Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

J.H., a 14-year-old pretrial detainee, was placed in segregated housing in Williamson County’s juvenile detention facility after other juveniles alleged that he threatened to assault them. J.H. suffers from Pediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorder Associated with Streptococcal Infections (PANDAS), which often manifests in psychiatric symptoms. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, J.H. alleged that his placement in segregated housing for a month in 2013 amounted to unconstitutional punishment; that a detention monitor, Cruz, sexually assaulted him during this period, as a result of Williamson County’s failure to train Cruz; and that during that period, officials failed to provide adequate medical care.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The official is entitled to qualified immunity. While the punishment imposed on J.H. was excessive in relation to the verbal threats he made, the right at issue was not established with sufficient specificity as to hold it clearly established as of 2013. J.H. met with and received medication from multiple medical professionals, none of whom requested that the facility make any accommodations for J.H.’s medical needs. J.H. has not shown a “direct causal connection” between the failure to train Cruz and his alleged assault; it is far from clear that any lack of training was the “moving force” behind Cruz’s decision to sexually assault a child. View "J.H. v. Williamson County" on Justia Law

Four men from Miami drove to Louisville to set up chiropractic clinics. Lezcano, the mastermind, decided to file false claims with the patients’ insurers and get paid for treatments that never happened. The others, Chavez, Betancourt, and Diaz joined in. The plan worked due to aggressive marketing. The conspirators recruited and paid patients both to come to the clinics and to recruit others. Many of the patients worked at the Jeffboat shipyard. Jeffboat (through its claim administrator, United Healthcare) paid the clinics more than $1 million for fake injections of a muscle relaxant. The government discovered the scheme and brought criminal charges. Chavez went to trial, claiming he had no idea that Lezcano was cooking the books. Convicted of healthcare fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit money laundering for purposes of concealment. Chavez was sentenced to 74 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and a related challenge to the prosecutor’s closing argument; two hearsay arguments; three objections to the jury instructions; and a sentencing argument. View "United States v. Chavez" on Justia Law

In 1974, a clerk was killed at a store near Toledo. According to Bailey, he entered the store, robbed the cash register at gunpoint, then shot the clerk in the neck and head. The Ohio Parole Board described the crime differently: Bailey entered the store, robbed Cannon, forced him to the ground, “told him . . . exactly what he was planning on doing,” placed the gun to the back of his head and shot him “execution-style” because “he was in need of money and ... the only way he was going to be successful was to kill all witnesses.” In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio prisoners had a right to a factually accurate parole record. Bailey challenged the Board’s version of events. Bailey ordered a transcript to show that trial testimony contradicted the Board's description and moved to correct his parole record. The Board and state courts denied his request. Bailey sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging due process violations by the Board’s refusal to investigate and correct inaccuracies in its description of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Bailey is in custody but does not purport to be in custody in violation of federal law. Bailey cannot argue that, but for the allegedly inaccurate description, the Board would grant him parole. View "Bailey v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

Faber pled guilty to receiving pornographic images of minors and was sentenced to prison. Faber transitioned to supervised release, with conditions barring him from possessing sexually explicit images and from possessing or using digital devices. Faber eventually moved into an apartment with Gieszer. Probation officers visited their apartment and discovered that Faber had electronic devices without permission, containing sexually explicit material. Gieszer denied that either he or Faber had any digital devices and tried to hide the devices. The district court sentenced Faber to another prison term followed by supervised release, with a condition that Faber not have contact with Gieszer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, Faber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his probation officer, alleging violation of his religious freedom by separating him from Gieszer (Faber’s spouse in their Wicca religion). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Faber unsuccessfully filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and a second section 1983 suit. The district court again revoked Faber’s supervised release because he communicated with Gieszer by email and sentenced him to imprisonment with supervised release, continuing the “no contact” condition. Faber did not appeal but later moved to eliminate the no-contact order under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2), citing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Sixth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Section 3583(e)(2) allows a court to modify or rescind a condition of supervised release only within 14 days. View "United States v. Faber" on Justia Law

Hendricks was convicted conspiracy to provide and attempt to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), in the form of personnel and services to ISIS. At trial, four witnesses had testified that Hendricks approached them about forming a group for the purpose of waging jihad in the U.S. Hendricks shared that he had purchased land and weapons for his group, occasionally asking whether they owned guns or suggesting that they should be trained to fight or operate weapons. Hendricks also exhorted each to recruit other like-minded individuals. The witnesses perceived Hendricks to be “build[ing] . . . an extension of [ISIS] in America.” Hendricks had similar interactions with an undercover FBI agent. An expert on terrorism testified that Hendricks’s interactions were consistent with the ISIS strategy at the time. Hendricks did not present any witnesses or evidence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted or conspired to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization and that the district court abused its discretion by partially closing the courtroom during testimony from an undercover FBI agent. View "United States v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

