Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Freeman pleaded guilty to felony murder in 2001. An Ohio trial court sentenced Freeman to 15 years to life imprisonment, followed by post-release control for the maximum period allowable. Freeman failed to appeal. After four unsuccessful motions to withdraw his guilty plea, Freeman collaterally moved in state court to vacate his conviction and sentence in 2015. He argued the sentencing court’s imposition of post-release control was “contrary to law” and that his felony murder conviction was improper because there was no evidence he committed an underlying violent felony. The state appeals court granted Freeman relief in part, agreeing that Ohio law does not provide for post-release control for felony murder and stating that “a sentencing entry that incorrectly imposes postrelease control does not render the entire sentence void. Only that portion of the judgment that improperly imposes postrelease control is void.” On remand, in 2017, the trial court “vacated and replaced, nunc pro tunc” the journal entry from Freeman’s original sentencing, leaving intact its original sentencing journal entry except for the single sentence discussing post-release control. Freeman then filed a 28 U.S.C 2254 petition, challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed Freeman’s petition as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A limited resentencing that results in a better-than-before sentence does not constitute a new “judgment” under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A), which imposes a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions. View "Freeman v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered J.H. deceased in her home with drug paraphernalia and .58 grams of fentanyl. Text messages in J.H.’s cellphone indicated that she had attempted to buy or had bought drugs from Jeffries earlier that day. Officers, impersonating J.H., texted Jeffries and requested more drugs. Jeffries went to J.H.’s home. A search of Jeffries’s car revealed 1.69 grams of fentanyl and a cellphone containing J.H.'s text messages. In Jeffries’s pocket, the officers found $446 and 36.14 grams of fentanyl.Jeffries was charged with possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute and distributing fentanyl, the use of which resulted in death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Two medical experts testified that the amount of fentanyl in J.H.’s system was “significantly above the lethal level” and that no other “anatomical issues” could have caused J.H.’s death. Jeffries asked the court to instruct the jury that, to impose section 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement, the government was required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of J.H. was the natural and foreseeable result of the defendant’s actions.” The instructed the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that but for the use of the drugs that Jeffries distributed, J.H. would not have died; there is “but for” causation where use of the drugs, combined with other factors to produce death and death would not have occurred without the incremental effect of the drugs. After the jury convicted Jeffries, the court held that it had erred by failing to include the proximate-cause jury instruction and granted a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for sentencing. Section 841(b)(1)(C) requires proof of only but-for causation. View "United States v. Jeffries" on Justia Law

In 2006, Foreman pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine powder, and possession of a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Foreman admitted that he was responsible for approximately 135 grams of crack cocaine and 250 grams of cocaine powder. Foreman had a final Guidelines range of 322-387 months; he was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment with respect to each drug conviction, to run concurrently, and 60 months’ imprisonment for the firearms conviction, to run consecutively. When the First Step Act of 2018 made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, Foreman sought relief.The district court held that Foreman was not entitled to a plenary resentencing and declined to revisit his career offender status or hold an in-person hearing, then weighed the new statutory range applicable to Foreman’s drug offenses, his recalculated Guidelines range, and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and reduced Foreman’s total sentence to 172 months on each drug offense, to run concurrently, plus the mandatory consecutive 60 months on the firearms offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Nothing in the First Step Act entitles a defendant to a plenary resentencing. First Step Act resentencings are not shielded from review for reasonableness; the district court thoroughly explained its rationale, carefully examining Foreman’s circumstances, the amended penalty provisions, and the resulting changes to Foreman’s Guidelines range. View "United States v. Foreman" on Justia Law

In 2006, Smith was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of powder or 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack cocaine); possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine powder; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court imposed a mandatory minimum life sentence. The Fair Sentencing Act subsequently lowered the penalty for cocaine-base offenses, made retroactive through the First Step Act. Smith moved for relief and received a reduced sentence of 360 months, the bottom of the new Guideline range for the counts impacted by the Fair Sentencing Act, to run concurrent to his existing 360-month sentence for his powder cocaine count that was not affected by the Fair Sentencing Act.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have imposed a below-Guideline sentence for all counts. The First Step Act is a limited grant of authority to impose a reduced sentence for certain offenses and does not require a plenary resentencing proceeding. Even assuming the court’s obligation to explain its reasons for imposing the modified sentence was akin to that which applies in initial sentencing, the court's use of a modified AO 247 form order to explain its decision was not procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

At Moody’s trial, the government produced a video of Moody cooking crack on his stove and waving a handgun while he mused about life in “the game” (drug trafficking). The court ruled that most of the video was admissible. Moody then tried to persuade the jury that the video was filmed more than five years before his indictment, putting it outside the statute of limitations. The jury convicted Moody. Due to prior felony drug convictions, Moody received enhanced, mandatory-minimum life sentences on several counts. He appealed on evidentiary grounds relating to the video. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.Later, Moody raised new claims on collateral review, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court found each claim meritless; most were also procedurally defaulted. The court authorized Moody to appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, stating that none of the claims should have been certified. Reasonable jurists could not doubt that the district court properly denied relief on Moody’s claims that he was deprived of his statute-of-limitations defense (violating due process); that the past convictions for his sentencing enhancements were not charged in the indictment or found by the jury; and that his previous lawyers failed to raise the first two claims sooner, violating his right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Moody v. United States" on Justia Law

