Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Owens covered his estranged wife’s nose and mouth with duct tape, hogtied her arms and legs behind her back, and left her alone in a shed to die. A Tennessee jury convicted Owens in 2003 of second-degree murder. The trial judge increased Owens’s sentence to 24 years, based in part on the judge’s finding that a sentencing enhancement was warranted for “exceptional cruelty.” Owens sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the Sixth Amendment required the jury, rather than the judge, to make that finding. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding that the state court’s error was harmless. Under Supreme Court precedent, the verdict alone did not authorize Owens’s sentence. There is, however, little doubt that, if asked, the jury would have made the requisite finding that Owens’ actions amounted to “psychological abuse or torture,” and reflected his “calculated indifference toward [her] suffering.” View "Owens v. Parris" on Justia Law

Clayton, the father of Bailey’s child, was charged with sexual exploitation of a minor. Bailey was present at Clayton’s trial when a victim, K.P., testified. K.P. and her mother reported that Bailey later threatened to assault K.P. in retaliation for her testimony. Bailey was also heard making threats to another testifying victim. Days after the guilty verdict, Bailey used Facebook Messenger to send K.P.’s sister messages stating: “I’m beating your ass cuz of your sister and your fat ass momma can get it too.” In later messages, Bailey again threatened to assault K.P’s sister. Bailey was indicted for witness retaliation, 18 U.S.C. 1513(b)(1)(c); 1591(a)(1)(b)(2), and pleaded guilty. The Presentence Report recommended a cross-reference (U.S.S.G. 2J1.2(c)(1)), for obstructing the prosecution of Clayton’s criminal case, which provides that the offense level shall be 6 levels lower than that of the offense that was obstructed as long as the resulting level is not less than 4 nor greater than 30. Clayton's offense level (underlying Bailey’s obstruction) was 40. Bailey’s offense level under the cross-reference became 30. The PSR alternatively recommended U.S.S.G. 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), which dictates an 8-level enhancement for “threatening to cause physical injury to a person ... to obstruct the administration of justice.” With that enhancement, Bailey’s offense level would have become 22 but when the cross-reference results in a greater offense level than that enhancement, the cross-reference controls. Applying the cross-reference, the district court found that Bailey’s Guidelines range was 78-97 months and sentenced her to 78 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence substantively and procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Elyria Police officers, dispatched to the house, observed blood on the frame of an open window. Wiseman appeared near a vehicle parked in the driveway and stated that there was a handgun on the driveway. The officers entered the home and observed a teenaged male in a pool of blood close to the bloody window; he appeared to have been shot multiple times. Police collected the loaded gun from the driveway, a package with white powder containing cocaine from the kitchen, and surveillance videos; they collected $4,949.00 in cash from Wiseman’s person. In a recorded video interview. Wiseman stated that he had been awoken by a voice and, on his surveillance monitor, saw Whitaker, that he had knocked Whitaker’s gun out of his hand and then shot Whitaker with a gun that Wiseman already had in the house. Wiseman subsequently placed that gun in a safe in the vehicle. Officers obtained a search warrant; the safe contained the handgun with a defaced serial number, 11 bags of a white powder containing cocaine, cutting material, a digital scale, and documents bearing Wiseman’s name. Wiseman was charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) & 924. The government identified the previous felony drug offense convictions that it intended to rely upon in enhancing his sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his convictions and 262-month sentence, rejecting arguments that the First Step Act of 2018 rendered his sentencing improper, that he was entitled to a jury instruction on the justification defense, and that testimony about his parolee status was improperly admitted. The Act does not apply retroactively and did not alter the definition of “felony drug offense[s]” that serve as qualifying convictions for sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). View "United States v. Wiseman" on Justia Law

In 1996, Montgomery was sexually assaulted and murdered in her Kalkaska, Michigan home. Months later, 22-year-old Peterson was in jail on an unrelated charge. Another inmate informed officers that Peterson had made an incriminating statement about the Montgomery crime. Peterson claims that he suffered from brain damage, mental illness, and severe depression, was on suicide watch, and that the defendants knew of Peterson’s disabilities. Peterson initially denied involvement, but after nine interrogations and several polygraph examinations, Peterson confessed. A week later, DNA results showed that Peterson’s DNA was not a match for a vaginal semen sample. Peterson was convicted. In 2013, Peterson’s attorneys obtained new DNA test results that excluded Peterson as a contributor to a previously-inconclusive sample from the victim’s shirt. Peterson’s conviction was vacated in 2014. Peterson filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers each raised qualified immunity, arguing Peterson was collaterally estopped from relitigating the voluntariness of his confession, which the Michigan trial court had determined was admissible. The district court rejected that argument and denied the defendants qualified immunity, absolute witness immunity, and governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to two officers but reversed with respect to one officer, who was not alleged to have participated in the interrogations. The court reversed the decision to deny governmental immunity to the county. The state court ruling regarding the confession was vacated with the conviction. View "Peterson v. Heymes" on Justia Law

