Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In February 2018, a confidential informant purchased 14.18 grams of methamphetamine from West for $300 in a Walmart restroom. Two months later, the same confidential informant met West inside a Meijer restroom and paid West $900 for 116.112 grams of simulated methamphetamine. Leaving Meijer, West entered the rear passenger side of a vehicle in which the driver’s seat was occupied by Johnson. Johnson’s girlfriend sat in the front passenger seat. Officers stopped and searched the vehicle, discovering a semi-automatic pistol under the front passenger seat. West was charged with knowingly and intentionally distributing methamphetamine in February 2018, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and for being a felon in possession of a firearm in April 2018, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).West pleaded guilty to the drug charge; the government dismissed the felon-in-possession charge. The district court determined that West’s base offense level should be increased by two levels under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1) because a firearm was possessed in relation to West’s drug-related offense, resulting in a Guidelines range of 37-46 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed West’s 40-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court abused its discretion in determining that he possessed the gun found in the vehicle and that the transaction was not “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). The district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Dunnican's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c).The court upheld the introduction of data extracted from Dunnican's cellular telephone and text messages. The stipulations of Federal Rule of Evidence 902 were met and the evidence was properly authenticated. Dunnican’s text messages are not hearsay because they are Dunnican’s own statements, regardless of the medium. Text messages regarding Dunnican's other drug transactions were relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show a necessary element of the charge: Dunnican’s intent to distribute the drug. The court properly allowed a DEA agent to offer expert opinion testimony that the marijuana appeared to be packaged for distribution. The agent offered no opinion on Dunnican’s mental state or intent but, drawing upon his training, experience, and the evidence, simply shared his subjective assessment of the facts. Dunnican was not entitled to a new trial following the dismissal of the only African-American jury member for health reasons. Dunnican’s speculation that there was “documented misconduct” during jury deliberations had no basis. A 21-month upward variance on Dunnican’s sentence was appropriate; the court reasonably concluded that an above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to advance the objectives of protecting the public and deterring Dunnican from future criminal conduct View "United States v. Dunnican" on Justia Law

Inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Correctional Institution, on behalf of themselves and others, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future Elkton inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in April 2020, directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and not allow transferees to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met.The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. While the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2241, that section does not permit some of the relief the petitioners sought. The court rejected the BOP’s attempts to classify the claims as “conditions of confinement” claims, subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The district court erred in finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim. There was sufficient evidence that the petitioners are “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” but the BOP responded reasonably to the known, serious risks posed by COVID-19. View "Wilson v. Williams" on Justia Law

Smith was indicted for knowingly and intentionally distributing a mixture of heroin, fentanyl, and carfentanil, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The government filed a notice that Smith was subject to an increased statutory maximum sentence under section 841(b)(1)(C) due to a prior state felony drug-trafficking offense. Pleading guilty, Smith waived his right to appeal the conviction and sentence save for five enumerated circumstances, including the right to appeal the determination that he was a career offender. The PSR indicated that Smith was a career offender based upon one prior state felony drug trafficking conviction and a state felony conviction for five counts of aggravated robbery. Smith argued that the First Step Act rendered his section 841(b)(1)(C) statutory enhancement invalid and that his state convictions were no longer predicate offenses for determining career-offender status. Smith asked to withdraw his guilty plea, citing the First Step Act and his contention that his state aggravated-robbery conviction was not a crime of violence.The district court rejected Smith’s request to withdraw his plea and imposed a within-Guidelines 150-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Arguments regarding the First Step Act’s application to section 841(b)(1)(C) were not among the five issues Smith preserved for appeal. Employing the categorical approach, Smith’s violation of Ohio Revised Code 2925.03(A)(2) is a controlled substance offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Confidential informants told Grand Rapids DEA agents that brothers Phillips and Lee bought and sold kilogram-level quantities of heroin and cocaine in Grand Rapids, Benton Harbor, and Kalamazoo. The investigators conducted surveillance of the brothers moving packages between “stash houses,” recovered drug-related products from “trash pulls” at those locations, and made controlled buys of drugs from their associates, and concluded that they got their drugs from interstate semi-truck shipments. They obtained authorization to tap the brothers' cell phones. Based on the wiretaps, the government observed the brothers arranging additional shipments of drugs and ultimately arrested 17 members of the alleged conspiracy and executed 20 search warrants, uncovering approximately $1,300,000, 13 kilograms of cocaine, 19 kilograms of heroin, 1.5 kilograms of fentanyl, 50 pounds of marijuana, three handguns, and an assault rifle. The brothers cooperated and provided evidence against Castro, Howard, and Tatum. Castro sold Phillips heroin, cocaine, and marijuana in kilogram-level quantities and used long-haul truck drivers to move drugs from California to Grand Rapids. A truck driver also agreed to cooperate. The brothers sold drugs to Howard and Tatum.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Castro, Howard, and Tatum for conspiring to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The district court properly authorized the wiretaps, properly admitted evidence obtained from them, properly concluded that the evidence supported the convictions, and properly sentenced Castro to 504 months’ imprisonment, Howard to 120 months, and Tatum to 84 months. View "United States v. Tatum" on Justia Law

