Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At 2:30 a.m., Bey and two friends went out to purchase space heaters. Bey had purchased his older minivan days earlier, so it had a temporary registration tag but no license plate. The three went to a Livonia store but came away empty-handed. They drove to a Canton Walmart, where they purchased space heaters. Undercover Livonia police Sergeant McKinley noticed the minivan. Livonia had recently experienced several retail break-ins. McKinley followed the minivan on “a hunch” that criminals often use stolen, older vehicles for retail crimes. The officers noted that the minivan’s passengers were black. McKinley observed the paper temporary registration taped to the window; he later testified that officers ran the registration through the Michigan state database but found no matching records. Another officer recalled that McKinley said over the radio that the problem was that “it was unreadable.” On the freeway, the officers thought the minivan executed an evasive driving tactic. An officer followed the men into the Walmart and watched them pay for their merchandise. At Livonia’s request, the Canton Police Department dispatched uniformed officers, who surrounded Bey’s van and ordered him out of the vehicle. Bey was carrying a concealed weapon; he properly stated that he was armed and produced a concealed weapon license. That license had expired; Bey was arrested him. The state court found the stop unconstitutional; the case was dismissed with prejudice. Bey then sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit: dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, McKinley’s appeal of the denial of qualified immunity as to Bey’s equal protection claim; affirmed the denial of as to Bey’s Fourth Amendment claim; and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to the other officers. View "Bey v. Falk" on Justia Law

The Playpen website, a message board for advertising and distributing child pornography, is within the “dark-web,” protected by the “Tor hidden service network,” rendering the website relatively inaccessible. A foreign law enforcement agency alerted FBI agents of its suspicions that a U.S.-based IP address was used to house Playpen. Agents identified the server and executed a search warrant, which allowed them to create a duplicate server at a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia. The FBI assumed administrative control of the website, then obtained a search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to employ a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) to unmask anonymous users. The NIT warrant led the District Court of the Southern District of Ohio to issue a search warrant that allowed authorities to search Bateman’s residence and computer where they found over 599 illicit images of children. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress the evidence and for a "Franks" hearing, to question Agent Macfarlane, who submitted the affidavit to obtain the NIT warrant. The search of Bateman’s home was valid under the good-faith exception. Agent Macfarlane’s affidavit provided a detailed and sufficiently specific picture of Playpen and of the NIT program; it accurately described the locations to be searched, which necessarily included locations outside of the Eastern District of Virginia, and accurately described the NIT’s operation as triggered only when an activating computer’s signals entered the Eastern District of Virginia. View "United States v. Bateman" on Justia Law

Giles County contracted with private probation companies to supervise people it convicted of misdemeanors. Probationers sued Giles County, its Sheriff, the probation companies, and some company employees, alleging RICO violations, civil conspiracy, improper debt collection, and constitutional violations. The district court granted a preliminary injunction based on a claim that the county and sheriff violated the probationers' “substantive right against wealth-based detention” by detaining them after arrest until they pay bail because the bail amount is set “without reference to the person’s ability to pay,” outside the person’s presence, and without determining whether the person poses “a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” The injunction permits bail based on evidence of the probationer’s ability to pay, the necessity of detention, and the alternatives to bail. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the probationers should have sued the state judges who determine the bail amounts instead of suing the county and sheriff who enforce them. The plaintiffs can sue the sheriff, regardless of whether he acts for the state or the county while judges have absolute immunity from suits based on their judicial acts, except in matters over which they clearly lack jurisdiction. View "McNeil v. Community Probation Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Mason, a Sheriff’s Department investigator, and uniformed officers were tracking Harrelson, a fugitive, whose vehicle was previously seen outside the home of Wooden and Harris. They approached the home. Mason, who was not in uniform, knocked on the door, while the uniformed officers dispersed. Wooden answered. Mason asked to speak with Harris and to step inside, to stay warm. According to Mason, Wooden responded “Yes.” Mason and an officer entered the home. As Wooden walked down the hallway, the officers saw him pick up a rifle. When they told him to put the weapon down, Wooden did so. Mason knew Wooden was a felon. The officers handcuffed and searched Wooden, finding a holstered loaded revolver. Harris gave the officers permission to search the home. The officers did not find Harrelson but found another rifle. After waiving his Miranda rights, Wooden admitted that he possessed all three firearms and ammunition. Charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), Wooden unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The district court Wooden was classified as an armed career criminal based on Georgia convictions: a 1989 aggravated assault, 10 1997 burglaries, and a 2005 burglary. Wooden argued that neither the aggravated-assault nor burglary offenses qualified as violent felonies and that the 1997 burglaries arose out of a single occasion and were a single ACCA predicate. The court rejected those arguments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, seeing no improper deception or “definite and firm” basis for discrediting the district court’s assessment that Wooden consented to Mason entering his home View "United States v. Wooden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, inmates in Michigan prison facilities, were once juveniles housed with adult inmates, a policy that Michigan has since abandoned. They filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims stemming from alleged sexual abuse by adult inmates, which occurred when the policy was in place. Prior suits were dismissed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The inmates had different experiences in filing grievances under a process enacted pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30302. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The parties disputed which administrative process the Plaintiffs were required to exhaust, MDOC’s regular three-step grievance process or PREA but the Defendants unquestionably treated the Plaintiffs’ complaints as PREA grievances. That grievance process was “unavailable” for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires inmates to exhaust available administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The court characterized the PREA grievance process as: “a classic case of Orwellian doublethink” full of contradictions and machinations that render it “incapable of use.” One inmate adequately alleged retaliation that might excuse following the process. View "John Does 8-10 v. Snyder" on Justia Law

