rights. The district court provided a more than adequate explanation, citing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court discussed Barber’s three prior felony drug offenses and the large amount of cocaine base involved in his crime, View "United States v. Barber" on Justia Law

Bourquin called the FBI to report a fabricated story, stating that “Raymond,” with whom he had been incarcerated, had described a plot to abduct, rape, sodomize, and set on fire a former federal prosecutor on August 10, 2017. The “hit” came from Bowman, a gang leader, who was serving a life sentence. FBI employees spent several hours transcribing, reviewing, and correcting the transcript of Bourquin's call. FBI agents had Bowman placed into segregation and traveled to interview Bowman, who said he had never heard of B.M. The U.S. Marshals Service deployed deputies to B.M.’s residence to provide 24-hour surveillance. FBI agents traveled to interview Bourquin. After video footage contradicted the story about "Raymond, agents transported Bourquin to a polygraph examiner (three hours away) for a four-hour test that indicated that Bourquin had fabricated his story.Bourquin pleaded guilty to maliciously conveying false information concerning an attempt to kill, injure or intimidate B.M., 18 U.S.C. 844(e). Although the government supplied no accounting of its expenses, the court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(4), based on the government’s substantial expenditure of funds and imposed a 40-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. Section 2A6.1(b)(4)(B) requires more, such as a full accounting of expenditures or some accounting of expenditures coupled with facts that allow a sentencing court to reasonably assess the full expenditure of funds required to respond to an offense and whether those funds are substantial. View "United States v. Bourquin" on Justia Law

Garth pled guilty to possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His sentencing guidelines range was originally 70-87 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s prior Tennessee convictions for aggravated assault and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver triggered the “career-offender enhancement,” which applies when a defendant has more than one prior conviction for either crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, which resulted in a range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment. Garth’s Tennessee conviction for possessing marijuana with intent to deliver counts as a sentence-enhancing controlled-substance offense. View "United States v. Garth" on Justia Law

Lorain Police Department officers, responding after hearing gunshots, spotted the man (Raymore) that McCollough (victim) had seen. They recovered a gun near where McCollough heard a “gun hitting the concrete,” ammunition in that gun, and a magazine with more ammunition in the black Nissan that rolled over McCollough’s hand earlier that night. Testing and DNA evidence connected that evidence with Raymore, who was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Raymore had previous convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year: possession of drugs, assault, aggravated robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and aggravated burglary.Raymore was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating his supervised release, consecutive to 110 months for the firearm possession. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was evidence that allowed a jury to conclude Raymore constructively possessed the gun and the ammunition in that gun. Rejecting an argument that the indictment failed to allege a mens rea element required after the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision and that the jury instructions were erroneous for the same reason, the court noted that Raymore stipulated to his felony convictions. The court appropriately enhanced Raymore's Sentencing Guidelines range because Raymore’s prior Ohio assault and aggravated robbery convictions qualified as crimes of violence. View "United States v. Raymore" on Justia Law

Fugate sold stolen firearms and other property that he acquired from co-defendants conducting thefts from automobiles across Kentucky, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Authorities recovered 25 firearms from Fugate’s residence. Fugate’s wife turned over an additional seven firearms. Fugate admitted that he sold firearms to drug traffickers and gang members and that he knew that some of the firearms were stolen. Fugate pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), The government dropped a charge of receipt, possession, or trafficking of firearms and ammunition, “knowing and having reasonable cause to believe the firearms and ammunition were stolen.” Fugate had a prior conviction for felony possession of firearms by an unlawful user of controlled substances. The court applied a six-level sentencing enhancement because the offense involved at least 25 firearms; a two-level enhancement because some firearms were stolen; a four-level enhancement because Fugate engaged in the trafficking of firearms; and a four-level enhancement because Fugate possessed or trafficked the firearms “in connection with another felony offense.” The calculated Guidelines range was 78-97 months’ imprisonment. The court sentenced him to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the sentence. Applying an enhancement for possessing or trafficking firearms in connection with another felony—knowingly trafficking stolen firearms was impermissible double-counting under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Fugate" on Justia Law

