Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A Tennessee sheriff’s deputy noticed a car swerving over the centerline and tried to perform a traffic stop. The car sped away. After a high-speed chase, the car crashed in the woods. Police found Rockymore in the passenger seat, with a loaded firearm on the floorboard in front of him. Rockymore pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He had previous convictions for burglary and three delivery-of-cocaine charges. Rockymore conceded that his burglary conviction counted as a “violent felony” and one of his delivery-of-cocaine charges qualified as “a serious drug offense,” but contended that the other two cocaine convictions did not fall within the definition of a “serious drug offense.” The district court agreed and declined to enhance Rockymore’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that an ACCA increases a felon-in-possession’s sentencing range from zero-to-10 years to 15-to-life. Under the ACCA, a “serious drug offense” is any controlled substance conviction for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 or more years. The district court properly found that, under Tennessee’s “complicated” sentencing scheme, Rockymore was a Range I offender convicted of two Class C felonies, and faced a six-year-maximum sentence for each. View "United States v. Rockymore" on Justia Law

From 2008-2016, Brennan and Dyer (Defendants) operated Broad Street, to incorporate Tennessee corporations (Scenic City). They claimed that once Scenic City was appropriately capitalized, Defendants would register its common stock with the SEC using Form 10, would publicly trade Scenic City, and would acquire small businesses as a legal reverse merger. Investors sent money by mail and electronic wire from other states. Defendants moved the funds through Broad Street’s bank accounts, diverting significant funds to their personal bank accounts. They issued stock certificates and mailed them to investors, but never filed Form 10 nor completed any reverse mergers. Investors lost $4,942,070.18. Defendants reported the embezzled funds as long-term capital gains, substantially reducing their personal tax liability and treated payments to themselves from Broad Street as nontaxable distributions. For 2010-2014, Dyer owed an additional $312,799 in taxes; Brennan owed $164,542. The SEC began a civil enforcement suit under 15 U.S.C. 77(q)(a)(1), 77(q)(a)(2), 77(q)(a)(3), and 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5. Defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1341 and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C 7201. The court sentenced them to prison, ordered restitution ($4,942,070.18), and ordered payments for their tax evasion. The SEC sought and the court entered a disgorgement order to be offset by the restitution ordered in the criminal case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the disgorgement violates the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Supreme Court’s 2017 “Kokesh” holding that disgorgement, in SEC enforcement proceedings, "operates as a penalty under [28 U.S.C.] 2462.” SEC civil disgorgement is not a criminal punishment. View "United States v. Dyer" on Justia Law

In 1992-2006, Snider committed various crimes, including four convictions under Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute. In 2007, he was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846; manufacturing and attempting to manufacture over 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; possessing equipment, chemicals, products, and materials that may be used to manufacture methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(6); possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C 922(g); possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j); and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Snider was sentenced as a career criminal offender based on three Tennessee aggravated burglary convictions deemed crimes of violence (USSG 4B1.1(b)(B)), which was defined to include “burglary of a dwelling.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Snider’s motion (28 U.S.C. 2255) to vacate his sentence, rejecting his argument that its 2017 "Stitt" ruling that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) required that it vacate his sentence as a career offender under the sentencing guidelines. Snider’s challenge to his advisory guidelines range is not cognizable under section 2255, which authorizes post-conviction relief only when a sentence “was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . the court was without jurisdiction ... or . . . the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” View "Snider v. United States" on Justia Law

Havis pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He had a lengthy criminal record. The district court concluded that his 20-year-old state conviction for selling or delivering cocaine was a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines and increased his base offense level. Havis objected, arguing that delivering cocaine does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” and that it was unclear whether his state conviction was for delivery or sale. The district court rejected this argument, citing the Sixth Circuit’s prior holding that any violation of the Tennessee statute at issue is a controlled substance offense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the categorical approach: the court did not examine the facts of Havis’s actual misconduct but relied on the elements of drug delivery under Tennessee law. The court’s precedential interpretation of the Guidelines’s definition of “controlled substance offense” included attempts to commit the offense. The court acknowledged that the precedential opinion’s reliance on commentary to the Guidelines was problematic, but concluded that it was bound by precedent and rejected an argument that the Tennessee statute was overbroad. View "United States v. Havis" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring and attempting to possess, as well as possessing, cocaine with the intent to distribute it. The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to exclude data obtained from his cell phone where the warrant's execution deadline established only the date by when the cellphone needed to be shipped to the data extraction laboratory to initiate the analysis of the phone's data, not when the extraction itself had to occur; the district court did not plainly err in overruling defendant's Batson objection to a peremptory juror challenge where there was no evidence of discriminatory intent inherent in the government's proffered explanation and defendant made no attempt to argue to the district court that the explanation was a pretext for discrimination; the testimony regarding the firearm found at the residence was admissible evidence indicative of the drug-trafficking conspiracy; and the government's comments did not constitute misconduct or rise to the level of argument that might mislead or inflame the jury concerning its duty. View "United States v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