A Tennessee jury convicted Atkins of murdering his stepfather in 2000 when he was 16 years old. A state court imposed a life sentence that renders Atkins eligible for release after at least 51 years’ imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court later held, in “Miller,” that a sentence of “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’” a decision that applies retroactively. Atkins argued that the life sentence he received as a 16-year-old also qualified as a “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment. A state appellate court rejected his claim. The district court denied relief in his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) prohibits a federal habeas court from upending a state criminal judgment unless a state court’s rejection of a constitutional claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Reasonable people can debate a sentencing policy that did not give the 16- year-old Atkins any opportunity for release for 51 years but the state appellate court reasonably distinguished Miller. View "Atkins v. Crowell" on Justia Law

Foster was suspected of conspiring to illegally distribute methamphetamine in southeastern Tennessee. In searching garbage Foster had left on the curb, officers discovered materials indicating methamphetamine use and distribution. With Foster’s consent, agents searched Foster’s residence and discovered methamphetamine, materials used for distributing methamphetamine, and $2,000 in cash. Foster admitted his role in the methamphetamine-trafficking conspiracy. Foster was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), & (b)(1)(C) & 846. Foster represented himself, with standby counsel. A prosecution witness, Agent Freeman, repeated informants’ out-of-court statements several times, largely without objection from Foster. After two particularly egregious exchanges, the court intervened. Freeman admitted during a sidebar that he had no personal knowledge of the events he had described. The prosecution argued that the statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The district court asked the parties to propose a curative jury instruction. Foster moved for a mistrial, arguing that no jury instruction would cure the error. The prosecutor requested that the trial continue but conceded that if the court believed a Confrontation Clause violation had occurred, a jury instruction likely would not cure the harm. The district court granted a mistrial but denied Foster's motion to dismiss the indictment. Foster pled guilty to count one. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly declared a mistrial but, because the prosecution did not intend to cause the mistrial, it rightly concluded that initiating a second trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law

Aguilar-Calvo pleaded guilty to illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(1). He had been previously convicted of felony drug possession, assault, driving under the influence, and illegal reentry. In its sentencing memorandum, the government addressed18 U.S.C. 3553(a)’s sentencing factors, noting that some people are “impatient for action to protect their perceived economic interests, as promised by our duly enacted immigration policies. Aguilar-Calvo’s sentencing memorandum argued that the district court should not consider such “extraneous, inflammatory, and idiosyncratic views.” The government responded that it did not agree that these concerns are “extraneous,” noting that the guidelines recommend a higher sentence for recidivist illegal reentries and for defendants who have a prior felony conviction. The district court sentenced Aguilar-Calvo to 38 months of imprisonment after a lengthy explanation, citing 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Aguilar-Calvo objected to “any consideration of the Government’s arguments about the political debate about illegal immigration.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable. At no point in sentencing Aguilar-Calvo did the district court rely on the government’s inappropriate representations, on unreasonable speculation or on erroneous information. View "United States v. Aguilar-Calvo" on Justia Law

In 2011-2012, Godofsky was a doctor at a “pill mill,” the Central Kentucky Bariatric and Pain Management clinic. The clinic accepted payment by only cash (later by debit card), at $300 for the first visit and $250 per visit thereafter, and did not give change. The clinic had thousands of dollars in cash on hand every day, so the manager was armed with a handgun and patrolled the clinic with a German Shepherd. The clinic scheduled multiple “patients” at the same time, every 15 minutes, and was often open until after 10:00 p.m. The clinic received hundreds of “patients” per day, many of whom had traveled long distances and waited for hours for a few minutes with a doctor who would then provide a prescription for a large amount of opioids, usually oxycodone. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Godofsky’s conviction for prescribing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a), and the below-guidelines 60-month prison term and $500,000 fine, upholding the trial court’s refusal to use a jury instruction titled “Good Faith,” which would have instructed the jurors that his “good intentions” were enough for his acquittal or, rather, that the prosecutor had to prove that he had not personally, subjectively, believed that the oxycodone prescriptions would benefit his patients. View "United States v. Godofsky" on Justia Law

An undercover FBI agent, posing as a mother, posted a Craigslist ad, indicating that she wanted to talk about “taboo” subjects with an “open-minded” counterpart. Fortner sent the agent an e-mail asking if he could have sex with her children. Fortner and two officers communicated regularly for several weeks. He sent them links to child pornography and asked graphic questions about what he could do with their children. Fortner also requested photographs of one officer’s child. The officer sent a photo of her undercover persona instead. Fortner and one officer agreed to meet. If the introductions went well, the officer promised, Fortner could take things further. At a restaurant, the officer and Fortner discussed his two prior child sex abuse convictions and what he could do with the officer’s child. The officer arrested him. The government charged Fortner with attempting to coerce a minor and committing a felony offense involving a minor while required to register as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), 2260A. Fortner moved to dismiss the second count, arguing that he did not commit an offense involving a minor because the children he sought to coerce were not real. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of that motion. A sex offender commits an “offense involving a minor” if, in the course of a sting operation, he attempts to commit a sex crime with a pretend child. View "United States v. Fortner" on Justia Law