Over four months, Woodson and his accomplices targeted 14 Jared stores in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Illinois, and New Jersey. While inside a Jared store, Woodson would ask a clerk to see a diamond. An accomplice would then cause a disturbance, drawing the clerk’s attention. With the clerk distracted, Woodson would replace the diamond with cubic zirconia, leave the store with the diamond, and then fence the stolen item to a buyer in Toledo, Cleveland, or New York. The group stole roughly $90,000 worth of diamonds before targeting multiple Grand Rapids area Jared stores on the same day and diverting from their routine, to pry open a display case. A clerk called 911. Officers broadcast descriptions of the men to law enforcement and jewelry stores. Later that day, Woodson was identified leaving another Jared store. When police stopped his vehicle, they found Woodson and his accomplices plus several pieces of diamond jewelry. Woodson pled guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2314, 2315. The district court calculated Woodson’s Guidelines range as 21-27 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence, upholding the imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement based on a finding that a central part of Woodson’s scheme was perpetual relocation to avoid law enforcement (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). The court rejected Woodson’s argument that his practice of returning to his “home base” in Toledo meant he never “relocated” the scheme. View "United States v. Woodson" on Justia Law

In 2016, Alam pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud for his role in a roughly $8,000,000 Medicare kickback scheme. He received a 101-month sentence. Alam, now 64, suffers from obesity, poorly controlled diabetes, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, kidney stones, and bladder issues. In March 2020, fearing the health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic, Alam sent a letter to the prison warden requesting compassionate release. Without waiting for a response, Alam sought emergency relief in federal court. Alam had not complied with the compassionate-release statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).The district court dismissed Alam’s claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure orderly processing of applications for early release) and it is mandatory, with no exception. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons did not move for compassionate release and Alam waited just 10 days after the warden’s receipt of his request to file his motion, not the required 30 days. While nothing in the administrative exhaustion requirement clearly limits the court’s jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition. View "United States v. Alam" on Justia Law

In 2008, Boulding was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. His PSR found Boulding responsible for 650.4 grams of crack cocaine. The district court accepted this finding over Boulding’s objection. The PSR also applied sentencing increases for possession of a dangerous weapon, for Boulding’s role as an organizer, and for obstruction of justice. Boulding’s attorney objected but did not seek a judicial determination because the statutory mandatory minimum (life in prison) controlled Boulding’s sentence. The court stated that the enhancements were justified. Boulding had two prior felony drug convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Boulding’s life sentence.In 2018, Boulding sought a reduction of his sentence under the First Step Act. The court imposed a reduced sentence of 324 months but denied Boulding a de novo resentencing hearing and an opportunity to address previously-frivolous objections to sentencing enhancements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Boulding is eligible for resentencing and remanded. Because the Act’s definition of a “covered offense” ties eligibility to the statute of conviction, the court held that eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act is a categorical inquiry governed by the statute of conviction rather than the defendant's conduct. Eligible defendants are not entitled to plenary resentencing, but discretion to deny resentencing is not unfettered. An eligible defendant is entitled to an accurate amended guideline calculation and renewed consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and must be allowed to raise objections. View "United States v. Boulding" on Justia Law

In 2001, Richardson pled guilty to multiple federal crimes involving crack cocaine. Federal law then punished crack-cocaine offenses much more severely than powder-cocaine offenses. The district court sentenced Richardson to five years in prison followed by four years on supervised release. Richardson served his custodial sentence but during his supervised release, Richardson stabbed someone in the chest. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to another 18 months in prison following his state sentence for first-degree assault.While Richardson was serving his state sentence, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; later, the First Step Act made the new sentencing rules retroactive,18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Richardson’s petition for relief under the Act. While Richardson was eligible for consideration of a reduced sentence, the district court properly considered the motion along with “the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), took into account “defense counsel’s objections,” and explained how Richardson’s history and characteristics (including his post-incarceration conduct) weighed against granting the motion. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

While pursuing an outstanding warrant for Buie, Columbia police officers learned that Buie had recently pawned firearms. Viewing surveillance footage from the shops, police saw Buie in possession of a rifle and a shotgun, each of which he exchanged for money. In additional footage, police saw Buie pawn another rifle and another shotgun. Buie pleaded guilty to two counts of felonious possession of a firearm.The PSR found that five of Buie’s past Tennessee convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): second-degree burglary, arson, voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of aggravated burglary. Buie conceded only that his voluntary manslaughter conviction so qualified. The court excluded his aggravated burglary convictions under Sixth Circuit precedent (Stitt) but rejected Buie’s arguments that his arson and second-degree burglary convictions were not ACCA predicates because Tennessee’s definitions of those crimes were broader than their common-law counterparts—second-degree burglary on the entry element, and arson on the mens rea and act elements.The court found Buie imposed ACCA’s mandatory minimum 180-month sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the “Stitt” decision, holding that the locational element of aggravated burglary under Tennessee law corresponded with generic burglary, bringing Buie’s aggravated burglary convictions back into play, under ACCA. Buie then argued that the entry element of his burglary convictions was overbroad and that his arson conviction was overbroad. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Buie has committed three violent felonies under ACCA. View "United States v. Buie" on Justia Law