Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Leavy and friends broke into the home of 71-year-old Terry and waited for Terry to return from visiting his wife at a nursing home. The young men ambushed him, binding his hands and feet with duct tape and weighted him down in a bathtub they had filled with water and kerosene. Terry died. Leavy and his friends took $20 and some household items. A Tennessee jury convicted Leavy of first-degree murder and other crimes. He was sentenced to life in prison. Leavy's habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, was denied in 2006. Leavy moved for relief from that judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) in 2017.The district court denied the motion and entered a formal judgment on September 12, 2018. The Sixth Circuit dismissed his appeal, filed on October 9, as untimely. Litigants generally have 30 days from the entry of a final judgment or final order to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(a). Leavy claimed that he mailed a timely notice of appeal in September but no record of this filing appears on the district court’s docket and Leavy’s application for a certificate of appealability makes no mention of it. He did not submit a copy of the purported document with his show-cause response and gave only a vague description of mailing the document, saying only that he handed it to prison officials, not that he paid for postage. View "Leavy v. Hutchison" on Justia Law

Howse claims Officers Hodous and Middaugh stopped in front of his home in an unmarked vehicle. Middaugh asked Howse if he lived there, got out of the vehicle, and told Howse to put his hands behind his back. Howse disobeyed and began screaming. Howse claims Middaugh grabbed Howse and threw him down. The officers tried to handcuff Howse, who resisted, “stiffening up” his body.The officers claim they saw Howse lingering suspiciously at a house that appeared to be boarded up. Middaugh suspected that Howse might be engaged in criminal activity and, when Middaugh reached the porch, Howse clenched his fists and assumed a fighting stance. The officers allege that Howse struck Hodous in the chest and tried to rip off Middaugh’s flashlight and handcuff case, so Middaugh used a leg sweep to take Howse down to arrest him.Middaugh charged Howse with assaulting a police officer. The stated eventually dismissed the charges. Howse sued the officers and the city, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. It is not clearly established that officers cannot tackle a non-compliant suspect and use additional force if he resists arrest, so the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Howse admitted that he tried to make it difficult for the officers to arrest him, which provided probable cause. View "Howse v. Hodous" on Justia Law

Detective Yasenchack saw Williams enter and then exit Gilbert's Jeep Cherokee within a few seconds at an intersection known for drug activity, shoving a plastic bag into his shorts as he exited. Yasenchack stopped Williams and recovered half a pound of cocaine. Williams pleaded guilty to state drug-trafficking charges. Two weeks later, Yasenchack saw Gilbert driving the Jeep and conducted a traffic stop. He smelled marijuana but his search only turned up a large amount of cash. Yasenchack later learned that Gilbert had convictions for drug possession, trafficking, and possessing a weapon while under disability. Yasenchack began surveilling Gilbert and searching the trash outside Gilbert’s residence. He found scale weights, a vacuum-sealed bag and zip-lock bags. Gilbert moved. Yasenchack searched the trash at Gilbert’s new residence but found nothing suggestive of trafficking. Yasenchack again searched Gilbert’s trash and discovered a vacuum-sealed bag containing “crumbs” later confirmed to be marijuana.An Ohio judge authorized a warrant for Gilbert’s home, which officers executed the following day. Officers discovered four kilograms of heroin (some laced with fentanyl), a handgun, $119,000 in cash, and drug-trafficking tools. After a Franks hearing and denial of his motion to suppress, Gilbert pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession with intent to distribute a mixed drug and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A reasonably well-trained officer in these circumstances would not know to disregard a judicial determination that probable cause existed, so the good-faith exception applies. View "United States v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

