Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Marshall pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute oxycodone and was sentenced to 118 months of prison plus six years of supervised release. After completing his sentence, Marshall began supervised release. Although required to stay in Kentucky, Marshall moved to Illinois, violating a release condition. The district court briefly revoked Marshall’s release. Marshall moved, with permission, to Michigan. For the next year, Marshall made progress. The probation office recommended an early end to his supervised release. Marshall filed an unopposed motion to end the supervision. The court denied his request, reasoning that Marshall had completed little of the release term and had violated the conditions before. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. There is no statute authorizing the review of a district court’s decision to deny a motion for early termination of supervised release. The court reviewed the challenges available under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a) and concluded that none of the four categories applies. Marshall never appealed his original or his new sentence; the district court did not issue a new sentence or an amended sentence before this appeal. It merely denied Marshall’s request to reduce the supervised release provision in his sentence. View "United States v. Marshall" on Justia Law

In 2001, Woods pled guilty to possessing and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine and to distribute marijuana, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The parties stipulated to Woods’s possession of 125 grams of crack cocaine, .73 grams of powder cocaine, and 660.1 grams of marijuana. Under the then-Guidelines, the PSR recommended a range of 121-151 months of imprisonment and an additional mandatory 60-month consecutive term for the firearm charge. The district court sentenced Woods to 121 months plus the consecutive 60- month sentence. In 2008, in response to Guidelines amendments, the district court reduced Woods’s sentence from 181 months to 120 months. Woods began his supervised release in 2015. While on release, he tested positive for cocaine and marijuana and pled guilty to new felony state charges—trafficking in controlled substances, possessing a handgun, and tampering with physical evidence. The court revoked Woods’s supervised release and imposed a 37-month sentence. Woods moved, under the 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194, to reduce his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Woods’s motion. Although he is currently serving a post-revocation sentence, Woods is eligible for consideration of a reduction but is not entitled to one. The court adequately considered factors warranting denial of a reduction: respecting the law, protecting the public, and adequately deterring similar conduct. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Law enforcement executed a search warrant to gather evidence of the possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography. The subject stated that he received and distributed child pornography through his Kik Messenger account and consented to the officers assuming his online identity. The operation led to a Kik user with an IP address registered Randall Hollon of Corbin, Kentucky. FBI agents executed a search warrant for Hollon’s residence and found pornographic images of prepubescent boys on Hollon’s electronic devices. Hollon was charged with distributing, possession of, and receiving child pornography each in violation of different provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2) and with engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g)--the enterprise consisting of section 2252(a)(2) violations. Hollon pled guilty to engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, admitting that he was an administrator of a group, the purpose of which was the distribution and receipt of child pornography. The government then disclosed that Hollon’s nephew, “J.H.”, had reported that, years earlier, he discovered child pornography on Hollon’s electronic devices and that Hollon engaged in sexual behavior with J.H., then a child. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Hollon’s sentence of 270 months of incarceration, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in applying the covered sex crime enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b). Engaging in a child exploitation enterprise is a “covered sex crime” for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(b) sentencing enhancement. View "United States v. Hollon" on Justia Law

At 11:53, Tennessee Highway Troopers stopped Hernandez for speeding and ran a warrant-check Hernandez and Betancourt, the front seat passenger and the car's owner. The check came back negative at 11:59. Troopers were denied consent to search the car. At 12:13, Troopers searched the names of all four occupants of the car through a more comprehensive database. A K-9 unit arrived at 12:17. The dog sniffed the outside of the car, alerting to the odor of drugs. The dog did not alert again when allowed into the car. After checking with their supervisor, Troopers manually searched the car and found re-encoded gift cards and suspected amphetamines. The car's occupants were arrested and held for months before all charges were dropped. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted the Troopers qualified immunity on the car search based on caselaw existing at that time. A jury found that the car stop was not impermissibly prolonged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs have not met the high burden of showing that the verdict was unreasonable as a matter of law. A reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the dog's first search was not sufficiently thorough, it did not dissipate the probable cause justifying a second search. At the time, a reasonable officer would not have been on notice that the dog’s failure to alert again to the car's interior was the kind of new information that dissipated the probable cause provided by its initial alert. View "Hernandez v. Boles" on Justia Law

Tolliver was charged with participating in a marijuana distribution ring that funneled money and drugs between a California supplier and a large-scale Memphis dealer. A jury acquitted him on the marijuana conspiracy but convicted Toliver of money laundering conspiracy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). A defendant can only complain about a speedy trial violation after the violation has occurred; Tolliver’s objection was premature. A rational trier of fact could have found Tolliver guilty. Payment for drugs can constitute promotional money laundering. The prosecution presented the right type of evidence to prove promotional money laundering and showed that Tolliver made financial transactions with money from illegal marijuana sales. There was compelling circumstantial evidence showing he knew what he was doing. In ordering forfeiture of the money laundered and of property traceable to the crime, 21 U.S.C. 853(a), the district court properly included some of Tolliver’s gambling winnings. Tolliver gambled hundreds of thousands of dollars but apparently had no source of income besides the cuts he got from money-laundering. Tolliver filed no tax return for two years. He was a long-time gambler, but the amount of money he gambled skyrocketed once he joined the conspiracy. View "United States v. Tolliver" on Justia Law

