Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The district court granted Stephen Mitchell habeas relief and gave him a sentence of time-served with three years of supervised release. Both Mitchell and the United States appealed. Since those appeals were filed, the Sixth Circuit decided substantially-similar cases. At the time of his sentencing, Mitchell’s three prior convictions qualified as “violent” felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), meaning Mitchell was subject to the ACCA’s enhanced sentencing. Applying the ACCA, the trial judge sentenced Mitchell to 250 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. But after the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s so-called residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, and then applied that holding retroactively, Mitchell filed for habeas relief. Mitchell argued that without the ACCA’s residual clause, his prior felonies no longer qualified as “violent” under the ACCA. Therefore, he said his 250-month, ACCA-enhanced sentence was invalid. Without the ACCA, the maximum sentence Mitchell could have served for his felon-in-possession conviction was ten years. But Mitchell had already served seventeen years by the end of his habeas proceeding. So the district court decided to release Mitchell from custody and correct his sentence to “time- served.” The district court also re-imposed Mitchell’s original three years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's habeas relief insofar as it held that Mitchell’s burglary conviction was not a “violent” felony under the ACCA. The district court’s judgment as it related to Mitchell’s sentence was vacated and remanded for a determination of whether: (1) a time-served sentence that is equivalent to a term-of-months sentence above the statutory maximum is invalid; and (2) a district court has the discretion to select appropriate proceedings for correcting a sentence—so long as the corrected sentence complies with substantive and procedural reasonableness. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Rodriguez-Penton moved from Cuba to the U.S. when he was 15. He is a lawful permanent resident. Rodriguez-Penton was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess Oxycodone, retained counsel Butler, and initially cooperated but stopped because he feared for his family’s safety. The government offered Rodriguez-Penton plea deals but he entered an open guilty plea. Rodriguez-Penton’s Cuban citizenship arose during the hearing: the court stated that there was no need to review the civil rights one forfeits by pleading guilty; inquired whether, due to Rodriguez-Penton’s citizenship, there would be an early sentencing; and asked about an Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer, but did not advise Rodriguez-Penton that pleading guilty might have adverse immigration consequences and sentenced him to a 121-month prison term. Rodriguez-Penton alleges that he learned of the deportation risk after sentencing, during a meeting with his prison counselor. Rodriguez-Penton appealed, represented by Butler, arguing that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. After hearing testimony from Butler and an interpreter, a magistrate concluded that Butler merely told Rodriguez-Penton that he did not have to worry about deportation. Rodriguez-Penton testified unequivocally that he “would not have gone to trial, even if he could not have negotiated a better plea arrangement.” The district court dismissed his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The legal standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims has changed in the context of non-citizens faced with criminal charges. Rodriguez-Penton asserted that his decision-making process would have been different if he had been properly advised; the government has not offered any countervailing evidence that Rodriguez-Penton could not have secured a more favorable plea. View "Rodriguez-Penton v. United States" on Justia Law

Boucher pleaded guilty to assaulting a member of Congress. The government sought a 21-month sentence, at the low end of Boucher’s guidelines range. The district court sentenced Boucher to 30 days’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit denied Boucher’s motion to dismiss the government’s appeal. Boucher’s plea agreement says nothing about waiving the government’s right to appeal. The prosecutor agreed to seek a 21-month sentence and recommend an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction in return for the agreement and kept that promise, so the plea was supported by consideration. In addition, U.S. Attorneys have no right to control appeals by the government. That authority rests with the Solicitor General. The written plea agreement “supersede[s] all prior understandings, if any, whether written or oral, and cannot be modified other than in writing signed by all parties or on the record.” Whatever Boucher may have believed, the four corners of the plea agreement restrict his appellate rights, not the government’s or anyone else’s. View "United States v. Boucher" on Justia Law

On November 22, 1997, around 1:30 a.m., Miles demanded money from brothers Maher and Ziad, outside of Maher’s Cincinnati Save-Way store. The brothers complied but Miles shot them with an assault rifle. Cincinnati police hypothesized that Issa, a Save-Way employee, hired Miles to commit the murders because Linda, Maher’s wife, offered Issa money to kill her husband. The state charged all three with aggravated murder. Miles refused to testify at Issa’s trial although he had testified in Linda’s trial. The prosecution had revoked Miles’s immunity the day before he was to testify. The court concluded that Miles was unavailable and allowed the admission of Miles’s out-of-court statements, through the testimony of siblings who were Miles’s teenage friends at the time of the murders. A jury acquitted Linda; Miles received a life sentence. Issa received a death sentence. In 2003, Issa filed his initial habeas petition. The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability for grounds including failure to call Linda as a witness and admission of the siblings’ testimony about Miles’s hearsay statements. The Sixth Circuit ordered a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The admission of Miles’s hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause under then-governing Supreme Court law and was not harmless. The Ohio Supreme Court did not consider the “totality of the circumstances,” which show that the statements are not trustworthy. The statements were the only direct evidence implicating Issa in a murder for hire. View "Issa v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Cincinnati officers obtained a warrant, searched defendants’ home, and found over 2,000 grams of heroin, marijuana, drug-distribution paraphernalia, and a large amount of cash. The district court suppressed the evidence, holding that because the warrant application so failed to connect defendants’ home with drug-trafficking activity, no reasonable officer could have relied on the warrant. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The officers acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant; the warrant application established enough of a basis to believe that at least one of the defendants was engaged in a continual, ongoing drug-trafficking operation and that drug-related contraband was, therefore, likely to be found in his home. View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Whitis brothers and Pyles drove to Louisville to pick up drugs for distribution. On the way home, Kentucky State Trooper Ramsey noticed their car traveling over the speed limit. Ramsey learned that the car’s owner had an outstanding arrest warrant. Ramsey approached and noticed Pyles stuffing something under a pile of clothes in the back seat. An occupant rolled down the window. Ramsey smelled marijuana and called for backup. Officers searched the car and found a loaded handgun, marijuana, and over 200 grams of methamphetamine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and Whitis’s 200-month sentence. Once an officer discovers that a car’s owner has an outstanding arrest warrant, he needs only reasonable suspicion that the owner is in the vehicle; Ramsey had reasonable suspicion to stop this car. Ramsey consistently stated that, before he stopped and approached the car, he could not determine the gender of the back-seat passenger and could not tell whether there were more passengers in the vehicle. Ramsey’s testimony was not so internally inconsistent or implausible that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it. The district court did not explicitly discuss Whitis’s health but showed familiarity with the arguments in Whitis’s sentencing memorandum. It looked at the section 3553(a) factors and explained that it was imposing a sentence above the guidelines range because the range understated Whitis’s criminal history. View "United States v. Pyles" on Justia Law

