Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Clayton was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for sexually exploiting minors. One minor, J.P. texted her father from Clayton’s house, saying she was being held against her will. Her father called Battle Creek Police. Police and J.P.’s father raced to Clayton’s house. Clayton’s roommate stated J.P. had left. J.P.’s father immediately received another text, alerting him that J.P. was in the house. Officers stormed inside. They found Clayton, loaded guns, brass knuckles, cocaine powder, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. J.P. was traumatized and hysterical. Clayton was arrested.Before questioning him, Detective Sutherland read Clayton his Miranda rights from the Department’s standard form: Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any questions. If you cannot afford to have a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. Do you understand your rights? Clayton: Yes. Sutherland failed to follow “[y]ou have the right to talk to a lawyer” with “and to have him/her with you during questioning.”At his third interview, Clayton stated: “Hell yeah I want to f[***]ing talk,” then made a statement and provided the password to unlock his cellphone. Clayton’s DNA was found on J.P.’s body; officers found 37 videos of Clayton engaging in sex acts with minors; videos of him weighing cocaine and holding a firearm; and text messages discussing sex trafficking. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The critical features of Miranda were conveyed to Clayton. Nothing in the words used indicated that counsel’s presence would be restricted during questioning. View "United States v. Clayton" on Justia Law

Knight was charged with two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; assault and robbery of a person having control of mail matter, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a); possession of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2114(b); use of a firearm during assault and robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a); use of a firearm during kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); carjacking 18 U.S.C. 2119; use of a firearm during carjacking, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Knight pled guilty to bank fraud; a jury convicted him on all other counts. The district court sentenced Knight to a total term of 955 months of imprisonment. After exhausting his direct appeals, Knight filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), claiming that his convictions under 924(c) are invalid because the residual clause of the crime-of-violence definition in section 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague in light of recent Supreme Court holdings. The government conceded that Knight’s kidnapping conviction was not a crime of violence. The Sixth Circuit vacated the related section 924(c) conviction but upheld Knight’s section 924(c) conviction for using a firearm during assault and robbery, which qualifies under the “elements clause” of the definition of a “crime of violence.” View "Knight v. United States" on Justia Law

Convicted of criminal sexual assault and domestic violence, Clark argued that his convictions should be set aside based on a Sixth (and Fourteenth) Amendment violation that allegedly arose when a scheduling error prohibited his lawyers from being physically present at his competency hearing. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim on the ground that the attorneys nonetheless were able to communicate with Clark and the court about the competency report and all agreed that he no longer would challenge his competence. Clark filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. No U.S. Supreme Court case requires a different result. The state court reasonably denied Clark’s claim of structural error. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a defendant can show a Sixth Amendment violation without the need to prove prejudice when there is a “complete denial of counsel” at, or counsel is “totally absent” from, a “critical stage of the proceedings.” The state did not prevent Clark’s attorneys from attending the hearing and the error was mitigated by the attorneys’ earlier communication with Clark and the judge about the competency report and earlier decision not to challenge his competence any longer. View "Clark v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Police received a report of a drunk driver, with the vehicle’s license plate number. The database reported the vehicle as stolen. The suspect’s name came back: Powell, who was allegedly “armed and dangerous.” Using the caller’s updates on the vehicle’s location, in minutes three deputies found it stopped on a dirt road with the driver standing outside. The deputies told the driver to get on the ground. He dropped to his knees and put his hands in the air. As the deputies approached, Deputy Stetson instructed the driver to lie down on the ground. The driver yelled back that he would not comply and asked what he had done wrong. Stetson and the driver repeated the conversation nine times, with the driver becoming more belligerent. At one point, the driver reached toward his open truck door but then returned his hands to the air. The driver had three warnings that deputies would tase him if he did not obey. Stetson tased the driver. Deputies then handcuffed him. The driver was not Powell but was the vehicle’s owner, Shanaberg. Powell had allegedly stolen the vehicle months before, but the police later recovered it. The vehicle remained in the stolen-vehicle database. Shanaberg sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Stetson, finding he was entitled to qualified immunity on Shanaberg’s excessive-force claim. Given what Stetson knew, it was objectively reasonable to tase Shanaberg after warning him. View "Shanaberg v. Licking County" on Justia Law

In 1995, Pike and Slemmer, students at the Knoxville Job Corps Center, had a strained relationship; Pike told Iloilo, that she intended to kill Slemmer. The next day, Iloilo observed Pike and Slemmer together. That night, Pike told Iloilo that she had just killed Slemmer and showed Iloilo a piece of Slemmers’s skull, describing many details about the murder. Pike made similar statements to another student. After Slemmer’s body was found, police quickly discovered Pike’s connection to the crime. Pike waived her Miranda rights and gave a complete statement. At trial, much of Pike’s defense centered on her mental health. A jury convicted Pike of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. At a sentencing hearing, Pike’s attorney, Talman, originally intended to rely on the testimony of Dr. McCoy, a mitigation expert; shortly before the hearing, Talman switched his plan and called only Pike’s relatives to testify about Pike’s difficult childhood, and her behavioral problems throughout her adolescence.The jury sentenced Pike to death by electrocution. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. State courts also denied postconviction relief, concluding that Pike’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present alternative expert testimony or additional lay testimony on compelling mitigation in her life history. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her federal habeas petition; the state court’s determination that she is unable to establish prejudice on her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Pike v. Gross" on Justia Law