Richardson participated in a series of Detroit-area armed robberies in 2010. In 2013, Richardson was convicted of five counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, five counts of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and of being a felon in possession of a firearm, section 922(g). The district court sentenced Richardson to 1,494 months in prison. Richardson twice successfully persuaded the Supreme Court to vacate Sixth Circuit judgments affirming his conviction and sentence. The Court remanded for consideration of whether an intervening the Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding that the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) residual clause was invalid or the First Step Act of 2018 affected his section 924(c) conviction. The Sixth Circuit again affirmed Richardson’s conviction. Johnson had no effect on Richardson’s conviction for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery; that conviction satisfies ACCA’s elements clause, so the residual clause is irrelevant. The court also affirmed his sentence. Richardson cannot benefit from the First Step Act because the district court resentenced him more than one year before the Act became law. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Sands pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Sands claimed to have found the gun and denied defacing the serial number. The district court applied a four-level sentence enhancement for possessing a firearm with an “altered or obliterated serial number” pursuant to USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) because the firearm’s serial number was, although readable, defaced with scratches in three separate locations. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence, agreeing with several other circuits “that a firearm’s serial number is ‘altered or obliterated’ when it is materially changed in a way that makes accurate information less accessible.” A serial number that has been defaced but is still visible to the naked eye is not “altered or obliterated” under section 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). View "United States v. Sands" on Justia Law

FBI agents seized a computer server that hosted a child-pornography website and observed that one user, accessed 107 “threads” in five days. The FBI traced the IP address to Demma’s residence, executed a search warrant and seized electronic devices, finding more than 3,600 images and 230 videos; many depicted adult men raping prepubescent girls. Demma pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B); (b)(2). The probation officer computed a Guidelines range of 78-97 months. Demma's sentencing memorandum described Demma’s lack of criminal history and that Demma served honorably in the Army for over five years and was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD. One forensic psychologist asserted that Demma’s use of child pornography “is directly resultant from experiencing the ravages of war as this impacts children.” The court sentenced Demma to one day, with 10 years of supervised release and payment of $45,000 in restitution. The court’s cited Demma’s PTSD diagnosis, his decision to voluntarily seek treatment after his arrest, his low risk of reoffending, the potentially detrimental effect of imprisonment on Demma’s treatment, and Demma’s low risk for committing a “contact offense.”The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. Any policy disagreement with the Guidelines based on the similarity of the enhancements does not justify the extent of this downward variance. In focusing on the role of Demma’s military service, the district court cast Demma as the victim. The court also unreasonably concluded that Demma’s sophisticated and extensive access to child pornography somehow made him less culpable than “someone who simply allowed his curiosity to get the better of him.” View "United States v. Demma" on Justia Law

The FBI became aware of the “Playpen” child pornography website on the dark web, gained control of the website and ran it for 13 days, tracking the registered users. The “Revenger” account accessed 205 postings, labeled: “11 YO boys fucking,” “girls changing on beach,” and “preteen videos girls hardcore.” With a warrant, the FBI traced the Revenger account to Libbey-Tipton’s IP address and computers’ MAC addresses at his Cleveland residence. A warranted search was executed. All of the seized devices showed indicia of child pornography in “previews” and were from Libbey-Tipton’s bedroom, the basement, and the garage. The previews did not find any evidence of child pornography on devices that belonged to the other residents--his mother, his brother, his girlfriend, and his brother’s girlfriend. The MAC addresses of the seized devices corresponded to images viewed by the Revenger account.Libbey-Tipton was indicted for accessing and possessing child pornography. The government was allowed to introduce evidence of Libbey-Tipton’s prior conviction of child molestation as evidence of his propensity to access and possess child pornography. Convicted, Libbey-Tipton was sentenced to 235 months in prison, 27 months below the advisory Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Libbey-Tipton’s challenges to the admissibility of his prior conviction, the reasonableness of his sentence, and the effectiveness of trial counsel. The court also upheld the denial of his motion to suppress the search warrant that led to his identification as a Playpen user. View "United States v. Libbey-Tipton" on Justia Law

A man left a voicemail at former attorney general Holder's law firm, (Covington): Former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, I’m going to kill you. ... to murder you. My name is Atrel Howard. We had spoken in February of 2010. I was a United States unconstitutional convicted ... prisoner by the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County ... through the second part of the clause of the double jeopardy law ... we had spoken. My name is Atrel Howard of Cleveland, Ohio. If you get this message you need to realize that I’m under unconstitutional law. ... I was sentenced to 50 months ... intentional assault of a federal agent or employee on the FBI agency premises.Howard was charged with the knowing and willful transmission in interstate commerce of a communication containing a threat to injure another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). Covington’s server identified the caller as Atrel Howard, from a Cleveland, Ohio area code. An FBI agent and a probation officer were familiar with Howard’s voice. The telephone number belonged to Howard’s father. The jury instructions were jointly proposed by the parties. Convicted, Howard was sentenced to 30 months for his section 875(c) offense and his supervised release violation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments of insufficient evidence; that omitting the essential mens rea element violated Howard’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and deprived the court of jurisdiction; and that the court erred in instructing the jury as to what type of communication would constitute a “true threat.” View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law