In 2015, Camp robbed a store at gunpoint. He pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a); using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(C)(i), Camp faced a 25-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on the 924(c) count because he had a prior conviction for the same offense. The district court also determined that Camp was a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, finding that Camp’s instant Hobbs Act robbery conviction was a crime of violence and that his 2003 federal bank robbery conviction and 1990 Michigan armed robbery conviction were both crimes of violence. Camp received a 372-month prison sentence—the 25-year mandatory minimum on the 924(c) count and 72 months on the robbery and felon in possession counts, to run consecutively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence. Although Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under section 924(c)’s use-of-force clause, Hobbs Act robbery, which includes threats against property, is not a categorical match with Guidelines extortion. Hobbs Act robbery criminalizes conduct that extends beyond both generic robbery and Guidelines extortion and is not a crime of violence under the enumerated offense clause. View "United States v. Camp" on Justia Law

Wogenstahl was convicted of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and was sentenced to death. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, in 1996, Wogenstahl sought post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and seeking to conduct DNA testing. Ohio courts denied relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Wogenstahl's 1999 petition for federal habeas relief. In 2014, Wogenstahl again sought a new trial, citing a 2013 Justice Department letter, stating that testimony by an FBI examiner, included “inappropriate” statements that “‘exceed[ed] the limits of the science’ of microscopic-hair-comparison analysis.” State courts denied relief. Wogenstahl sought to file another habeas petition in the district court, arguing that his petition, although second-in-time, was not second or successive.The Sixth Circuit granted permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Wogenstahl is attacking the same state court judgment of conviction and his claims were not unripe at the time of his initial petition. Wogenstahl’s claims fall under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2)(B); he is raising new claims, relying on facts that he only recently discovered. That Wogenstahl did not previously obtain that evidence is not attributable to a lack of reasonable diligence. Wogenstahl has made prima facie showings that the evidence is impeaching; the state suppressed the material in the original police file and made inaccurate statements misrepresenting the hair analysis; and that he can establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty. View "In re Wogenstahl" on Justia Law

McKnight, a bartender, became friends with Fewlas. McKnight rented an apartment in his duplex. For 17 years, McKnight lived in this upstairs apartment with her boyfriend, Kurt. Fewlas and McKnight did not always get along. Fewlas disliked Kurt. Fewlas died, having accumulated more than $2.2 million. McKnight went on a spending spree. She withdrew over $600,000 in 171 different transactions—all in amounts less than $10,000. This suspicious conduct got the IRS’s attention; the IRS suspected that Fewlas had not left his estate to McKnight. Kurt confessed that he had forged Fewlas’s signature on a fake will, prepared by attorney Pioch. His confession resulted in multiple convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting a Confrontation Clause claim based on the admission of Kurt’s videotaped deposition testimony. Kurt was 76 years old, in poor health, and unable to travel at the time of trial. The court also upheld the admission of testimony concerning handwriting analysis. The court remanded for reconsideration of a motion for a new trial because the court conflated the rules, repeatedly characterizing its task as evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, rather than weighing the evidence for itself. The court vacated the sentences: the court enhanced sentencing ranges after concluding that the defendants caused financial hardship to the putative beneficiary of Fewlas’s estate but the Guidelines did not contain that enhancement at the time of the misconduct. View "United States v. Pioch" on Justia Law

Police arrested Bunkley for attempted murder. Although he was convicted, Bunkley was innocent. When the conviction was overturned, Bunkley sued Detroit on a Monell claim, Investigator Moses for malicious prosecution, and four officers for false arrest and failure to intervene to stop the wrongful arrest. The district court granted the city summary judgment but denied the individuals’ summary judgment motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers assumed that Bunkley and his father were the shooters, even though neither fit the description (other than being African-American and Bunkley’s wearing black clothing); and they did not even question Bunkley about this shooting before arresting him—stating that he was being arrested for a parole violation, which they knew was a lie. “Viewed objectively,” a jury could find that these officers under these circumstances had no reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest Bunkley. Moses knowingly withheld Bunkley’s Facebook alibi; withheld from the prosecutor that the victim had rejected a photo array; and made false statements. A jury could conclude that these facts undermine a reasonable belief that Moses had established probable cause to prosecute Bunkley or that the photo-array identification was alone sufficient. The duty of law enforcement officers to intervene to prevent an arrest not supported by probable cause was stated in precedent “clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish” this rule. View "Bunkley v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law