Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Winburn represented himself at his trial for armed robbery, home invasion, and conspiracy. Based on Winburn’s disruptive behavior, the judge removed him from the courtroom and revoked Winburn’s permission to represent himself, then granted a competency evaluation and a mistrial. While Winburn awaited his second trial, the judge permitted Winburn’s stand-by attorney to withdraw because Winburn had sued her and enjoined Winburn from filing complaints or grievances against his new attorney, except to discharge her. Although represented by a new attorney, Winburn moved pro se to dismiss his charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial judge denied the motion because Winburn’s attorney had not filed it. Winburn filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 challenging his retrial and another section 2241 petition challenging the injunction. The district judges denied both and declined to issue certificates of appealability. Winburn filed a notice of appeal for one petition and sought a certificate of appealability for the other. The Sixth Circuit held that state pretrial detainees proceeding under section 2241 may not appeal without certificates of appealability and granted Winburn a certificate on the injunction claim. A reasonable jurist could conclude that the unusual order was constitutionally infirm. The court denied relief with respect to double jeopardy. Winburn failed to exhaust his state-court remedies by a motion to dismiss. View "Winburn v. Nagy" on Justia Law

Dowl pleaded guilty to presenting false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 286. He received a sentence of 30 months of imprisonment plus 24 months of supervised release. On supervised release, Dowl was charged with four new state crimes; failing to inform his probation officer that he had police contact; communicating with his co-defendant despite instructions to the contrary; failing to make payments on his restitution, fine, or special assessment; and failing to get a job. At a hearing, the court reviewed the evidence and allowed Dowl to tell his side of the story. The court deferred judgment on three of the four new state criminal law violations and dismissed the fourth and found Dowl gainfully employed. Dowl had failed to notify his probation officer about police contact, impermissibly communicated with his co-defendant, and did not pay his fines. After considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court returned Dowl to prison for 11 months, giving Dowl and his attorney the opportunity to raise any objections. Dowl had none.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dowl’s argument that the court committed reversible error by not directly addressing him to solicit an allocution. The court employed the “plain error” standard because Dowl did not raise any objection during his revocation hearing. View "United States v. Dowl" on Justia Law

In 2018, Fowler pled guilty to possession of child pornography and violations of the conditions of his supervised release from a previous conviction for the same. In addition to possessing child pornography, Fowler had failed drug testing, had threatened his parole officer, and had tried to harass his girlfriend to recant her testimony. The district court ordered Fowler to pay a $5,000 special assessment for possession of child pornography under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014. The court also varied upward and sentenced Fowler to the maximum statutory penalty for violating the conditions of his supervised release, imposing a 120-month sentence for possessing child pornography and a consecutive 36-month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release.The Sixth Circuit vacated as to the assessment and remanded for a determination of indigency. The district court committed plain error by failing to address Fowler’s ability to pay; the parties did not contemplate the $5,000 special assessment as a part of the waiver provision in the plea agreement. The court affirmed the sentence. The district court did not consider an impermissible factor (whether Fowler had actually touched a child) and Fowler had no other challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence, View "United States v. Fowler" on Justia Law

Sumlin was convicted of the distribution of drugs that caused the 2015 death of Carrie Dobbins, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), which carries enhanced penalty provisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions and his sentence to life in prison. The district court properly denied Sumlin’s suppression motion, given that the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between his drug trafficking activity and residence that was searched. The court properly admitted testimony by the victim’s sister, Kelly, who was Sumlin’s former girlfriend and had purchased drugs from him. Kelly’s testimony about Sumlin's drug-trafficking and that Sumlin was with Carrie on the day of her overdose was intrinsic proof that was relevant for providing background information and contextualizing the government’s case against Sumlin. Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Sumlin distributed the drugs that caused Carrie’s death. View "United States v. Sumlin" on Justia Law

The Spriggs’ bank account was established to receive social security checks. The Spriggs’ great-grandson, Vance, filled out an application in Mr. Spriggs’s name for a debit card to draw on the checking account. Mr. Spriggs had never used a debit card. The Spriggses did not authorize Vance to do so. Bank cameras photographed Vance using the card to withdraw cash. Vance also used the card for personal expenses. At another bank, Vance used Mr. Spriggs’s social security number to establish an account and obtain a $15,000 cash advance. Vance made other, unsuccessful loan applications. Upon being notified by the banks about suspicious activities involving his identity, Mr. Spriggs filed a police report. The police arrested Vance. While searching Vance’s car, the police located a large stash of personal and financial documents belonging to the Spriggses, including bank statements, tax return forms, property-tax bills, and a car title.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Vance’s convictions for access-device fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(5), and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), and his 65-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact after the bench trial, improperly denied a motion for judgment of acquittal, and failed to correctly calculate the loss amount connected to Vance’s charges under Sentencing Guidelines 2B1.1. View "United States v. Vance" on Justia Law

