Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Confidential informants learned that Ardd wanted to buy cocaine and connected him with Memphis officer Tellez, posing as an out-of-state cocaine dealer. Before a scheduled meeting, Tellez obtained a warrant to search Ardd’s home for drug records and drug proceeds “[u]pon Ardd being arrested for attempting to possess th[e] cocaine.” Tellez’s affidavit described his experience in narcotics investigations and stated that a reliable informant told him about Ardd’s drug activities; Ardd contacted Tellez several times during the year about buying distribution quantities of cocaine; Ardd was ready to buy. The affidavit described Ardd’s residence and noted the police had surveilled it. Officers observed the controlled buy and arrested Ardd after he showed Tellez money, climbed into Tellez’s car, and took the bag of cocaine. Police searched Ardd and seized the cocaine, $9,800, and a loaded pistol. In his home, they seized 34 baggies of drugs, digital scales, and a loaded pistol with an obliterated serial number. Police gave Ardd his Miranda warnings and supplied a written copy. Ardd admitted that he came to the parking lot with a loaded gun to obtain cocaine, and that he had been making up to a thousand dollars a week in cocaine sales for years and that he had more drugs and another gun at home. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress, Ardd’s convictions, and his 270-month sentence. View "United States v. Ardd" on Justia Law

From 2007-2011, a group led by District employee Palazzo defrauded the Cuyahoga Heights School District. From 2009-2011, Defendant was part of this group. The scheme involved Palazzo submitting fake invoices to the District, purporting to be for IT-related goods and services. The vendors were actually shell corporations that never supplied goods or services of any kind to the District. The shell corporations were owned by Palazzo’s brother, Boyles, and Defendant. Five shell corporations defrauded the District of approximately $3.3 million. Defendant was aware, no later than 2009, that the scheme was a fraud. When the scheme was uncovered, Defendant sold his property, moved to Europe, and cut off communications with people in the U.S. He claims he was afraid of Palazzo, who had threatened his family. He was extradited and pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1349 (mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)(money laundering). The Sixth Circuit affirmed his a 70-month sentence, rejecting Defendant’s claims that he should have only received a 14-level offense level increase for the amount of loss that resulted from his offenses—$916,948.77, that he should have received a two-level decrease for playing only a minor role in the offenses, and that he should not have received a two-level increase for obstruction of justice. View "United States v. Donadeo" on Justia Law

In 2003, Jasso obtained lawful U.S. permanent resident status. More than a decade later, he pled guilty to first-degree home invasion in Michigan. DHS began removal proceedings, arguing that Jasso’s home-invasion conviction was a “crime of violence” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which then defined a “crime of violence” with both an elements clause and a residual clause, 18 U.S.C. 16. The IJ found that Jasso’s home-invasion conviction was a crime of violence under the residual clause. Before the Board of Immigration Appeals acted, the Sixth Circuit found the residual clause unconstitutionally vague. The BIA remanded for a new removability determination. The IJ terminated the proceeding, warning Jasso that DHS could “recharge under a different theory.” Two days later DHS initiated a second removal proceeding, arguing that Jasso’s home-invasion conviction was a “burglary offense” rather than a “crime of violence,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The IJ agreed and rejected Jasso’s argument that res judicata barred the second proceeding. The BIA affirmed, concluding that res judicata does not apply in removal proceedings involving aggravated felons. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for determination of whether claim preclusion applies, which depends on whether the first removal proceeding was dismissed with or without prejudice—an issue never addressed by the Board. View "Jasso-Arangure v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the United Kingdom and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was convicted of two counts of rape in 2011 under Ohio law. He was charged as removable for being convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which lists rape as an aggravated felony, but it does not define the term. An IJ found held that Petitioner was removable without eligibility for relief. Petitioner argued in his appeal to the BIA that his Ohio conviction is not an aggravated felony because Ohio’s definition of rape includes digital penetration, whereas the federal law does not. The BIA disagreed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the Fifth Circuit and the BIA previously considered this question. The BIA reversed course in Petitioner’s case. A conviction for rape in Ohio can be committed by digital penetration, whereas the aggravated felony of rape under the Immigration and Nationality Act cannot; the Ohio conviction does not categorically fit within the federal definition, and Petitioner’s conviction is not an aggravated felony. View "Keeley v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Logan was a drug courier in a cross-country drug ring from 2004-2007. In total, Logan transported over 150 kilograms of cocaine from California to Michigan. Logan received conflicting advice while considering whether to accept a plea offer with a 10-year sentencing cap. His counsel of record told him it was a very good deal that avoided the high risks of proceeding to trial. Logan signed the plea agreement. His second attorney (retained by Logan’s family but not counsel of record) subsequently persuaded Logan to withdraw from the plea agreement. Ultimately, Logan accepted another plea agreement that did not include a sentencing cap and received a much longer sentence than contemplated by the first agreement. Logan claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court and Sixth Circuit rejected his argument. Counsel of record advised Logan about the risks of going to trial; Logan testified that he signed the plea agreement because he was guilty and was worried about facing a sentence of 30 years or more. He was aware of the risks of trial. Whether to accept the plea offer was ultimately Logan’s decision and that the fear of a higher sentence after trial was a valid concern. Logan received all the information needed to make an informed decision. View "Logan v. United States" on Justia Law

