Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Armstrong sold a confidential informant about three grams of heroin during three controlled buys. He pleaded guilty to distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 37 months in prison, based, in part, on a finding that he sold around 70 grams of heroin to the informant over the course of two years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, district courts must consider the defendant’s entire relevant conduct beyond the scope of the conviction, U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). The informant claimed she purchased about one gram of heroin from Armstrong 70 times over 18-24 months. The district judge made a credibility determination and found that the informant’s out-of-court statements were more reliable than Armstrong’s. View "United States v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

n 1975, Jackson, Ajamu, and Bridgeman were convicted of murder, based largely on the purported eyewitness testimony of Vernon, who then was 13 years old. In 2014, Vernon recanted, disclosing that police officers had coerced him into testifying falsely. Vernon’s recantation led to the overturning of their convictions. The exonerated men filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, along with state law claims for indemnification against Cleveland. The district court granted the defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to the section 1983 claims based on conspiracy, but reversed judgment on the pleadings as to the indemnification claims; denial of motions to amend the complaints to substitute the administrator of the estates of the deceased officers as a party in their place; summary judgment as to section 1983 claims arising from violations of Brady v. Maryland, fabrication of evidence, and malicious prosecution; and summary judgment as to “Monell” claims against Cleveland. The court noted evidence that officers may have been unaware of their “Brady” obligations, that Brady violations were common, and that officers intimidated Vernon. View "Jackson v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Roberts and seven co-conspirators stole millions of dollars’ worth of sensitive military equipment from an army base and sold it on eBay. Although Roberts testified that he did not knowingly traffick stolen goods, he was convicted of conspiracy to steal government property valued at over $1,000 (18 U.S.C. 371); 10 counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343); and two counts of unauthorized export of prohibited military equipment (22 U.S.C. 2778(b)(2)). The court applied sentencing enhancements: 18 offense levels for stealing more than $3.5 million of military equipment (USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J)), two levels for mass-marketing (USSG 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii)), two levels as a “person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property” (USSG 2B1.1(b)(4)), two levels for committing a crime involving sophisticated means (USSG 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)), four levels for organizing or otherwise leading the criminal conspiracy (USSG 3B1.1(a)), and two levels for willfully obstructing justice (USSG 3C1.1). The court sentenced Roberts to 180 months’ imprisonment, varying downward from the 210-262-month Guidelines range. The Sixth Circuit vacated the loss enhancement (USSG 2B1.1(b)(1)(J)) and the obstruction enhancement (USSG 3C1.1) and remanded for resentencing. The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting challenges to other sentencing enhancements; the exclusion of evidence of current e-Bay listings, to show that Roberts did not intend to commit a crime; the denial of Criminal Justice Act funds to allow Roberts to retain a forensic accountant; and the substantive reasonableness of Roberts’s sentence. View "United States v. Roberts" on Justia Law

In February 2002, Daniel, his brother, Peter, McGlown, and Neal, traveling in a van, pulled up alongside a car and shot Newsom. They mistook Newsom for Bradley (the intended target). Newsom was in an automobile owned by Newsom’s sister, Bradley’s girlfriend. Newsom died from gunshot wounds. Based on eyewitness testimony, officers stopped Daniel's vehicle. Retracing the route from the shooting, investigators recovered firearms and gloves that had been discarded on the roadway. Bullets from those firearms matched bullets found in Newsom’s body and in his sister’s vehicle. Daniel, Peter, and McGlown were tried together. Before trial, the Michigan judge ordered them to wear a Band-It electronic restraint concealed underneath clothing. Daniel’s counsel unsuccessfully objected, stating that the Band-It was “pretrial punishment” and Daniel had no history of acting out in the courtroom. They were convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and felon in possession of a firearm. Officers never activated or threatened to activate Daniel’s Band-It. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed; the Michigan Supreme Court denied an appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Daniel’s 28 U.S.C.2254 habeas petition, in which he alleged that he was denied due process, a fair trial, and access to counsel. Noting that Daniel had made threats, the court held that use of the restraint was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; there is no evidence that the Band-It hindered his communications with his attorney. View "Daniel v. Burton" on Justia Law