A masked gunman attempted to rob a Columbus Ohio restaurant. Employees escaped and flagged down a police officer. A man, matching the robber's description, discarded distinctive clothing items as he ran away. A pocket contained a handgun matching that used in the robbery. Police apprehended Smith nearby. DNA material matching Smith was found on the discarded items. Smith retained attorney Armengau. Detectives connected Smith to earlier restaurant robberies with “a strikingly consistent method of operation.” They requested cell phone records for a phone number that Smith had given to his probation officer; Smith’s phone had been used near and at the approximate time of most of the robberies.Smith was charged with 18 robberies. Smith’s attorney, Armengau, was indicted for sex crimes. The judge handling Smith’s case recused himself. At Smith’s request, Armengau continued to represent Smith; Armengau’s criminal charges were unknown to the jury. Smith received three continuances. During trial, the prosecutors offered a plea deal for 27 years’ imprisonment. Armengau conceded to the court that he did not share the offer because prior discussions with Smith led Armengau to believe that a 27-year sentence would not be accepted. Smith was present and did not object. The prosecutors stated that the offer would remain open. Smith never asked to discuss a plea. The jury convicted Smith for 12 robberies. With prior-offender gun charges, the judge sentenced Smith to 84 years’ imprisonment.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief, rejecting ineffective assistance and Confrontation Clause claims, based on the Armengau’s stipulation to limit the number of trial witnesses, his failure to communicate the plea offer, and the “conflict” posed by his own criminal charges. View "Smith v. Cook" on Justia Law

In a 2006 Ypsilanti drive-by shooting, two teenagers, inside a mobile home, were killed. Four people, including Tackett, were charged. Tacket was found guilty on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After unsuccessful state-court proceedings, Tackett filed a federal habeas corpus petition.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even assuming that Tackett’s gun misfired, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Tackett was guilty of first-degree murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The facts supported an inference of an intent to kill and there was more than enough time for the shooters to take a “second look.” There was evidence that premeditation and deliberation took place during that time. Tackett provided assistance to the other shooters, knowing all the facts known to the shooters. The court rejected Tackett’s argument that he could have been convicted as a principal, or as an aider and abettor and that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a special instruction that they had to unanimously agree as to which of these theories was the basis for their verdict. There was no constitutional problem in the fact that two other defendants were convicted of second-degree murder while Tackett was convicted of first-degree murder. The court also rejected ineffective assistance claims. View "Tackett v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law

In 2007, Allen pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. The court determined that Allen was a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment. In 2019, Allen moved to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194, citing his age and participation in numerous prison classes and programs. The government argued that his sentencing guidelines range remained unchanged even though the statutory mandatory minimum penalty had been lowered. The district court denied Allen’s request for a reduced prison sentence, reasoning that the Act precluded it from considering Allen’s post-sentencing conduct.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The First Step Act provision regarding retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act does not prohibit courts from considering a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct when deciding whether to reduce his sentence. Courts may consider all relevant factors when determining whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under section 404, which does not require courts to ignore all developments that occurred after the defendant committed the covered offense. Congress contemplated that district courts may look to 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s familiar framework when deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Grand Rapids police received tips from an organization that receives anonymous information from the public, describing vehicles May-Shaw was using to transport drugs and a specific bag where he kept drugs, money, and a gun. May-Shaw had one felony firearm conviction and two felony drug convictions. The Department began investigating and, for 23 days, watched a parking lot near his apartment building and a covered carport next to that building, where May-Shaw parked his BMW, one of his several vehicles. The surveillance used a camera affixed to a telephone pole on a public street and cameras in a surveillance van parked in the parking lot. After witnessing May-Shaw engage in several suspected drug deals, the police used a drug-detecting dog to sniff the BMW. The dog indicated the presence of narcotics. Officers then obtained a search warrant for May-Shaw’s apartment and all of his vehicles. They found evidence of drug distribution, including cash, wrappers, and cocaine.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his to suppress the evidence from his apartment and vehicles. May-Shaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport such that police surveillance constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nor was the carport within the curtilage of his apartment such that the dog sniff was unconstitutional. View "United States v. May-Shaw" on Justia Law

Reiner’s convictions arose from a 2011 Macomb County home invasion. Eisenhardt, age 69, was stabbed in the neck; jewelry was taken from her house, including a ring from Eisenhardt’s finger. Eisenhardt survived but suffered declining health after the stabbing and died months later. Police in New York apprehended Reiner days after the incident, on unrelated suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle. At his Michigan murder trial, the court admitted the statements to the police, in which a pawnbroker identified Reiner as having pawned Eisenhardt’s ring. The pawnbroker died before trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Reiner’s conviction, finding the Sixth Amendment error harmless.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The evidence presented at trial “paints the picture of a circumstantial case lacking physical evidence or eyewitness testimony placing Reiner at the crime scene.” The statements that caused the Sixth Amendment violation were the linchpin of the government’s case, connecting Reiner to the fruits of the crime in a way no other evidence could. Without those statements, the prosecution’s case would have been significantly weaker, such that “grave doubt” exists as to whether their admission had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "Reiner v. Woods" on Justia Law