Robinson was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Under Michigan’s complex sentencing scheme, the judge sentenced Robinson as a fourth habitual offender to “concurrent terms of 47-1/2 to 120 years’ imprisonment for the assault and felon-in-possession convictions, to be served consecutive to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction.” The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court denied review. Robinson then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, which was denied. On appeal, Robinson argued that Supreme Court and state decisions postdating his sentencing have established that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Robinson’s sentencing claim undoubtedly has merit; the Supreme Court’s Alleyne decision clearly established the unconstitutionality of Michigan’s sentencing regime. However, Robinson did not “fairly present” his sentencing claim to the Michigan Supreme Court and failed to exhaust that claim in state court. On remand, the district court should decide whether to dismiss Robinson’s sentencing claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust or to stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while Robinson returns to state court to exhaust that claim. Stay and abeyance is appropriate only “when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court” and when the claims are not “plainly meritless.” View "Robinson v. Horton" on Justia Law

Cavazos and Serrano transported cocaine from Texas to Kentucky at the request of undercover FBI officers. Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The government gave notice that 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) subjected them to enhanced statutory punishments because of prior felony drug convictions. Cavazos unsuccessfully objected to basing the enhancement on his 2004 federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Serrano orally affirmed his prior conviction. The court calculated Cavazos’s sentencing range as 84-105 months. The statutory minimum enhanced the Guidelines recommendation to 120 months; the court imposed that sentence. The court found that Serrano’s prior federal conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver cocaine and prior Texas conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver qualified as predicate offenses under USSG 4B1.2; calculated Serrano’s guidelines range to be 262-327 months; and sentenced Serrano to 262 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Cavazos’s sentence. The court properly applied the enhancement; 21 U.S.C. 851(e) prevents any challenge to a prior conviction used to enhance the statutory penalty under section 841(b)(1)(B) when five years have elapsed between the prior conviction and “the information alleging such prior conviction.” The court vacated Serrano’s sentence. The Texas law under which Serrano was previously convicted included attempted delivery of controlled substances and was too broad to categorically qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under section 4B1.2. View "United States v. Serrano" on Justia Law

Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for his role in a drive-by shooting outside a Detroit nightclub. The trial was marked by outbursts, threats toward witnesses, and offensive language by witnesses, spectators, and counsel. After a particularly contentious incident involving a witness and defense counsel, the court took protective action, temporarily closing the courtroom to spectators before reopening it a few days later. On direct appeal, and in this habeas proceeding, Williams argued that the temporary closure violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Williams’s trial counsel failed to object to the closure, so Williams defaulted his public trial claim in the state proceeding. He has not overcome that failure by showing that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective, which might otherwise constitute cause and prejudice excusing the default. Regardless of whether closing the courtroom was an error, Williams cannot establish that his defense was prejudiced by the closure. The vast majority of his trial took place in an open setting, transcripts were made available from the limited sessions that took place behind closed doors, and the closure had no discernable effect on the judge, counsel, or jury. Nor did the temporary closure “lead to basic unfairness.” View "Williams v. Burt" on Justia Law

Ramamoorthy, an Indian citizen living in the U.S., took a redeye flight, sitting between his wife and Laura. Laura claims she suddenly awoke to find her pants unzipped and Ramamoorthy shoving his fingers into her vagina. She alerted the flight attendants. Airport police met Ramamoorthy in the jetway, asking “What’s going on?” Ramamoorthy began talking about Laura, claiming that she fell asleep on him and that he did not know where he had put his hands. Ramamoorthy made a written statement that Laura had slept on him, that he had been in a “deep sleep,” and that he did not remember where he had put his hands. The officers arrested Ramamoorthy. Before asking Ramamoorthy any questions, FBI agents gave him a written Miranda waiver form. Ramamoorthy signed it after reading his rights aloud and discussing them for several minutes. Ramamoorthy admitted that he had tried to put his fingers inside Laura’s pants.An indictment accused Ramamoorthy of both attempted and completed sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2242(2), which have the same punishment. Ramamoorthy moved to suppress his statements to the FBI, claiming that he did not speak English fluently. He did not seek to suppress his statements to the airport police. The court denied the motion, finding Ramamoorthy “articulate." A jury instruction explained that completed sexual abuse and attempted sexual abuse were two ways of committing sexual abuse, “all twelve of you must agree that at least one of these has been proved; however, all of you need not agree that the same one has been proved.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed Ramamoorthy's conviction and 108-month sentence, rejecting claims that his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because his indictment was duplicitous and that the statements he made to airport police and to the FBI should have been suppressed. View "United States v. Ramamoorthy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Michigan inmates adhere to a religion called Christian Identity. Plaintiffs believe that their religion requires the observance of seven “Biblical Holy Days,” weekly group worship on the Sabbath, baptism by full-body immersion, and that Caucasians not mix with other races “in marriage and worship” and that people of different races not cohabitate. In other areas of life, plaintiffs apparently have no objection to interacting with people of other races. Plaintiffs contend they cannot engage in group worship because the Department of Corrections does not recognize Christian Identity as a religion. While they are allowed to attend the services of other religions that have been recognized, they do not because of the differences between Christian Identity and other faiths. One inmate believes that not being baptized “affects [his] salvation of [his] eternal soul." The district court rejected a challenged under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (RLUIPA).The Sixth Circuit reversed. The sincerity of the plaintiffs’ beliefs is not at issue. Under RLUIPA’s second step, the plaintiffs have established that the policy substantially burdens their exercise of religion. At step three, the burden shifts to the Department to prove that the imposition of the substantial burden on plaintiffs’ religious exercise was “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and that it used “the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” The district court made no findings on those questions. View "Fox v. Washington" on Justia Law