In operating his companies, Rankin failed to remit to the IRS employees’ withholding taxes and inaccurately reported his own earnings as royalties (26 U.S.C. 7202, 7206, 7212). Rankin interfered with and delayed IRS investigations, filing amended returns containing false information and falsely claiming that fire had destroyed his records. Rankin bragged about his efforts to beat the IRS at its own game. He was convicted of 17 tax-related counts, sentenced to 60 months in prison, and required to pay restitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence, modifying his judgment to reflect that he need not pay restitution until his term of supervised release commences. The court rejected a challenge to Count 17, which alleged that during the relevant time, Rankin had “willfully misl[ed] agents of the IRS by making false and misleading statements to those agents and by concealing information sought by those agents who he well knew were attempting to ascertain income, expenses and taxes for [Rankin] and his various business entities and interests.” The indictment contains the elements of the charged offense and does more than merely track the language of the statute. It alleges a nexus between Rankin’s misleading conduct and the agents’ attempts “to ascertain [his] income, expenses and taxes,” an investigation that went beyond the “routine, day-to-day work carried out in the ordinary course by the IRS.” The indictment reflects that the investigation was pending and that Rankin was aware of it. View "United States v. Rankin" on Justia Law

In 2009, Brumbach was arrested for pointing a gun at a man and was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty and agreed that because he had at least three previous convictions for violent felonies and possessed a gun, he qualified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The PSR explained that Brumbach had 12 prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Tennessee law. The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. After the Supreme Court struck down ACCA's residual clause in "Johnson" (2015), Brumbach filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate or correct his sentence, arguing that his convictions for aggravated burglary could no longer count as violent felonies under the ACCA. In another case, Stitt, the Sixth Circuit held that a conviction under Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute did not constitute a violent felony under the ACCA. The district court granted Brumbach’s habeas petition and imposed a new sentence of time served, which equated to 105 months in prison. In December 2018, the Supreme Court reversed Stitt, finding that the language of the Tennessee statute falls within the scope of generic burglary’s definition. The Sixth Circuit then reversed the grant of habeas relief and reinstated Brumbach’s original sentence. View "United States v. Brumbach" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of federal habeas relief to petitioner, who argued that he was entitled to a resentencing hearing, essentially because the guidelines were considered mandatory at the time of his hearing, even though not at the time that his sentence became final. The court held that declining to conduct such a new hearing in this case was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Furthermore, there was no constitutional error in the substance of the sentencing court's decision. View "Magnum Reign v. Gidley" on Justia Law

Lopez was charged with possessing a firearm as an alien “illegally or unlawfully in the United States,” 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(A). The district court thought that section 922(g)(5)(A) as applied to Lopez was unconstitutionally vague in light of administrative guidance from the Department of Homeland Security, giving “prosecutorial discretion” as to certain (DACA) aliens who had entered this country without authorization as children. Lopez, along with his family, entered the U.S. without authorization when he was four years old and had obtained deferred action under DACA in 2017. Lopez was arrested for DUI and officers found a 9mm pistol and a 12-gauge shotgun in his vehicle. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting his argument that once he was granted relief under DACA, Lopez was “lawfully present” in the United States. The Secretary’s grant of deferred action under DACA, therefore, did not, and could not, change Lopez’s status as an alien “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” for purposes of section 922(g)(5)(A). That relief represented only the Secretary’s decision temporarily not to prosecute him for that status. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Brice, who had been purchasing heroin from defendant “[o]ff and on, for maybe a year and a half,” suffered from hypertension and a mild arrhythmia, tested positive for hepatitis C, and had been an opioid addict for years. In the drug sale in question, Brice purchased half a gram of what he believed to be heroin; it was actually fentanyl. Brice injected approximately a quarter of that half gram intravenously, had a stroke, and entered a coma. He survived with a subarachnoid hemorrhage, anoxic brain injury, liver failure, kidney failure, and heart failure. He recovered his day-to-day functioning after six months of intensive therapy. Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Defendant’s presentence report acknowledged that the district court could increase his sentence above the authorized range based upon USSG 5K2.2, which authorizes departures when “significant physical injury result[s]” from the crime. He objected because the victim had an “extensive and serious history of pre-existing medical conditions." Feola, a doctor of pharmacy, testified that it was possible Brice’s pre-existing health status affected his likelihood of experiencing a drug overdose and that it was possible that his condition could have increased the likelihood of overdose symptoms. The district court increased the defendant’s offense level by six points, which increased his Guidelines range to 51-63 months and sentenced him to 51 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court failed to consider Brice’s “own choices.” View "United States v. Gillispie" on Justia Law

Ragland pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). His PSR calculated Ragland’s base offense level as 22, based in part on Ragland’s prior conviction for unarmed robbery, a "crime of violence." It applied a four-level enhancement, USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), because the pistol with which Ragland was arrested had an “altered or obliterated serial number.” The gun had been reported stolen and had been used in two shootings, including one the day before Ragland was arrested. Ragland’s Guidelines range was 121-151 months of imprisonment, although the statutory maximum was 120 months. Ragland did not object to his base offense level or the enhancement but objected to a recommendation that the court not grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court gave him full acceptance-of-responsibility credit, reducing his Guidelines range to 87-108 months. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and decided that an upward variance to the statutory maximum—120 months—was appropriate because the circumstances of Ragland’s arrest and his prior record indicated that Ragland was a “significant risk to the public and a significant risk to re-offend.” Ragland did not object. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The Michigan offense of unarmed robbery constituted a “crime of violence” under USSG 2K2.1(a)(3); the court did not commit plain error in applying the enhancement for an altered or obliterated serial number on a firearm. View "United States v. Fuller-Ragland" on Justia Law