After federal agents arrested Robert Doggart for plotting to attack an Islamic community at the foothills of the Catskill Mountains, he attempted to plead guilty to making a threat in interstate commerce, a crime carrying a sentence of no more than five years. But the district court found that he had not made a cognizable threat and rejected his plea under Criminal Rule 11. After that and after the government added some charges, a jury convicted Doggart of solicitation to damage religious property and solicitation to commit arson, leaving him with a sentence of almost 20 years. Because the district court wrongly rejected the plea agreement, the Sixth Circuit reversed its decision to reject the agreement, left in place the later convictions, and remanded for it to reconsider the agreement under the correct law. View "United States v. Doggart" on Justia Law

Officer Joseph Danzy responded to a call about two suspicious men in an Akron neighborhood. He found Rauphael Thomas and Jesse Gray standing on the sidewalk. One thing (a Terry frisk) led to another (a tussle on the ground), which led to another (the discharge of Thomas’s concealed pistol). Thomas sprinted away, and Danzy shot him. Thomas died. His mother and estate administrator, Sherry Wilkerson, filed constitutional and state-tort claims against the officers, the City of Akron, and its police department. The district court denied Danzy summary judgment on one claim, which Danzy appealed. Wilkerson cross-appealed the grant of summary judgment on the other claims. The Sixth Circuit agreed Danzy was not entitled to summary judgment on the Terry stop-and-frisk; the Court agreed Wilkerson was not entitled to judgment in her favor on the other claims raised. View "Wilkerson v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

In 2006, a federal jury convicted Victor Castano of drug and firearms crimes. At a subsequent trial in 2015, Castano was convicted of suborning perjury and obstructing justice regarding the 2006 trial, among other crimes. His sentence could be enhanced due to his 2006 felony convictions. Fearing such enhancement, Castano petitioned the district court for a writ of coram nobis to challenge his 2006 firearms conviction. The district court denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding Castano’s petition ultimately failed because he did not show fundamental error that would justify this extraordinary remedy, and he lacked sound reasons for failing to seek earlier appropriate relief. View "United States v. Castano" on Justia Law

In 2016, commercial air pilot Sean Fitzgerald showed up for work "rip-roaring drunk." He was set to fly in the morning, so he readied the jet for take-off: he conducted a walk-around safety check before entering the cockpit, where he calibrated the altimeter, programmed the flight-management system, turned on the auxiliary power unit, and requested flight clearance from air- traffic control. Before passengers boarded, Fitzgerald’s co-pilot recognized his inebriation and alerted airline executives, who in turn notified local law enforcement. Fitzgerald was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. 342, which makes it a crime to operate a common carrier while intoxicated. A jury convicted Fitzgerald, and the district court sentenced him to one year and one day in prison and to three years of supervised release. On appeal, Fitzgerald contended that the actions he performed were not enough to operate the aircraft within the meaning of section 342, that the jury was wrongly instructed, and that the district court erred at his sentencing. Finding no reversible error, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Fitzgerald's conviction. View "United States v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Frank Richardson appealed his conviction for aiding and abetting he use of a firearm during a crime of violence. On his first appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence in full. But while that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that part of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a violent felony was unconstitutionally vague. Although Richardson was not convicted under the Armed Career Criminal Act, he petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, arguing that Johnson nonetheless called part of his conviction into question. Richardson contends that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) was unconstitutional because its definition of the term, "crime of violence," was similar to the language at issue in Johnson. The Court granted Richardson’s petition, vacated the Sixth Circuit's judgment, and remanded. In turn, the Sixth Circuit vacated Richardson’s sentence and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Richardson’s original sentence should stand in light of Johnson. Without determining whether section 924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Richardson’s conviction under 924(c)’s force clause, which supplied a separate definition of "crime of violence." The Court also concluded its remand limited the district court’s inquiry to Johnson-related issues and that the district court properly refrained from considering Richardson’s other arguments about alleged deficiencies in the indictment and the trial court’s jury instructions - arguments that he could have raised in his first appeal but did not. Finally, the Sixth Circuit held Richardson’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law