Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Igboba was convicted on 18 counts under 18 U.S.C. 286, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 18 U.S.C. 287, and 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), (b), and (c)(5), based on his participation in a conspiracy to defraud the government by preparing and filing false federal income tax returns using others’ identities. He was sentenced to 162 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and required to pay restitution, special assessment, and forfeiture sums.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that when the district court increased his base offense level based on the total amount of loss his offense caused, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), it failed to distinguish between the loss caused by his individual conduct and that caused by the entire conspiracy and that the district court erred in applying a two-level sophisticated-means enhancement, section 2B1.1(b)(10). the district court could rightly attribute $4.1 million in losses to “acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by” Igboba. The court noted his “sophisticated” use of technology and multiple aliases. View "United States v. Igboba" on Justia Law

In 2002, Hugueley stabbed correctional counselor Steed 36 times, stopping only after his homemade weapon broke off. Hugueley testified that he had planned the attack because Steed “had a smart ass mouth.” The jury convicted Hugueley of first-degree murder. Hugueley waived the presentation of any mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. The jury considered several aggravating factors. In 1986, Hugueley was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his mother. In 1992, he was convicted of first-degree murder after killing another inmate. In 1998, Hugueley was convicted of attempted first-degree murder after stabbing another inmate, The jury sentenced Hugueley to death. Tennessee law requires an automatic appeal from a death sentence. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. Hugueley originally raised ineffective assistance of counsel in his state post-conviction proceedings, but he waived the claim when he voluntarily withdrew his petition. The Sixth Circuit rejected Hugueley’s argument that he should have been declared incompetent to withdraw that petition, and that the state-court procedures that determined that he was competent were procedurally deficient or, alternatively, that his state post-conviction counsel was ineffective and caused his default. View "Hugueley v. Mays" on Justia Law

Ware was convicted in 1997 of several federal drug offenses and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. At the time, adherence to the federal sentencing guidelines was mandatory; the jury did not make any drug amount finding. The court did not specify the particular sentence for each count nor specify under which provisions of section 841(b)(1) Ware was sentenced. In 2003, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ware’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for relief under Apprendi. In 2019, Ware moved for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act.The district court concluded that Ware was eligible for relief but denied Ware’s motion as a matter of discretion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ware’s argument that the court abused its discretion by insufficiently considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), putting undue weight on the legislative purpose of the First Step Act, and inadequately considering that Ware’s statutory sentencing range would be lower under current law. The district court assessed at length three of the section 3553(a) factors that it deemed most relevant. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that, under Apprendi, Ware’s statutory maximum would have been lower because specified drug amounts were not found by the jury or charged in the indictment but that this factor did not weigh heavily in favor of granting relief, due to concerns regarding disparities with other similarly situated defendants. View "United States v. Ware" on Justia Law

Davenport, convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial in Michigan state court. He was visibly shackled at the waist, wrist, and ankles during trial. Davenport’s right hand was uncuffed and there was a privacy curtain around the defense table. The court did not justify the shackling on the record. During an evidentiary hearing on direct appeal, several jurors recalled that they had thought Davenport might be dangerous when they saw him in shackles. The jurors testified that Davenport’s shackling was not discussed during deliberations and did not affect their verdict. After exhausting his state remedies, Davenport challenged his conviction in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court found that the shackling was harmless error and denied the petition.The Sixth Circuit reversed and granted a conditional writ. Because “shackling is ‘inherently prejudicial,’” and the evidence of premeditation and deliberation necessary to a first-degree murder conviction was not overwhelming, the state has not met its burden to show the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "Davenport v. MacLaren" on Justia Law

Small, a Michigan prisoner, pro se, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, alleging that, without provocation, Officer Brock several times brandished a knife, threatened to kill Small, and motioned in a manner suggesting how Brock would use the knife to kill Small. On initial screening, the district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c).The Sixth Circuit vacated the dismissal. Small plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment violation. While verbal abuse and nonphysical harassment of prisoners do not alone give rise to a constitutional claim, the combination of multiple, unprovoked verbal threats to immediately end a prisoner’s life and the aggressive brandishing of a deadly weapon can violate the Eighth Amendment. Based on the allegations in Small’s complaint, Brock had no legitimate penological reason for repeatedly placing Small in fear of his life; it is reasonable to infer that Brock knew that his conduct would cause Small psychological harm. Unprovoked and repeated threats to a prisoner’s life, combined with a demonstrated means to immediately carry out such threats, constitutes conduct so objectively serious as to be “antithetical to human dignity.” Neither the force threatened by Brock (death) nor the resulting injury to Small (fearing for his life to the point of paranoia and psychological distress necessitating mental health treatment) was de minimis. View "Small v. Officer Brock" on Justia Law

Three employees and a customer were in the Coldwater, Michigan store when two men, their faces obscured, entered. One pointed a semi-automatic weapon while the other locked the front door. The men led the victims from the sales floor to a back breakroom at gunpoint. They forced the victims to lie face-down and bound their wrists and ankles with zip ties, then looted the store and took the customer’s purse. They went out to a waiting getaway car driven by a third robber with cellphones and cash worth $42,129.44. Hill pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 2. Hill’s presentence report suggested applying a four-level enhancement that applies when victims were “abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape” U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(A). Hill argued that he should receive only a two-level enhancement that applies when victims were “physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape,” 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The court applied the four-level enhancement and imposed a sentence of 130 months’ imprisonment, based on Hill’s guidelines range of 130-162 months. With the two-level enhancement, Hill’s guidelines range would have been 110-137 months. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In the context of this “abduction” enhancement, the phrase “different location” refers to a place different from the store being robbed. A store’s backroom does not qualify as a “different location” from the store. View "United States v. xHill" on Justia Law