Canton Police received a 911 call from Andrews, who stated that his fiance, White, had physically attacked him. Officers arrested White. Andrews later took White's medications to the jail; a “KOP” policy allows inmates to keep certain drugs for self-administration. During an intake interview, White admitted to attempting to harm herself or commit suicide in the past but said she was not thinking of harming herself or having suicidal thoughts. An R.N. later evaluated White for nearly two hours, reported White’s chief complaints were “anxiety and depression,” and contacted a pharmacy to verify White’s prescriptions. The R.N. claims White did not exhibit any psychotic behavior, suicidal ideation, or psychiatric distress but ordered further evaluation. The next day, White was found on the floor with vomit on her face. She stated repeatedly that she took too many pills. The next day, White died in the hospital. The cause of death was Verapamil toxicity.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. A pretrial detainee does not have an automatic right to a suicide screening. The court rejected an argument that the KOP Policy was deficient because it allows inmates in need of a psychological evaluation to participate before a psychiatrist’s assessment of proper housing. The County had no history of suicides relative to the program, so any purported failure to train its employees in suicide risk assessment did not cause White’s death. View "Andrews v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Cincinnati officers Scott and Moore responded to a reported incident of menacing. Two people alleged that Quandavier had driven by their home that night and threatened to kill them and that Quandavier carried guns. Officer Loreaux identified a vehicle fitting the description. Officers Scott, Moore, Schneider, and Loreaux, standing where the vehicle was parked, heard a voice. Thinking that it was likely Quandavier, they knocked on the exterior door of the residence. It swung open. Three officers entered without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Loreaux remained outside. Neither Scott nor Moore recall announcing their presence or identifying themselves. Inside and upstairs, Scott knocked on a closed door. As it opened, Scott “saw the barrel of a rifle pointed at [her] face.” Moore and Schneider also saw Quandavier “nonchalantly” panning the rifle from left to right. Moore reached for its barrel as Scott fired her weapon. Moore did not instruct Quandavier to drop his rifle nor did Scott issue any commands before firing. Quandavier collapsed. The officers immediately radioed for paramedics. Before the officers applied handcuffs or provided first aid, they heard another voice and conducted a sweep. Quandavier died at the scene without receiving medical attention.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for unlawful entry, excessive force, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, plus state claims, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Scott, Moore, and Schneider on the unlawful entry claim. The court affirmed as to the excessive force, deliberate indifference, and state-law battery claims, and remanded for evaluation of municipal liability and wrongful death claims. View "Hicks v. Scott" on Justia Law

The DEA had been surveilling Benton and Merida. Merida went inside Benton’s home carrying four kilograms of powder cocaine. Moments later, Merida exited and drove away. DEA agents stopped and searched Merida’s car and executed a search warrant on Benton’s home. In Merida’s car, agents found $94,190. In Benton’s home, they found the four kilograms of powder cocaine and three kilograms of crack cocaine in a safe, with a handgun lying nearby. Benton pled guilty to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), & 846. The government dropped a charge of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. The PSR calculated Benton’s offense level as 33 based on the underlying drug quantity calculation, which added the four kilograms of powder cocaine and the three kilograms of crack cocaine, deemed to be “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). Benton had 30 prior convictions, including prior offenses for cocaine possession and trafficking, resulting in a Guidelines range of 235-293 months.The Sixth Circuit upheld his 260-month sentence. The court upheld the “relevant conduct” determination and rejected arguments the district court should have granted a downward departure because Benton’s criminal history category overrepresented the seriousness of his past crimes and that Benton should not have received a considerably higher sentence than his co-defendant, Merida, who received 84 months of incarceration. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

Witnesses told Memphis police that Ward had pulled up in a car, had fired shots at individuals gathered outside, then got out of the car and continued shooting. People returned fire. The witnesses directed the officers to another house, where they found Ward with a gunshot wound to his leg. Officers subsequently found an empty (stolen) pistol and shell casings on the lawn of the house next to the house where they found Ward. Two weeks later, Ward, on crutches, was arrested for trying to rob a pharmacy. Ward has a 2007 state conviction for aggravated robbery and a 2011 federal conviction for brandishing a firearm during a robbery. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm based on the shooting, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); for attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; and for brandishing a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), Ward pleaded guilty to robberyl the government dropped the section 924(c) count. At trial on the felon-in-possession count, Ward stipulated that he had a prior felony. Convicted, Ward was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Ward’s argument that his conviction was improper under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” holding because neither the indictment nor the jury instructions charged that he “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” There was clear evidence that Ward knew he was a felon and that the government could prove it. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

In 2007, a jury convicted Brown as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) The Armed Career Criminal Act increases the sentence for felons who possess firearms from a 10-year maximum to a 15-year minimum if the defendant has three prior convictions that qualify as “violent felonies,” 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2), (e). Sixth Circuit precedent (Nance: then treated Brown’s three Tennessee aggravated-burglary convictions as violent felonies, so that court upheld his 180-month sentence under the Act. Years later the parties agreed that changes to precedent showed that Brown’s burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felonies. The district court granted Brown relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He was resentenced and released from prison.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision granting Brown relief under section 2255 and remanded for the court to reinstate his original sentence. The court concluded that, following the Supreme Court’s 2018 “Stitt” holding, the Sixth Circuit’s 2007 Nance’s holding that a Tennessee aggravated-burglary conviction categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act “is once again the law of this circuit.” View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law