Hill turned on the sink in a detox cell and let the water overflow. Jailor Hickman punched Hill, knocking him to the floor, severely injuring his jaw. Hickman and Asher kicked Hill while he laid curled on the floor; mocked Hill for soiling his pants; and stated, “We’re the law, dawg. We can do what we want.” They threw Hill into a restraint chair. Asher watched as Hickman pounded Hill’s face. Bruises on Hill’s wrists memorialized his attempts to free himself. The jailors left Hill in the restraints, sitting in his own feces. Hill woke up on the floor and asked to see a doctor. Hickman testified that he and Asher took Hill to another room, where a “doctor” looked at him and that the “doctor” was Asher in disguise. Hill filed a complaint. Hickman wrote a report stating that Hill was the aggressor. Asher signed Hickman’s report and later wrote a corroborating report, claiming that Hill slipped on the water and hit the wall.Asher was charged with depriving Hill of his civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 242, and falsifying a record to impede a federal investigation, 18 U.S.C. 1519.2. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce testimony that Asher had battered a different prisoner and concealed that crime. over Asher's objection and offer that if the jury believed that he committed the charged assault, he would admit intent. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The charged conduct provided a sufficient basis for the jury to find intent; the prior-act evidence had only incremental probative value. Evidence of Asher’s guilt was not overwhelming. Absent the prior-act evidence, Asher’s arguments that Hickman lied might have persuaded the jury. Hill testified that he could not remember much about Asher’s role. View "United States v. Asher" on Justia Law

Doe pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. Megan’s Law, Ohio Code section 2950, requires determination of whether a person convicted of a sexually oriented offense is a “sexual predator,” “likely to engage in the future" in "sexually oriented offenses.” Doe’s classification as a sexual predator was affirmed on appeal. Doe is required, for the rest of her life, to register with the sheriff and provide detailed personal information; she must provide written notice of any changes, and verify, in person, the current address of her residence, school, and place of employment every 90 days. Failure to comply is a felony. Doe’s registration information is publicly disseminated through an internet sex-offender database. Doe may not reside within 1000 feet of any school and is barred from living in federally subsidized housing. The law provides that “[i]n no case shall the lifetime duty to comply . . . terminated.” Doe sought a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional in preventing her from obtaining a hearing to demonstrate that she is no longer “likely to reoffend.” The Sixth Circuit upheld the statute, first holding that named state officials did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Doe had standing. Doe’s classification is based on her likelihood of reoffending as of the time of the classification hearing; the restrictions stem not from her current dangerousness, but from that assessment. Due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the statutory scheme. View "Doe v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Deputies responding to a call about a disturbance on county property peered into the car in which Carter was sitting with C.C. and saw “a bag containing green leafy substance” and rolling papers. Believing the bag contained marijuana, and learning that C.C. was just 13, the deputies obtained Carter’s consent to search the car and found another bag of marijuana. Carter had an apparent anxiety attack. After an ambulance took Carter away, deputies resumed searching; one picked up what looked like a dictionary, shook it, and realized it was a disguised lockbox. The deputy broke the lock and found sexually explicit photographs of C.C. and DVDs. Carter consented to searches of his apartment and his computer, where more images of C.C. were found. Carter admitted to taking pictures of C.C. and knowingly exposing him to HIV. Carter used the pictures as blackmail to force C.C. into sexual acts. Tennessee charged Carter with child rape, criminal exposure to HIV, sexual exploitation of a minor, and possession of marijuana. After denial of motions to suppress, Carter pled guilty. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals declined to consider whether Carter had consented to the lockbox search. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Carter cannot demonstrate prejudice. Even if Carter’s counsel had made different arguments, the end result would have remained the same. Seeing a bag of marijuana gave officers probable cause to search. The Supreme Court makes no distinction between searching a vehicle and searching a container within a vehicle. View "Carter v. Parris" on Justia Law

Veloz-Alonso, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally in the 1990s. He was removed in 1997, 1999, and 2008. In 2018, Veloz-Alonso was discovered again and was indicted for illegal reentry. He pleaded guilty and sought release on bail pending sentencing. Under the Bail Reform Act (BRA), a defendant pleading guilty must be detained unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk or a danger to the community, 18 U.S.C. 3143(a)(1). The government argued that Veloz-Alonso was subject to an order of removal and an ICE detainer, so that, if released, he would be taken into custody, removed, and unable to attend a sentencing hearing. The court granted the motion subject to electronic monitoring and a property lien on his house. The court ordered the government, under threat of contempt, “to refrain from detaining or deporting the Defendant while he is released pending sentencing.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. While deportable aliens are not per se ineligible for bail, the district court incorrectly inferred that an alien released on bail is ineligible for ICE detention. Reading the BRA’s permissive use of release to supersede the Immigration and Naturalization Act’s mandatory detention would be incongruent with canons of statutory interpretation. To the extent that ICE may fulfill its statutory mandates without impairing the purpose of the BRA, there is no statutory conflict. View "United States v. Veloz-Alonso" on Justia Law

In 1982, a Tennessee jury convicted Miller of first-degree murder. The court sentenced him to death. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Miller’s federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Miller and other Tennessee capital prisoners sought injunctive relief preventing implementation of a recently-adopted lethal-injection protocol. Miller sought a preliminary injunction; his execution is currently scheduled for December 6, 2018. The district court denied a preliminary injunction to prevent the use of the lethal injection protocol. Miller sought a stay while the appeal is pending. The court was notified that Miller has elected to be executed by electrocution. The Sixth Circuit denied his motion. Miller has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Electrocution was the method of execution that existed at the time of Miller’s crime. A change in a State’s method of execution does not constitute an ex post facto violation if the evidence shows the new method to be more humane. Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution, no matter how humane; the Constitution does not guarantee a pain-free execution. Miller has not shown that the new protocol is “sure or very likely” to be less humane than electrocution but neither method violates the Constitution. View "Miller v. Parker" on Justia Law