In an infamous 2009 incident, the state of Ohio tried to execute death-row inmate Broom by way of lethal injection but was forced to abandon the effort when the execution team concluded—two hours into the process—that it could not maintain a viable IV connection to Broom’s veins. The state then returned Broom to his cell, to await a second execution attempt. That second execution attempt has not yet happened. The parties have spent 11 years litigating whether the U.S. Constitution bars Ohio from ever trying to execute Broom again. Broom relies on both the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment and the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on “double jeopardy.” The state courts, including the Ohio Supreme Court, have rejected Broom’s contentions on the merits, as did the district court below on habeas review.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While calling Ohio’s treatment of Broom “disturbing, to say the least,” the court reasoned that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 permits reversal of a state court merits decisions in only a narrow set of circumstances and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Broom’s constitutional claims on the merits does not fall within that set of circumstances. View "Broom v. Shoop" on Justia Law

In 2004, Flowers was charged with possessing with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A); because Flowers had two prior felony drug convictions, his minimum sentence was life in prison. Flowers pled guilty; the government agreed to allege only one prior drug offense, meaning his mandatory minimum would be 20 years. As a career offender, his Guidelines sentencing range was 262-327 months. The court found no basis supporting a departure and imposed a 262-month sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the Guidelines are advisory. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the mandatory minimum for Flowers’ conviction to 10 years; the First Step Act of 2018 made those reductions retroactive if the 2010 law modified the statutory penalties.Flowers sought resentencing, arguing that the Act modified his statutory minimum and that if he were sentenced today, he would not qualify as a career offender. HIs Ohio conviction no longer qualifies as a felony drug offense. Flowers noted his educational accomplishments and limited disciplinary record in prison. The government argued that Flowers’ Guidelines range was unchanged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Although it is unclear whether the district court indicated that Flowers was ineligible for a reduction because his Guidelines range did not change and the First Step Act only concerns statutory sentencing ranges, any error was harmless. The court considered all of his arguments and rejected them on the merits. View "United States v. Flowers" on Justia Law

Plain-clothes Euclid officers approached Wright’s parked SUV with weapons drawn. Thinking he was being robbed, Wright, an African-American, tried to back up. Officers flashed their badges. Wright stopped the SUV. Officers opened the driver’s door. Wright had no weapon. The officers simultaneously deployed a taser and pepper-sprayed him at point-blank range, while Wright remained seated. Wright had trouble getting out because of a colostomy bag stapled to his abdomen. He was recovering from an operation. The encounter caused bleeding. The officers arrested Wright “arising from a drug investigation,” although they found no drugs on him. Wright was detained for more than nine hours and subjected to an intrusive body scan after the officers knew of Wright’s medical condition. No drug-related charges were ever brought against him.The Sixth Circuit reinstated Wright's civil rights case. Even if the officers had no knowledge of Wright’s medical condition, other facts, construed in Wright’s favor, could support a reasonable juror’s finding that Wright did not actively resist. An officer may not tase a citizen not under arrest merely for failure to follow orders when the officer has no reasonable fear for his safety. With respect to the Monell claim, the evidence includes the Chris Rock video, played during the city's use-of-force training, in which the comedian talks about police misconduct. There was an offensive cartoon in Euclid’s police-training manual, showing an officer in riot gear beating a prone, unarmed civilian with a club, with the caption “protecting and serving the poop out of you.” Wright has sufficient evidence of municipal policy. View "Wright v. City of Euclid" on Justia Law

Detroit police discovered Ralston dead in her home, with multiple stab wounds, plus “defensive-type” cuts and bruises. Ralston was clutching long brown hair, which was never matched to any person. Blood was found throughout Ralston’s house. Days later, police arrested Smith. There was no physical evidence linking Smith to Ralston’s death. Smith’s acquaintances (Dennis and Evans) testified that Smith had confessed to killing a woman “at a safe house” that he had intended to rob. Ralston’s son confirmed that Smith was at the house the night before Ralston's death. Smith was convicted of first-degree felony murder and assault with intent to commit armed robbery. A juror reported that he and others had changed their votes based on a belief that Smith would receive a relatively light sentence for felony murder. The court declined to grant an evidentiary hearing and imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Michigan courts upheld the convictions.Smith returned to state court to (unsuccessfully) seek relief from judgment with an affidavit from Evans’s brother, attesting that he spoke with Evans and Dennis on the day that Smith allegedly confessed, that they said Smith had only said that the police wanted to speak with him, and they thought that they might receive a reward for providing information.The federal district court construed Smith’s habeas claim to be an actual innocence claim and denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the state court should have granted a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the jury improperly relied on prejudicial information; there was insufficient evidence for conviction; and the courts erred in refusing to consider new evidence of Smith’s innocence. View "Smith v. Nagy" on Justia Law