Holland, a songwriter, sold his song-rights to music companies, in exchange for royalty payments. Holland failed fully to report his income. In 1986-1990, the IRS levied Holland’s royalty assets and recovered $1.5 million. In 1997, the IRS informed him that it intended again to levy those assets. Holland converted his interest in future royalty payments into a lump sum and created a partnership wholly owned by him, to which he transferred title to the royalty assets ($23.3 million). The partnership borrowed $15 million, for which the royalty assets served as collateral. Bankers Trust paid $8.4 million directly to Holland, $5 million in fees, and $1.7 million for Holland’s debts, including his taxes. The IRS did not assess any additional amounts against Holland until 2003. In 2005, the partnership refinanced the 1998 deal, using Royal Bank. In 2012, the IRS concluded that the partnership held the royalty assets as Holland’s alter ego or fraudulent transferee and recorded a $20 million lien against the partnership.In an enforcement suit, the partnership sold the royalty assets. The proceeds ($21 million) went into an interpleader fund, to be distributed to the partnership’s creditors in order of priority. The government’s lien ($20 million), if valid against the partnership, would take priority over Royal Bank’s security interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment for Royal Bank. Transactions to monetize future revenue, using a partnership or corporate form, are common and facially legitimate. Holland received adequate consideration in 1998. The IRS’s delay in making additional assessments rather than the 1998 transfer caused the government’s collection difficulties. View "United States v. Holland" on Justia Law

Hamm, addicted to opioids, drove from Mt. Sterling, Kentucky to Cincinnati daily, to buy fentanyl. In Mt. Sterling, he and his wife used some of the drugs and gave the rest to their roommate, Myers, a drug dealer. Myers diluted, divided, and sold her share. Hamm found a new Cincinnati supplier: Shields. A few hours after Hamm returned from visiting Shields and giving Myers her share, Myers sold three packets of opioids. The customer died that night from an overdose. Police traced the drugs to Myers and arrested her and Hamm. After her arrest, Myers smuggled her remaining drugs into the jail and gave them to her cellmates, who lost consciousness but survived. Myers died by suicide a week later.A jury convicted Hamm and Shields of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and two counts of distributing carfentanil, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. On the latter two counts, the jury applied a statutory sentencing enhancement for distribution resulting in death or serious bodily injury, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), triggering a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years for Hamm and a mandatory life sentence for Shields (who had a prior felony drug conviction). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting challenges to a remark in the prosecutor’s closing argument and to the sufficiency of the evidence. The court vacated the sentences. The jury instructions on section 841(b)(1)(C)’s sentencing enhancement misstated the law. View "United States v. Hamm" on Justia Law

Paulus, a cardiologist at KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. Audits indicated that in multiple cases Paulus reported a higher degree of blockage in his patients’ arteries than their angiograms reflected, inserted a stent, and billed insurers. Before Paulus was indicted, the government informed him that its consultants had reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 were unnecessary and that KDMC’s consultants had reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures and found 75 angiographic films with minimal blockage. A jury convicted Paulus of healthcare fraud and making false statements relating to healthcare.Before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” indicating that KDMC's independent experts had reviewed 1,049 of Paulus’s cases and flagged 75 procedures as unnecessary. KDMC offered to refund Medicare for those procedures. Paulus knew that KDMC had identified 75 of his procedures as problematic but did not know that KDMC had reviewed 974 other procedures that it apparently found non-problematic. The government had planned to use the Letter at trial but KDMC objected. After an ex parte hearing, the district court held that the information was inadmissible and ordered that the parties not disclose any more information about the KDMC Review. The district court denied Paulus’s motion for a new trial, sentenced Paulus to five years’ imprisonment, and ordered him to pay $1,156,102.23 in restitution.The Sixth Circuit vacated. KDMC's attorney-client privilege claims did not justify and ex parte hearings and the evidence withheld from Paulus violated his Fifth Amendment rights under “Brady.” The Letter had “potential exculpatory value” and Paulus lacked a readily available means to get the missing details. Paulus was prejudiced and “it doesn’t matter how blameless” the prosecution was. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