Ashrafkhan came to the U.S. in 1991 after receiving a scholarship to study at Michigan State University. He earned a Ph.D. with a research focus on pathology and the genetics of cancer. In 2006, he founded Compassionate Doctors, a medical practice outside of Detroit, that was actually a “pill mill,” where unscrupulous doctors wrote fraudulent prescriptions for fake patients. Compassionate billed Medicare for the fake patient visits and collected millions of dollars in Medicare payments over the course of several years. The fraudulent prescriptions were filled by individuals recruited by Compassionate at pharmacies that paid Compassionate kickbacks. Those drugs were then sold on the street, resulting in hundreds of thousands of opioid-based drugs being distributed onto the illegal drug market. Ashrafkhan was convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and money laundering and was sentenced to 23 years of imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the jury instruction on “reasonable doubt.” The instruction stressed to the jury the need to base its decision on “the evidence or lack of evidence” and that a reasonable doubt was one that was “still standing” after all of the evidence had been considered. View "United States v. Ashrafkhan" on Justia Law

McReynolds and 17 codefendants were charged under federal drug laws. McReynolds was charged only under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Only McReynolds went to trial. He admitted selling drugs but argued that he was not a member of the conspiracy. There was testimony that McReynolds was in contact with the conspiracy’s leader every few days to buy drugs. The conspiracy’s supplier and its leader mentioned each of the other codefendants in their plea agreements but did not mention McReynolds. None of the searches returned any evidence associated with McReynolds. A cooperating codefendant testified that McReynolds was a conspiracy member. Confidential informant A.A. testified to buying drugs from McReynolds.The jury returned a guilty verdict and found the amount of controlled substances attributable to McReynolds beyond a reasonable doubt to be “less than 100 grams” of heroin and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine. The PSR combined the amounts from the codefendants’ plea agreements with the sales to A.A. for the total quantity of over 750 grams of heroin, over 700 grams of cocaine, and over 250 grams of crack. After a firearm enhancement, McReynolds’ guidelines range was 151-181 months’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the 151-month sentence. The indictment sufficiently alleged that McReynolds had “knowingly conspired and agreed” with the other coconspirators. A court cannot hold a defendant to the entire conspiracy-wide drug amounts without any particularized findings as to why it is doing so. View "United States v. McReynolds" on Justia Law

Koger, an inmate of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), is a practicing Rastafarian. Between 2006 and 2018, Koger made several religious-practice accommodation requests, including requests to grow his dreadlocks, keep a religious diet, observe fasts, and commune with other Rastafarians. Alleging that ODRC’s responses were inadequate, Koger brought these claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several ODRC officials. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Koger has not shown that the prison’s grooming policy, which provides for an individualized determination of whether an inmate’s hair is “searchable,” prevents him from growing his locks naturally and, therefore, cannot “demonstrate that [the] prison policy substantially burdens [his] religious practice.” It is not clear that ODRC denied Koger the ability to commune with fellow Rastafarians. The court reversed in part. The defendants did not present any government interest to justify the denial of Koger’s religious diet requests. Koger sufficiently alleged equal protection violations. View "Koger v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Firefighters, including Sparks, responded to a fire at the Pritchard residence. Sparks lost consciousness and died days later. Sparks suffered from coronary disease, hypertension, and diabetes and had not been taking his prescribed medications. Pritchard had arranged for his wife, children, and dog to be out of the house that morning. Pritchard indicated to several people that he was responsible for the fire and gave investigators a false alibi. In persuading his wife, Brandi, to cooperate with his plan to burn the house to collect insurance proceeds, Pritchard recounted previous fires that he started to collect insurance money. Pritchard used threats of violence to coerce Brandi not to confess. Pritchard and Brandi were charged with malicious destruction of property by fire, 18 U.S.C. 844(i), which permits punishment for arson causing death, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Brandi pleaded guilty.At Pritchard’s trial, a physician for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health testified that firefighting “triggered” Sparks’s fatal heart attack; he could not conclude that Sparks would not have had a heart attack independent of the fire. Pritchard’s counsel unsuccessfully objected to evidence about Pritchard’s previous arsons, emergency protective orders obtained by Brandi, and cell phone information obtained without a warrant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Pritchard's conviction and 360-month sentence. The jury had sufficient evidence that Sparks' death was “a direct or proximate result of [Pritchard’s] conduct." View "United States v. Pritchard" on Justia Law