An informant contacted the FBI and explained that, during an internet chat, Oliver had requested contact information for someone who could facilitate a meeting between Oliver and a minor for the purposes of sexual activity. An FBI agent instructed the informant to provide Oliver with the agent's contact information. Oliver sent the agent images and videos of child pornography and a picture of his penis. For several weeks, the two exchanged messages focusing on Oliver’s interest in having sexual intercourse with the agent’s purported minor daughter. Oliver pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). Oliver’s PSR called for a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), which applies when a defendant distributes child pornography “in exchange for any valuable consideration, but not for pecuniary gain,” stating that the defendant distributed images of child pornography to gain access to a minor to engage in sexual intercourse. The court concluded that there was an “implicit agreement” then calculated a guideline range of 210-262 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated Oliver's 210-month sentence. The district court did not fully consider the essential elements for applying the enhancement under the 2016 version of 2G2.2(b)(3)(B): whether the defendant agreed, explicitly or implicitly, to an exchange with another person and then knowingly distributed child pornography to that person for the specific purpose of obtaining something of valuable consideration from that person. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Steele and 11 other suspected members of the Detroit Rollin 60s Crips street gang were charged with racketeering conspiracy (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). All but one of the co-conspirators pleaded guilty. Although Steele denied any gang affiliation, during his trial the government presented seven current and former Crips members who testified that Steele was a member of the gang during the relevant time period. The jury saw photographs of Steele’s tattoos which demonstrated participation in the gang and a photograph of Steele with other gang members, with one member holding a sawed-off shotgun, and were read his social media messages that demonstrated his fluency in the gang’s jargon. Crips members testified to seeing Steele store guns to protect his drug and weapon stash and seeing Steele sell marijuana while armed with a weapon. The jury also heard from multiple officers. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Steele’s convictions under RICO and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence; an argument that the district court should have provided a specific jury instruction requiring unanimity on section 924(c); and a challenge to the denial of his motion to change counsel mid-trial. View "United States v. Steele" on Justia Law

Eason pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The statutory range for such a violation is zero to 10 years’ imprisonment but under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) who has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months. Eason had five prior felony convictions for the promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. Eason argued that an ACCA “serious drug offense” is defined as “an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” and that, under the Tennessee statute, his prior offenses could have been based on no more than the purchase of an ingredient that can be used to produce methamphetamine with reckless disregard of its intended use. The district court agreed with Eason. Without the ACCA enhancement, Eason was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment, the top of the guideline range. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Purchasing ingredients needed to make methamphetamine, and consciously disregarding an unjustifiable risk regarding how those products will be used, “indirectly,” if not “directly,” connects with methamphetamine’s “production, preparation, propagation, compounding or processing” and is a serious drug offense under ACCA. View "United States v. Eason" on Justia Law

Lee was a member of the Summit County Council. The FBI obtained wiretaps and investigated the relationship between Lee and Abdelqader, a store owner, after complaints that Abdelqader “was insisting on monthly cash payments from other local businesses” that he would give to Lee in exchange for political favors. Abdelqader’s nephews were arrested for felonious assault. Abdelqader called Lee for help; they discussed Lee’s financial problems. Abdelqader promised that they would “work it out.” Lee placed calls to the juvenile court bailiff and the judicial assistant; Lee subsequently deposited 200 dollars in her bank account and placed calls to the judge who was handling the case. Lee also took payment for attempting to intervene in an IRS investigation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lee’s convictions on four counts of conspiracy to commit honest services mail and wire fraud, honest services mail fraud, Hobbs Act conspiracy, and Hobbs Act extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1346, 1349, and 1951 and two counts concerning obstruction of justice and false statements to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2); 18 U.S.C. 1001 and her 60-month sentence. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the sufficiency of her indictment in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 “McDonnell” decision. At a minimum, the indictment supports an inference that Lee agreed to perform an official act or pressure or advise other officials to perform official acts in exchange for gifts or loans from Abdelqader. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

Officer Minard pulled over Cruise-Gulyas for speeding. He wrote her a ticket for a lesser, non-moving violation. As she drove away, she made a vulgar gesture at Minard, who then stopped her again and changed the ticket to a speeding offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Minard’s motion for dismissal of Cruise-Gulyas’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, in which she alleged unconstitutional seizure, restriction of her liberty, and retaliation. Cruise-Gulyas did not break any law that would justify the second stop and at most was exercising her free speech rights. Qualified immunity protects police from personal liability unless they violate a person’s clearly established constitutional or statutory rights; the rights asserted by Cruise-Gulyas meet that standard. Minard’s authority to seize her in connection with the driving infraction ended when the first stop concluded. Cruise-Gulyas’s crude gesture could not provide that new justification. Any reasonable officer would know that a citizen who raises her middle finger engages in speech protected by the First Amendment. An officer who seizes a person for Fourth Amendment purposes without proper justification and issues her a more severe ticket clearly commits an adverse action that would deter her from repeating that conduct in the future. View "Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard" on Justia Law

Jackson, Palmer, Taylor, Dillard, and Rembert were charged with multiple violations of 18 U.S.C. 2119(2), carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, and 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during a crime of violence. Palmer was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Rembert and Taylor entered guilty pleas pursuant to agreements that required that they testify against their co-defendants. Dillard later entered a guilty plea but did not testify. Palmer unsuccessfully moved to have the felon-in-possession charge severed from the other charges against him to avoid undue prejudice from the introduction of evidence of his prior felony convictions, then pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession charge. Before trial, the government moved for leave to introduce background evidence of defendants’ gang activities, including their involvement in several retaliatory drive-by shootings under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The court allowed Rembert's testimony regarding the relationship between co-defendants as well as the motive for the carjacking. Rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Palmer’s conviction and 175-month sentence. The court vacated one of Jackson’s firearms convictions and remanded for resentencing; the district court had imposed a 771-month term of imprisonment. The district court reasonably found that the gang evidence was admissible as evidence of motive under Rule 404(b) and was not substantially more prejudicial than probative. View "United States v. Palmer" on Justia Law