McCloud pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and to one count of actually distributing the drug, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). He was sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment. The district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement (U.S.S.D. 2D1.1(b)(1)) because McCloud carried a firearm during an attempt to buy marijuana during a trip to Detroit in the course of the conspiracy. McCloud argued that the marijuana incident was not “relevant conduct” under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. Although the government charged a meth conspiracy, the overall relevant conduct as described in terms of what was found in various homes along the way included cocaine and marijuana. One of McCloud’s sources of meth, whatever else he might have been doing in Detroit, was in Detroit and the Detroit trip involved others involved in the conspiracy. The Detroit trip was within the scope of the overall conspiracy and relevant conduct. View "United States v. McCloud" on Justia Law

In 1999, Vowell pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, agreeing that his prior criminal history qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Vowell waived his right to collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, except for claims asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or “that an applicable change in the case law renders the defendant’s conduct ... not a violation of federal law.” Vowell had Tennessee convictions for second-degree burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated burglary, and a 1983 conviction for Georgia burglary. The district court determined that Vowell qualified as an ACCA career offender and sentenced him to 180 months of imprisonment. Vowell did not appeal. In 2016, Vowell filed a section 2255 motion to set aside his sentence, asserting that his 1983 Georgia conviction did not constitute a predicate offense because it was broader than generic burglary and “portions of Georgia’s burglary statute could only have qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s now-void residual clause,” citing the Supreme Court’s Johnson and Mathis decisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Vowell’s petition, first holding that Vowell’s appellate waiver did not prohibit him from raising his claims. The court determined that Georgia’s burglary statute was divisible and that because Vowell was convicted of burglarizing a “dwelling house,” Vowell was correctly designated as a career offender. View "Vowell v. United States" on Justia Law

The FBI gained control over Playpen, a child pornography website. Agents used a controlled server containing a copy of the website and continued operating Playpen to catch its users. Playpen uses Tor, which conceals users’ IP addresses and other identifying information. The government sought a warrant to authorize additional instructions to the content that a computer automatically downloaded when visiting the site, to cause the user’s computer to send back specific information, including the actual IP address. A magistrate authorized the government to use the technique to search any computer that logged into Playpen with a username and password for 30 days. The technique identified Harney. He created a Playpen profile and spent about 80 minutes on the site during the window of observation. The protocol captured Harney’s IP address, which allowed agents to get his physical address from his internet provider. Officers obtained a warrant and searched Harney’s house. Harney admitted and a forensic examination confirmed that he had downloaded child pornography. The government charged Harney with receiving and possessing child pornography.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Harney’s motions to suppress the evidence and to require the government to hand over all information about the technique.. The investigators acted in good faith in relying on the warrant. The government did not violate 18 U.S.C. 3509(m), which prohibits reproducing child pornography “in any criminal proceeding.” An investigation is not a criminal proceeding. Harney has not shown that the government engaged in wrongdoing in employing the technique. View "United States v. Harney" on Justia Law

Cleveland Gang Impact Unit officers arrested Johnson based on an outstanding warrant, issued when Johnson failed to appear in state court for his arraignment. They searched Johnson and found a loaded pistol with an obliterated serial number, a baggie with crack cocaine, another containing marijuana, and $460. Johnson pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k), his fifth firearm conviction. The district court varied upward from the 37-48 month guidelines range and sentenced him to the statutory maximum: 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and provided a detailed explanation for its decision, based on the record. The court acknowledged that Johnson did not have a “history of violence,” but reasonably stated that “carrying a firearm” creates “a heightened risk of violence.” The court emphasized that the state courts had been lenient in sentencing Johnson and that this leniency prompted the federal government to bring this case. Johnson had repeatedly violated gun-possession laws, obtaining the gun at issue two days after being released for his last conviction, and had serial convictions for escape, drug possession, drug trafficking, and theft. This 14-month upward variance did not exceed the judge’s discretion. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2003, Clark and Harrington were jointly tried for the Martin murder. The only evidence connecting Clark to the crime was the preliminary testimony of Martin’s neighbor, Stewart. At trial, Stewart would not say what she had seen the day of the murder. The prosecutor asked if she was afraid or nervous; she responded she was not. Stewart agreed that she had been threatened but would not say by whom. The prosecutor attempted to refresh her recollection with her testimony from preliminary examinations, but Stewart would not ratify her earlier statements. The judge declared Stewart unavailable and had her preliminary testimony, including cross-examinations, read to the jury. Clark’s attorney, who had not been counsel of record during the preliminary proceedings, was not permitted to cross-examine Stewart. Clark was found guilty. Stewart has recanted. Clark sought habeas relief, based on an exculpatory affidavit from another purported eyewitness, who states that her father, a city police detective, told her not to report what she had seen. Clark was granted permission to file a second or successive habeas petition in light of the alleged Brady violation. The district court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit reversed. An evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine whether Clark has made out a Brady violation and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 are satisfied. View "Clark v. Nagy" on Justia Law