Ashford was driving while intoxicated, speeding at over 100 miles per hour and changing lanes without a turn signal. An officer followed him, using his lights to indicate that Ashford should pull over. Ashford did not comply. Backup cruisers arrived and forced him to stop. Ashford complied with instructions to show his hands but ignored instructions to turn his engine off. Officer Raby and his police dog, Ruger, arrived. Raby reached through the window, unlocked Ashford's door, and pulled it open. The officers told Ashford to step out of the vehicle. He did not comply. Ashford’s SUV was in drive and his foot on the brake was the only thing stopping it from lurching forward into a police cruiser. Ashford claims he was afraid to retract a hand into the passenger compartment to turn the key. Ashford tried to explain this to the officers. Officers warned him that Raby would use the dog. Raby commanded Ruger to attack. Raby stepped in, grabbing Ashford’s arm and lowering it for Ruger to bite. Raby and Ruger pulled Ashford out of the car. At a hospital, Ashford was treated for puncture wounds and superficial injuries to his forearm. Ashford sued Raby under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Raby based on qualified immunity. Existing law did not clearly establish that the officer’s perspective was unreasonable, View "Ashford v. Raby" on Justia Law

In 2007, Alexander pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base; the offense carried a statutory penalty range of 10 years to life imprisonment. The PSR attributed to Alexander 258.58 grams of cocaine base and Alexander was designated a career offender. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a 360-month sentence. In 2019, Alexander filed a pro se motion for a reduced sentence, citing section 404 of the First Step Act, which made retroactive certain sections of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Under the Fair Sentencing Act, an offense involving 50 grams of cocaine base carries a statutory maximum of 40 years of imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) and his guidelines range became 262-327 months. Alexander asserted that “[a] sentence of 262 months would be reasonable.”The district court reduced his sentence to 262 months. Alexander appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to conduct a de novo resentencing hearing that would permit him to argue in support of a sentence outside the reduced guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The First Step Act’s limited, discretionary authorization to impose a reduced sentence is inconsistent with a plenary resentencing. Alexander did not raise his arguments that he should have received a one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and concerning his post-offense rehabilitation and serious medical condition in his motion for a sentence reduction. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Franklin was convicted of arson (18 U.S.C. 844(i)), using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c), possessing an unregistered firearm or destructive device; and possessing firearms while unlawfully using a controlled substance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Franklin filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Franklin later sought authorization to file a second section 2255 motion, in which he would argue that his section 924(c) conviction should be vacated because his arson conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition. Davis established a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Lower courts may determine the retroactivity of new rules when “[m]ultiple cases . . . necessarily dictate" retroactivity. The Supreme Court’s 2016 “Welch” decision explained that decisions announce a substantive rule and are retroactive when they “alter[] the range of conduct . . . that the law punishes.” In Davis, the Court narrowed section 924(c)(3), concluding that its second clause was unconstitutional. Arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) does not qualify as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against a building, including one owned by the arsonist, Franklin’s section 924 conviction must have been based on section 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated. View "In re: Franklin" on Justia Law

Davis, an African American inmate, claims that officer Gallagher called him “Bubba” and “boy.” Davis stated he might file a grievance over Gallagher’s perceived racism. Later that day, Davis encountered Gallagher. According to Davis, Gallagher “searched” Davis and planted heroin in Davis’s pocket and wrote an incident report which falsely alleged that Davis possessed heroin. Davis was placed in administrative segregation and was tested for drug use. The test came back negative. Gallagher’s version is that he saw Davis put something in his pocket, “shook [Davis] down,” and discovered a rock-like substance, which proved to be heroin. Davis claims that Inspector Miller told him that he would be released from segregation only if he revealed who had supplied him with drugs and threatened to make Davis “suffer.” A jury found Davis not guilty of felony heroin possession by a prisoner.Davis filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for being placed in solitary confinement; First Amendment retaliation for threatening to file a grievance; malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment); and substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court ultimately rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to Gallagher on Davis’s malicious prosecution claim. When there is evidence to support each version of the parties’ dueling allegations, summary judgment is not appropriate—even when the evidence includes self-serving statements from the parties. View "Davis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law